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C h a p t e r  1
INTRODUCTION
A ) IN T R O D U C T IO N  T O  T H E  T H E S IS
1 - T h e  S c o p e  o f  th e  R e se a rc h
This thesis analyses issues in European Community Law and European Union Law 
related to immigration from third countries into the Union and regarding natural persons 
already living within the countries of the Union who do not have the nationality of a 
Member State.
For the sake of simplicity these persons are referred to as third country nationals, 
or immigrants from third countries. In the absence of indications to the contrary, these 
expressions should be understood as comprising three categories of persons who live in a 
Member State of the European Union [hereinafter ’’Member State”]: first, nationals of a 
third country who have immigrated into a Member State; secondly, persons bom in a 
Member State but who have the nationality of a third country and, finally, also stateless 
persons. In 1992 these three categories made up a total of about 10 million persons.1
The key concern of this thesis is the situation of third country nationals belonging 
to national or racial groups who are socially disadvantaged. Clearly, in certain areas, 
Swiss, (white) American or even Japanese entrepreneurs or managers are in a completely 
different position to that of Algerian, Chinese or Peruvian low-skilled workers. The latter 
have a far less advantageous socio-economic status in comparison to the former. They are 
the ones in need of more attention from public institutions and from the society as a 
whole. Thus, they are the main concern of this thesis. However, in certain other domains, 
any person not having the nationality of a Member State can confront basically the same 
problems - like those pertaining to exclusion from the rights granted only to nationals of a 
Member State. In this aspect, the thesis will examine in the same manner the position of all 
third country nationals.
On the other hand, it should also be noted that, with the entry into force of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, almost all Community rules apply to 
nationals of countries that are members of the EEA, but not of the European Union.2 
Consequently, if these persons are subject to the same rules as are nationals of a Member 
State, the analysis undertaken in this thesis on third country nationals does not apply to 
them.
It is also important to note that this thesis does not analyse in depth legal issues 
concerning the fight against racism and racial discrimination at the level of the European 
Union. Occasionally issues related to this topic will be mentioned. However, this area 
seems to be too important and complex to be properly dealt with as a mere part of a PhD 
thesis. Furthermore, the fight against racial discrimination is also related to general aspects 
of the legal status of third country nationals, which up to now are mainly in the domain of 
national legislation.
Finally, this thesis does not intend to address, as such, problems pertaining to 
immigration for refugees and asylum seekers - notably the formation of a European
1 This figure is calculated as if in 1992 Austria, Sweden and Finland were already Member States. See 
Eurostat Rapid Reports on Population and Social Conditions, 1994, No.7, pp.6-7.
2 These are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
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refugee policy. Again, these problems are vast and important enough to be studied in 
themselves. Naturally, refugees are also nationals of third countries and in that capacity 
their position will be analysed here. Furthermore, on a number of occasions, reference will 
be made to legal issues specifically regarding refugees and asylum seekers - as in the case 
of the Community legislation on coordination of social security schemes and of the 
Schengen Agreements. However, analysis of the problems of refugees will be undertaken 
only exceptionally. It is justified by their very close relation to the matters to be analysed 
in this thesis. Besides, that reference to refugee problems is also useful to highlight and put 
in context certain points to be made on third country nationals in general.
The scope of the thesis is limited to issues in European Community Law and 
European Union Law regarding immigration from third countries and regarding nationals 
from third countries living in a Member State [hereinafter "immigration matters"]. 
Naturally, I am aware that issues in European Union Law are not the only issues at stake, 
nor the only important ones regarding immigration matters in the Member States. Issues in 
national legislation regarding immigration continue to be very important, if not of utmost 
importance. However, the concern of this thesis is with issues at the level of 
European Union Law. National legislation will be often referred to, but only to give the 
national background of discussions developed at the level of the Union, to illustrate the 
problems and to conceive common solutions. In this manner, a rather deep analysis will be 
made of rules pertaining to the free movement of persons within the Union, and only a 
very general reference will be made to issues like access to the nationality of each Member 
State - a matter with European repercussions, yet presently treated at a national level. 
Admittedly, as European integration progresses, fewer issues remain excluded from the 
European Union level, subject to the principle of subsidiarity. Yet, as things stand, there 
are still issues that are discussed more at a national than at European level and the thesis 
will necessarily reflect this fact.
2 - T h e  P u rp o s e s  o f  th e  T h es is  - L egal Issu es  in  th e  E u ro p e a n  U n io n
The objective of this thesis is to examine legal aspects of immigration policy at the 
level of the European Union to ascertain whether and to what extent current policy is a 
proper model for the Union.
In my view, the current process of economic and political integration is 
inconsistent with the present treatment of immigration matters in the European Union. 
Such matters should be treated to a greater extent at a joint level than they currently are, 
and within a legal and institutional framework which is more democratic. Moreover, from 
a substantial perspective, a common immigration policy should be more positive towards 
third country nationals. Fundamental human rights should be fully respected by any 
immigration policy and more attention should be given to integrating third country 
nationals resident in the Union into European society.
These points correspond roughly to the three fundamental types of legal issues that 
seem to be at stake in the European Union, as far as immigration matters are concerned.
1) The first type of issue relates to competence: whether, and to what extent, 
immigration matters can and should be addressed by the European Community and the
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European Union. Community and Union competence' will be analysed in absolute and in 
relative terms - in comparison with some other subject matters within European 
integration with characteristics similar to those of immigration.
2) The second type of issue concerns the institutional structures and working 
methods with which immigration matters are handled. It is important, for instance, to 
determine to what extent joint handling of immigration matters includes or excludes the 
positive (or negative) characteristics of treatment at a national level, notably as far as 
democratic features of a modem État de Droit are concerned.
This second type of issue is, in a way, related to the first. Often, the choice is not 
between dealing with immigration issues at a national or at a jointly European level, but 
between different frameworks for dealing with the matters in a joint manner. This is the 
case for the choice between the framework of the Community and that of 
intergovernmental cooperation - both on an ad hoc basis and under Title VI of the Treaty 
on European Union. Both frameworks can be used by Member States to address together 
the same problems, although there are important differences between them regarding 
institutional aspects.
3) A third type of issue at stake in the European Union is of a substantive nature: 
what rules and policies should be adopted and enforced in the sphere of immigration 
matters. This type of issue can be seen from two fundamental perspectives, to some extent 
interconnected. One relates to the pursuit of the public good (including social cohesion in 
the European Union and its position within world relations). The other concerns the 
individual and collective interests of third country nationals. Respect for the latter's 
fundamental human rights is, arguably, as much a matter of the common interest of the 
European Union, as a democratic society, as it is of the third country nationals themselves.
It is important to be aware of how closely these three types of issue are related. In 
some cases, this classification can be somewhat arbitrary, and in other cases the different 
types of issue correspond to no more than different aspects of the same basic problems. 
However, it was thought useful to highlight here such different aspects.
The next subsection will explain the structure adopted in this thesis in order to 
analyse these three types of legal issue. It will also refer in more detail to the issues at 
stake in European Union Law.
3 - P r e s e n ta t io n  o f  th e  P la n  o f  th e  T hesis
a) General Structure and its Justification
This thesis is divided into two main parts, to which the present chapter is a general 
introduction and following which a final chapter draws the conclusions.
Part I deals with European Community Law and Part II with the formation of a 
European Immigration Policy, notably in the framework of intergovernmental cooperation 
(on an ad hoc basis and under Title VI of the TEU).
Part I comprises four chapters: chapter 2, on Community competence; chapter 3, 
on Article 7A of the EC Treaty (establishment of the internal market by 1993); chapter 4, 
on Community rules relevant for third country nationals, notably on free movement of
■ I __________ L O U  I m i l — n--------------------nr—r r '. l  I 11!' .........  ■■ ■ ■ » — mm
persons; and chapter 5, on the status of third country nationals under Community 
Agreements with Third Countries.
Part II is made up of three chapters: chapter 6, on early intergovernmental 
cooperation; chapter 7, on the legal and institutional framework introduced by the Treaty 
on European Union; and chapter 8, on immigration policy (control of external borders» 
action against illegal immigration and admission of third country nationals to a Member 
State).
This division of subject matters between the two parts is justified on several 
grounds* but it is not meant to be very strict.
First, it has a chronological justification. Initially, immigration matters were dealt 
with either by the Community or by the Member States acting individually. Fundamental 
common discussions on immigration matters were conducted within the framework or 
against the background of Community Law. At that time, the joint treatment of 
immigration matters almost did not exist and each Member State pursued its immigration 
policy in a quite distinct manner. But then came the Single European Act, with its 
objective of establishing an internal market comprising an "area without internal frontiers". 
This re-launched the debate on whether there should be some joint treatment of 
immigration matters. For some time this problem was still discussed within Community 
Law, or in relation to it. This is analysed in Part I.
A second phase developed in the final period of the countdown to 1993, the 
deadline for the establishment of the internal market. A joint Immigration Policy began to 
be formed within the framework of ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation. Later it was 
developed under the new institutional and legal framework created by the Treaty on 
European Union, which formalised that cooperation. Immigration policy in the new 
framework is mainly dealt with under Title VI, on Cooperation on Justice and Home 
Affairs. A part of immigration policy (certain visa aspects) is also being formed within the 
European Community, under new explicit competences granted to it by the Treaty on 
European Union. Part II includes the examination of the institutional rules and structures, 
as well as activities developed by the three frameworks referred to: ad hoc 
intergovernmental cooperation; cooperation under Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union and the European Community - as far as the new rules and competences introduced 
by the Treaty on European Union are concerned. Activities of the European Community 
developed under competences existent before the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union will be analysed in Part I. The subsidiarity principle will also be analysed 
in Part I. The reason for this lies in the fact that it applies to all Community activities, since 
it has a wide scope - unlike the new Article 100C, for example, which is analysed in the 
second part of the thesis in chapter 7.
A second reason for the division of the thesis in these two parts is that it highlights 
the differences between the two fundamental frameworks for joint handling of immigration 
matters. The choice between these two frameworks seems to be one of the fundamental 
topics of the current debate at the level of the European Union.
Thirdly, the criterion for the division has a plain practical function: it was thought 
to be the best way of grouping the issues to be analysed in this thesis.
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The division is not veiy strict in that subjects examined in one part are clearly 
related to others examined in the other part and are difficult to separate in a precise 
manner. That close relation is clear from the point of view of competence, institutional 
frameworks and substantial rules. Furthermore, it may be noted that, insofar as the 
division of the thesis follows legal and institutional criteria, it may not correspond to a 
proper classification of the relevant substantial issues. In this manner, the abolition of 
border controls, for example, is analysed both in Part I, in the context of establishment of 
the internal market, and in Part II, in the context of intergovernmental cooperation 
activities.
Two final notes have to be made.
The first concerns the references made in this thesis to ''Community" and "Union". 
Except when otherwise stated (or clear from the context), reference to "Community" 
means the "European Community" as established by the Treaty of Rome - which was 
called "European Economic Community" before its name was changed by the Treaty on 
European Union.3 The references to Union relate to the "European Union" created 
precisely by the Treaty on European Union. In principle, this reference is meant to 
comprise all the three "pillars" of the Union. The "first pillar" corresponds to the European 
Communities (including the "European Community", the "European Coal and Steel 
Community" and the "European Atomic Energy Community"); the "second pillar" to the 
"Common Foreign and Security Policy"; and the "third pillar" to the "Cooperation in the 
Fields of Justice and Home Affairs".4 When the expressions Community and Union are 
mentioned together that is usually meant to highlight the distinction between, the 
European Community, on one hand, and "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs", on the other hand. The expressions Union or European Union may also be used 
as general terms to refer to all Member States as a whole, as opposed to third countries, to 
an individual Member State, or to some of the Member States only.
Secondly, it should be noted that this thesis is updated as to December 1995. 
However, as far as the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Commission and Court of Human 
Rights is concerned, this thesis is updated only as to 1 November 1995. Moreover, as far 
as visas are concerned, the analysis undertaken in chapter 8 is updated only as to 24 
September 1995.
Next, the content and purposes of each chapter will be explained,
b) The Content of the Chapters
Besides the introduction to the thesis provided in the present section, Chapter 1 
contains also section B. This puts into an international legal context the European legal 
issues on immigration matters. It deals with the most important rules of Public
3 Occasionally, the allusion to the EEC Treaty may be used to refer to the version of the EC Treaty 
previous to the Treaty on European Union.
4  The "Common Foreign and Security Policy" and "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs" were established by Title V and Title VI, respectively, of the Treaty on European Union.
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International Law regarding immigration. A survey will be made of international 
conventions adopted by the United Nations, by the International Labour Organisation, and 
by the Council of Europe - with particular attention being given to the European 
Convention of Human Rights.
Then the thesis goes on to Part I - on European Community Law.
Chapter 2 deals with Community competence on immigration matters. Its aim is to 
challenge the conventional idea that the Community does not have competence to deal 
with issues concerning third country nationals. The chapter will examine the scope for the 
Community to adopt legal measures exclusively or primarily related to them.
Section A investigates which EC Treaty provisions could form the basis for a 
specific and explicit Community competence to adopt measures on third country nationals. 
Section B seeks to determine the relation of issues concerning third country nationals to 
the achievement of Community objectives. That relation will be examined in the light, first, 
of the original version of the EEC Treaty; secondly, of the objective of establishing a 
single market "without internal frontiers" (provided by the Single European Act in Article 
7A of the EC Treaty); and, thirdly, of the changes brought by the Treaty on European 
Union. Section C analyses the relevance of the subsidiarity principle to the legal 
justification for adopting EC measures on third country nationals. Section D examines EC 
Treaty provisions for adopting measures of narrow scope concerning third country 
nationals, giving particular attention to Article 118 and the case Germany et al v. 
Commission.5 Section F deals instead with EC Treaty procedures which could form the 
basis for adoption of measures of general scope concerning third country nationals. 
Articles 100 and 235 of the EC Treaty will be examined with that aim. The use of these 
provisions is analysed also in comparative terms, in relation to other areas marginal to the 
process of economic integration, and concerning which the competence of the Community 
was not explicitly provided for in the EC Treaty. The legal congmity of the use of that 
Article in some areas and not in others (e.g. as far as third country nationals are 
concerned) will be questioned. Finally, section F of chapter 2 examines also Article 238 
and the Community external competence to act on the legal status of third country 
nationals in Member States.
Chapter 3 will analyse Article 7A of the EC Treaty. It will attempt to interpret it, 
notably by determining its precise legal effects and by discussing the remedies for its 
violation. While chapter 2 examines how Article 7A could justify the possibility of 
adopting measures on immigration matters, chapter 3 analyses whether and to what extent 
Article 7A imposes a legal duty on the Community to adopt such measures - in so far as 
that is necessary for the establishment of the internal market. This analysis concentrates on 
the duty of EC institutions to adopt measures to abolish internal border controls on 
persons - including controls on third country nationals travelling among Member States. 
This point is relevant for this thesis, since it highlights the relation between matters 
concerning third country nationals and the establishment of an essential part of the internal
5  Joined cases 281, 283 to 285 & 287/85, Germany, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom & Denmark v. 
Commission [1987] ECR 3203.
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market* This is an interesting example of the place of matters concerning third country 
nationals within general EC integration.
Section A will examine the legal content of the "internal market" concept. This 
concept will be compared with the original concept of a "common market". Then, an 
attempt will be made to determine what the establishment of an "internal market" requires. 
An important topic in this respect is whether or not the persistence of controls on persons 
at the internal borders can be reconciled with the existence of an internal market "without 
internal frontiers". It is argued that internal border controls on persons within the 
Community violate Article 7A of the EC Treaty - at least without special justifications of a 
temporary nature.
Section B examines the legal effects of Article 7 A, considering the legal remedies 
available in case of its violation, inasmuch as internal border controls on persons were not 
entirely abolished by the end of 1992. First, Article 7A is analysed to ascertain whether or 
not it contains the required conditions for it to have direct effect in this respect. Secondly, 
the possibility that Article 7A may have indirect effect is explored. Thirdly, this section 
will examine the possibility of bringing a successful action against the EC institutions for 
failing to abolish internal border controls on persons. In this context, reference is made to 
the action in which the European Parliament complained to the Court of Justice that the 
Commission had not "put forward the necessary proposals to facilitate achieving freedom 
of movement for persons".6 Some ideas are explored on what could be the future 
judgment of the Court on the case. Finally, for the sake of completeness, reference is also 
made to an eventual non-contractual liability of the Community for violation of Article 7A.
Section C deals with the declarations annexed to the Single European Act. Their 
legal value, for purposes of the interpretation of Article 7A, will be analysed. To this end 
the declarations are examined in the light of the International Law of the Treaties, 
Community Law and national Law.
Chapter 2 and 3, in one way or another, deal with issues of competence. Chapter 4 
and 5 concentrate, instead, on substantive Community Law. Chapter 4 analyses the 
relevance for third country nationals of mies of the Community elaborated within its 
internal decision-making process. Chapter 5 analyses the legal status of third country 
nationals under Agreements concluded by the Community with third countries.
Chapter 4 concentrates on the analysis of the position of third country nationals in 
the area of free movement within the Community. It also refers to EC legislation in the 
social area and on education. The objective of chapter 4 it to argue that third country 
nationals' resident in a Member State should benefit from all the Community rights of free 
movement - namely from the right to move to another Member State to work and reside 
therein.
Section A of chapter 4 examines Community Law on free movement from the 
point of view of the rights assigned to third country nationals irrespective of any 
relationship with a national of a Member State. This section analyses the legal situation of
6  Case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission, for the abstract of the application of the Parliament see OJ C 
1/12 of 4/1/1994. The written phase of the case is already concluded, but as to 15/2/1995 there was, yet, 
no date set for the oral hearing.
third country nationals in the framework of each of the four fundamental freedoms of 
movement. The section starts by highlighting the difference between the legal position of 
nationals of a Member State and that of resident third country nationals concerning their 
movements within the Community. Then the section refers specifically to the freedom of 
movement of workers. Article 48 of the EC Treaty is examined in detail to determine 
whether third country nationals residing in the Union should enjoy the right to free 
movement as workers. This part of the section will also examine two other topics: the 
particular situation of refugees concerning the EC right to free movement of workers, and 
the so-called principle of "Community preference" in the access to the labour market of 
Member States. Later, section A proceeds to analyse EC rules on freedom of 
establishment, and free movement of services, capital and goods. The analysis of EC rules 
on free movement of services will deal also with the situation of third country nationals 
working in a Member State as providers of services of an enterprise established in another 
Member State. Section A will also examine the Commission proposals of July 1995 on the 
right of third country nationals to travel within the Community.
Section B analyses the rights granted to third country nationals by Community 
Law on free movement of persons due to their family relationship with migrant nationals 
of a Member State. These rights are subordinate rights, granted only to allow those third 
country nationals to accompany a migrant national of a Member State, who exercises his 
or her right to free movement. This situation raises the issue of reverse discrimination, 
which will be examined. Then, after a summary of such subordinate rights, the section 
concentrates on the right of residence of the third country national spouse of a migrant 
national of a Member State. Two situations are analysed in this context: that of the 
divorced spouse of the worker and that of the worker's partner (within an unmarried 
couple). Their situations are examined both in the light of Community Law in general, and 
in the light of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Section C of chapter 4 deals with the personal scope of Community Law on 
matters not related to freedom of movement. Legislation on social affairs and on education 
is the object of particular attention.
Chapter 5 deals with agreements concluded by the Community with third countries 
containing rules on the legal status of nationals of the latter in the European Union. This is 
one fundamental part of EC Law concerning third country nationals' resident in the Union.
Section A of this chapter makes an overview of the several agreements, including 
the Association Agreement with Turkey, the Cooperation Agreements with the Maghreb 
countries, the Agreement on the European Economic Area, the "Europe Agreements" 
with Central and Eastern European Countries, and the Agreements on Partnership and 
Cooperation with some countries of the ex-Soviet Union.
Section B examines specific issues in the content of these agreements and refers to 
some legal problems regarding the interpretation of their rules. First, the rights of workers 
and their families will receive particular attention. In this context the section will examine 
rules concerning the right to work and reside in a Member State, the prohibition of 
discrimination against the workers on the grounds of nationality, educational rights, and 
social security. Particular attention will be paid to the rights of Turkish nationals to work 
and reside in a Member State. The Demirel and Bozkurt cases will be analysed. This
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analysis will concentrate on the fundamental human rights at stake in those cases - notably 
as far as those human rights are related to the scope of Community Law and as far as the 
(non)review by the Court of Justice of their protection is concerned. Secondly, this section 
deals also with Agreements' rules on freedom of establishment and provision of services. 
Thirdly, common and final rules of the agreements will be examined - including rules on 
limitations to the rights provided by the agreements and rules on cooperation with the 
Community.
Part II of the thesis examines the formation of a European Immigration Policy.
Chapter 6 deals with the early intergovernmental cooperation that took place, 
which was developed on an ad hoc basis before the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union (and afterwards in the case of Schengen). Section A refers to general 
legal issues raised by such cooperation: the relationship between its activities and 
Community competence, as well as the relationship between the substantive rules of 
Community Law and rules enacted in the intergovernmental framework. Section B 
examines the different intergovernmental groups dealing with third country nationals and, 
in a more general manner, with the abolition of internal border controls between Member 
States. The structures and activities of such groups will be examined, with particular 
reference to the TREVI Group, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration, and the 
Schengen Group. The activities of these groups will be assessed to see how efficient they 
were and to examine the democratic character of their working methods.
Chapter 7 analyses the new legal and institutional framework introduced by the 
Treaty on European Union, as far as third country nationals are concerned. Section A 
provides a historical introduction to the Treaty. Then, section B analyses the provisions of 
Title VI of that Treaty, on "Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs". This is 
the so-called "third pillar" of the Union, the predominant framework for dealing with 
issues concerning third country nationals.
First, section B refers to the scope of the activities to be developed under Title VI. 
Then, it deals with the activities to be developed and the decision making-process to be 
used under the same Title. This part will examine the legal nature of the instruments to be 
adopted, the procedures to be used (and the position of the different institutions therein), 
and the extent to which this framework is transparent in its functioning. A third part of this 
section concerns respect for fundamental human rights and the Member States' 
responsibilities on "internal security". These are legal limits established by the Treaty on 
European Union to the activities developed under its Title VI. Subsequently, this section 
deals with the lack of a uniform judicial control over the activities undertaken and 
instruments adopted under Title VI. A fifth part of this section refers to the intermediate 
structure of decision making and law enforcement of Title VI. Following this, the relations 
between Title VI and the European Community will be analysed. A seventh part deals with 
Article K.7 and the relations between Cooperation developed under Title VI and other 
types of intergovernmental cooperation. Finally, a general assessment of Title VI will be 
made.
Section C of chapter 7 deals with amendments made by the Treaty on European 
Union to the Treaty of Rome, which are of relevance for third country nationals. It
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concentrates on the analysis of Article 100C, on visas, and its material scope. Section C 
deals also with the Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy, and with the EC Treaty 
provisions establishing the Union Citizenship.
Chapter 8 deals with a number of legal issues regarding immigration policy, i.e. the 
regulation of entry of third country nationals into the European Union and their circulation 
within it. It deals, first, with the control of external frontiers of the Union, secondly, with 
the admission of immigrants to a Member State, and, thirdly, with action against illegal 
immigration. These issues will be analysed taking into account mostly the activities of 
intergovernmental cooperation between Member States, developed both before the entry 
into force of the Treaty on European Union (on an ad hoc basis), and after it (within the 
framework of Title VI).
Section A looks at the control of external frontiers. It examines, first, the 
Commission draft Convention on External Frontiers and, secondly, the rules on visas - 
including the rules on visas of the draft Convention and of the recently adopted EC 
instruments on the matter. This section starts by making a general survey of the rules of 
the draft Convention on the Crossing of the External Frontiers of the Member States. 
Special attention is given to the legal status under the Convention of third country 
nationals living in a Member State, to the exchange of information within the Convention 
framework, and to the proposed jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on the Convention. As 
far as visas are concerned, this section analyses the relevant rules contained in the draft 
Convention. It also analyses the rules on visas contained in Community instruments 
already adopted under Article 100C of the EC Treaty - i.e. in the Regulation laying down 
a uniform format for visas and in the Regulation determining the third countries whose 
nationals have to hold a visa to enter into the Union.
Section B of chapter 8 examines the resolutions on admission of immigrants to a 
Member State. First, it examines common aspects of such resolutions. Secondly, it deals 
separately with the resolution on admission for employment, with the resolution on 
admission for pursuing activities as self-employed persons and the resolution on admission 
for study purposes. Finally, particular examination will be made of the resolution on 
admission for the purposes of family reunification, approved in June 1993 by the 
ministerial meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration. Reference will also be 
made to relevant rules in this domain of international legal instruments.
Section C of chapter 8 deals with action against illegal immigration into the Union. 
It surveys of the relevant resolutions of the Council, concentrating on the internal and 
external aspects of the expulsion of illegal immigrants. As far as the external aspects are 
concerned, it refers to readmission agreements with third countries, including the so-called 
"parallel Conventions" to the External Frontiers Convention and to the Dublin 
Convention.
Finally, chapter 9 submits the conclusions of the thesis.
As mentioned above, this thesis analyses issues in EC and European Union Law 
related to immigration from third countries and to third country nationals living in the
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Member States. Issues concerning immigration and foreigners' rights are often quite 
complex. In addition, the treatment of these issues at the European level, as far as third 
country nationals are concerned, is relatively recent. Thus legal study of immigration 
issues and of their treatment by the European Union is still in a relatively undeveloped 
condition. More work is called for than has so far been done.
This is my contribution.
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B ) THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT : A REVIEW OF 
UN, ILO AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTIONS RELEVANT 
FOR THE LEGAL STATUS OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
This section deals with rules of Public International Law relevant for third country 
nationals in the Member States of the European Union.7 It makes an overview of some of 
the most important multilateral treaties on the matter - namely those adopted in the 
framework of the United Nations, International Labour Organisation and the Council of 
Europe. Instruments approved within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe may also be of relevance for third country nationals in Member States, but they are 
not legally binding.8 Therefore, they are not dealt with by this section.
In this section, particular attention will be given to the position of migrant workers 
and their families. Following the scope of the thesis as explained in the previous section, 
international instruments regarding, first, racial discrimination, and, secondly, refugees and 
asylum-seekers, are not mentioned here. Finally, note that section B of chapter 8 deals in 
further detail with treaties relevant for the family reunification of migrant workers.
1 - United Nations
Several legal instruments adopted under the framework of the United Nations are 
relevant for the legal position of third country nationals in Member States. Most of those 
international instruments are of interest for their position simply because, when they grant
7  See, generally, Plender, R. International Migration Law, 2nd. ed., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, at 
chapters 5, 7, 8 ,9 , 11,12 and 13, and the list of treaties relevant for international migration, idem, p. 357. 
See also Cator, J. & Niessen, J. (eds.), The use o f  international conventions to protect the rights o f  
migrants and ethnic minorities, Strasbourg, CCME, 1994; Capotorti, Francesco (special rapporteur of the 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) Study on the Rights o f  
Persons belonging to Ethnic. Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Study Series No.5, New York, United 
Nations. 1991; de Lary de Latour, H. "Le Droit International en Matière de Migration" in Les Accords de 
Schengen - Quelle Politique Migratoire Pour la Communauté?, Luxembourg, Institut Universitaire 
International Luxembourg, 1992, pp.63-100, in particular at 78-93; Niessen, Jan "Immigrants and 
Migrant Workers" in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by Eide, Asbj0 m , Krause, Catarina & Rosas, 
Allan (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, at 323-340; and Storey, Hugo "International Law and 
Human Rights Obligations" in Strangers and Citizens: a  positive approach to migrants and refugees, 
Spencer, Sarah (ed.), London, Institute for Public Policy Research / Rivers Oram Press, 1994, pp.l 11-136. 
Older works are those of Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. International Law and the Movement o f  Persons between 
States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978; Lillich, R. B. The Human Rights o f Aliens in Contemporary 
International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984; Nascimbene, Bruno II Trattamento 
dello Straniero nel Diritto Intemazionale ed Europeo, Milan, Giuffrè, 1984; and Weis, P. Nationality and 
Statelessness in International Law, 2nd.ed., Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979. See also 
the interesting Article by McNamee, B.L. & Terrell, T.P. "Transovereignty: Separating Human Rights 
from Traditional Sovereignty and the Implications for the Ethics of International Law Practice", Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol.17, 1994, No.3, p.459.
8  On instruments adopted within the CSCE process see Gibson, U. & Niessen, J. , The CSCE and the 
Protection o f  the Rights o f  Migrants, Refugees and Minorities, CCME Briefing Paper N o.ll, Brussels, 
CCME, March 1993.
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rights, they do not always distinguish between nationals and non-nationals of a certain 
State. This is the case, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,9 the International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights10 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,11 both from 1966.12
The most ambitious treaty adopted within the United Nations and concerning 
migrant workers is the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families.13 This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, in December 1990.14 It is perhaps the most comprehensive 
international instrument aiming at the protection of rights of migrant workers and 
members of their families.15 It deals with their civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights. The Convention has two aims. One is to establish and reaffirm that all migrant 
workers enjoy a common core of human rights. The other is to diminish the flow of illegal 
workers. The drafters had the view that only by providing a common group of rights to 
legal and illegal workers could illegal immigration be discouraged and legal immigration 
supported.
In this way, Part III of the Convention establishes the principle of non­
discrimination between all migrant workers and worker nationals of the host country. This 
non-discrimination principle applies to legal and illegal workers, whatever their nationality. 
The materia] scope of the equality principle includes issues related to detention and 
imprisonment, courts and tribunals, social security, emergency medical care, education, 
and also remuneration and conditions of employment - such as working hours, overtime, 
weekly rest and paid holidays, health and safety, minimum age of employment, restriction 
on home work and termination of employment. All migrant workers are also recognised to 
have the right to join trade unions.
Additional rights are granted in Part IV of the Convention to regular migrant 
workers and members of their families, whatever their nationality. They can also benefit 
from equality of treatment with nationals in relation to a further range of rights, including 
taxation, the exercise of a remunerated activity, protection against dismissal, 
unemployment benefits, access to placement services, vocational training, housing, social 
and health services, and cultural life. In case of unemployment, protection is provided 
against expulsion from the host country before expiration of the residence permit. States
9  See, e.g., its Articles 2,9, 10, 12, 13(1) and 16.
1 0 UNTS, Vol. 993, p.3. It was ratified by 131 States, including all Member States.
11 UNTS, Vol. 999, p.171. See its Articles 12 and 13. This Covenant was ratified by 129 States. Among 
the Member States only Greece has not ratified it.
12 See also the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by Resolution of the General Assembly of 18 December 
1992, see HRU, Vol.14, 1993, No.1-2, pp.54-6.
13 For a detailed analysis of the Convention see Hune, Shirley "Equality of Treatment and the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Member of Their 
Families", in The use o f  international conventions, op. cit., at p. 79-92; and Hune, S., Niessen, J. & 
Taran, P. Proclaiming migrants' rights: the new international Convention on the protection o f  the rights 
o f  alt migrant workers and members o f  their familles, CCME Briefing Paper No. 3, Brussels, CCME, 
March 1991.
14 United Nations G.A. Res. 45/158. This Convention was adopted without a vote.
15 Niessen, J. "Immigrants and Migrant Workers", op. cit., at p. 324.
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parties are also bound to take measures to facilitate family reunification with spouses and 
children of regular foreign workers.
To ensure its enforcement, the Convention provides for the creation of a special 
committee, composed of 14 independent experts and one observer from the ILO, who are 
to receive and analyse national reports submitted by States parties. The Convention 
provides also, on a optional basis, for inter-state and individual complaints to the same 
Committee.
This Convention is not yet in force. It needs twenty ratifications to enter into force, 
and only Egypt, Morocco and Seychelles have yet ratified it.16 In the European Union, the 
Commission17 invited Member States to ratify this Convention, but with no results until 
now. This is certainly explained by the ambitious character of the Convention. Some 
States refused from the beginning to accept a Convention that would apply also to illegal 
immigrants.
2 - International Labour Organisation18
Several ILO Conventions also have some relevance for the legal position of 
migrant workers and, in general, for the legal status of third country nationals in the 
Member States. In some cases, ILO Conventions provide for rights which apply also to 
migrant workers and their families, and in other cases, although the Conventions are not 
exclusively about migrant workers, they contain provisions dealing specifically with their 
situation.19
*6  As of 1 January 1995. Unless otherwise stated, when mention is made in this section to States 
ratification or signature of a Convention, such mention relates to this date. Note, in the meantime, that 
Mexico, Chile and the Philippines have also signed the Convention, but have not yet ratified it.
17 Communication on Immigration and Asylum Policy of 1994, COM (94) 23 final, point 22, p. 43.
18 See, e.g., Bôhning, W.R. "International Contract Migration in the Light of ILO Instruments", chapter 
10 of his Studies in International Labour Migration, London, Macmillan, 1984, pp. 233-261; and 
Trebilcock, Anne M. "Migrant Workers: An Overview of International Labour Standards", in The Legal 
Position o f  Aliens in National and International Law, Vol.2, Frowein, J. A. & Stein.T. (eds.), Berlin, Max 
Planck Institut/Springer Verlag, 1987, pp.l 827-1850.
19  See, for both types of situations, for example, Articles 10 to 13 of ILO Convention No.82 concerning 
social policy on non-metropolitan territories, of 1947, UNTS, Vol.218, p.345; Articles 1, 6  to 9 and 14 of 
ILO Convention No.l 17 concerning basic aims and standards of social policy, of 1962, UNTS, Vol.494, 
p.249 (ratified by 31 States, including the following Member States: Italy, Portugal, and Spain); Articles 3 
to 7 and 10 of ILO Convention No.l 18 concerning equality of treatment in social security, of 1962, 
UNTS, Vol.494, p.271 (in this Convention, unlikely in other ILO Conventions, the equality principle 
applies on the basis of reciprocity, except for stateless persons and refugees; the Convention was ratified 
by 37 States, including Turkey and the following Member States: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, and Netherlands); and Articles 3, 6 , 9 and 10 of ILO Convention No. 157 concerning 
maintenance of social security rights, of 1982, ILO Official Bulletin, 1982, Ser.A No.2, p.61 (ratified only 
by 2 Member States: Spain and Sweden). Note also that the International Labour Office was the sponsor 
of a European Agreement concerning the provision of medical care to persons during temporary 
residence, of October 1980, ILM, Vol.22, p.553 (in force only in 7 States: Finland, Germany, Italy and 
Sweden, as well as in Norway and Hungary). A further arrangement for the application of this Agreement 
was concluded on 26 May 1988, in the framework of the Council of Europe, but was not yet ratified by 
any State, ETS, No. 129. The information of this footnote is updated at least as to 1 January 1993.
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K B9
The ILO Conventions most relevant for the position of migrant workers are the 
ILO Convention No.97 of July 1949 concerning Migrant Workers20 and ILO Convention 
No. 143 of June 1975 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of 
Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers.21 Unlike most Conventions 
concluded within the Council of Europe, both these ILO Conventions apply to migrant 
workers irrespective of their nationality, and whether or not their countries of origin have 
ratified them.
ILO Convention No.97 is the successor of a Migration for Employment 
Convention which was approved in 1939 in the International Labour Conference, but 
which never obtained sufficient ratifications to enter into force. The Convention No.97 
establishes the principle of non-discrimination between migrant workers and worker 
nationals of the host country, as far as certain labour rules and some aspects of social 
security are concerned. According to its Article 6, equality is to be applied, inter alia, in 
what relates to remuneration, family allowances, working hours, holidays, minimum age 
for employment, membership of trade unions and employment taxes, as well as to dues 
and contributions payable in respect of persons employed. The Convention protects also 
the stability of the residence status of workers and their family in the event of injuries 
sustained or illnesses contracted after the entry in the host country.22 Nevertheless, the 
Convention applies only to workers legally admitted to work in the territory of the 
contracting parties.23
ILO Convention No. 143 provides for action against illegal migration and expands 
the principle of equal treatment included in Convention No.97.
As far as the latter expansion is concerned, like in Convention No.97, in 
Convention No. 143 the rights of equality of treatment apply only to workers and their 
relatives, provided they are legally residing in the territory of the host country.24 In this 
respect, the Contracting Parties commit themselves to establish a policy aimed at 
promoting and guaranteeing to migrant workers and to members of their families:
"equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, 
of social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and 
collective freedoms for persons".25 
National governments are, for example, required to
"take all steps to assist and encourage the efforts of migrant workers and their 
families to preserve their national and ethnic identity and their cultural ties with 
their country of origin, including the possibility for children to be given some 
knowledge of their mother tongue".26
2 0  UNTS, Voi. 120, p.71. It was ratified by 40 States, including 8  Member States: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands. Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
21 ILO Official Bulletin, voi. LVIII, 1975, Ser.A., No.l, pp.36-43. It was ratified by 17 States, including 
the following Member States: Italy, Portugal and Sweden.
2 2  Article 8(1). See, however, Article 8(2), providing that, if a worker is admitted on a permanent basis to 
one country, the authorities of the latter can demand a minimum period of residence to provide him the 
protection envisaged in Article 8(1). In any case, that period cannot exceed five years from the date of 
admission of the worker. See also the reference to this Article made in chapter 5, on the Bozkurt case.
2 3  Article 11.
2 4  Article 10, in fine, and Article 11. Emphasis added.
2 5  Article 10.
2 6  Article 12 (g).
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A difference in tone may be noted in Article 13 of the Convention, providing that a 
"Member may take all measures which fall within its competence (...) to facilitate the 
reunification of the families of all migrant workers legally residing in the territory". The 
families include the worker's "spouse and dependent children, father and mother".27
As far as illegal migration is concerned, Convention No. 143 provides for the 
detection, suppression and repression of clandestine movements of migrants seeking 
employment and of their actual illegal employment. Contracting Parties are required to 
adopt legislation providing for administrative, civil and penal sanctions ("which include 
imprisonment in their range") to persons who organise or knowingly assist illegal 
movement of migrants for employment, or who employ them.28 On the other hand. 
Convention No. 143 contains no provision for the sanctioning of illegal migrants.
On the contrary, some protection is even provided for them. Article 1 of 
Convention No. 143 provides that each Party "undertakes to respect the basic human rights 
of all migrant workers". An interesting protection is provided by its Article 9 to the rights 
of migrant workers whose entry in the country, or employment therein, violated the 
relevant migration or labour rules. If their position cannot be regularised, they nevertheless 
"shall enjoy equality of treatment for himself and his family in respect of rights arising out 
of past employment as regards remuneration, social security and other benefits." Workers 
are also granted the right to present their case to a competent body in case of dispute on 
these rights. Moreover, it may be noted that the Convention provides also that, if a 
migrant worker is legally resident in the territory for the purposes of employment, he or 
she shall not be considered to be in an illegal situation due to the mere fact that he or she 
lost employment. Such loss of employment shall not in itself imply the withdrawal of his 
authorisation of residence.29
Note that the ILO has also adopted some recommendations concerning migrant 
workers, although these do not have binding effect.30
Finally, the system of supervision of the implementation of ILO Conventions is 
based on governmental reports and on complaints and representations presented to ILO 
organs, the examination of which is mainly made by independent groups of experts.31
2 7  Article 13(2).
28  Articles 2,5 and 6 .
29  Article 8 . This right is less restrictive than that provided in Article 8  (1) of Convention No. 97, notably 
because the rule of Article 8(2) of Convention No.97 does not exist in Article 8  of Convention No. 143.
3 0  See Recommendation No.8 6  concerning migration for employment (revised) of 1949, including a 
model agreement on temporary and permanent migration; and Recommendation No. 151 concerning 
migrant workers, of 1975. See also Recommendation No. 166 concerning protection against and in case of 
termination of employment, of 1982.
31 Regular reports are made by governments, which copies are requested to be sent to the national 
organisations of employers and workers, the governments being obliged to inform the ILO of their 
comments. The reports are examined by an independent Committee of Experts, appointed by the ILO 
Governing Body, on a proposal of the Director General of the ILO. Complaints can be initiated by States 
or by the ILO governing body of its own motion or on receipt of a complaint from a delegate to the ILO 
Conference. The complaints are examined by independent Commissions of Inquiry appointed by the 
governing body of the ILO. The conclusions of these commissions are legally binding, although they may 
be subject of an appeal to the International Court of Justice. Finally, representations can be presented by 
organisations of employers or workers and are examined by a tripartite Committee of the Governing Body 
of the ILO, and then by the Governing Body itself. For more details on the ILO system of supervision see
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3 - Council of Europe32
a) The European Convention of Human Rights33
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [hereinafter E.C.H.R.], concluded on 4 November 1950, is probably the most 
important international instrument for the protection of human rights in Europe 34 The 
Convention protects only a group of basic human rights and its main concern is not the 
protection of immigrants as such. Nevertheless, the Convention is of interest for the legal 
position of third country nationals in Member States.
First, its Article 1 provides that Contracting States have to secure the rights and 
freedoms established in the Convention to "everyone within their jurisdiction".35 
Therefore, in the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, as far as the rights of the Convention 
are concerned, aliens are to be protected in the same way as nationals of that State. This 
protection is granted regardless of whether those aliens are or not nationals of another 
Contracting Party to the Convention. The rights granted by the Convention can be enjoyed 
by all third country nationals in all Member States of the European Union. All Member 
States ratified the Convention, allowed for individual complaints and recognised as 
compulsory the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
Secondly, although the Convention is not addressed to immigrants as such, it can 
have concrete interest for their position. The Commission and the Court of Human Rights
Valticos, N. "Once More About the ILO System of Supervision: In What Respect is it Still a Model?" in 
Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organisations - Essays in Honour o f  Henry C. 
Schermers, voi. I, Muller, Sam & Blokker, Niels (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp.99-113.
3 2  For a general overview of the activities of the Council of Europe in the field of migration see Niessen, 
Jan & Murray, John The Council o f  Europe and Migration, CCME Briefing Paper No.6 , Brussels, CCME, 
December 1991. As far as the Conventions adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe are 
concerned, see generally Plender, R. , op. cit., chapter 7. See also Gomien, Donna "The Rights of 
Minorities under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter on Regional and 
Minority Languages", in The use o f  international conventions...", Cator, J. & Niessen, J. (eds.) 
Strasbourg, CCME, 1994, at pp.49-72; Murray, J. & Niessen, J. The Council o f  Europe and the protection 
o f  the rights o f  migrants, refugees and minorities, CCME Briefing Paper No. 13, Brussels, CCME, 
September 1993; and Human Rights o f  Aliens in Europe, Proceedings of the Colloquy on Human Rights 
of Aliens in Europe, Funchal-Madeira, 1983, Council of Europe Directorate of Human Rights; Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
3 3  ETS, No.5. It was ratified by 31 States: including Turkey, all Member States, and Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland. On the 
E.C.H.R. and aliens see, e.g., Drzemczewski, A. The position o f  aliens in relation to the European 
Convention o f  Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe - Directorate of Human Rights, 1985; 
Mackintosh, K ., Peers, A ., Mole, N ., Guild, E. & Duffy, P. The European Court o f  Human Rights and 
UK Immigration and Asylum Law - An Analysis o f  Implementation, London, ILPA, July 1993; Salvia, 
Michele "Nazionalità in senso formale e nazionalità in senso sostanziale nella Convenzione europea dei 
diritti deU'uomo", Rivista intemazionale dei diritti dell’uomo, Voi. Vili, 1995, No.l, pp.9-22.
3 4  At least apart from Community Law.
3 5  However, application of the Convention to non-metropolitan territories, requires an explicit declaration 
to that effect, according to Article 63 ( 1).
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of Strasbourg36 have held that the right to reside or to enter a Contracting Party, as well 
as the right of asylum and the freedom of expulsion, are not, as such, protected by the 
Convention. However, they have also considered that migration measures adopted by a 
Contracting State may put at stake certain rights protected by the Convention.37
Thirdly, the Convention is also relevant within the framework of Community and 
Union Law, themselves. As far as Community Law is concerned, the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities has repeatedly declared that "fundamental human rights form 
an integral part of the general principles of Community Law".38 Moreover, the Court has 
already stated that:
"International treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community Law"39 
The European Convention of Human Rights being one of such treaties, the Court has 
often used the Convention as a standard to review the legality of acts under the scope of 
Community Law.40 Meanwhile, recently, Article F of the Treaty on European Union 
established that:
"The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) 
and as result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community Law."
Thus, there is a strong case to sustain that the Law of the European Union, including 
Community Law, is subject to the rules of the E.C.H.R.
Last, but not at all least, the E.C.H.R. has one of the more effective systems of 
enforcement among international treaties on human rights. Although individual petitions 
(complaining about the violation of the Convention) can only be presented after the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies,41 the decisions of the Court of Human Rights are final 
and binding on the States.42
As mentioned above, under the E.C.H.R. aliens are entitled to the same set of 
rights as nationals of the Contracting Parties. Nevertheless, their specific position as aliens
3 6  Them, together with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, are the organs of the 
Council of Europe with the task of ensuring the observance of the E.C.H.R..
37  See, e.g., the decision of the Commission of Human Rights of 24/4/1965, in Application No. 1855/63, 
Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.8 , p.203; and the European Court of Human Rights in cases Abdulaziz et al., 
judgment of 28/5/1985, Series A, No. 94, p.67. For the first part of the statement, denying the protection 
of the right of entry as such, see also application No. 16360/90, D&R, No.76-A, 1994, p.13. On the other 
hand, note application 434/58 X v. Sweden, Yearbook E.C.H.R., V ol.2.1958-9, p.354. The Commission, 
in its decision on this application, held that a "State which signs and ratifies the European Convention of 
Human Rights must be understood as agreeing to restrict the free exercise of its rights under general 
international law, including the right to control the entry and exit of foreigners to the extent that and 
within the limits of the obligations which it has accepted under that Convention." Idem, at p.372.
3 8  See, for instance. Case 29/69, Stauder [1969] ECR 419; Case 4/73. Nold(II) (1974] ECR 491; Case 
44/79, Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 and Case 136/79, National Panasonic (1980] ECR 2033.
3 9  Case 4/73, quoted in the preceding note, at para. 13 of the judgment, idem, at p.507.
4 0  See. e.g.. Case 36/75, Rulili (1975] ECR 1232 and Case 63/83, Kirk, [1984] ECR 2718.
41  Article 26.
4 2  All States that ratified the Convention have by now accepted that the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Human Rights is compulsory and that individual complaints can be presented.
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makes certain rules of the Convention particularly relevant for them. For aliens the most 
important rules of the Convention seem to be article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment), articles 5 and 6 (concerning detention and judicial 
procedures), article 8 (on respect for private and family life), article 12 (on the right to 
marry and to found a family) and article 14 (on freedom of discrimination in the enjoyment 
of the rights set forth in the Convention). As far as protocols to the Convention are 
concerned, attention should be given to the Fourth43 and Seventh44 Protocols. Article 2 of 
the Fourth Protocol protects free movement within the territory of a State of everyone 
lawfully present there. Article 4 of the same Protocol prohibits the "collective expulsion of 
aliens". Meanwhile, Article I of the Seventh Protocol gives minimum procedural 
guarantees to aliens in relation to their expulsion, provided they are lawfully resident in the 
State.
Here, a brief examination will be made both of the content of these rules and of 
most important aspect of the case-law on their application to migration cases. The analysis 
will first, give particular attention to Articles 3 and 8 of the E.C.H.R., and then refer 
briefly to the other relevant provisions of the Convention and the Protocols to it.
(i) Article 3
This provision states that
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment."45
Besides protecting foreigners in their daily life in Member States, this provision applies to 
situations regarding specifically their entry into and exit from the territory of a Contracting 
Party. It applies to migration measures, as regards both the manner in which they are 
performed and the measures themselves.
Article 3 applies, for example, to the conditions in which the arrest, detention for 
expulsion and the very expulsion of third country nationals is performed. If they are 
carried out in a manner that constitute torture or involve inhuman or degrading treatment, 
they are incompatible with Article 3.46 This is a very important point, because such types
4 3  ETS, No.46. It was ratified by 23 States, including all Member States except Greece, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom.
4 4  ETS, No.l 17. It was ratified by 18 States, including the following Member States: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden.
4 5  See AUeweldt, Ralf "Protection Against Expulsion Under Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights", EJIL, Vol.4, 1993, No.3, pp.360-376; and Cassese, A. "Prohibition of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment", in The European System fo r  the Protection o f  Human 
Rights, Macdonald, R. , Matscher, F. & Petzold, H. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp.225- 
261. Note also that there are international treaties which have the specific objective of fighting torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Within the framework of the Council of Europe, on 26 November 
1987, was adopted a European Convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, see ETS, No. 126. It entered into force on 1 February 1989 and was ratified by 
29 States, including all Member States. In the framework of the United Nations was adopted, on 10 
December 1984, a Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, see United Nations, G.A. Res. 39/46, Doc.A/39/51. It entered into force on 26 June 1987 and 
was ratified by 85 States, including all Member States, except Belgium and Ireland.
4 6  Application No. 6242/73, Briickmann v Federal Republic of Germany, D&R, No.6,1977, p.57.
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of situation are more frequent than is generally thought.47 An interesting example 
regarding both admission and expulsion is that of the East African cases, in which was at 
stake not only the effect but also the manner in which a migration measure was taken. The 
cases concerned a piece of UK immigration law48 which prevented citizens of the UK and 
Colonies of Asian origin from entering the UK. These persons had been affected by 
restrictive immigration laws in Africa and, in some cases, had no other country to which 
they could go. The Commission of Human Rights found that the substance and effect of 
the UK immigration law made a discrimination on grounds of colour and race. It 
considered that "publicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the 
basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a special form of affront to human 
dignity" and "amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention".49 The Commission held that Article 3 had actually been violated in the case 
at stake.50 However, as the case was not referred to the Court of Strasbourg, it ended up 
in the Committee of Ministers, where the lack of the required majority of two thirds51 
made it impossible to declare the existence of a violation of the Convention.
In any case, the expulsion or extradition from a country can, in itself, also 
constitute a violation of Article 3. The Commission of Human Rights has already 
considered that repeated expulsion of an alien without identity documents, whose country 
of origin is unknown, may result in a degrading treatment.52
4 7  Note, for example, the case of inhuman conditions of detention of foreigners waiting deportation in the 
"dépot des étrangers", located in the basement of the "Palais de Justice" in Paris. Since 1991 the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture had complained about its inhuman conditions, but these 
continued for some time, even after French newspapers "Libération" and "Le Monde" denouncing the case 
in 1993. See the dossier of the Groupe d'information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigrés, "Dépot de 
Paris - L'Assignation du Préfet de Police", Paris, November 1993. For recent news about the situation in 
that detention centre see "Le Monde", 28/4/1995, p. 13. A significant case is also that of Joy Gardner, a 
Jamaican woman who in 1993 was visited by three Scotland Yard agents to be arrested for deportation. As 
she started to cry out the policemen put in her face a big plaster to shut her mouth. Her resistance 
continued and while a policeman tied her legs, the other policeman sat on her stomach. She was also 
restrained with a body belt and soon died of suffocation. See by Amnesty International, United Kingdom: 
Death in Police Custody o f  Joy Gardner, London, August 1995. Apparently, this type of treatment of 
foreigners is not uncommon in Britain. Another case is that of the death in 1991 of Omasase Lumumba, 
an Zairian asylum-seeker, while he was being controlled and restrained by prison officers in a strip cell in 
the United Kingdom. An inquest jury found that he was unlawfully killed by prison officers, but no 
criminal charges were brought. See Amnesty International, United Kingdom - Unlawful killing o f  
detained asylum seeker Omasese Lumumba, November, 1993. Naturally, this and other similar cases of 
arrest or detention raise the issue of respect not only of Article 3 but also of Article 2 of the E.C.H.R., on 
the right to life. On cases in the United Kingdom, see also Charter fo r  Immigration Detainees. London, 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, 1994, p.3. Naturally, it must not be forgotten that cases of 
this type exist also in other Member States.
4 8  The United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968.
4 9  Decision of the Commission of 10/10/1970, on the admissibility of applications 4403 et al 770, 
European Commission of Human Rights Collection of decisions No.36, pp.92-131 at pg.l 17, or Yearbook 
E.C.H.R., Vol.13, pp.929-1027, at pg.994.
5 0  See the only recently published report of the European Commission of Human Rights in case "East 
African Asians v. UK", D&R, No.78-A, 1994, p.5, and HRU, Vol.15, 26/9/1994, No. 4-6, pp.215-232.
51 Article 32 of the E.C.KR.
5 2  Application No.7612/76, Giama V. Belgium, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.23, 1980, p.428. Note also that 
in the Nasri case the Commission decided that not only Article 8  but also Article 3 of the E.C.H.R. would
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Furthermore, on the basis of case-law of the Commission and Court of Human 
Rights, it can be argued that Article 3 is also violated when there are good reasons to 
believe that there is a real risk in the State to which the person will be sent that such 
person be subject to the treatment defined by Article 3.53 This treatment may be imposed 
either by public authorities or by private entities.54 5 According to what seems to be the 
broadest formulation ever made by the Commission in this respect:
"the deportation of a foreigner to a particular country might in exceptional 
circumstances give rise to the question whether there had been 'inhuman treatment' 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention" and "similar considerations 
might apply to cases where a person is extradited to a particular country in which 
due to the very nature of that country, basic human rights, such as are guaranteed 
by the Convention, might be either grossly violated or entirely s u p p r e s s e d (...)".55 
In this respect the leading case is that of Soering,56 which was the first case in which a 
possible extradition was considered to be in violation of the Convention.57 The case 
concerned a decision to extradite a German citizen to Virginia, in the U.S.A., There, he 
would face trial on a charge of murder58 and could be condemned to death. The 
Commission decided, by six votes to five, that such extradition would constitute a 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. However, the Court of Strasbourg unanimously 
considered that in the circumstances of the case his extradition would violate that
be violated if a deaf-mute Algerian national, who had lived in France with his family since he was four, 
was expelled from that country to Algeria, The Commission considered that in view of his handicap and 
his dependency of his family, his expulsion would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, besides an 
unjustified interference with the exercise of his right to respect for his family life, thus violating also 
Article 8 . See Application No.19465/92, Nasri v. France, report of the Commission of 10/3/1994, in 
Council of Europe Information Sheet-human rights, No.34, January-Iune 1993, Strasbourg 1994, p.72. As 
will be explained below, when examining Article 8 , the Court of Human Rights ruled that in this case the 
France had violated Article 8  of the E.C.H.R. Thus the Court considered that it was not necessary to 
examine the complaint that his eventual expulsion would violate Article 3 of the Convention. See 
paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment of the Court of 13/7/1995, Series A, Vol.322-B.
5 3  An extradition to a country leading to a serious risk of a person being condemned to the death penalty 
and executed, arises the application of Article 1 of the Sixth Protocol to the E.C.H.R., concerning the 
abolition of the death penalty, of 1983, ETS, No. 114. See Application No.22742/93, Joy Aylor-Davis v. 
France, which admissibility was decided by the Commission on 20/1/1994, D&R, No.76-A. 1994. p.I65, 
at p.170. Protocol No. 6  was ratified by 23 States, including all Member States, except Belgium, Greece 
and the United Kingdom.
5 4  Application No. 10040/82, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, not published. Here the Commission 
considered that "it is £& necessary for the application of article 3 that the danger emanates from the 
Government of the State, which requires extradition" (emphasis added). See also pointing in the same 
direction the Commission's decision in Application No. 10308/83, Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
D&R, N o.36,1984, p.209, at 232, paragraph 5 of the final part of the decision.
5 5  See Commission’s decision on the admissibility of Application No. 1802/63, X v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol. 6 , 1963, p.462, at 480.
5 6  Case Soering v. United Kingdom, judgment of the Court of 7/7/1989, Series A, No. 161.
5 7  Note, however, the friendly settlement between the government of the United Kingdom and the widow 
of a Moroccan pilot. The UK extradited the pilot to Morocco after he had participated in a failed coup d' 
état against the King of that country. Soon after his extradition he was summarily judged and executed. 
See Application No. 5961/72, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol. 16. 1973, p. 357.
5 8  He had killed his girlfriend’ parents by repeatedly stabbing them in the neck, throat and body, 
"because" they were opposed to his relationship with their daughter.
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provision. The Court gave particular relevance to the following points. First, the Court 
concluded that Mr.Soering would run a "real risk of being sentenced to death in 
Virginia".59 There, he would be subject to the "death row phenomenon”. He would most 
likely spend 6 to 8 years waiting for a final decision on his punishment, while enduring 
anguish and mounting tension, as well as the severity of the special custodial regime on 
death row. Moreover, the Court took into consideration the personal circumstances of Mr. 
Soering, namely the fact that when he committed the crime he was only 18 years old and 
that he was considered to be at that time in a disturbed mental state.60 Therefore, the 
Court held that his extradition would "expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond 
the threshold set by Article 3." Consequently, the decision to extradite him "would, if 
implemented, give rise to a breach of Article 3.”61
A similar reasoning has been applied by the Court regarding the expulsion of 
asylum-seekers. The Court declared in case Cruz Varas that an expulsion of an asylum 
seeker could put at issue Article 3 and engage the responsibility of the expelling State: 
"where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he is to be returned.”62
The reasoning underlying the judgment of the Court in cases Soering and Cruz 
Varas to forbid the extradition or expulsion of a foreign person is very interesting. 
Arguably it is theoretically far-reaching. The Court (and the Commission) have held that 
the government of a Contracting State may be responsible for a violation of the 
Convention not only when it occurs in its own jurisdiction, but also when it takes place in 
the jurisdiction of another State, provided the Contracting State is in a position of 
preventing such violation to happen. This clearly departs from a literal interpretation of the 
Convention. On the other hand, this principle has been stated only as far as Article 3 is 
concerned. However, it could be argued that the same reasoning should also be applied 
when the rights at stake (i.e. in danger of being violated in another country) are rights 
protected under other Articles of the E.C.H.R.63
5 9  Idem, p,36.
6 0  A report of a forensic psychiatrist considered that Mr. Soering was immature and inexperienced and 
had lost his personality in a symbiotic relation with his girlfriend - a powerful, persuasive and disturbed 
young woman. See paragraph 21 of the judgment.
61 Idem, paragraph 111. Finally, the Court also considered relevant that Mr. Soering could be extradited 
or deported to face trial in Germany, his native country. His crime would not go unpunished.
6 2  Cruz Varas v. Sweden, judgment of 20/3/1991, Series A, No. 201, p.28, paragraphs 69 and 70. This 
ruling was repeated in Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30/10/1991, series A, 
No.215, p.34, paragraph 103.
6 3  In favour of this application see van Dijk, P. & van Hoof, G.J.H. in Theory and Practice o f  the 
European Convention o f  Human Rights, Deventer, Kluwer, 1990, p.236; and Ergec, Rusen & Velu, 
Jacques La Convention Europetnne des Droits de L'Homme, Brussels, Bruylant, 1990, at p.214. See also 
Vogler, Theo, "The Scope of Extradition", in Protecting Human Rights: the European Dimension - 
Studies in Honour o f  Gerard J. Wiarda, Matscher, F. & Petzold, H. (eds.), Cologne, Heymanns, 1988, 
pp,663-671, at 669. Vogler believes that an extradition agreement whose object is a transfer leading to 
inhuman treatment would be void, "every effect of actions performed on the basis of such an agreement is 
to be removed, and an extradition already executed has to be reversed." However, for him, this comes as 
"a legal consequence of a violation of tus cogens*, because in that respect such extradition agreement
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Nevertheless, the theoretically far-reaching reasoning that protected Mr.Soering is 
limited in practice by the case-law of the Commission and Court of Human Rights. The 
broad statements of the Commission and the Court, mentioned above, should not mislead 
on the actual results of their decisions and judgments. It has been particularly hard to 
make a case on this basis. The applicant has to present strong arguments to convince the 
Commission and the Court that there is a serious and real risk of him being subjected to 
the treatment described in Article 3.64 After Soering, for example, the Commission 
considered inadmissible an application against an extradition order to the U.S.A., where 
the applicant would face criminal proceedings for a crime that could entail the death 
penalty.65 The Commission held the petition manifestly ill-founded simply because the 
American prosecutor officer, then charged of the case, made a solemn promise that he 
would not ask for the death penalty. In the meantime, asylum-seekers have also had 
considerable difficulties in having their situations protected under the Convention. They 
are required to present very strong evidence of risk of being submitted to treatment such 
as that defined in Article 3 of the Convention.66
"violates peremptory norms of international law and is therefore void according to the law of international 
agreements'*, see idem, p.670. According to Vogler, this is justified by the fact that elementary rights of 
the person are included in the general principles of international law recognised by all civilised nations. 
Whenever they are at stake "they constitute a bar to extradition". He states that protection from torture and 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, as well as the principle o f "nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege praevia" would be among such principles of international law. On the contrary, in his opinion, 
the guarantees of legality of procedure protected by Article 6  of the Convention "only in their intrinsic 
components" are among these principles of public international law. Note, in the meantime, that in 
assessing the admissibility of Application No. 10308/83, AHun v. Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Commission considered that an eventual trial (in the State requiring extradition) without the guarantees 
laid down in Article 6  of the Convention "would not in itself make extradition appear as an inhuman 
treatment". This constituted one of the reasons to declare the application inadmissible as manifestly ill- 
founded - D&R, No.36, 1984, p.209, at pp.231-232. However, the Commission and the Court of Human 
Rights have already declared that it is not excluded that a decision to extradite may exceptionally raise a 
problem within the scope of Article 6 , when the person to be extradited "had suffered or risked suffering a 
flagrant denial of a fair trial". See case Soering, quoted supra, p.45, paragraph 113 and Application 
No.22742/93, D&R, No.76-A, 1994, p.164, at p. 172.
6 4  See Ergec & Velu, op. cit., pp.2I4-5. See also, e.g., the decision of the Commission on 20/5/1994, in 
Application No.24015/94, D&R, No.77-A, 1994, p.144.
6 5  See again Application No.22742/93. quoted supra, which the Commission declared inadmissible on 
20/1/1994, at p.172.
6 6  See cases Cruz Varas v. Sweden, quoted supra; Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, quoted 
supra; and Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, judgment of 27/8/1992, series A, Vol.241-B. The first 
case, the Cruz Varas case, concerned a Chilean asylum-seeker deported to Chile, where he claimed to run 
the risk of persecution and treatment as defined by Article 3. The Court held that there was no proof of 
such danger, no substantial basis had been shown to prove his fears, and thus there was no violation of 
Article 3 of the E.C.H.R., op.cit. paragraphs 77-82. The second case, the Vilvarajah and others case, 
concerned Tamil asylum seekers in the United Kingdom. In this case, the Court repeated its ruling in the 
previous case, on the need of proof of risk of treatment as defined by Article 3, op.cit., p.34, paragraph 
103. After explaining its "general approach to assessing the risk of ill-treatment" (op.cit., p.36, paragraph 
107-108), the Court made its concrete assessment on the existence of such risk in the case. The Court 
considered that: "substantial grounds [had] not been established for believing that the applicants would 
not be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3 on their return to Sri Lanka", idem, paragraphs 109-116 and particularly paragraph 111. The 
Commission had also find no breach of Article 3, by seven votes against seven, with the casting vote of its
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As long as the Commission and Court of Human Rights do not adopt a more 
protective behaviour when the risk of torture and inhuman treatment (or death) is at stake, 
there seems to be little hope of avoiding expulsions to other countries, in which there is 
the risk of violation of other rights protected by the Convention.
(ii) Article 8
This is the rule of the Convention most often used in the context of migration 
cases, notably as far as the respect for family life is concerned. It states that :
”1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or economic well being
President. As far as Article 13 was concerned, the Commission considered that it had been violated, by 
thirteen votes to one. However, the Court held that Article 13 had not been violated, by seven votes to two. 
See the dissenting opinion of Judge Russo, who recalls that, while the procedures developed in Strasbourg, 
the British judicial authorities had meanwhile allowed for the possibility of entry to the applicant's and 
decided that they had the right to obtain asylum in the UK. See Judge Russo's opinion, op.cit., at p.44 and 
paragraphs 7 1 -72 of the judgment of the Court for an account of the facts. The third case, the 
Vijayanathan and Pusparajah case, related to two asylum-seekers, who were Sri Lanka citizens of Tamil 
origin. They claimed to be in danger of suffering treatment as defined by Article 3 if deported to that 
country. They claimed that they have been active militants of Tamil organisations and had been arrested 
and persecuted for such reason in Sri Lanka. They sustained that their deportation would breach Article 3 
of the E.C.H.R. With the dissenting opinion of H. G. Schermers, the Commission decided against finding 
such violation. The Court considered that they had not exhausted domestic remedies, as they had been 
given a direction to leave French territory, but were not yet subject to an expulsion order enforceable in 
itself. See also Application No.22414/93, the Chahal Family v. United Kingdom, Press Release of the 
Secretary of the European Commission of Human Rights, No. 362(94), of 2/9/1994. It concerns a Sikh 
religious leader, living in the United Kingdom since 1971, with his wife; who settled there in 1975, and 
their two children - who, having been bom there are British nationals. Since 1984, Mr.Chahal has been a 
prominent religious figure in the affairs of British Sikhs. He has supported the independence of the Sikh 
homeland in India. In India, in 1984, Mr.Chahal was detained and tortured. In Britain he had been 
unsuccessfully prosecuted for his involvement in disturbances at Sikh temples. In 1980, the Home 
Secretary decided to deport him to India, because his continuous presence in the UK was deemed not 
conducive to the public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, 
namely the international fight against terrorism. He was arrested and has been detained since then in the 
UK. He claimed that if he would be deported to India he would run a risk of real torture and persecution, 
contrary to Article 3 of the E.C.H.R.. Amnesty International backed this claim. He applied for asylum in 
the UK, but the British authorities refused to grant it to him. Mr.Chahal claimed also that his prolonged 
detention was not justified under Article 5 of the Convention. His family complained of violation of the 
right of respect of family life protected by Article 8 . The violation of Article 13, on the right to effective 
remedy against a violation of a right protected by the Convention, was also invoked. The Commission of 
Human Rights considered the case admissible. See Council of Europe information Sheet-human rights, 
No.36, January-June 1995, Strasbourg, 1995, at p.52. For cases with positive outcomes, although not 
decided in last resort by the Commission and Court of Human Rights, see infra the last footnote of the text 
on the E.C.H.R. On the E.C.H.R. and asylum-seekers, see, generally, Einarsen, Terje, "The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied Right to de facto  Asylum". 
International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 2, No.3, pp.362-389.
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of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."67
Until the end of the eighties the Commission declared admissible only a few 
applications of aliens complaining that an expulsion or refusal of entry violated Article 8.68 
The Commission was quite demanding in formulating the conditions required to find a 
violation of that provision. As far as family life is concerned, the substantial analysis of a 
case was usually divided into three phases. First, there was an assessment of the existence 
of an effective family life. Secondly, the Commission would verify that the relevant 
migration measure did actually interfere with the family life of the applicants. Finally, if the 
answer was positive with respect to these two issues, the Commission would examine 
whether there was a justification for such a measure under Article 8(2). In this respect, the 
Commission considers often that States have a margin of appreciation in determining 
whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society".69
As far as the first point is concerned, i.e. the determination of the existence of 
family life, recourse is made to several criteria, like the existence of biological, sentimental 
and financial ties, which are close and effective. The existence of family life is normally 
regarded as being a matter of fact. Thus, for spouses it is demanded that their marriage is a 
real marriage and not a marriage of convenience. Likewise, Article 8 seems to protect 
more easily family reunification than family formation. It has been held that Article 8 
protects existing family life, but does not oblige a Party to grant entry to its territory to a 
foreigner citizen for the purposes of establishing a new family relationship there.70 
However, the separation of fiancés may raise the issue of the respect for the right of family 
life, in combination with the principle of equality in the enjoyment of the rights protected
6 7  On Article 8  of the E.C.H.R. see, inter alia, Cohen-Jonathan, G. "Respect for Private and Family Life", 
in The European System fo r  the Protection o f  Human Rights, Macdonald, R . , Matscher, F. & Petzold, H. 
(eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp.405-444; Drzemczewski, A. The right to respect fo r  private 
and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 o f  the European Convention o f  
Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Directorate of Human Rights, 1984; Duffy, P.J. "The 
Protection of Privacy, Family Life and Other Rights under Article 8  of the European Convention on 
Human Rights", YEL, V o l.2 ,1982, pp. 191-238; Robertson, A.H. & Merrils, J.G. Human Rights in Europe 
- A Study o f  the European Convention o f  Human Rights, 3rd.ed., Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1993, p.127; and Villiger, M.E. "Expulsion and the right to respect for private and family life 
(Article 8  of the Convention) - an introduction to the Commission's case-law", in Protecting Human 
Rights: the European Dimension ..., op. cit., pp.657-662.
68 On the admissibility of applications to the Commission of Human Rights (and the UN Human Rights 
Committee), in general terms, see Zwart, Tom. The Admissibility o f  Human Rights Petitions - the Case 
Law o f  the European Commission o f  Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, and particularly chapter 5, at pp. 139-154, on admissibility related to the merits.
6 9  For an analysis of the margin of appreciation doctrine, for the E.C.H.R. in general, see Jones, T.H., 
"The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European Convention", Public Law, Autumn 1995, pp.430- 
449 (who sustains that "The margin of appreciation is an imprecise legal doctrine, although hardly unique 
in that.", idem, p.448); and Yourow, H. C., The Margin o f  Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics o f  
European Human Rights Jurisprudence, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995.
7 0  Commission's decision in Application 7229/75 X and Y v. Germany, D&R, No.9,1977, p. 219.
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by the Convention.71 Nonetheless, marriage is not indispensable for recognition of the 
existence of family life for the purposes of Article 8. Extra-marital relationships of a 
couple may also constitute family life,72 as well as relationships outside marriage between 
parents and their children 73 Cohabitation is in principle required, but in particular cases 
the existence of regular contacts may be sufficient.74 Finally, homosexuals couples are 
considered not to have family relations.75 In any case, this relatively broad formulation of 
the concept of family life does not mean that in migration cases it was (or is) easy to 
sustain the existence of family life for the purposes of Article 8.
Moreover, the Commission was particularly demanding as far as the second point 
is concerned, i.e. in assessing whether the migration measure imposed interfered with the 
family life of the applicants. Usually, to accept the existence of such interference, the 
Commission demanded a proof that the applicants would not be able to move and live 
together somewhere else, outside the territory of the Contracting State concerned.76 That 
is what Storey calls the "elsewhere test".77 This requirement would only be put aside if the 
applicants demonstrated the existence of serious and practical, or insurmountable 
obstacles to change country of residence, as well as if special reasons existed for not 
demanding that prerequisite. Such special reasons include the existence of strong links 
with the Contracting State of residence, the absence of such links with another country 
and the impossibility for the applicants to know in advance whether a similar immigration 
measure could threaten their family life.
The "elsewhere test" seems particularly open to criticism. Clearly, the Commission 
preferred to be particularly demanding in accepting the existence of interference with 
family life, instead of admitting such interference and then develop legal criteria to 
determine whether it was justified under the restriction clause of Article 8(2). This strict 
avoidance of scrutiny of migration measures is not satisfactory. Furthermore, in the use of
7' See case Abdulaziz et al., judgment of 28/5/1985, Series A, No. 94, and European Human Rights 
Report, Vol.7, 1985, No.28, pp.471-511. This case is also referred infra, in the main text, on Article 14 of 
the E.C.H.R.
7 2  Applications No.7289/75 and No.7349/76, X and Y v. Switzerland, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.20, 1977, 
p.372, at 408.
7  ^ See cases Berrehab v. Netherlands, judgment of 21/6/1988, Series A, No. 138. See also the judgments 
of the Court in cases Marckx v. Belgium, Series A, No.31, 1979, paragraph 31 (on the rights of the 
mother); Rasmussen v. Denmark, judgment of 28/11/1984, Series A, No.87, 1985 (on the father); 
Johnston v. Ireland, Series A, No.l 12, 1987 (as far as both parents are concerned, but particularly on the 
position of the father); and Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26/5/1994, series A, Vol.290 (on the rights of 
the biological father not living with the mother). Likewise, see the Commission's decision on the 
admissibility of Application No.20769/92, G.F. v. Germany, D&R, No.78-A, 1994, p. l l l ,  in which is 
declared that Article 8  makes no distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" family. See also case 
Kroon v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 October 1994, series A, No.297-C.
7 4  See, again case Berrehab. Note also that in case Kroon, quoted in the preceding note, the 
European Court of Human Rights declared that "as a rule, living together may be a requirement for 
'family life', but exceptionally other factors may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship had sufficient 
constancy to create de facto 'family ties' - such is the case here, as four children have been bom to 
Mrs.Kroon and Zerrock". The latter were not married, nor cohabited.
7 5  Commission decision in Application No.9369/81, D&R, No.32,1983, p.220.
7 6  See Abdulaziz et al., case quoted supra, at p.34, paragraph 6 8 .
7 7  See Storey, H., "The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case-Law at Strasbourg", ICLQ, Vol.39, 
1990, No.2, pp.328-344.
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the "elsewhere test" there seems to be a confusion between general interference with a 
relationship and interference capable of terminating it, or seriously threatening its 
existence. It may be that in a certain case the expulsion of one member of a family will not 
terminate completely the relation between him and the rest of the family. Because, for 
instance, the whole family has the possibility of moving to another country. However, it 
seems hard to sustain that to oblige a family to change the country of residence is not an 
interference with their family life.78 It does certainly affect the life of the family as such.79 
In this respect, as far as the respect for family life is concerned, one may note some 
Commission decisions in cases not involving migration matters. The Commission has 
dealt, for instance, with cases concerning persons being imprisoned in a jail that was so 
distant from the residence of their family that all visits by the latter family were practically 
impossible.80 In these cases the Commission considered that here was an indirect 
restriction on the right of family life, although justified on grounds of public safety. 
Another comparison could perhaps also be made with other rights protected by the 
Convention, for instance with the right to liberty, protected by Article 6 of the 
Convention. If such right was restricted for persons living in a certain part of a country, 
could it be said that there was no interference at all with such right, provided such persons 
could move to another part of the country where such a right was fully respected?
In any case, from the end of the eighties onwards, the case-law of the Commission 
and Court of Human Rights became more liberal. In more cases it was found that 
expulsion of foreigners violated Article 8 of the Convention, as far as their right to respect 
of family life was concerned.81 Invariably, in these cases the persons concerned were not
7 8  A similar remark can be made regarding the denial to nationals of a Contracting Party to exercise, in 
the territory of that Party, their right to family life with an alien spouse. It can be argued that such denial, 
including the denial of permission to the spouse to enter and reside for that purpose, is an interference 
with the respect of family life. For a good analysis of this issue see Cvetic, G., "Immigration Cases in 
Strasbourg: The Right to Family Life Under Article 8  of the European Convention", in ¡CLQt Vol. 36, 
July 1987, No.3,pp. 647-655.
7 9  In alternative, it could be said that such change of the country of residence would affect the private life 
of each and all members of the family, individually and collectively. In any case, Article 8  of the 
Convention protects private life as well. See infra, in the main text, my remarks on the relevance of this 
point in the context of migration cases.
8 0  See Application No.5712/72, decision of 18/7/1974, in Collection of decisions of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, No.46, p. 1 12; and Application No.8586/79, decision of 10/10/1980, 
unpublished, abstract in Digest o f  Strasbourg Case-Law relating to the European Convention o f  Human 
Rights, Vol.3 (Articles 7-12), Council of Europe / Heymanns, Cologne, 1984, p.126.
in Digest o f  Strasbourg Case-Law relating to the European Convention o f  Human Rights, Vol.3, p.126.
81 See cases Berrehab v. Netherlands, judgment of 21/6/1988, Series A, No. 138; Moustaquim v. 
Belgium, judgment of 18/2/1991, Scries A, No. 193; Beldjoudi v. France, judgment of 26/3/1992, Series 
A, No. 234-A; and Nasri v. France, judgment of the Court of 13/7/1995, Series A, Vol.322-B. Note also 
the friendly settlements achieved in cases Djeroud v. France, judgment of 23/1/1991, Series A, No. 191 -B, 
and Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28/6/1993, Series A. No. 258-C, The latter case 
concerned the deportation of Moroccan national who was 7 years old when he come to the United 
Kingdom and had lived since with his family. He spoke no Arabic and had no family or friends in 
Morocco. Although he had committed several criminal offences, the Commission decided that his 
deportation did violate Article 8 .
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nationals of a Member State, nor of any other State of the Council of Europe. A 
considerable part of these new cases concerned the expulsion of foreigners convicted for 
multiple crimes who had a very close connection with the State of residence.82 Frequently, 
they had been living with their family for a long period of time in the territory of a 
Contracting Party.83
It was held by the Commission and the Court that their expulsion was an 
interference with their right to respect for family life, because they had a continued 
relationship with their families residing in the expelling countries. The authorities of the 
latter claimed that their expulsion had the aim of preventing disorder and crime, which was 
accepted by the Commission and Court of Human Rights as being a legitimate aim. 
Nevertheless, the interference with their family lives caused by their expulsion, was held 
not to be "necessary in a democratic society”, since not proportionate to the aim pursued. 
To determine whether or not the expulsions were proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, consideration was given to the circumstances and the background of the 
applicant. It was considered important that the persons subject to expulsion had long 
lasting ties with the expelling country and with their families living there. It was also seen 
as important that it would be difficult for them to live in the country to which they were 
going to be expelled - an application of the "elsewhere test". This difficulty was explained 
by their ignorance of the language of that country and by the absence of family or friends 
there. In this type of situation it was considered that the expulsion would constitute such 
an hardship as not to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.84 Thus, the 
expulsions were held to infringe Article 8, as far as the right to respect of family life was 
concerned.
However, it may also be argued that the expulsion of long resident foreigners may 
raise the issue of the respect of their right to private life. This right may be violated
82 That was not the situation at stake in case Berrehab, to be analysed in chapter 4, section B. This case 
concerned a Moroccan citizen who was given a residence permit to live with his Dutch wife, from whom 
he had a child. When the couple divorced he was expelled. The Court considered that his expulsion 
violated his right to have respected his family life with his daughter, with whom he had regular and close 
contacts, when he was in Netherlands.
83 In the Beldjoudi case, the applicant was even bom there.
84 Such an hardship was particularly serious in the Nasri case. This concerned the expulsion of an 
Algerian national bom in I960, who come to live with his parents in France in 1965. He had been bom 
deaf and dumb, he was illiterate and had little knowledge of sign language. He had been convicted five 
times for various crimes, including one of gang rape. The Court held his deportation to Algeria not to be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of protection of disorder and prevention of crime and would infringe 
his right to respect for family life. The Court recalled that he had not been the instigator of the rape for 
which he was convicted, and since then had not re-offended. Moreover, with such an handicap his family 
was very important for him, even for preventing him to elapse into a life of crime. Besides, he did not 
understand Arabic (he was deaf and dumb) and the majority of members of his family were French 
nationals with no close ties to Algeria. An eventual violation of Article 3 of the Convention was declared 
by the Court not necessary to be examined, in the view of the finding of a violation of Article 8. In its 
report on the case the Commission had considered that both Article 3 and 8 of the E.C.H.R. would be 
violated if the expulsion was performed. See the report of the Commission of 10/3/1994. and the judgment 
of the Court of 13/7/1995, Series A, Vol.322-B.
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independently of a violation of the right of respect for their family life.85 It seems a 
reasonable interpretation of the concept of ‘'private life”, protected by Article 8, to sustain 
that it includes the human relations that an individual develops with others while living in a 
country. This could, for instance protect the rights of homosexuals couples, who are 
regarded by the Commission not to have family relations.86 Furthermore, it could also 
protect the situation of (other) persons who have been living for a considerable time in a 
Contracting Party, but who do not happen to have family members there - for example, 
because they died.
Persons without family ties in the country of residence may also have been settled 
there for a considerable time, may have all their life connected with that country, and may 
have no ties with the country of their nationality, or with any other country, apart from 
that of residence. The personal consequences of their expulsion may be as serious as if 
they had family relations in the country of residence. Such persons would usually have to 
learn a new language and break all ties with friends, as well as their labour and social 
relations in the country of residence. An eventual expulsion of a person in such situation 
should be scrutinised under Article 8(2). There could be a presumption of absence of a 
need in a democratic society to expel such a person. A presumption that would admit 
derogation under stringent circumstances only.87
The relevance for their right to respect of private life of the expulsion of foreigners 
is endorsed even by some judges of the Court of Human Rights and by members of the 
Commission.88 Moreover, to a certain extent, it seems to find some support in the
85 It must be recalled that, when a breach of the Convention is found on one ground, the Commission and 
Court of Human Rights usually do not examine whether such a breach may exist as far as another ground 
is considered. Thus, the fact that a violation of the right to respect of family life is found in a case, does 
not necessarily mean that the Court or the Commission consider that such violation does not exist as far 
as respect for private life is concerned.
86 See the Commission decision in Application No.9369/81, quoted supra. There, the Commission held 
that relations between an homosexual couple do not arise the issue of family life, but of private life. Thus, 
the expulsion of an homosexual couple may constitute an interference to the exercise of the right of 
respect of private life, provided it is established that the couple cannot live elsewhere and that the 
connection with the expelling State is a fundamental element of their relation. However, neither in this, 
nor in any other case, was a homosexual couple protected under the Convention, in the context of a 
migration case.
87 Note that, according to the Court of Human Rights, respect for family life "implies an obligation for the 
State to act in manner calculated to allow [family] ties to develop normally", Marckx v. Belgium, 
judgment of 13/6/1979, Series A, No. 31, paragraph 45. This is what is called the positive obligation of a 
State. It is submitted that, for example in case of persons in the circumstances described in the main text, 
there is also a positive obligation of the State to allow that their private lives "develop normally", namely 
by not expelling them from their country of long residence.
88 For a member of the Commission, see Schermers, in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion in 
case Lamguindaz, quoted supra, at pg. 104. In favour see also judge Martens, in his concurring opinion in 
the Beldjoudi case. He recalls Article 12(4) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
according to which "No one may be arbitrarily deprived of the right of entry to his own country". He 
believes that this rule includes a prohibition of expulsion from one country of all foreigners integrated in 
it. See judgment of the Court in case Beldjoudi, Series A. No. 234-A, at pp. 37-8. In the same case, judge 
De Meyer considered that the expulsion would constitute "an unacceptable interference" with the private 
and family life of the applicants. In pointed out that Mr.Beldjoudi had resided in France for over forty 
years, and that country "has always in fact been ’his' since his birth, even though he [did] not possess his 
nationality". Thus, he sustained that such expulsion would be even an inhuman treatment. He hold the
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Commission itself, in its decision in the Lamguindaz case. This case concerned a 
Moroccan national expelled from the United Kingdom after having committed several 
criminal offences. The Commission decided that his deportation would violate Article 8, 
recalling that
"(...) the applicant had lived in the United Kingdom from an early age, that his 
close relatives all live in the United Kingdom and that he had received his 
education there. Until he was abandoned there in 1988 [for 19 months] he had no 
real links with Morocco or acquaintance with its culture or language. Although he 
is legally an alien, his family and social ties are therefore in the United Kingdom 
and his nationality status does not reflect his actual position in human terms"89
The previous remarks dealt with expulsion of foreigners who had been living for a 
long time with their family in a Contracting Party. However, a recent case may raise hopes 
that Article 8 may also be used to ask for the right of entry for persons residing in another 
country. In its report on the GUI case,90 the Commission decided by 14 votes to 10 that 
Switzerland had violated Article 8 by not granting a residence permit to a minor son of a 
Turkish national resident in the country, on the grounds that his father had insufficient 
means to support him and his wife could not look after him because she was epileptic.91 
Mr GUI, his wife and their baby daughter had been granted a residence permit in 
Switzerland on humanitarian grounds. This case is now before the Court.
Another possibility of raising the compatibility of migration measures with the
E.C.H.R. is through the combined consideration of its Article 8 and Article 14. The latter 
provides that:
"The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status".
In Abdulaziz,92 the Court of Human Rights considered that the United Kingdom 
had violated Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention for requiring more restrictive conditions 
for the admission of husbands to join wives living in that country, than for the admission 
of wives to join husbands.
It can also be argued that Articles 8 and 14 are violated when an expulsion order is 
attached to a criminal sentence given to a foreigner, while such expulsion would not be 
imposed on a national. Those provisions would be violated particularly when, having 
regard to the foreigner's situation, namely a long residence and family ties in the country,
view that, as far as his offences were concerned, Mr.Beldjoudi could be sufficiently punished by criminal 
law. Idem, at p.35. On the respect of private life as far as an expulsion order is concerned, see also the 
Commission decision of 19/5/1994 in Application No.23634/94, D&R, No.77*A, 1994, p. 133- 
&9 Lamguindaz, case quoted supra, op. cit., at p.102. Emphasis added.
90  GUI v. Switzerland, Application No.23218/94.
91 See the report of the Commission on the case, adopted on 4 April 1995. See also the Press Release 
No.290 of the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, of 6/6/1995, and the Press Release No. 
525 of the Registrar of the Court, of 25/10/1995, the latter on the hearing of the case by the Court on the 
same date.
92 Abdulaziz et al., judgment of 28/5/1985, Series A, No. 94.
31
he or she can be compared to nationals of that country "in the context of punishment for a 
specific crime".93
(iii) Other relevant provisions
Other provisions of the E.C.H.R. and of the Protocols to it have been used in the 
context of migration cases.
Article 5, for example, guarantees the liberty and security of a person. However, 
its paragraph (1) (f) provides that one of the exceptions to this general rule is the case of 
deprivation of liberty, in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, when there is a 
“lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition,"94
Although the arrest or detention of such a person is cleared under this provision, it is 
stated twice that the arrest or detention must be legal.
Article 6 provides for a fair hearing in the determination of "civil rights and 
obligations" and of a "criminal charge".95 The Commission of Human Rights has held that 
proceedings on the prohibition of entry, residence permit, and deportation of an alien are 
not related to the determination of civil rights and obligations, and thus, are not covered 
by the E.C.H.R.96 However, such assessment seems more difficult to apply when the right 
to family life is at stake in migration proceedings. Moreover, the protection of Article 6 
applies to proceedings in which the violation of migration legislation is qualified as a 
criminal action.97 Finally, this Article can be of indirect, but also concrete interest for third
93 Schermers opinion in the Commission's report in case Lamguindaz, quoted infra. Schermers criticises 
the Commission for usually considering that there is no violation of the principle of equality of treatment 
when expulsion orders are imposed as an addition to criminal sanctions, but only to foreigners and not to 
nationals. He takes the view that the Commission's argument that the expulsion is an administrative act 
and not an additional punishment is "too formalistic". He adds that ”[i]n reality expulsion is often a more 
heavy punishment than a prison sentence. In many cases it totally upsets the life of the person concerned." 
Idem, p. 105. These measures could be also be assessed by comparison with the measures imposed on 
nationals. If the latter are considered satisfactory to prevent crime by nationals, why should additional 
measures be necessary in relation to foreign nationals? Should expulsion measures be a proper alternative 
to a reform of criminal policy? In any case, the eventual relevance of this observation in the light of the 
E.C.H.R. can only be sustained through the relation of discriminatory treatment with another provision of 
the Convention, besides Article 14. That is precisely what Schermers did.
94 Article 5 (1) (0-
95 On the rights of accused persons under Article 6 of the E.C.H.R., see Stavros, S., The Guarantees fo r  
Accused Persons under Article 6 o f  the European Convention o f  Human Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1993.
96 Applications No.7289/75 and 7349/75, X  and Y v. Switzerland, D&R, No.9, 1978, p.57; No.8244/79, 
Uppal v. United Kingdom, D&R, No. 17, 1980, p. 149; and 7729/76, Agee v. United Kingdom, D&R, 
No.7, 1977, p.164, respectively. See also, for a similar decision in a case of extradition. Application 
No. 13930/88, Commission decision of 11/3/1989, D&R, No.60,1989, p.272.
97 As far as criminal actions are concerned, see also Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the E.C.H.R (of 1984, 
ETS, No. 117); as well as Article 7 of the E.C.H.R. itself. On the latter see, e.g., Jamil v. France, 
Application No. 15917/89, judgment of the Court of 8/6/1995, Series A, Vol.320. It concerns a Brazilian 
national who was condemned in France under a criminal law applied retrospectively. Such application 
was found in breach of Article 7(1) of the E.C.H.R.
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country nationals, when they are subject to a deportation order, taken as a consequence of 
criminal proceedings. These proceedings have to conform to Article 6.98 
Article 12 provides that:
"Men and women of marriageable age have the right to many and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right."
This Article has been invoked against deportation orders, but, according to the 
Commission of Human Rights, this right has to be read subject to Article 5 (l)(f), above 
quoted, which provides for the arrest or detention of a person "against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."99 10
In the Fourth Protocol to the E.C.H.R., Article 2 guarantees the free movement 
and residence within the territory of a State of everyone lawfully present there. This right, 
however, can be subject to restrictions, if these are made,
"in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the 
prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
rights and freedoms of others."
Article 4 of the same Protocol prohibits the "collective expulsion of aliens". No 
reservation or qualification is made to this rule. Yet, it has been held not applicable to 
cases of expulsion of groups of aliens, when such expulsion is based on a reasonable and 
objective examination of the particular cases of each individual aliens.*00
Finally, Article 1 of the Seventh Protocol to the E.C.H.R. gives minimum 
procedural guarantees to aliens in relation to their expulsion, provided they are lawfully 
resident in the State.101 Their expulsion shall be made only "in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with the law”, and after they have been allowed to submit reasons 
against the expulsion, have their case reviewed, and be represented for these purposes 
before the competent authority or persons designated by the latter. The person may be 
expelled before the exercise of these rights, "when such expulsion is necessary in the 
interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security".
98 This was confirmed in case SaYdi, a Tunisian national who had been sentenced to 8 years of 
imprisonment and permanent exclusion from French territory. The Court of Human Rights considered 
that France had violated Article 6(1) and (3)(f) of the E.C.H.R. because it had failed to organise a 
confrontation with the prosecutor witness, whose statements constituted the sole basis for the applicant's 
conviction for drug trafficking, therefore depriving him in certain respects of a fair trial. See case Saidi, 
Application No. 14647/89, judgment of the Court of 20/9/1993, Series A, Vol.261*C.
99 See Applications No.7175/75, X v. Germany, D&R, No.6,1977, p.138. No. 7031/75, X v. Switzerland, 
idem, p.124, and No.5269/71, X & Y v. United Kingdom, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.15,1972, p.564.
100 Application No.7011/75, Becker V. Denmark, XIX Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.19, 1976, p.416, at 454; 
and D&R, No.4, 1976, p.215 at 235. This case dealt with the expulsion of 199 Vietnamese children who 
had been temporarily placed in an hostel in Denmark. On mass expulsion of aliens, see generally 
Henckaerts, Jean-Marie "The Current Status and Content of the Prohibition of Mass Expulsion of Aliens", 
HRLJ, Vol.15, 30/11/1994, No.8-10, pp.301-317. For a more detailed analysis of the topic see his "Mass 
Expulsion in Modem International Law and Practice", Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff. 1995.
101 It may be argue that the legality of their residence includes not only the respect by the individual of 
the relevant national legislation, but also the respect by the State of residence of the rules of the E.C.H.R. 
and its Protocols, which bind that State. See Plender, op.cit., p.236.
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As we have seen, the E.C.H.R. was not drafted specifically to provide protection 
to migrants, nor, in general terms, to third country nationals living in the Contracting 
Parties. Nevertheless, the Convention has a considerable importance for the protection of 
the rights of such persons. Such importance derives not only from the mere content of its 
rules. It derives also from the interpretation given to them by the Commission and Court 
of Human Rights, as well as from its binding system of enforcement. It is certainly true 
that, in some cases, the Commission and the Court could have done more to protect the 
rights of third country nationals. However, on several occasions they have also granted 
considerable protection to them. Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten that, as in relation to 
any other rule of Law, the real effect of the case-law of the E.C.H.R. transcends the cases 
that are actually decided by the judicial authorities. It is clear that, in spite of its 
limitations, the E.C.H.R. has had a practical influence on respect of the rights of third 
country nationals in the European Union.102
b) Other Conventions of the Council of Europe
Besides the E.C.H.R., there are other Conventions adopted within the framework 
of the Council of Europe that are of relevance to the legal status of third country nationals 
in Member States of the European Union. However, while the E.C.H.R. applies to 
everyone "within the jurisdiction" of the Contracting Parties, the following Conventions 
usually apply only to nationals of the Contracting Parties. In almost all cases this means 
that these Conventions apply only to States members of the Council of Europe that have 
ratified the Conventions.103 Their relevance, for the purposes of this thesis lies in the fact 
that some members of the Council of Europe are not Member States of the European 
Union. The Conventions are particularly important when they cover not only nationals of 
EEA countries (which, when their countries are not Member States of the European 
Union, benefit basically from the same rights as the nationals of those member States), but 
also nationals of Turkey. Furthermore, with the recent entry in the Council of Europe of 
States of Central and Eastern Europe, the Conventions to be examined below may also 
apply to these States, to the extent that they have ratified or will ratify them.
102 See, for example, the friendly settlement reached in application 15671/89, Abbas v. France, on the 
expulsion of an Algerian national who had lived in France from the age of three. His expulsion order was 
annulled and he was grant a residence permit - see Council of Europe information Sheet-human rights, 
No.31, June-December 1992, Strasbourg 1994, at p.48. See also (he 10 migration cases, "struck off the 
list" due to attainment of a satisfying solution to the applicants. These cases concerned (namely) the 
expulsion of integrated aliens and asylum-seekers - see Council o f  Europe Information Sheet-human 
rights, No.33, July-December 1993, Strasbourg 1994, at p.47(point D.l), and Council o f  Europe 
Information Sheet-human rights, No.34, January-June 1994, Strasbourg 1994, at p.69. See, finally, the 
case of Application No. 22903/93, D.R. v. France, D&R, No.76-A, 1994, p.174. It concerned an 
instruction to leave the country issued to an Algerian, member of the "F.I.S." and condemned to death in 
his country. The case was struck off the list, due the achievement of a solution satisfactory to the 
applicant. As far as decisions of national court are concerned, see, e.g., the judgment of 26/11/1993, of the 
French administrative court of Versailles, in case Teguig v. Préfet de Versailles, which annulled an 
expulsion order of an Algerian woman who cohabited with a French citizen, from whom she was 
pregnant, and with whom she wanted to marry. See Plein Droit, No.24, 1994, p. 37.
103 In some cases, the Conventions are open to accession by States that are not members of the Council of 
Europe.
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(i) European Convention on Establishment104
This Convention was concluded in 1955 and its interest goes beyond its immediate 
practical effect. Its interest lies in the fact that it is a Convention of wide scope, and that it 
has influenced some other instruments on similar matters, notably later EEC rules on free 
movement of persons. The Convention deals with the admission, expulsion, and legal 
status of physical persons who are nationals of one Party in the territory of another Party. 
The rules on their legal status cover a broad range of domains, including their conditions 
of access to a gainful activity. However, the Convention has significant limits. First, most 
of its provisions granting rights to foreigners are qualified or subject to reserve clauses 
that diminish their practical effect. According to Section I of the Protocol to the 
Convention,105 each Party has the right to judge by national criteria the meaning of most 
of such qualifications and reservations. Furthermore, the Convention applies only to 
nationals of the Contracting Parties - which are at present Turkey, Norway and 10 
Member States of the European Union.106 Finally, its enforcement mechanism is rather 
weak. There is no possibility to present individual complaints. A Standing Committee 
composed of representatives of the Parties is charged only with formulating proposals to 
improve the practical implementation of the Convention and, if necessary, to amend or 
supplement its provisions. The Committee publishes also a periodical report on laws and 
regulation related to the matters dealt with by the Convention. In case of disputes between 
States Parties on the interpretation and application of the Convention, recourse is to be 
made to the International Court of Justice, or, for the States that ratified it, to the 
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, of 1957.107
Article 1 of the Convention provides that each Party shall facilitate to nationals of 
other Parties the entry in its territory for the purposes of temporary visits, and shall permit 
them to travel freely within such territory, except when that will be contrary to "ordre 
public, national security, public health or morality". This provision was a precedent of the 
limitation on grounds of public policy, public security and public health to the free
104 ETS, No. 19; UNTS. Vol.529, p.141.
105 Which, according to Article 32 of the Convention, "shall form an integral part of it".
106 AM Member States, except Austria, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain. The Convention applies in 
principle only to metropolitan territories of the Contracting Parties, unless these declare that it applies to 
non-metropolitan territories. See Articles 29 and 30. Note also that Piender, op.cit., pp.238-9, recalls that 
there is some support for the view that the rules of the Convention could be extended to nationals of 
countries not Party to the Convention, through the invocation of "most favoured nation" clauses included 
in other treaties. Piender, however, seems to take the view that, given the objectives of the Convention 
(e.g. as declared in its Preamble), such use of the "most favoured nation clause" should be allowed among 
States members of the Council of Europe. In any case, unlike what happens in trade agreements, "most 
favoured nation" clauses do not seem to be very common in treaties related to the matters of this 
Convention.
107 Nq.23, ratified by 13 States, including Malta, Norway, Switzerland and all Member States, 
except Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The States that did ratify both this 
Convention and the European Convention on Establishment are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These are the States that are 
committed to use the provisions of the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, instead of 
having recourse to the International Court of Justice in order to settle disputes on the Convention on 
Establishment.
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movement of workers within the Community.108 Article 2 refers that subject to those 
limitations and to "the extent permitted by its economic and social conditions", each Party 
shall "facilitate the prolonged or permanent residence in its territory of nationals of other 
parties". Article 3 establishes several limits to the possibility of expulsion of persons 
"lawfully resident". Paragraph 1 provides that nationals of any Contracting Party lawfully 
residing in the territory of another Party can be expelled "only if they endanger national 
security or offend against ordre public or morality". According to paragraph 2, in the case 
of expulsion of a person lawfully resident for two years, that person has the right to submit 
reasons against such expulsion, to appeal to, and to be represented before a competent 
authority, or persons designated by the latter. Finally, paragraph 3 establishes that 
"nationals of any Contracting Party lawfully residing for more than ten years in the 
territory of any other Party may only be expelled for reasons of national security", or due 
to reasons related to their offence against ordre public or morality, if those reasons "are of 
a particularly serious nature".
Furthermore, the Convention provides for a principle of equality of treatment in 
the host country between nationals of the latter and nationals of other Contracting Parties. 
This principle applies to a wide range of matters, including: the possession and exercise of 
private rights, including rights related to property (in the latter case safe for reasons of 
national security or defence); legal and judicial protection of property, persons, rights and 
interests, including the right of access to the competent judicial and administrative 
authority, the right to obtain legal assistance and even legal aid; the right to admission to 
primary and secondary education and technical and vocational training (but not granting of 
scholarships); taxation; compulsory civil service; and also expropriation and 
nationalisation of property.
The equality principle applies also to several aspects related to the taking up and 
exercise of gainful occupations. Save for "cogent economic or social reasons",109 the 
equality principle applies to authorisations to engage in gainful occupations, for both self- 
employed and employed persons, and including, inter alia, "industrial, commercial, 
financial and agricultural occupations, skilled crafts and the professions."110 The 
authorities of the host countries cannot apply the mentioned restrictions on economic and 
social grounds if the persons were "lawfully engaged in a gainful occupation (...) for an 
uninterrupted period of five years"; or "have lawfully resided [there] for an uninterrupted 
period of ten years"; or if "they have been admitted to permanent residence".111 The effect 
of this provision can be limited under specified conditions, through a declaration made by 
the Parties at the signature or deposit of the instrument of ratification of the 
Convention.112 Another possible restriction is that of Article 13 of the Convention, which
108 Article 48(3) of the EC Treaty. See Plender, op. cit., p.238.
109 See also Article 14, which regulates the case of past restrictions and establishes a stand-still clause for 
restrictions on the exercise of gainful occupations, safe for "imperative reasons of an economic and social 
character."
110 Article 10. Article 16 of the Convention regulates the case of commercial travellers "employed by an 
undertaking whose principal place of business is situated in the territory of a Contracting Party". They do 
not need authorisation to exercise their occupation in the territory of another Party, "provided they do not 
reside therein for more than two months during any half-year."
1,1 Article 12(1).
112 See Article 12 (2). i
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reminds Article 48(4) o f the EC Treaty, excluding employment in the public service from 
the scope o f EC rules on free movement of workers. Article 13 of the European 
Convention on Establishment allows Parties to
"reserve for its own nationals the exercise of public functions or of occupations 
connected with national security or defence, or make the exercise of these 
occupations by aliens subject to special conditions."
This reminds more the EC's Court of Justice interpretation o f Article 48(4) of the EC 
Treaty, according to which free movement of workers is only excluded in relation to 
"posts which involve direct and indirect participation in the exercise of powers 
conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of 
the State or of other public authorities''.113
On the other hand, under the European Convention on Establishment, the principle of 
equality of treatment applies also in the case that the exercise of an occupation is 
submitted to the production of guarantees and the possession of professional and technical 
qualifications.114 However, the Convention contains no rules for the recognition of 
diplomas or periods o f studies.
As far as the exercise o f occupations is concerned, an important point is that 
equality of treatment applies to "statutory regulation by a public authority concerning 
wages and working conditions in general".115 Likewise, Parties cannot forbid nationals of 
another Party to be electors on equal conditions to nationals of the host country, in 
elections to economic and professional bodies or organisations. However, this is valid only 
for persons who have been lawfully engaged in an appropriate occupation for at least five 
years, and subject to decisions that such bodies or organisations take within their limits of 
competence.116
(ii) European Social Charter117
The European Social Charter was adopted in 1961 and complements the 
protection o f rights ensured by the E.C.H.R. The Charter is generally regarded as having 
had an important influence in the harmonisation of social policies in Western Europe. It 
protects a wide range of social and economic rights, including rights regarding work and 
workers (including children, young persons and women workers); the right to vocational 
guidance; to vocational training; to protection of health; to social security; to social and 
medical assistance; to benefit from social welfare services; rights of physically or mentally 
disabled persons; to social, legal and economic protection of the family; and to the right of 
mothers and children to social and economic protection.118
1 1 3  Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium, [19801 ECR 3881, at 3900.
1 1 4  Article 15.
1 1 5  Article 17
1 1 6  Article 18.
11 7  ETS, No.35. Adopted in 1961, it was ratified by 20 States, including Turkey and all Member States. 
See Niessen, Jan & de Lary de Latour, H. "Equality of treatment: the European Social Charter and the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers", in The use o f  international conventions..., 
op. cit., at pp. 93-101.
1 1 8  The Additional Protocol to the Charter of 1988 (ETS, No. 128) protects further rights: the right to 
equal treatment for both sexes in matters of employment and occupation; the right to information and 
consultation of workers within the undertakings; the right to take part in the determination and 
improvement of the working conditions and working environment in the undertaking, and the right of
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Each State is obliged to accept only a part of the Charter provisions, comprising at 
least 5 out of 7 fundamental Articles. Among the latter there is Article 19 of the Charter, 
on the ’’right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance". This 
provision is based in large part on the ILO Convention No.97, examined above; but it 
applies also to self-employed migrants, where appropriate.119 Article 19 includes general 
rules obliging Member States to provide adequate and free services to assist migrant 
workers; to adopt measures to facilitate the departure, journey and reception of such 
workers and their families; and to promote cooperation "between social services, public 
and private, in emigration and immigration matters". Governments will also allow, "within 
legal limits", the transfer of such parts of earnings and savings of migrant workers "as they 
may desire". Migrant workers who are lawfully residents are not to be expelled "unless 
they endanger national security or offend against public interest or morality". Article 19(6) 
provides that the Contracting Parties shall facilitate "as far as possible the reunion of the 
family of a foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the territory". The Annex to 
the Charter specifies that "family o f a foreign worker" is understood to mean at least his 
wife and dependent children under the age o f 21 years.
Moreover, Article 19(4) establishes the principle o f equality o f treatment between 
regular migrant workers and nationals of the host country. This principle applies to 
remuneration and other employment and working conditions (but not access to 
employment); to membership of trade unions and enjoyment of the benefits of collective 
bargaining; and to accommodation. However, this equality principle is to be guaranteed 
only in so far as such matters are regulated by law or regulation, or when they are subject 
to the control of administrative authorities. The equality principle applies also to 
"employment taxes, dues or contributions payable in respect o f employed persons",120 and 
to "legal proceedings referring to matters" dealt with in the very Article 19 of the 
Charter.121
Article 18 o f the Charter is also important for migrants. It establishes that the 
Parties shall apply existing regulations in a spirit of liberality, with a view "to ensuring the 
effective exercise of the right to engage in a gainful occupation in the territory of any other 
Contracting Party".
The European Social Charter applies to foreigners but "only in so far as they are 
nationals o f other Contracting Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the 
territory of the Contracting Party concerned", subject to the understanding that "Articles 1 
to 17 are to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19",122 these 
provisions referring specifically to the rights o f migrant workers and their families. The 
European Social Charter applies to third country nationals residing in the Member States 
o f the European Union, provided they are nationals of States members of the Council of
elderly persons to social protection. It has the same personal scope of the Charter and a similar system of 
supervision of enforcement. However, it was ratified by 6  States only: Austria, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden and Norway.
1 1 9  Contrary to that Convention, see Article 11 of the latter - which excludes workers employed on their 
own account.
1 2 0  Article 19(5).
121 Article 19 (7).
1 2 2  Appendix to the Social Charter. Note that the annex to the Additional Protocol contains a similar 
provision.
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Europe, like Turkey. However, a recent draft for a revised Social Charter123 proposes to 
extend its scope in a manner similar to that of the E.C.H.R.. It would apply to all persons 
whatever their nationality, while keeping the condition that they must be lawfully resident 
or working regularly within the territory of a Party.124 Finally, note that the Preamble of 
the Social Charter mentions that the enjoyment of social rights should be secured
"without discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin”.125
The supervisory mechanism of the Charter is based on biannual governmental 
reports, analysed by a committee o f experts, whose conclusions are submitted to a 
committee o f the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council o f Europe and to a sub­
committee o f  the Governmental Social Committee. The conclusions of the latter, together 
with the report o f the committee o f experts, are submitted to the Committee o f Ministers. 
This, by a majority of two-thirds o f its members, and after consultation with the 
Parliamentary Assembly, may adopt recommendations. These recommendations and the 
interpretations o f the mentioned committees are not legally binding in formal terms, but 
governments usually "try to avoid appearing as not fully and correctly implementing the 
Charter'*.126
(ill) European Convention on Social Security127
This Convention, concluded in December 1972, is a complement of the European 
Code on Social Security,128 concluded in 1964 also in the framework of the Council of 
Europe. The latter, in its Article 73, refers to the need for a specific instrument on social 
security for migrants and aliens, in order to secure the preservation of acquired rights and 
the establishment o f the principle o f equality of treatment with nationals of host countries. 
The European Convention on Social Security was drafted with this aim in mind, and thus 
is an important contribution to the elimination of legal obstacles for mobility within 
Europe.129
123  Which would bring together all rights guaranteed in the 1961 Charter and the 1988 Additional 
Protocol to it.
1 2 4  See Council of Europe information Sheet-human rights, No.35, July-December 1994, Strasbourg 
1995, at p. 106-107. However the governments of the State members of the Council of Europe have not 
accepted that idea. See the reaction to this of the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly in 
Opinion No. 185 (1995) on the draft revised European Social Charter, adopted on behalf of the Assembly, 
on 15 March 1995 - See the Council of Europe Information Sheet-human rights. No.36, January-June 
1995, Strasbourg, 1995, pp.80-1.
1 2 5  Third recital, emphasis added.
1 2 6  See Niessen & de Lary de Latour, op. cit., at p. 96.
1 2 7  ETS, No.78. It was ratified by Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Turkey. A Supplementary Agreement to this Convention regulates relations between social security 
institutions and the procedures for the provision of benefits granted by the Convention. The 
Supplementary Agreement was concluded on the same date and was ratified by the same States that 
ratified the Convention, ETS, No.78 A. In 1994, a Protocol to the Convention was concluded, ETS, 
No. 154. It was signed only by 2 States and has so far been ratified by none.
1 2 8  ETS, No.48. It was ratified by 17 States, including Turkey and all Member States, except Austria and 
Finland. A new European Code of Social Security was concluded in 1990, ETS, No. 139. However, it has 
not yet been ratified by any country, although 14 States have signed it.
1 2 9  Plender, op. cit., p.251.
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It is an extensive and elaborated document that applies to legislation in several 
fields of social security: sickness and maternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age 
benefits, survivors' benefits, benefits in respect o f occupational injuries and diseases, death 
grants and unemployment and family benefits.130 However, the Convention does not apply 
to social or medical assistance schemes, to benefit schemes for victims of war or its 
consequences, or to special schemes for civil servants or persons treated as such.131 The 
personal scope o f the Convention is similar to that of EEC  Regulation 1408/71.132 It 
applies to all nationals o f Contracting Parties and refugees who have been subject to the 
legislation of one or more such Parties, including self-employed persons. It applies also to 
survivors o f persons subject to such legislation, whatever the nationality of the latter, 
provided the survivors are nationals o f a Contracting Party or refugees or stateless 
persons. Moreover, it applies also to civil servants and assimilated persons who are subject 
to the legislation of a Contracting Party.
The Convention establishes the general principle that persons to whom the 
Convention applies, and who are resident in the territory of a Contracting Party,
"shall have the same rights and obligations under the legislation of every 
Contracting Party as the nationals of such Party."133 
This general principle is subject to some qualifications. For example: the granting of non- 
contributory benefits, the amount of which does not depend on the length of the period of 
residence, may, within specific limits, be conditioned to a certain period o f residence in the 
territory of the relevant country. Subsequent provisions of the Convention define the law 
applicable for each case134 and deal in detail with each type of benefit and situation.135 
The Convention and its Supplementary Agreement have the objective o f making possible 
the aggregation o f benefits, both as far as contributory and non-contributory schemes are 
concerned. Furthermore, the Convention establishes that periods o f insurance completed 
under the legislation o f  other Contracting Parties must be taken into account for the 
acquisition, maintenance or recovery o f the right to the benefit. It provides also that the 
benefits shall be provided in the territory o f another Contracting Party.
Only some provisions o f this Convention are applicable from its entry into force. 
The implementation o f other provisions depends from the conclusion of subsequent 
agreements between the Parties, for which the Convention is supposed to function as a 
model.
1 3 0  Article 2.
131 Article 2(4). See also paragraph (5).
1 3 2  Article 2(1). OJ L 149/2 of 05/07/71. This Regulation is analysed later, in chapter 4, section A. The 
fundamental difference between the personal scope of the two instruments is that in Regulation 1408/71 
stateless persons are themselves entitled to rights under the Regulation, which is not the case in the 
Convention - see Article 4(1 )(a) of the latter.
1 3 3  Article 8(1).
1 3 4  Articles 14 ff.
1 3 5  Articles 19 ff.
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(iv) European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers136
This Convention was concluded on November 1977 and is in force in 8 countries 
only: France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. It applies 
to migrant workers who are nationals o f one Contracting Party and who have been 
authorised by another Party "to reside in its territory in order to take up paid 
employment.''137 However, it does not apply to frontier workers, artists138 and members 
o f liberal professions, seamen, trainees, seasonal workers, or to workers
"who are nationals of a Contracting Party, carrying out specific work in the 
territory of another Contracting Party on behalf of an undertaking having its 
registered office outside the territory of that Contracting Party".139
The Convention provides for protection of such migrant workers in their migration 
to work in another country (including their recruitment, travel to and establishment in that 
country), in their life in the host country, and in their eventual return to the country of 
origin.
As far as their migration is concerned, the Parties undertake to respect the right of 
migrant workers to leave their country of origin and also their right of admission in 
another Party to take paid employment there, when the worker has been authorised to 
take that employment and obtained the necessary documents to that effect. Although these 
rights are not exactly a major novelty, they are, nevertheless, subject to legal limitations 
for the protection o f "national security, public order, public health or morals". If  the 
recruitment o f the worker is made through unnamed requests it shall be effected through 
an official authority o f the country of origin. Before the departure, each migrant worker is 
to be provided with a contract o f employment or a definite offer of employment in the 
language of the country of origin, and is also to be informed on several aspects of the life 
and regulations o f the receiving country that may be of relevance for the worker and his or 
her family. Likewise, each Party shall prevent misleading propaganda related to emigration 
and immigration. Finally, in the case of a official collective recruitment, migrant workers 
are not to pay the costs of the travel to the receiving country.
As far as their reception and establishment in the receiving country are concerned, 
there are rules on the issue and renew of work and residence permits and rules on other 
more general aspects.
When a migrant worker is authorised to take up paid employment in a State, he is 
to be issued a work permit or to have his or her former one renewed, unless such permit is 
not necessary. When the work permit is issued for the first time, "as a rule" it may not bind 
the worker to the same employer or the same locality for more than one year. The renewal 
o f a work permit shall not be for less than one year, but this is so only "as a general rule" 
and "insofar as the current state and development of the employment situation permits".
136 e TS. No.93. The Convention was signed on 24 November 1977 and entered in force in 1 May 1983. 
It was ratified by 8  States: France (with reservations), Italy, Netherlands (with territorial declarations and 
also with reservations), Norway (with reservations too), Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey.
1 3 7  This contrasts with the European Convention on Establishment, which, as mentioned supra, applies 
also to self-employed persons.
1 38  Except "entertainers and sportsmen engaged for a short period."
1 3 9  Article 1(2) (0-
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As far as residence permits are concerned, they are to be issued to migrant 
workers, when they are required by national legislation and when such workers were 
authorised to take employment in the country concerned. The validity of the residence 
permits is, "as a general rule", at least so long as that of their work permit. When the work 
permit is o f an indefinite validity, the residence permit shall, again "as a general rule", be 
issued or renewed for at least one year. Similar provisions apply also to relatives of the 
worker authorised to join under the Convention. The residence permits issued according 
to these rules, may be withdrawn under certain conditions, namely for reasons o f national 
security, public policy or morals; if the holder, conscious o f the consequences, refuses to 
comply with measures for the protection of public health; and also if "a condition essential 
to its issue or validity is not fulfilled." The Convention regulates also the case in which a 
migrant worker is no longer in employment, either because he is involuntarily unemployed, 
or because he is temporarily incapable to work due to illness or accident. In such cases, 
the worker shall be allowed to remain in the host country for not less than five months for 
the purposes o f re-employment; but even less, if an unemployment allowance is paid to 
him only for a shorter period.140
Under certain conditions, the right to family reunion is provided to the spouse of 
the worker and to their unmarried children, when these are dependent on the worker and 
are considered to be minors in the host country law. These workers' relatives are entitled 
to residence permits under the same rules as those applicable to the workers themselves.
Besides these rules on work and residence permits, the Convention provides that, 
at their arrival, migrant workers shall be given all appropriate information and advice, as 
well as assistance necessary for their settlement and adaptation, namely from social 
services and employment services. The authorities of the host country shall also facilitate 
to workers and their relatives the teaching of the language of that country.
As far as their life in the host country is concerned, the Convention provides for 
special protection of migrant workers and establishes the principle that in a wide range of 
matters migrant workers will be treated equally to nationals of the host country.141 
However, there are often some qualifications to this principle.
The equality o f treatment principle applies to social security (subject to rules of 
national legislation and international treaties); to entitlement to education (including 
general and higher education, and vocational training and retraining - but not regarding 
access to scholarships142); to matters related to legal proceedings, including legal 
assistance; to access to housing and rents, insofar as covered by domestic laws and 
regulations; to inspection o f standards o f accommodation; to taxation;143 and to the right
1 4 0  Article 9.
141 The duty of equal treatment seems to go beyond the mere enactment of rules equally applicable to 
nationals and migrant workers and to require equal treatment in practice. This is apparent from the fact 
that the wording of the provisions insist on the word ’treatment*, even when referring to matters which are 
covered by laws and regulations. Apparently pointing in the same direction, although only in relation to 
the equality of treatment on working conditions, see Plender, op. cit., p. 256.
1 4 2  In relation to which the Contracting Parties are required only to make efforts to grant children of 
migrant workers the same facilities of children of the State's nationals. See Article 14(3).
1 4 3  The principle applies to "duties, charges, taxes or contributions of any description whatsoever", and 
even deductions, exemptions and allowances, including allowances for dependants. Yet, it is not clear 
whether migrant workers can claim allowances for dependants which do not reside in the host country.
of organising themselves for the protection of economic and social interests. An important 
rule of the Convention is that in which Parties undertake to ensure that the workers and 
their families may "worship freely, in accordance with their faith". Likewise, it is also 
provided that "each Contracting Party shall facilitate such worship, within the limits of 
available means".
As far as labour matters are concerned, the equality principle applies to working 
conditions144 and their inspection; to the application o f laws and collective agreements on 
prevention o f industrial accidents and o f occupational diseases, and on industrial hygiene; 
to occupational rehabilitation when a worker has an industrial accident or gets an 
occupational disease; to the expiry or cancellation o f the work contract and on individual 
or collective dismissals, as regulated by national legislation or collective agreements; and 
to the use of employment services. Parties shall also facilitate, "as far as possible", the 
participation of migrant workers in the affairs of the undertakings, on the same conditions 
as national workers.
In addition to the principle of equal treatment, the Convention provides for specific 
rights to migrant workers and their families, which take in consideration their situation and 
needs. The workers are entitled to the transfer of all or such parts of earnings and savings 
as they may wish, including when they leave the host country. They are to be protected 
against exploitation in respect of rents (according to relevant laws and regulations). 
Furthermore, Parties are to "take action by common accord to arrange, so far as 
practicable" that migrant worker’s children are taught the migrant worker's mother tongue. 
In legal proceedings, migrant workers may obtain an interpreter where they cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court. If the worker loses his job  "for reasons 
beyond his control, like redundancy or prolonged illness," the competent authorities o f the 
host country "shall facilitate his re-employment, in accordance with national laws and 
regulations", namely through vocational training and occupational rehabilitation. Finally, 
each Party shall "take care (...) that steps are taken to provide all help and assistance 
necessary for the transport to the State of origin of the bodies of migrant workers 
deceased as a result o f an industrial accident".
Special protection is also provided regarding the return o f (living) workers and 
their families to their country of origin. On the return o f migrant workers and their 
families, each Party shall assist them "as far as possible”. The host country "shall 
endeavour to ensure" that vocational training and retraining "cater as far as possible for 
the needs o f migrant workers with a view to their return to their State of origin". 
Furthermore, the teaching to the children o f the worker of the mother tongue of the latter 
is meant "to facilitate, inter alia, their return to their country of origin". Their State of 
origin shall provide information on matters relevant for their return - including possibilities 
of employment, maintenance of social security rights acquired abroad and equivalence of 
educational and occupational qualifications.
Reservations to the Convention are possible, but not regarding more than nine 
Articles among its substantive rules. In any case it is not possible to formulate reservations 
in relation to Articles 4  (right o f exit and admission), 8 and 9 (on issue of work and
1 4 4  As regulated by legislative or administrative provisions, collective labour agreements or custom. But 
there is no possibility to derogate from this equality rule by individual contract.
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residence permits), 12 (family reunion), 16 and 17 (working conditions and transfer o f 
earnings and savings), 20 (on prevention o f industrial accidents and occupational diseases 
and on industrial hygiene), 25 (on facilitation of re-employment) and 26 (equality of access 
to the courts and administrative authorities).
The enforcement system of the Convention is not very strong. The Convention 
created a Consultative Committee made up of one representative of each Contracting 
Party. The Committee has the task of examining proposals presented by the Contracting 
Parties to facilitate or improve the application of the Convention, as well as to amend it. 
Furthermore, it is charged with preparing periodically for the Committee of Ministers a 
report on the laws and regulations in force in the Contracting Parties in respect of the 
matters o f the Convention. Opinions, proposals or recommendations of the Consultative 
Committee are addressed to the Committee of Ministers, which decides on action to be 
taken. The Consultative Committee has asked the Committee o f Ministers to make the 
mentioned reports public. Parties to the Convention are not legally required to submit 
reports to the Consultative Committee, but the latter has taken the initiative of asking for 
such reports, a request which Parties have satisfied.145
This Convention covers a very wide range of subjects related to the life o f a 
migrant worker, but has important limits. It does not regulate the access of workers to the 
labour market of another country, nor does it provide for co-operation between 
employment services in relation to clearance o f vacancies.146 Besides, the personal scope 
o f the Convention is limited. It only protects nationals of the Contracting Parties and does 
not protect increasingly important categories of migrant workers: like self-employed 
workers, frontier and seasonal workers, and even undocumented migrants, who are 
covered by the UN Convention on All Migrant Workers. Furthermore, often the rights 
granted by the Convention are formulated and qualified in such a way as to diminish their 
practical relevance. Some times they are not much more than the repetition of previously 
acquired rights, like the right to leave one's own country, or to be admitted in a country 
...once authorised to work there; or to have diplomas and vocational qualifications 
recognised ...in accordance with bilateral and multilateral agreements.147 Moreover, the 
enforcement mechanism is weak for the position of the worker, as it does not provide, for 
example, for individual complaints to the Consultative Committee.
There is another noteworthy point. One of the main types o f migration envisaged 
in the Convention is migration for employment whereby workers are hired in their 
countries o f origin through public employment services. The problem is that, although this 
Convention started to be negotiated in the second half of the sixties, it was concluded in 
1977 and entered in force only in May 1983. The importance of this type of migration had 
been diminishing since the middle o f the seventies and virtually disappeared in the 
eighties.148 This Convention came too late to be o f a crucial importance to migrants in
1 4 5  Niessen & de Lary de Latour, op. ciL, at p. 100.
1 4 6  Plender, op.cit., p.251.
1 4 7  Article 14(4).
1 4 8  Niessen & de Lary de Latour, op. cit., p, 97. It may also be recalled that in the eighties Greece, 
Portugal and Spain acceded to the European Communities. The legal status of their immigrants in 
Member States was from there onwards regulated by Community Law.
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Europe. This is particularly true for the status of third country nationals in Member States. 
Among the present parties to the Convention, only in respect to Turkey are the rules of 
the EC Treaty, or of the EEA Agreement not in force.
(v) Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level149
A quite interesting instrument adopted within the Council o f Europe is the 
Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level. Its Preamble 
states that this Convention was based, inter alia, on the fact that "the residence of 
foreigners on the national territory is now a permanent feature of European societies". 
Moreover, the Preamble declares that the Contracting Parties were convinced o f the 
"need" to improve the participation of foreign residents in the local community, "especially 
by enhancing the possibilities for them to participate in local public affairs".
The Convention applies therefore to "foreign residents", and according to its 
Article 2, this term means "persons who are not nationals of the State and who are 
lawfully resident on its territory".
The substantive provisions o f the Convention are divided in three chapters: 
Chapter A, on freedom of expression, assembly and association, and on involvement in 
processes of consultation on local matters; Chapter B, on the creation of consultative 
bodies to represent foreign residents at local level; and Chapter C, on the right to vote and 
to be elected in local authority elections.
Only Chapter A is obligatory. By a declaration on the occasion o f the deposit of 
the instrument o f ratification,150 the Contracting Parties may declare that they are not 
bound by Chapter B  of the Convention, or by its Chapter C, or by neither of them. This 
last possibility may appear slightly odd as the innovative content of Chapter A is not very 
substantial.
In Chapter A, Article 3 provides that each Party guarantees to foreign residents the 
rights to freedom o f expression, of peaceful assembly, and of association (including to 
form and to join trade unions),"on the same terms as to its nationals". The rights to these 
freedoms are defined in the same manner as that made in the corresponding provisions of 
the E.C.H.R.151 However, Article 3(b) adds that the right to freedom of association shall 
imply the right o f foreign residents to form and join "local associations for their own 
purposes o f mutual assistance, maintenance and expression of their cultural identity or 
defence of their interests", but only "in relation to matters falling within the province of the
1 4 9  ETS, No. 144.
1 5 0  Or the instrument of acceptance, approval or accession, as the case may be.
151 Article 3(a) of the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Local Life (providing for freedom 
of expression) is equivalent to Article 10(1) of the E.C.H.R. Moreover, the first phrase of Article 3(b) of 
the former Convention (providing for freedom of peaceful assembly and of association) is based on Article 
11(1) of the E.C.H.R. Likewise, the restrictions made by the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners 
to the rights to such freedoms - in its Article 9(2) and 9(3), respectively - are based on the restrictions 
made to the corresponding provisions of the E.C.H.R. - Article 10(2) and Article 11(2) of the latter, 
respectively. Note, however, that there is a slight difference between Article 11(2) of the E.C.H.R. and 
Article 9(3) of the Convention on Participation of Foreigners. The latter does not provide that the exercise 
of the right to peaceful assembly and to association can be restricted by law in the case of members of the 
armed forces, of the police (who usually are not foreigners) or of members of the administration of the 
state (who can more easily be foreigners). Under Article 11(2) of the E.C.H.R., such restriction is possible.
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local authority”. The other provision of chapter A, Article 4 , provides that each 
Contracting Party "shall endeavour to ensure that reasonable efforts are made" so that 
foreign residents are involved "in public enquiries, planning procedures and other 
processes o f  consultation on local matters".
Chapter B regards the creation of local bodies of a consultative type to represent 
foreigners. Each Party is bound to ensure that there are no legal obstacles to prevent local 
authorities from setting up such bodies, in areas where "there is a substantial number of 
foreign residents". Those bodies, or other "appropriate institutional arrangements", refer 
to bodies designed to form a link between the local authorities and foreign residents, to 
discuss and express opinions of foreign residents on matters of the "local public life" 
(including those related to the local authority concerned), and, in general terms, to foster 
the integration o f foreign residents "into the life of the community". Each Party shall also 
encourage and facilitate the establishment o f  such consultative bodies, and ensure that 
foreign residents, or their associations, can elect or appoint representatives to those 
bodies.
Chapter C is the most innovative o f the Convention. It provides for the right of 
foreign residents to vote and to be elected to local authorities. Article 6 provides that this 
right is granted to "every foreign resident", provided that he or she fulfils the same legal 
requirements applicable to nationals, and has been a "lawful and habitual resident" in the 
State for five years preceding the elections. Provision is made so that this period may be 
shortened, either unilaterally, or by bilateral or multilateral agreement. On the other hand, 
by a declaration on the occasion of deposit o f the instrument o f ratification, a Party may 
declare that a foreign resident can only vote in elections to local authorities, but cannot be 
elected to them. Likewise, according to Article 15, although the provisions o f the 
Convention apply in principle to "all categories o f local authorities existing within the 
territory o f each Party", when ratifying the Convention a Party may delimit the "territorial 
authorities1' to which the Convention applies, or exclude some o f such authorities from the 
scope o f the Convention.
Also o f  relevance is Article 8, according to which the Parties shall endeavour to 
ensure that information is available to foreign residents on their rights and obligations in 
relation to local public life.
Finally, according to Article 9 (1) of the Convention, the rights accorded to foreign 
residents may be subject to further restrictions, "in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life o f the nation". It is, nevertheless established that these restrictions shall 
not go beyond "the extent strictly required by the exigencies o f the situation".152 On the 
other hand. Article 9 (5) establishes that the Convention does not affect any other more 
favourable provisions on the rights granted by it.
This Convention is a very innovative instrument o f international Law. Its 
innovative character regards particularly the fact that is a multilateral instrument granting 
to "every foreign resident" the right to vote and to be elected for local authorities. 
However, although it was concluded in 1990, the Convention has been yet ratified only by
15 2  Article 17 provides that no other reservations may be made to the Convention, apart from the ones 
mentioned - which include the limiting and derogatory clauses explained in the main text, as well as the 
possibility to exclude Chapters B, or C, or both, from the commitment undertaken under the Convention.
46
Italy, Norway and Sweden.153 It is not in force, since four ratifications are required for 
this to occur.154
(vi) Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities155
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was opened 
for signature in February 1995. It was announced as the "first international treaty 
exclusively devoted to the protection o f national minorities to establish substantive legal 
principles and to incorporate a monitoring mechanism under international law for their 
implementation".156 The Convention is indeed a very useful element for the protection of 
national minorities, at least potentially. However, there was no consensus to define what is 
a national minority for its purposes. Some authors suggest that the Convention does not 
protect national minorities with a ethnic link to another country.157 In this case the 
Convention is not relevant for the purposes of this thesis; except to the extent that it may 
highlight the difference in the protection afforded to different minorities, according to 
whether or not their origin is within the boundaries o f the relevant country.158
(vii) Other Conventions
There are other Conventions o f the Council o f Europe which may be o f interest 
with regard to the legal status o f some third country nationals in the Member States of the 
European Union. These Conventions concern, for example, specific aspects of movement 
of persons between States members o f the Council o f Europe,159 and the equivalence of 
educational periods or diplomas, as well as the facilitation of such studies abroad.160
153 Denmark, Netherlands and the United Kingdom did sign the Convention, but did not ratify it yet.
1 54  Article 12( I) of the Convention.
155 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 November 1994, doc. H (94) 10. It was opened for 
signature on 1 February 1995. Up until October 1995 it had been ratified by Hungary, Romania, Slovakia 
and Spain and signed by 28 States including all Member States, except Belgium, France, Greece and 
Luxembourg. For its text see Council of Europe information Sheet-human rights, No.35, July-December
1994, Strasbourg, 1995, at p.147-153, and also HRLJ, Vol. 16, 1995, No. I-3, pp.98-115, including an 
explanatory memorandum to the Convention, at pp. 101 -108; and a comparative table with the 
Parliamentary Assembly proposal for an additional protocol to the E.C.H.R., at pp. 108-115. See also the 
introduction to the Convention made by Klebes, H., idem, pp.92-98. Note that there is also a European 
Charter for regional or minority languages, of 5 November 1992, ETS, No. 148. It is not in force and has 
been yet ratified only by Finland, Hungary and Norway. While this Charter is a positive document for the 
protection of the rights related to the use of minority languages, it has been criticised for implying 
"acceptance of the policy of assimilation for 'newcomers', rather than integration". In fact, not only is the 
protection of the Convention limited to nationals of the ratifying States, but it also allows these States to 
limit the protection of accepted provisions to users of only certain languages. Finally, it excludes 
languages of migrants from its protection. See Gomien, D. "The Rights of Minorities ...", op. cit., at p.59. 
See also Packer, John & Myntti, Kristian (eds.) The Protection o f  Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in 
Europe, Institute for Human Rights - Abo Akademi University, Turku/Abo, 1993; and Miall, Hugh (ed.) 
Minority Rights in Europe: The scope fo r  a transnational regime, London, Pinter, 1994.
1 5 6  See Council of Europe Information Sheet-human rights, No.35, July-December 1994, Strasbourg
1995, at p.80.
15 7  See Klebes. op. cit., p. 93. Cf. also with Capotorti, op. cit. at pp.95-6.
1 5 8  In the sense that "our" national minorities are considered more worthy of protection than "foreign" 
national minorities living among us.
1 5 9  European Agreement on Regulations Governing the Movement of Persons Between Member States of 
the Council of Europe, of 1957, ETS, No.25 (ratified by 13 States, including Turkey and all Member
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Final remarks - section B
Som e remarks can be added to the analysis above made of international 
multilateral instruments relevant for the legal status o f third country nationals in Member 
States.
First, there are plenty of sources of inspiration to provide legal protection to their 
rights and interests. The most interesting Conventions for such purposes include the UN 
Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers, the ILO Conventions No.97 and 
No. 143, the European Convention o f Human Rights, the European Convention on the 
Legal Status o f Migrant Workers, and the European Convention on the Participation of 
Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level. These Conventions contain a wide range of 
provisions protecting the situation o f migrant workers, or that of simple foreigners, most 
o f which could well be emulated to protect rights and interests o f third country nationals.
Secondly, the practical interest of the most protective Conventions is considerably 
reduced by their concrete personal scope, by the wording o f their provisions and by their 
weak system o f  enforcement.
As far as their personal scope is concerned, they often apply only to legal residents 
who are nationals o f the Contracting Parties. That is not always the case of the UN and 
ILO Conventions, but it is a rule among the Conventions o f the Council of Europe, the
E.C .H .R. being the exception.160 61 Furthermore, the fact that so few States ratify the most 
protective Conventions gives food for thought.162 Among the relevant Conventions of the 
Council o f  Europe, most have nsl been ratified by all the Member States of the European 
Union. Some times this is particularly striking, e.g. when the objectives o f the Conventions
States, except Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom); and the European 
Agreement on Travel by Young Persons on Collective Passports Between the Member Countries of the 
Council of Europe, of 1961, ETS, No.37, (ratified by 17 States, including Turkey and all Member States 
except Austria, Finland and Germany).
1 6 0  See the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas Leading to Admission to Universities 
of 1953, ETS, No. 15 (in force in 31 States, including Turkey and all Member States); the Protocol to it of 
1964, ETS, No.49 (in force in 24 States, including all Member States, except Greece, Ireland and Spain); 
the European Convention on the Equivalence of Periods of University Study, of 1956, ETS, No.21 (in 
force in 27 States, including Turkey and all Member States, except Greece); the European Convention on 
the Academic Recognition of University Qualifications, of 1959, ETS, No.32 (in force in 26 States, 
including all Member States, except Greece and Luxembourg); the European Convention on the General 
Equivalence of Periods of University Study, of 1990, ETS, No.138 (ratified by 14 States, including all 
Member States other than Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom). See also the European Agreement on Continued Payment of Scholarships to Students Studying 
Abroad, of 1969, ETS, No.69 (in force in 18 States, including all Member States, except Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal).
161 Together with the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public life at Local 
Level, as referred to supra, in the main text.
1 62  The UN Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers has not yet been ratified by any 
Member State; the ILO Convention No. 143 was ratified only by 3 Member States; the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers is in force in 8  countries only (in 6  Member States, 
and in Norway and Turkey); and the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local 
Level is not yet in force, due to lack of sufficient ratifications. Only the E.C.H.R. and the European Social 
Charter were ratified by all Member States.
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are not very ambitious, as is the case o f European Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers. On the other hand, it is relevant that Turkey has ratified some o f the 
Council o f Europe Conventions. Furthermore, after the entry of Central and Eastern 
European countries in the Council of Europe, the relevance o f the Conventions adopted 
within the latter increased substantially, inasmuch as such countries did or may ratify them. 
As far as the substantive rules o f the Conventions are concerned, they are often carefully 
worded and qualified when granting rights to foreigners. Their practical interest to the 
effective protection o f rights varies accordingly. In what relates to the mechanism for 
supervision o f the Conventions' enforcement, only the E.C.H.R. provides for a strong and 
legally binding enforcement mechanism. The problem is that, in spite of its considerable 
relevance for third country nationals, the E.C.H.R. can only provide them protection in a 
rather limited area.
In a conclusion, there is a difference between the general, long term importance of 
the relevant international treaties, and their practical, immediate relevance. The 
international instruments analysed are quite rich in their potentialities, and as a source of 
inspiration; but are weaker in what relates to the actual protection they provide for. They 
can provide minimum and optimal guidelines which may be useful to protect and develop 
rights at a national and European Union level. However, it comes as no surprise that 
international treaties are not sufficient to ensure appropriate protection o f the rights of 
third country nationals in the European Union.
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PART I - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Chapter 2
COMMUNITY COMPETENCE
ON THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

INTRODUCTION
Does the European Community have powers to adopt measures on third country 
nationals? A  common view among European politicians and some legal literature sustains 
that the Community does basically not have competence to act on third country nationals.1 
This presumed lack o f competence has been often used as an argument to refuse the 
adoption o f Community measures on third country nationals» as well as to explain why so 
few of them were adopted. The aim o f this chapter is to analyse the legal validity o f the 
assertion on the Community's lack of competence. The chapter concentrates on analysing 
the provisions o f the EC Treaty, in order to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
European Community has competence to take legal measures exclusively or primarily 
related to third country nationals.2
This chapter will make only a brief reference to the new Community competences 
in relation to third country nationals, that were introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union. These new competences will be analysed in chapter 7, which deals with the new 
legal and institutional framework introduced by the Treaty on European Union. The 
activities based on those new competences are examined in chapters 8 and 9.
The chapter is divided in five sections. Section A will look for EC Treaty 
provisions which could form the basis o f  a specific Community competence for adoption
1 Exceptions are some times made to such a generic assessment, namely regarding Article 59(2) of the EC 
Treaty (which was never used) and the new competences on visas introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union. Nevertheless, these exceptions do not diminish the importance of and emphasis on the general
assertion.
2 For specific works on Community competence in relation to third country nationals, see Cruz, A., 
Community Competence over Third Country Nationals Residing in an EC Member State, Brussels, CCME 
Briefing Paper No.5, September 1991; Hubeau, B. &. Van Put, R. "Les compétences des Communautés en 
matière d'immigration". Revue du droit des étrangers, 1990, No.58, p.71; Plender, Richard "Competence, 
European Community Law and Nationals of Non-Member States", ICLQ, 1990, No.39, pp.599-610. Other 
works deal with the issue of Community competence when analysing more general legal issues in EC Law 
related to third country nationals: see, e.g., Böhning, W. R. &. Werquin, J . , Le futur Statut des Nationaux 
des Pays-Tiers dans la Communauté Européenne", Brussels, CCME, Briefing Paper No.2; 1990; Delgado, 
M. Isabel Lirola, Libre Circulaciôn de Personas y Uniôn Europea, Madrid, Editorial Ci vitas, 1994, at pp. 
195-201; Reischle, Matthias, The Legal Status o f  Non-EU Nationals residing in the European Union from  
a  Community Law perspective, Bruges, College of Europe, April 1994, paper for the Master's Degree, at 
pp.28-36; Timmermans, C.W.A. "Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers Between the 
Community and its Member States - Why do it the intergovernmental way?", in Free Movement o f  
Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European 
Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993; pp.352-368, 
particularly at pp.361 -364. For a general overview of the issue of Community competence see Snyder, F. 
"Competences", in Butterworths Expert Guide to the European Union, O'Keeffe, D., Neuwahl, N. & 
Monar, J. (eds.), Butterworths, London, forthcoming. Relevant for the issue of Community competence on 
third country nationals are also the works of Heaton, Ricou "The European Community After 1992: The 
Freedom of Movement of People and Its Limitations", Vanderbilt Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 25, 
November 1992, No.4, pp. 643-679, and Govaere, Inge & Martiniello, Marco "Place de l'Immigration et 
Politiques Migratoires dans l'Europe de Demain - Quelques elements de réflexion", Contradictions, 
No.56, 1989, pp. 143-159, in particular at pp. 149-155.
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o f EC  measures on third country nationals. It will be seen that only a few EC Treaty 
provisions are specifically and explicitly related to issues concerning third country 
nationals. Thus, Section B , will proceed in the search for a legal justification for adoption 
o f such measures. This section aims to determine how issues concerning third country 
nationals relate to the achievement o f Community objectives. This will be analysed in the 
light of, firstly, the original version of the EEC  Treaty; secondly, the objective o f 
establishing a single market "without internal frontiers" provided by the Single European 
Act; and, thirdly, the Treaty on European Union. In section C the legal justification for the 
adoption o f EC  measures on third country nationals will be examined in the light of the 
subsidiarity principle. This is the sole aspect o f the Treaty on European Union to be 
examined in relative depth in this chapter, and not in chapter 7. This is due to the fact that 
the subsidiarity principle is important for Community activities in general terms, and does 
not have a narrow scope like Article 100C, for example. Section D will analyse EC  Treaty 
provisions for the adoption o f measures o f  narrow scope concerning third country 
nationals. Particular attention will be made to Article 118 and the case Germany et al v. 
Commission.3 Section F  will examine decision-making procedures which could form the 
basis for the adoption o f measures with general scope concerning third country nationals. 
It will explore the possibilities of using Article 100 and Article 235 o f the EC Treaty to 
adopt measures on third country nationals. It will refer in particular to the use o f these 
provisions to justify EC  action in other areas in which the competence o f the Community 
was not explicitly provided for in the EC Treaty. Article 238 will also be analysed in 
section F, in the context o f  the Community external competence to act on the legal status 
of third country nationals in Member States. Finally, some conclusions will be proposed on 
the issue o f the Community competence in relation to third country nationals.
Naturally, there are a number of other important questions relevant to the 
discussion o f EC competence in relation to third country nationals. However, for the sake 
o f convenience they will not be treated here, but in other chapters. In this way, a legal 
obligation incumbent on the Community to take measures on third country nationals will 
be analysed and argued for in the next chapter, when interpreting Article 7A o f the EC  
Treaty and examining its precise legal effects. In chapter 4 the personal scope of Article 48 
o f the EC  Treaty will be analysed. Chapter 6 will refer how Community competence on 
third country nationals relates to the activities developed in intergovernmental 
cooperation. As mentioned above, Chapter 7  will analyse the relations between the 
competence o f the European Community and o f the European Union, in particular as far 
as the Cooperation established under Title VI is concerned.
However, further elaboration is still necessary on the exact scope of the EC 
competence to be examined in this chapter.
Firstly, it should be noted that the search here is for provisions o f the Treaty which 
could be a basis for the adoption of measures exclusively or primarily related to third 
country nationals. Only in section C o f chapter 4, not in this chapter, I will refer to 
provisions under which measures can be taken on certain groups o f persons, in part
3 Joined cases 281, 283 to 285 & 287/85, Germany, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom & Denmark v. 
Commission [1987] ECR 3203.
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constituted by third country nationals, but which were not adopted with third country 
nationals primarily in mind. Examples o f these measures are the Community instruments 
on health and safety at work. They apply not only to workers who are nationals o f a 
Member State, but also to workers who are nationals of third countries. Nevertheless, 
these instruments were not adopted with the specific situation of third country nationals in 
mind, but that of workers in general.
Secondly, as far as the subject scope of the measures under analysis is concerned, 
EC competence will be examined in relation to immigration from third countries to the 
Member States and in relation to the legal status of third country nationals in the 
Community. Immigration from third countries to the Community is relevant here, in 
principle, regardless of the purposes and duration of such immigration. Community 
competence may be discussed in relation to workers coming from third countries4 (on a 
temporary or a permanent basis). However, it may also be analysed in relation to relatives 
o f such workers or simple tourists entering the Community. The sole issue which, in 
principle, is beyond the scope of this thesis, is the right of asylum and the situation of 
asylum-seekers and refugees.
For the purposes of this chapter, the legal status of third country nationals in the 
Community includes issues that relate specifically to them * like equality of rights with 
nationals o f member States - and issues that concern them in a primarily but not exclusive 
way - like the fight against racism. Their legal status is in principle also relevant either 
when their rights are examined at a national level (racism, discrimination and access to the 
labour market) or at a broad Community level (e.g. free movement among Member 
States).
Finally, it may be noted that the analysis here undertaken of the Community 
competence, both on immigration from third countries and on the status of third country 
nationals in the EC, will also pay attention to how those two fields relate to the 
implementation of a complete free movement of persons within the European Community,
A) SEARCH FOR A SPECIFIC COMPETENCE ON THIRD 
COUNTRY NATIONALS
In the Community legal system the point of departure is the competences o f  the 
Member States. It is usually said that the Community is based on the principle of limited 
powers ("compétences d'attribution").5 It may only act when specific provisions o f the 
Treaties attribute it the power to take decisions. It has no inherent powers. The provisions 
o f the Treaties define the specific fields for action and the procedure for the adoption of 
measures.6 In certain cases the competence attributed to the Community is an exclusive
4 One of the main concerns of this thesis.
5 See Hartley, T.C. The Foundations o f  European Community Lawt second edition, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1988, at pp. 102-104, Kapteyn, P. J. G. & Verloren Van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law o f  
the European Communities, 2nd.ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989, pp. 112-113, and Snyder, F., 
"Competences", "Division of powers", and "Implied Powers", in Butterworths Expert Guide to the 
European Union, op.cit..
6  The alternative would be a general authorisation to act within the scope of certain pre-defined areas.
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competence. The Member States have no competence to act in a given area, except to the 
extent and according to the procedures provided for by Community Law. Such is the case 
with external commercial policy and with agriculture.
It is more than clear that there is no exclusive general Community competence in 
relation to issues concerning third country nationals. Furthermore, there was no provision 
in the original Treaty of Rome expressly granting competence to the European 
Community to adopt measures specifically related to third country nationals.7 Most of the 
legal difficulties in establishing a Community competence on third country nationals rest 
on that fact. The only exception to this assessment is Article 59(2), which envisages the 
possibility o f extending to third country nationals the provisions of the Treaty chapter on 
free provisions of services. However, even if this provision is grounds for sustaining that 
third country nationals are not beyond the scope of Community Law, the provision itself 
has a narrow scope. It can only deal with one of the many issues related to third country 
nationals. Furthermore, according to the prevailing view, Article 48 o f the Treaty does not 
apply to third country nationals when it provides for freedom of movement for "workers" 
in general terms, or when it envisages "the abolition o f any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers o f the Member States".8
The Treaty on European Union introduced a number o f specific Community 
competences on third country nationals. First, a new Article 100C allows the Community 
to determine the third countries whose nationals must have a visa to cross the external 
borders of the Community, and entitles it to define a uniform format o f visas. Secondly, an 
Agreement on Social Policy concluded between all Member States (except the United 
Kingdom) entitles the Council to adopt, by unanimity, Directives on "conditions o f 
employment for third country nationals legally residing in Community territory".9 Chapter 
7 will analyse the new Community competences on third country nationals introduced by 
the Treaty on European Union, while chapter 8 will examine Community visa legislation 
adopted under Article 100 C. The possibility provided by the Agreement on Social Policy 
to adopt legal binding measures on third country nationals has not yet been used.
This fact, together with the narrow scope of Article 100 C, can lead us to conclude 
that there is no general specific or explicit Community competence to deal with issues 
concerning third country nationals.
7 See, however. Articles 131 to 136 (on association with the overseas countries and territories), and 238 
(on association agreements with third countries or an international organisation) of the Treaty of Rome. 
See also that, in any case, third country nationals are not entirely out of the scope of Community Law, as 
will be demonstrated in chapter 4, in particular in its section C.
8 See infra the analysis on the personal scope of Article 48, in chapter 4.
9 See Article 2(3) of the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Protocol. The Directives will define 
"minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules 
obtaining in each of the Member States" - Article 2(2) of the same Agreement. As will be recalled again 
in chapter 7, the Protocol on Social Policy was signed by all Member States, including the United 
Kingdom, authorising 11 Member States to use the Community institutions to act on the domains 
mentioned in the Social Policy Agreement, including those referred to supra concerning third country 
nationals. Note also that third country nationals resident in the Community may also submit petitions to 
the European Parliament, as well as to present complaints to the European Ombudsman, accordingly to 
the new Articles 138d and 138e of the EC Treaty, respectively.
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B) COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES AND JUSTIFICATION OF EC 
MEASURES ON THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
In any case, the adoption of Community measures on third countiy nationals seems 
to be justifiable due to the relevance o f  issues concerning them for the attainment of 
Community objectives.
1 - The original legal framework
As we have seen, in the original Treaty of Rome there was a lack of provisions to 
act specifically on third country nationals. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that 
issues concerning third country nationals did already relate to the objectives and the 
activities o f the Community, as defined by the original version of that Treaty. This seems 
particularly clear in the light o f the Community objectives defined in its Preamble and 
Articles 2 and 3. The Preamble o f the original Treaty o f Rome mentions that the founding 
Heads of State decided to create a European Economic Community, inter alia, under the 
following circumstances:
being "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe,
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by 
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement 
of the living and working conditions of their peoples.
Recognising that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action 
in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition,
Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions (...) [andj Resolved by 
thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty(...)M 
Article 2 o f the Treaty stated that:
“ The Community shall have as its tasks, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising 
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it."10 
Article 3 provided that:
" For the purposes set out on Article 2, the activities of the Community shall 
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out 
therein: (...)
10 The new version of Article 2 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, reads as 
follows: "The Community shall have as its tasks, by establishing a common market and an economic and 
monetary union and by implementing the common policies and activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, 
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States."
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(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement 
for persons, services and capital; (...)
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is 
not distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member 
States can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments 
remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for 
the proper functioning of the common market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment 
opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of 
iiving;(...)."
"(k) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase 
trade and promote jointly economic and social development".11
Issues concerning third country nationals could, already under the original version 
o f the Treaty o f Rome, be related to the objectives and activities o f the Community in two 
different ways, distinguishable more easily in conceptual terms than in practice. One is the 
relation between issues concerning third country nationals and the strict economic aspect 
of the Community. The immigration and legal status of third country nationals are directly 
relevant to "economic progress", to "a harmonious development o f  economic activities" 
and to the establishment of a "common market" - in which "obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital" are to be abolished and "fair competition" 
ensured. Another aspect is the fact that the improvement of the social and legal situation 
o f third country nationals is certainly part o f the general "social progress" of the 
Community. I f  it is true that the Member States want "to preserve and strengthen peace 
and liberty" and to promote "an accelerated raising of the standard o f living", they cannot 
be indifferent to the situation of those persons in the Community.
A more general argument can also be made, partly based on this last "social 
progress" aspect of Community objectives. Third country nationals residing in the 
Community for a long time constitute a considerable number o f persons, whose work and 
imagination contribute to the achievement o f Community objectives. It would be 
appropriate to entitle them to EC rights, namely those related to the free movement of
11 This last atinea is relevant in so far as the association of such countries and territories with the 
Community may concern third country nationals in the EC. Meanwhile, note that Article 3 of the EC 
Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, did not fundamentally change this provision, but 
reinforced it, insofar as Article 100C on visas is concerned. The new version of Article 3 refers to the 
following Community activities: "(c) an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital; (d) measures 
concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal market as provided for in Article 100C; (...) 
(g) a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted; (h) the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market; (i) 
a policy in the social sphere comprising a European Social Fund; (j) the strengthening of economic and 
social cohesion; (...) (o) a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection; (...) ”(r) the 
association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and promote jointly 
economic and social development".
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persons.12 T o grant them these rights would entail extending the scope of EC legislation 
to include them, or to adopt specific measures in their favour. Granting such rights seems 
to be particularly justified inasmuch as the Community being a Community based on the 
rule of Law,13 is bound by the equality principle, which is a general principle of Public 
International Law.
2 - Community objectives after the Single European Act
The new EEC  Treaty provisions introduced by the Single European Act reinforced 
the relationship between issues concerning third country nationals and Community 
objectives.
The most important of such new provisions was Article 7A ,14 which provides that: 
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing 
the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article 7b, 7c, 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1), 84, 99, 100a and 
100b and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty.
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with provisions of this Treaty."
a) the single internal market project in context
This provision, like the whole Single European Act, is the result o f the historical 
evolution o f the Community in the seventies and eighties. The wish for progress in the 
process of European integration had produced several concrete proposals for institutional 
change and substantive action.15
12 See O’Keeffe, D. "The Free Movement of Persons and the Single Market", ELR, Vol. 17, 1992, No.l, 
pp.3-19, at 17.
13 See case 294/83 Les Verts v, European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23; and Opinion 1/91 
on the EEA Agreement, [1991J ECR 1-6079, paragraph 21.
14 The original number of this provision was Article 8 A. After the Treaty on European Union, this 
provision was numbered as Article 7A of the EC Treaty. For the sake of simplicity, it will be referred to 
here as Article 7A, with its present number.
15 See, e.g. the Tindemans report (Bull. EC, Supplement 1/1976), the "Three Wise Men report" 
(requested by the Brussels European Council of 1978 to Borend Biesheuval, Edmund Dell and Robert 
Marjolin - see Agence Europe, No.4117 (new series), of 26 June 1985, p. 13.), and a draft "European Act", 
presented in 1981 by the German and Italian foreign ministers, respectively Genscher and Colombo. The 
latter proposed an improvement in the Community institutional aspects and an intensification and 
expansion of cooperation on the way to the European Union. See Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat, 
op.cit., p.26. This challenge was not adequately met by the European Council. In its meeting in Stuttgart, 
in June 1983, it adopted only a "Solemn Declaration on European Union", which was more a declaration 
of policy intentions and procedures to be applied, than a contribution to towards institutional change; 
Bull. EC, 6/1983, pp.24-9. Meanwhile, a movement led by Spinelli, within the European Parliament, 
prepared a "Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union", adopted by the European Parliament by 237 
votes in favour, 31 against and 43 abstentions, on 14 February 1984, OJ C 77/33, of 19/3/1984, This Draft 
Treaty was federalist oriented and presented several ambitious proposals, a part of which would only be 
adopted much later, in the 1992 Treaty on European Union. The Parliament’s Draft Union Treaty of 1984 
proposed to change the Community into a European Union (with its own legal personality) and to set a 
global constitutional framework for the Union institutions and activities. The Draft Treaty would establish 
a European citizenship for the nationals of Member States, and provided for the protection of human 
rights within the Union jurisdiction. It proposed also that a complete "free movement of persons and
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The Fontainebleau European Council o f June 1984 set up the Dooge Committee, 
on institutional affairs and the Adonnino Committee, on "a people's Europe".
The report o f the Dooge Committee was concluded in March 1985. Not all 
members o f the Committee agreed with all proposals put forward, this partial 
disagreement reflecting the diverging opinions of Member States on the need and manner 
in which to progress forwards. In any case, a majority of the Committee suggested the 
creation o f a European Union as a true political entity. It proposed the establishment of a 
true internal market to accomplish the EEC Treaty objectives, the reinforcement of the 
European Monetary system, and the building up of an external entity. In institutional terms 
it suggested a political cooperation even on security and defence matters, a generalised use 
o f the majority rule in the Council, a co-decision legislative power of the European 
Parliament. To put its proposals into practice, the Dodge Committee proposed convening 
an intergovernmental conference to negotiate a Union Treaty, on the basis of the acquis 
communautaire, the Stuttgart declaration on the European Union, and having in mind the 
spirit and method of the Parliament's Draft Union Treaty of 1984.
The final report o f the Adonnino Committee16 suggested the adoption of 
measures in a wide range o f fields. The proposals had a quite different intrinsic value as 
well as consequences. It proposed, for example, a uniform electoral procedure for the 
elections to the European Parliament, voting rights in European and local elections for 
citizens of one Member State living in another, and consular cooperation in third countries 
for the protection of EC  citizens in countries where its own Member State did not have 
diplomatic representations. It proposed measures also in the field of culture and 
information and for exchanges of university students, professionals and young people. 
Finally, it included measures such as "the strengthening of the Community's image and 
identity", with the use o f  a European flag and a European anthem.
Both the report o f the Dooge Committee and of the Adonnino Committee were 
examined by the Milan European Council o f June 1985, the one which endorsed the 
W hite Paper o f  the Commission on "Completing the Internal M ark et".17
This document was presented by the Commission on June 1985, as a reply to the 
request of the European Council o f March 1985, that the Commission presented concrete 
proposals for the completion of "a single large market’*.18 The Commission presented a 
White Paper with a plan for finally completing a true internal market by the end o f 1992.
goods" to be accomplished within two years after the entry into force of the Treaty. It was pointed out that 
"this [free movement] implies in particular the abolition of personal checks at internal frontiers" (Article 
47(3), third indent). On the institutional side, it would establish clearer rules on the division and exercise 
of competences of the Union and of the Member States, it would give more legislative powers to the 
European Parliament, diminish the blocking powers of the Member States in the Council, and increase the 
supervisory powers of the Court of Justice.
1 6  Agence Europe, No.4117 (new series), of 26 June 1985, p.13.
17 "Completing the Internal Market", White Paper of the Commission to the European Council of Milan, 
28 and 29 June 1985, COM (85) 310 final, of 14/6/1985.
18 It emphasised, as one of the fields for action, the one: "to achieve a single large market by 1992 thereby 
creating a more favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, competition and trade; it called upon 
the Commission to draw up a detailed programme with a specific timetable before its next meeting". See 
Bull. EC, 3/1985, point 1.2.3., p.12. The following meeting of the Council took place in June 1995 in 
Milan, where the White Paper was endorsed. See also the several calls of the European Council to the 
Commission mentioned in p. 3 of the White Paper, quoted supra.
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The White Paper proposed the Council to adopt of a wide range of measures meant» on 
one hand» creating conditions for effective competition throughout the Community and, on 
the other hand, abolishing completely any border controls among the Member States.'9 
Border controls o f persons were also supposed to be abolished.19 20 Therefore, the plan 
envisaged the adoption by the Community of acts on police and public order related 
matters. Among such acts there were Directives for the approximation of firearm's 
legislation,21 of drugs legislation22 and on the coordination of rules on extradition.23 The 
abolition of border controls would also concern third country nationals. The Commission 
would present, until the end of 1988, several draft Directives with the aim of coordinating 
national rules: on the legal status of third country nationals, on the right o f asylum and 
refugee status, and on visas. They were supposed to be all approved by the Council by the 
end of 1990.24 The White Paper was endorsed by the European Council of Milan, in June 
1985, with no reservations.25
In the following month, July 1985, the General Affairs Council agreed on the 
details of an intergovernmental conference to revise the Treaties of the European 
Communities and to draft a treaty "on common foreign and security policy".26 An Inter- 
Govemmental Conference was held in the autumn of 1985, and in December 1985, in 
Luxembourg, the European Council reached agreement on an institutional reform of the 
European Communities. This agreement materialised in the Single European Act, which 
amends and completes the EC's Treaties, in a further step towards a European Union. The 
result of this conference was the European Single Act, which also formalised the aim of 
achieving an internal market by 1993, as suggested by the Commission's White Paper. It 
entered into force on 1 July 1987.
As we have seen, there was no lack o f ideas or o f concrete proposals for progress 
in European integration. However, the adoption of the European Single Act (and to some 
extent also o f  the Commission's White Paper) gave only partial satisfaction to the desire 
for progress and it accepted only part o f the proposals with that aim which were on the 
table at the time.
b) EC measures on third country nationals and the internal market
Nevertheless, the historical background is useful to recall that the European Single 
Act was meant to constitute a substantial step in the process o f European integration, 
towards a European Union.27 In this light, Article 7A is of fundamental importance. The 
correct interpretation and the precise legal effects of this Article will be analysed in detail
19 The Commission stated that its "objective is not merely to simplify existing procedures, but do away 
with internal frontier controls in their entirety." See the White Paper of the Commission, quoted supra, 
point 27.
2 0  Idem, p.l4*16.
21 To be adopted by 1988.
2 2  To be adopted by 1989.
2 3  To be adopted by 1991.
2 4  Commission's White Paper on "Completing the Internal Market", quoted supra, point 55 and annex,
pg. 1 2 .
25 Bull. EC, 6/1985, p.I4-5.
2 6  Bull. EC, 7/8 1985, p. 9.
27 See the first recital of the Preamble of the Single European Act.
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in the next chapter. Here it is important to emphasise that, with this new provision, it 
seems more obvious than before that it is appropriate for the EC to take measures relating 
to third country nationals.
The importance o f Article 7A for E C  competence with respect to third country 
nationals goes as follows. It provides for the establishment o f  an internal market 
comprising "an area without internal frontiers" with free movement of persons and 
services.28
This single internal market was supposed to be established by the Community. For 
this purpose the Community would in principle adopt the measures envisaged in the 
Commission White Paper of 1985. An authoritative confirmation o f this idea was given by 
two sources. One is the endorsement by the European Council of Milan, in June 1985, of 
the Commission's White Paper. The other is a declaration on Article 7A of the EEC 
Treaty, which was adopted by the Conference of the Representatives o f the Governments 
o f the Member States that signed the Single European Act.29 Such a declaration states 
that:
"The Conference wishes by means of the provisions of Article 7A to express its 
firm political will to take before 1 January 1993 the decisions necessary to 
complete the internal market defined in those provisions, and more particularly the 
decisions necessary to implement the Commission's programme described in the 
White Paper on the Internal Market".
Therefore, if  the Community was supposed to adopt the measures envisaged in the White 
Paper, it seems clear that it had competence to do so.30
In any case, at the very least, it seems that the new Article 7A reinforced the 
possibilities for the Community to adopt measures on third country nationals.31 This is so 
because, under Articles 100 and 235, the Community may adopt measures related with the 
common market and its objectives. These provisions will be analysed below, but it must be 
emphasised at this point that the common market and the Community's objectives were 
extended or reinforced by Article 7A o f the Single European Act. Thus, it seems easier 
than hitherto to justify the possibility for the Community to adopt measures on third 
country nationals. With the Single European A ct the adoption of such measures became 
more pertinent for the attainment of the Community objectives.32
28  Actually, this is rather a new and more forceful legal expression of the old objective of the 
establishment of a common market. See the next chapter for further analysis of the relationship between 
the "old" "common market" concept and the concept of "internal market’'.
29  Cruz sustains that this declaration means that the Conference "accepted the powers of the Community 
in the areas dealt with by the White Paper, including those related to third country nationals as well as 
asylum seekers", Cruz, A., Community Competence over Third Country Nationals...t op.cit., pg.4.
30  In chapter 6 , on earlier intergovernmental cooperation, this point will be retaken. An analysis will there 
be made on whether the competence to deal with matters related with third country nationals belongs to 
the Community, or to the Member States - in the framework of the intergovernmental cooperation 
procedure.
31 In the next chapter it will be argued that the Community has under Article 7A the legal obligation to 
adopt such measures, to the extent required to establish a single internal market as defined in Article 7A.
32  See, e.g., Mancini, G. F., "II govemo dei movimenti migratori in Europa", Diritto del Lavoro e di 
Relazioni Industriali. Year XIV, 1992, No.54, pp.233-242, at p.239.
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The need for or pertinence of the adoption by the Community of measures on third 
country nationals may be seen from two perspectives. A first perspective only considers 
necessary, or important, the adoption of measures on third country nationals to the precise 
extent that they are required by the abolition of border controls o f persons. There would 
be, for instance, the need for the adoption of common action on visas.33 This narrower 
perspective seems to be shared by the Commission. In presenting its three draft Directives 
on the abolition o f border controls on persons,34 in July 1995, the Commission reaffirmed 
its opinion that such abolition an "constitutes a clear and unconditional obligation on the 
part of the Union stemming from Article 7A."35 However, according to the Commission, 
the fact that the establishment of an internal market would entail for third country 
nationals the right to move within the territory of the Member States, would not mean that 
such a right to move
"would carry with it no right of residence or work throughout the Community even 
for those non-Community citizens who have been granted such a right in a 
particular Member State."36
Nevertheless, it is also possible to have a less restrictive perspective on what the 
establishment of an internal market requires in relation to third country nationals. In this 
view, the existence o f a true single market (e.g. in labour) would not be compatible with 
the different national markets, with distinct rules on the entry into and on the rights 
derived from the participation in such markets. This incompatibility would entail the 
adoption of a minimum threshold of common European measures on the right of entry to
33 Mattera, A. "L'achèvement du marché intérieur et ses implications sur les relations extérieures", in 
Relations extérieures de la Communauté Européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et 
fonctionnels, Demaret.Paul (ed.), Bruges, College of Europe, 1986/ Brussels, Story Scientia, 1988, p.201, 
at 217-218.
34 The draft Directive on the elimination of controls on persons crossing internal frontiers, COM (95) 
347; the draft Directive on the right of third-country nationals to travel in the Community, COM (95) 346; 
and the draft Directive amending Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families and Directive 73/148 on 
the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member 
States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, COM (95) 348 final. All three draft 
Directives are dated from 12/7/1995. See chapter 4 for an analysis of these draft Directives.
35 Idem, in the introduction to all three draft Directives. Likewise, it may be noted that these three draft 
Directives were presented under Article 100A, which refers to the "common market" only.
3 6  "Completing the Internal Market: an Area without Internal Frontiers, Progress Report required by 
Article 8 B of the Treaty", COM (90) 552 final, Brussels, 23 November 1990. Note, however, that the 
Commission seems to recognise that it is in the logic of the internal market that third country nationals 
resident in the Community may move from one Member State to another to work. The Commission has 
stated that "in spite of the establishment of an internal market without internal frontiers, third-country 
nationals who are permanently and legally resident in one Member State currently do not have the right to 
move to another Member State to engage in econnomic activity." Thus, as "a first step", the Commission 
planned to present in the first half of 1996 a recommendation to the Member States inviting them to give 
employment priority to "third country nationals permanently and legally resident in another Member State 
when job vacancies cannot be filled by EU nationals or nationals of third countries legally resident in the 
Member State concerned." See the Commission's communication on a "Medium Term Social Action 
Programme 1995-1997", COM (95) 134, point 3.3.5.
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the single market and the rights to be enjoyed as a participant in that market.37 It would 
also entail the extension to third country nationals of the rights granted to Community 
nationals under the rules on the free movement of workers and services.38 Finally, it could 
also justify positive action favouring the integration of third country nationals in the 
Community society.39
This broader perspective could be explained by the mere establishment o f a 
substantial version o f a single market, in itself. However, it could also be sustained as a 
necessary and reasonable consequence o f the establishment of a restrictive version of that 
market, in which the primarily important objective was the abolition o f border controls. In 
fact, the dynamic that the abolition o f border controls would create would justify the 
adoption o f common rules on entry, rights o f membership and the extension of full free 
movement to all participants in that market. The adoption of such common measures 
could prevent an increase in the number of third country nationals illegally working or 
residing in Member States, who would more easily move in a Community without internal 
border controls. More importantly, the adoption of such common measures could 
contribute to avoiding the scenario in which controls on third country nationals are merely 
transferred from the borders to the interior of the territories of the Member States. Until 
now the worst version o f these controls seems to have happened in France, with 
systematic controls o f identity (and residence status) concentrated on non-white coloured 
pedestrians. Naturally, at least a modest increase in the controls of third country nationals 
within the territory o f each Member State seems inevitable. After all, this type o f control 
existed already when border controls were in full force. However, the point is to avoid, as 
a corollary o f the creation o f the single market with no internal frontiers, the creation o f a 
Police State within the territory of each Member State.40 Positive and common measures 
on third country nationals could contribute to overcome that negative possibility.
In this context an extremely important aspect needs to be outlined. The extent to 
which the establishment of an internal market, as defmed in Article 7A, requires the 
adoption o f common measures on third country nationals has been discussed. In particular, 
the extent to which those measures should be adopted within the EC institutions or in the 
framework o f intergovernmental cooperation between governments o f the Member States
37 See Mattera, op.cit., loc.cit.
38 See, e.g., O’Keeffe who sustains, that "(i)f the Community is to have an area without internal frontiers, 
it becomes progressively absurd that non-Community nationals established in the Community should not 
be afforded the protection of Community law. (...) To entrust competence in this area to the Member 
States at this stage of European integration only recalls and reinforces a statist view of Community Law 
which is inappropriate in this area." See O’Keeffe, "The Free Movement of Persons ELR, Vol. 17, 
1992, No.l, pp.3-19. at 17.
39 As Cruz, A. sustains "The smooth functioning of a Single European market will require Community 
legislation against discrimination to protect all residents to avoid the creation of second or even third class 
citizens". See Cruz, A. op.cit., p.2. See also, for an extensive analysis of this issue, Hoogenboom, T., 
"Integration into Society and Free Movement of Non-EC Nationals", EJIL, Vol. 3, 1992, No.l. pp.36-52 
and with the title "Free Movement and Integration of Non-EC Nationals and the Logic of the Internal 
Market", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe..., op.cit., pp.497-511.
40  In a way, this would mean that the psychological and concrete barriers would move from the national 
frontiers to the interior of the territory of the Member States, to everywhere in which a foreigner could be 
controlled by the police forces.
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has been discussed. However, in abstract terms, there seems to be a consensus that the 
adoption o f some common measures on third country nationals is indispensable for the 
establishment o f an internal market, as defined in Article 7A o f the EC Treaty - whatever 
the appropriate forum for the adoption o f such measures may be. This idea is, to some 
extent, shared even by the governments of the Member States, by the Communities' 
European Council and Council o f Ministers. This is shown, for example, by the fact that 
when Member States' governments justify the need for intergovernmental cooperation, 
they often refer to the abolition of border controls and the establishment o f an internal 
market, as defined in Article 7A. This type of reference occurs repeatedly in the 
statements o f the European Council on intergovernmental cooperation activities. It can 
also be find in the declarations of the intergovernmental groups, for instance after the 
meetings o f Ministers of the EC governments responsible for immigration matters. 
Another good example is the very Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, 
which includes several rules on third country nationals. In its Preamble it is stated that the 
Convention is agreed upon,
"Whereas the Treaty establishing the European Communities, as amended by the 
Single European Act, envisages that the internal market comprises an area without 
internal borders,[and]
whereas the aim pursued by the Contracting Parties coincides with that objective, 
without prejudice to the measures that will be adopted in pursuance of the [EC]
Treaty provisions."
Consequently, it seems obvious that to establish the internal market there is a need to 
adopt some measures on third country nationals, even if  the governments o f the Member 
States would not agree to adopt them within the EC institutions.
Clearly, the establishment of a single internal market made more clear the 
pertinence o f the adoption of EC measures on third country nationals for the attainment of 
the Community objectives.
3- The Treaty on European Union
The relationship between issues concerning third country nationals and Community 
objectives was, in a way, further reinforced by the very Treaty on European Union. First, 
this Treaty amended the old EEC Treaty provisions on Community objectives and 
activities, extending their scope.41 More ambitious objectives and activities justify more 
easily their connection with issues concerning third country nationals. Secondly, the 
purpose of the provisions of Title VI o f the Treaty on European Union, which envisage 
action in relation to third country nationals (inter alia), is the pursuit of the old Community 
objective o f achieving free movement o f persons. The adoption o f common measures with 
respect to third country nationals is clearly seen as a requirement of such freedom of 
movement. According to Article K.1 TEU , the cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs 
will be undertaken:
41 Cf. supra the footnotes on the original version of Articles 2 and 3. Those footnotes recall the present
version of those provisions, as amended by the Treaty on European Union.
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"For the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free 
movement of persons, and without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Community."42
In turn, Article B of the TEU, when defining Union objectives, does not refer explicitly to 
the free movement o f persons. It only mentions "the creation o f an area without internal 
frontiers", while seeking:
"to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and to build on it with the view to 
consider, through the [revision of the Treaties ] (...) to what extent the policies and 
forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the 
aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the 
Community."
It thus seems that, as far as free movement of persons is concerned, the Union does not 
have different objectives from those of the Community.
Therefore, in legal terms, it may be argued that Community objectives, as far as 
third country nationals are concerned, were reinforced, or at least stressed by the Treaty 
on European Union.43
42  See also Article M and, to a certain extent, even Article B, as far as the respect for the acquis 
communautaire is concerned. See also Article 134 of the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, 
with a similar rule: "The provisions of this Convention shall apply only in so far as they are compatible 
with Community Law".
4 3  See chapter 7, where it will be argued that, in strict legal terms. Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union introduced an alternative institutional framework to deal with issues concerning third country 
nationals, without as such diminishing Community powers in this area.
C) THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE AND THE JUSTIFICATION 
OF EC MEASURES ON THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
The subsidiarity principle44 was formally introduced in general terms in 
Community Law by the Treaty on European Union, which included in the EC Treaty a 
new Article 3B , providing that:
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the *&
4 4  There is an extensive literature on the principle of subsidiarity in the European Community. See, e.g., 
Burgess, Michael "Federalism, Subsidiarity and the European Union", in The European Union at the 
Crossroads - Problems in Implementing the Single Market Projects Cox, Andrew & Furlong, Paul (eds,), 
Boston - Lincolnshire, Earisgate Press, 1995, p .l; Cass, Deborah Z., "The word that saves Maastricht? 
The principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers within the European Community", CMLRev, Vol. 
29, 1992, No.6 , pp.l 107-1136; Constantinesco, V., "Article 3B", in Traité de Maastricht sur L'Union 
Européenne, Constantinesco, Vlad , Kovar, Robert & Simon, Denys (eds.), Paris, Económica, 1995; 
pp.l07-118; Dehousse, R., Does subsidiarity really matter?, E.U.I. Working Paper 92/32; Emiliou, 
Nicholas, "Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against 'the Enterprises of Ambition?' ", ELR, Vol.17, 1992, 
No.5, pp. 383-407; Emiliou, N., "Subsidiarity : Panacea or Fig Leaf ?", in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht 
Treaty, O'Keeffe, David & Twomey, Patrick (eds.), London, Chancery, 1994, pp.65-83; Jacqué, J.P., 
"Rapport Communautaire", Le Principe de Subsidiarité, XVI FIDE Congress, Rome, 1994, pp.l3-38; 
Koopmans, T. "The Quest for Subsidiarity", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration, Vol.II, by 
Curtin, D. & Heuklels, T.fed.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp.43-55; Lenaerts, K. & van 
Ypersele, P., "Le principe de subsidiarité et son contexte: étude de l’article 3 B du Traité CE", CDE, 
Vol.30, 1994, No. 1-2, pp.3-85; Marquardt, Paul D., "Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European 
Union", Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.18, 1994, No.2, pp.616-640; Neunreither, K., 
"Subsidiarity as a Guiding Principle for European Community Activities", in Government and Opposition 
, Vol.28, No.2, pp.206-220; Palacio González, José "The Principle of Subsidiarity (A guide for lawyers 
with a particular community orientation)“, ELR, Vol. 20, 1995, No.4, p. 355-370; Philip, C. & Boutayeb, 
C. "Subsidiarité (Principe de - )", in Dictionnaire Juridique des Communautés Européennes, Barav, Ami
& Philip, Christian (eds.), Paris, P.U.F., 1993, pp. 1023-1035; Steiner, J., "Subsidiarity under the 
Maastricht Treaty", in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., pp.49-64; Toth, A. G. "The principle 
of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty", CMLRev, Vol. 29, 1992, No.6 , pp.1079-1105; Toth, A.G.. "A 
Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity", in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., pp.37-48; Toth, A.G., 
"Is Subsidiarity Justiciable ?", ELR, Vol. 19, 1994, No.3, pp.268-285; Van Kerbergen, K. & Verbek, B. 
"The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union", JCMS, Vol.32, 1994, No.2, pp.215-236; and 
Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit,, pp.779-782. See also, in a more general perspective on division of powers 
between the Community and Member States: Fischer, Thomas C , M 'Federalism' in the European 
Community and the United States: A Rose by Any Other Name", Fordham International Law Journal, 
Vol. 17, 1994, No.2, pp.389-440; Lenaerts, K., "Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the 
European Community", in CMLRev, Vol.28, 1991, No.l, pp.l 1-35; Moravcsik, A., "Preferences and 
Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist Approach", in JCMS, Vol.31, 1993. 
pp.473-524; Pollack, M. A. "Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European 
Community", Journal o f  Public Policy, Vol. 14, 1994, No.2, pp.95-145; and Weatherill, S., "Beyond 
Preemption ? Shared Competence and Constitutional Change in the European Community", in Legal 
Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., pp.l 3-31.
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Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty.
While the first paragraph of this provision confirms the principe d'attribution des 
compétences, and the third paragraph formalises the proportionality principle, it is the 
second paragraph that refers to the "principle o f subsidiarity".
The subsidiarity principle has deep historical roots,45 and is not exactly new within 
the Community legal order.46 It is also subject to various understandings. In any case, its 
basic idea is that power should be allocated so as to favour local control except where 
broader common interests predominate.47 A larger unit shall only assume functions 
"insofar as the smaller units of which it is composed are unable or less qualified to fulfil 
their role."48
It is out of the scope of this chapter, as well as of this thesis, to analyse in depth 
the subsidiarity principle. Here what is important is to determine whether the subsidiarity 
principle, as introduced by the Treaty on European Union, brought significant changes to 
the existing EC  Treaty regime on Community competence to act on third country 
nationals. Does it make any fundamental difference for the possibility that the Community 
adopt measures on third country nationals?
To start with, some general remarks can be made.
The first is the following. It is undoubtedly true that the intention behind the 
inscription o f the subsidiarity principle in the EC  Treaty was to limit Community action 
and emphasise the general competence o f Member States.49 However, it has also been 
argued that the reasoning underlying the subsidiarity principle actually reinforces the 
justification for the adoption of Community action, since it calls for a general functional 
justification o f Community and Member States actions.50
4 5  See, generally, Millon-Delsol, VÉtat subsidiaire, ìngérence et non-ingérence de VÉtat: le principe de 
subsidiarité aux fondements de Vhistoire européenne, Paris, PUF, 1992. In one way or another the idea of 
subsidiarity was used by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Proudhon, Tocqueville. See also the 1931 encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno, of Pope Pius XI, and Article 72 of the German Gnindgesetz (the German Basic 
Law).
4 6  See, e.g., Article 130R(4), introduced by the Single European Act in the EEC Treaty, providing that 
"The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives [of 
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of environment; contributing towards protection of 
human health; and ensuring a prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources] can be attained better 
at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States. Without prejudice to certain 
measures of a Community nature, the Member States shall finance and implement the other measures." 
See also Article 1 2(2) of the Parliament's "Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union" of 1984, quoted 
supra. See, generally, Cass, op.cit., pp. 1110-1128.
4 7  Marquardt, op.cit., p.618.
4 8  Neunreither, op.cit., p.207.
4 9  See Constantinesco, op.cit., p.l 1, and Jacqué, op.cit, p.38.
5 0  See Marquardt, who states that: '[subsidiarity reduces the question of sovereignty to one of efficiency. 
Without the emotional and historical appeal of the classical vision of sovereignty, the state is reduced to a 
functional justification. (...) In the long run, nation-states forced to fight on subsidiarity's field of 
functional efficiency must lose power.' See Marquardt, op.cit., p.636-7. See also Steiner, op.cit., p.52.
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Secondly, the subsidiarity principle is relevant for the Community competence to 
act on third country nationals since, as explained before, there is no exclusive EC 
competence to act in this field.51 As will be explained below, the Community may act on 
issues concerning third country nationals mainly under Articles 100 and 235 of the EC 
Treaty. These provisions grant the Community a potential competence, which, by its own 
nature is a concurrent or shared competence. It is to Community action under this type of 
competence that the subsidiarity principle applies.
Thirdly, it may be recalled that the subsidiarity principle does not confer or 
withdraw Community competences. It just allocates the exercise of competences that have 
already been created by other Treaty provisions.52
However, what about the competences' exercise? Does the subsidiarity principle 
established in Article 3B introduces significant new limits on the exercise of Community 
competences to act on third country nationals?
In my view that is not the case. It is submitted that the formal inclusion of the 
subsidiarity principle in the EC Treaty, through the new Article 3B, did not exclude or 
substantially reduce the possibilities for the EC to act on issues concerning third country 
nationals.
A first important point to draw this conclusion relates to Articles 100 and 235 of 
the EC Treaty, which are still in force after the Treaty on European Union. Below, in this 
chapter, it will be seen that these are the main EC Treaty provisions under which the 
Community may act on issues concerning third country nationals. Article 100 provides 
that the Council, acting by unanimity, may
"issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning 
of the common market".
Under Article 235, also by unanimity, the Council may take "appropriate measures", in 
case that
"action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and [the 
EC] Treaty has not provided the necessary powers".
The point here is that, arguably, the conditions for Community action to be taken under 
these two provisions are equivalent to those of the subsidiarity principle.53 Article 100 
refers to approximation of rules that "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market". Article 235 refers to Community action that proves "necessary to attain, 
in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community". In Article 100 the need for common action is implicitly required in the
51 Unless the legal status of third country nationals comes under the domain of areas in relation to which 
the Community has exclusive competence.
52 Philip & Boutayeb, op.cit, p.1026 and Toth, ELR , op.cit., p.269.
53 See also Philip & Boutayeb, op.cit., (who consider that these provisions contain implicitly the 
subsidiarity principle) and Steiner, op.cit., p.50. Against, Toth argues that the subsidiarity principle 
cannot apply to Community action taken under Articles 100 and 235. See Toth, CMLRev, p. 1082.1 do not 
agree with Toth but his position has the advantage of reinforcing my view that the inclusion of the new 
Article 3B in the EC Treaty did not reduce the possibilities for the EC to act on issues concerning third 
country nationals.
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demanded relation to the "establishment or functioning of the common market". In Article 
235 the need for common action is both required explicitly ("should prove necessary 
to...") and implicitly ("in the course of the operation of the common market"). Therefore, 
it can be said that these two provisions contain a sort of practical application of the 
subsidiarity principle.
The required conditions for their use are at least equivalent to those required by 
the subsidiarity principle. In practical and legal terms it does make sense to adopt EC 
action under those Articles "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action" 
can "be better achieved by the Community", "by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action". At most the subsidiarity principle reinforces the requirement that any 
Community action, and thus also Community action on third country nationals, be really 
necessary and "cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States". The proportionality 
principle reinforces further this idea as far as the extension of the Community action is 
concerned.54 In any case neither the subsidiarity principle, nor the proportionality principle 
challenge in basic terms the possibility for the Community to act on third country 
nationals.
This does not mean that the present author underestimates the repercussions of the 
subsidiarity principle. Such repercussions are valid for an eventual Community action on 
third country nationals, as well as for action in other fields. Any EC action has to fulfil the 
requirements of Article 3B, and notably of its second paragraph. All I want to emphasise 
here is that the subsidiarity principle does not exclude or substantially reduce (in view of 
the previously existing legal regime) the possibilities for the EC to act on issues 
concerning third country nationals.
On the other hand, it could even be said that, under Articles 100 and 235, the 
conditions for adoption of EC measures are actually more stringent than those established 
by the subsidiarity principle, since those provisions require explicitly a relation of the EC 
action to the 'establishment*, 'functioning', or 'operation* of the common market".
Furthermore, the subsidiarity principle as included in Article 3B of the EC Treaty 
does not exclude the wide margin of discretion enjoyed by the EC institutions (e.g. under 
Articles 100 and 235) to decide whether it is necessary to adopt an EC measure.55
Thus, it does not seem that the subsidiarity principle substantially reduces the 
possibilities for the EC to act on issues concerning third country nationals.
There is another important factor pointing in that direction. It relates to the fact 
that the subsidiarity principle applies not only to the Community activities, but also to 
those of the European Union in general. According to the last paragraph of Article B of 
Title I, on Common Provisions, of the Treaty on European Union,
54 This is, to a certain extent, an aspect already included in the subsidiarity principle itself, as inscribed in 
the second paragraph of Article 3B - "if and in so far as" - seen in conjunction with the EC Treaty 
provisions that define the Community objectives, notably Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty.
55 This has been pointed out by several authors, who, likewise highlight the political dangers of a strict 
judicial enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. See, for the both aspects: Constantinesco, op.cit, pp.l 12- 
4; Emiliou, N., "Subsidiarity : Panacea or Fig Leaf ?", op.cit., p.78; Lenaerts & van Ypersele, op.cit., 
pp.77-8; Palacio González, op.cit., pp.366-8, Toth, ELRt op.cit, and Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., 
p.782. See also Cass, op.cit., p. 1130.
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The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting 
the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 3B of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community".
Therefore, the subsidiarity principle applies also to action taken under Title VI of the 
Treaty on European Union, on "Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs". 
This is further confirmed by Article K.3(2)(b) of that Title, which provides that the 
Council may
"adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better 
by joint action than by the Member States acting individually on account of the 
scale or effects of the action envisaged".
The fact that the subsidiarity principle is equally applicable to the Community pillar, and to 
the third pillar seems to be of a fundamental importance. Some of the most fundamental 
activities planned of Title VI relate precisely to third country nationals: to ’immigration 
policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries’, to 'asylum policy' and to ’rules 
governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the 
exercise of controls thereon'.56 There seems to be no reason to believe that an action may 
be justified under the subsidiarity principle if adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union, but not if adopted under the Community framework. The explicit 
reference in Article B of the Treaty on European Union to the new Article 3B shows 
unequivocal that we are talking here of the very same principle. Therefore, it seems clear 
that the subsidiarity principle, as such, is not an obstacle for the Community to adopt any 
type of measure, whatsoever, which may be adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union.
What conditions the adoption of EC measures that can be adopted within the third 
pillar is not the subsidiarity principle, since it applies to both pillars. What conditions the 
adoption of EC measures on third country nationals are, first, the requirements laid down 
in Articles 100 and 235 and, secondly, the Community objectives. The objectives of Title 
VI of the Treaty on European Union may eventually be seen as being broader than those 
of the European Community. However, to most extent the first pillar (Community) and 
the third pillar (Title VI of the Treaty on European Union) have common objectives.57 
This is particularly clear as far as free movement of persons is concerned. Insofar as Title 
VI of the Treaty on European Union and the EC Treaty have the same objectives, any 
measure that can be adopted under the framework of Title VI, can also be adopted under 
the Community framework - provided the conditions of Articles 100 and 235 are fulfilled. 
The subsidiarity principle makes no difference in this respect, since in both frameworks it 
has to be respected in the same manner. Again, it seems clear that the formal inclusion of 
the subsidiarity principle in the EC Treaty, in the new Article 3B, did not diminish the 
possibilities for the EC action on issues concerning third country nationals. It could even 
be argued that by establishing that the third pillar has to respect the subsidiarity principle, 
while explicitly envisaging that it will act on third country nationals, the Treaty on
56 See Article K. 1 of the Treaty on European Union.
57 Compare Articles B and Article K.1 of the Treaty on European Union, with Articles 2 and 3 of the EC 
Treaty. See also, supra in this chapter, point 3 of section B, and, below in chapter 7, my remarks on the 
relation between Title VI and Community Law.
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European Union actually stresses the need for common action on them. In this respect, it 
may reinforce the justification for adoption of Community measures on third country 
nationals.
This permits to emphasise another important point.58 The need for common action 
on third country nationals may be separated from the precise framework in which that 
action will be adopted and carried out.
Articles 100 and 235 of the EC Treaty, and the subsidiarity principle in general 
terms, stress the need for a common action as a fundamental condition for Community 
action to be adopted. But the need for common action on third country nationals is beyond 
doubt in most of the issues concerning them. The fact that intergovernmental cooperation 
(both on an ad hoc basis and under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union) acts on 
issues related to third country nationals is evidence that common action on them is 
necessary.59 Clearly, the "objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States".
This may be of interest for the following reason. In my view, the subsidiarity 
principle, as established in Article 3B of the EC Treaty, does only consider two 
hypotheses: either action is better taken by individual Member States, or by the 
Community. The implicit principle is that action is better taken by Member States.60 In 
case that is not so, then action should be taken by the Community. In itself, the 
subsidiarity principle established in Article 3B of the EC Treaty, does not consider a third 
possibility, i.e. that action may not be adequately taken by Member States, but that it may 
be satisfactorily taken within an intergovernmental cooperation framework.61 Thus, to this 
extent, it may be argued that it reinforces the possibility that the Community takes action 
on third country nationals when such action cannot be adequately taken by individual 
Member States.
In any case, what seems to be certain is that the subsidiarity principle, included in 
the new Article 3B of the EC Treaty, did not substantially reduce the possibilities for the 
Community to act on issues concerning third country nationals.
58 To some extent this is just another aspect of the point made before - on the repercussions of the 
application of the subsidiarity principle in both the Community and in Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union.
59 See supra, section B, point 2.b).
60 In areas which are not of the Community exclusive competence.
61 In favour (in general terms and not referring specifically to issues concerning third country nationals), 
see Lenaerts & van Ypersele, op.cit., pp.46-7; and (apparently) Toth, CMLRev, op.cit., pp. 1098-9.
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D) EC TREATY PROVISIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MEASURES OF
NARROW SCOPE
1 - General
It seems clear that issues concerning third country nationals may be closely related 
to the general objectives and activities of the Community. Furthermore, the subsidiarity 
principle, as established in Article 3B of the EC Treaty does not seem to preclude the 
existence of Community competences with respect to third country nationals. However, 
under which provisions of the EC Treaty could specific62 measures on third country 
nationals be adopted?
Article 101 is one of the provisions under which measures relating to third country 
nationals could be taken.63 This Article envisages the adoption of Directives when:
"a difference between the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in the Member States is distorting the conditions of 
competition of the common market and (...) the resulting distortion needs to be 
eliminated!...)"
This provision could be the basis for the adoption of Directives concerning third country 
nationals, e.g., insofar as different national rules on access to the labour market and their 
rights and duties as workers may distort competition in the common labour market. It is 
noteworthy that, after the end of the first stage, for Directives to be adopted under this 
Article only a qualified majority is required.
On the other hand, it is clear that measures relating to third country nationals 
cannot be adopted on the basis of Article 113, which provides for the establishment of a 
common commercial policy. Clearly, trade relates to goods not to persons. It may be 
difficult for a comprehensive common external policy to avoid dealing with issues related 
with immigrants from third countries, but these issues certainly cannot be included under 
the Community competence in external trade. However, for the purposes of this chapter 
there are some interesting aspects of the competence of the Communities in external and 
internal trade that are worthy of being mentioned here. First, as Evans recalls, under the 
ECSC Treaty there was no provision for a common customs tariff or for a common 
commercial policy. However, very early on the Commission argued and the Court 
accepted64 the principle that the Community guaranteed free movement for coal and steel 
products, not only when they originated in Member States, but also when they came from 
third countries - provided they had been properly admitted to one Member State.65 
Secondly, it may also be noted that Article 95 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits 
discriminatory taxation on products only refers to "products of other Member States". 
However, the Court of Justice held that such provision is also applicable to products
62 It is again recalled that I am interested here in measures exclusively or primarily related to third 
country nationals. 1 am not referring to measures which, even if applicable to third country nationals, were 
not adopted having them as an exclusive or primary concern.
63 See also Article 102 of the Treaty of Rome.
64 See joined cases 9 and 12/60, Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs, S.A. v. High Authority of the 
ECSC [1961] ECR 197, at 215-217.
65 See Evans, Andrew, "Third Country Nationals and the Treaty on European Union", EJ1L, Vol. 5, 1994, 
No.2,p.l99.
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originating in third countries that are in free circulation in the Community.66 That ruling 
was based on the fact that commercial policy with regard to third countries falls within the 
exclusive competence of the Community.67 That is certainly not the case for issues related 
to immigration and immigrants from third countries. However, that seems to be the case 
as far as the free movement of persons is concerned, and »arguably, as regards the 
establishment of a common labour market in the context of the creation of a single internal 
market.
Certainly, persons are not goods. Therefore the reasoning applied to the relation 
between external and internal movement of goods cannot be automatically applied to 
persons. Yet, the solutions found in the matters to which reference has been made still 
remain interesting examples of how the Treaty roles can be used going beyond a restrictive 
interpretation.
In the field of Social Policy there are some Treaty provisions which could justify 
the adoption of measures relating to third country nationals. In Article 117 there is a 
general reference to the fact that:
"Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and 
an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained"
The same provision adds that Member States:
"(...) believe that such a development will ensue (...) also from the procedures 
provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action."
Clearly, this provision does not confer any powers on the Community, it simply expresses 
the common concerns of the Member States. At most, it has, in relation to its chapter, an 
equivalent significance to that of Article 2 for the whole Treaty. Meanwhile, the existence 
of those common concerns can result in the adoption of legal instruments, but such 
adoption can only be done under powers granted by other provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome.
One instrument used in the social field is the European Social Fund, whose Treaty 
roles are also relevant for the Community competence in relation to third country 
nationals. According to Article 123, that Fund is established 
The task of the Fund is that of
"rendering the employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical 
and occupational mobility within the Community, and to facilitate their adaptation 
to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through 
vocational training and retraining."68
66 See case 193/85, Cooperativa Co-Frutta v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1987] ECR 
2085, at 2112-2114.
67 Idem, paragraph 28 of the judgment.
68 Emphasis added. This is the version as amended by the Treaty on European Union. The previous 
version referred to the common market and not to the internal market, and did not mention the objective 
of facilitating the workers* "adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in 
particular through vocational training and retraining".
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The generic references of the Article explain why the European Social Fund has financed 
programmes promoting the integration of immigrants from third countries and even the 
training of social workers and teachers involved with third country nationals.69
2 - Article 118 and case Germany et al v. Commission70
Another interesting instrument in the social field is Article 118, which reads as 
follows:
"Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with 
its general objectives, the Commission shall have the task of promoting close 
cooperation between Member States in the social field, particularly in matters 
relating to: employment; labour law and working conditions; basic and advanced 
vocational training; social security; prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases; occupational hygiene; the right of association, and collective bargaining 
between employers and workers.
To this end, the Commission shall act in close contact with Member States by 
making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations both on problems 
arising at national level and on those of concern to international organisations.
Before delivering the opinions provided for in this Article, the Commission shall 
consult the Economic and Social Committee."
During the late seventies and the first half of the eighties the issues relating to 
immigrants from third countries were discussed on several occasions by the Community 
institutions. The Commission has proposed to initiate consultations on Member States' 
migration policies concerning third countries and the Council, on several occasions 
recognised the need for such consultation.71
69 Sec Jacobs, A. T. J. M. & Zeijen, H. in European Labour Law and Social Policy, Tilburg, Tilburg 
University Press, 1993, at p.44. See also chapter 4, section C.
70 Joined cases 281, 283 to 285 & 287/85, Germany, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom & Denmark 
v. Commission [1987J ECR 3203. On this case see Constantinesco.Vlad & Simon, Denys, JDi, Year 115, 
1988, No.2, pp.493-494; Decaux, Emanuel "Sommaire et Note au Arrêt du 9 Juillet 1987 - Allemagne, 
France, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Royaume-Uni c. Commission (aff, jtes. 281, 283, 284, 285 et 287/85)", 
RTDE, Vol.23, Dec, 1987, No.4, pp.707-716; Desolre, Guy , "Compétence en matière de politique 
migratoire vis-à-vis des États tiers - Cour de Justice, 9 Juillet 1987, (affaires 281,283,284,285 et 287/85, 
Allemagne et Autres c. Commission)", CDE, Vol.26, 1990, No.3-4, pp.53-464; Hartley, Trevor "The 
Commission as Legislator under the EEC Treaty”, ELR, Vol.13, April 1988, No.2, pp. 122-125; Mancini. 
G, F., "Politica comunitaria e nazionale delle migrazioni nella prospettiva dell'europa sociale", Rivista di 
Diritto Europeo, Vol,29, 1989, No..3-4, pp.309-319 and Ti governo dei movimenti migratori in Europa", 
op.cit., pp.233-242; O'Keeffe, D., annotation to the case in International Labour Law Reports, Vol.7, 
1986-87, pp.338-347, at 346-347; Simmonds, Kenneth R. "The Concertation of Community Migration 
Policy"; CMLRev, Voi.25, 1988, No.l, pp.177-200; Travesa, Enrico Tl coordinamento delle politiche 
migratorie nazionali nel confronti degli stranieri extracomunitari. Prospettive aperte dalla sentenza della 
Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee 9 Luglio 1987", Rivista di Diritto Europeo, Vol.28, 1988, 
No.l, pp.5-22 and Vilà Costa, Blanca, annotation to the case in Revista Juridica de Catalunya, 1988, pp. 
516-520.
71 On 21 January 1974, the Council adopted a resolution concerning a Social Action Programme, in 
which it recognised that the migration policies pursued by Member States affected the Community’s social 
policy and considered necessary and expressed its resolve to promote consultation between the Member 
States on immigration policies vis-à-vis third countries, see OJ C 13/1 of 1974. In December 1974, the
73
a) the Commission's Resolution
Attempting to make progress in this respect, on 8 July 1985, the Commission 
adopted under Article 118 a "decision setting up a prior communication and consultation 
procedure on migration policies in relation to non-member countries".72 According to its
European Council stressed the need for progressive harmonisation of legislation affecting aliens (point 10 
of the final communiqué of the Conference). In February 1976, the Council approved a resolution based 
on the proposal of the Commission for an Action Programme for Migrant Workers, in which it was 
considered important to undertake appropriate consultation on migrant policy vis-à-vis third countries - 
Resolution of the Council of 9 February, OJ 1976 C 34/2 of 14/2/1976 and Bull. EC, Suppl. 3/76. In 
November 1979 the Council stated that the aim of the consultation on migration policies vis-à-vis non­
member countries would be not to facilitate the adoption of the Community legal instruments but rather to 
attain "a common attitude of the Member States", without prejudice to the powers of the institutions of the 
Community. The Council also asked the Commission to prepare or organise such consultations. See the 
conclusions of the Council meeting of 22 November 1979, in Bull. EC 11-1979, p.45, point 2.1.43. See 
also Doc. PV/CONS S3 SOC 292 of 26/11/1979. In June 1980, the Council Resolution on Guide Lines for 
a Community Labour Market Policy stated that market integration "should be fostered within the 
framework of free movement of labour (...) taking account of the employment priority to be offered to 
workers who are nationals of a Member State and of the need to contain access to the Community labour 
market by labour from third countries, and by appropriate consultation on migration policies vis-à-vis 
third countries(...)"; OJ C 168/1 of 1980. This document ends by stating that the Commission should take 
the initiatives necessary to promote cooperation between Member States in the field of labour-market 
policy. On 22 June 1984, the Council, in its conclusions concerning a Community Medium Term Social 
Action Programme (OJ C 175/1, of 4/7/1984), noted that the Commission would submit proposals to the 
Council for: "developing cooperation between Member States on the control of migratory flows from third 
countries". The situation soon developed further, especially after the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council on Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration, of 1 March 1985, COM 
(85) 48 final. In its point 41 the Commission expresses its intention to provide an appropriate framework 
for "a process of information and consultation" on "migration policies with regard to third countries". In 
an annex, the communication included a Draft EEC Council Resolution on the matter. It considered it to 
be "necessary to have much closer consultation and co-operation at Community level in the 
implementation of national migration policies vis-à-vis third countries". However, the response of the 
Council to the Commission proposal was a very laconic one. In July 1985, the Council issued a Resolution 
on Guidelines for a Community policy on migration - Council Resolution 85/C, 186/04, OJ C 186/3, of 
26/7/1985. In its Preamble it mentioned that: "much closer consultation and cooperation is required at 
Community level in the implementation of national migration policies vis-à-vis third countries(...) 
however, matters relating to the access, residence and employment of migrant workers from third 
countries fall under the jurisdiction of the governments of the Member States, without prejudice to 
Community agreements concluded with third countries". In the main text of the Resolution, the Council 
recognised "that it is desirable to promote cooperation and consultation between the Member States and 
the Commission as regards migration policy, including vis-à-vis third countries, and notes the 
Commission's intention of drawing up an appropriate procedure to this end". Finally, the Council invited 
the Commission to take the necessary initiatives and present the necessary proposals to the Council itself 
"to put into effect the measures referred to in this resolution". It was as a result of this Council Resolution 
that the Commission adopted the decision mentioned in the following footnote.
72 Commission Decision 85/381/EEC setting up a prior communication and consultation procedure on 
migration policies in relation to non-member countries, OJ L 217/25, of 14/8/85. The Commission's 
resolution was approved on 8 July but only published in 14 August. The Council Resolution on Guidelines 
for a Community policy on migration (the immediate precedent to the Commission resolution) was 
approved on 13 June 1985, formally adopted at its meeting of 16 July and published in 26 July.
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Article l, the Member States were to infoim each other, and the Commission, of draft 
measures and agreements related
”to third country workers and members of their families, in the areas of entry, 
residence and employment [including illegal], (...) as well as the realisation of 
equality of treatment in living and working conditions, wages and economic rights, 
the promotion of integration into the work force, society and cultural life, and the 
voluntary return of such persons to their countries of origin".
The objectives of the consultation were defined in Article 3:
- to facilitate the mutual exchange of information and the identification of prob­
lems of common interest and the adoption of a common position by the Member 
States, particularly as regards international instruments relating to migration;
- to ensure that the refereed agreement and measures are in conformity with and do 
not compromise the results of Community policies and actions in these fields, in 
particular in relation to the Community labour market policy, and
- to examine the possibility of measures (to be taken by the Community or 
Member States) aimed at achieving progress towards a harmonisation of national 
legislation on foreigners, promoting the inclusion of a maximum of common 
provisions in bilateral agreements, and improving the protection of Community 
nationals working and living in third countries.
Articles 2 and 4 defined the procedure to be adopted in the consultation. The latter could 
be initiated by a Member State or by the Commission itself and would be arranged by the 
latter. Meetings would be chaired by the Commission too, which would also provide the 
secretariat.
However, not all Member States were satisfied with this Commission decision. The 
governments of Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom asked 
the Court of Justice to declare the decision void.73 The main arguments of such 
governments against the decision were related to the Commission's competence in 
adopting it.74 According to those Member States, neither Article 118 nor any other 
provision of the EEC Treaty could empower the Commission to adopt a binding decision. 
Moreover, they also contended that the field of the decision falls (entirely or at least 
partly) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States.
b) the Court's Ruling
The Court ruled on the case in July 1987, two years after the adoption of the 
Commission decision. The Court declared the decision void on two points, giving only 
partial satisfaction to the governments of the Member States. 734
73 The application of the Netherlands was declared inadmissible because it was presented too late.
74 Member States also submitted that the Commission would have infringed an essential procedural 
requirement because it did not consult the Economic and Social Committee. Furthermore it would lack a 
proper statement of reasons since it did refer to the Council resolution of 16 July 1985, which had no 
binding effect. Advocate General Mancini argued that the lack of consultation of the Economic and Social 
Committee was a valid reason to annul the Commission's decision. The Court of Justice considered that 
the Commission did not need to consult the Economic and Social Committee because its decision was not 
a proposal for the implementation of practical measures, but only a "purely preparatory and procedural" 
instrument. The Court also ruled that the reference to Article 118 was sufficient as the legal basis of the 
decision.
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In relation to their first argument the Court ruled that Article 118 in fact 
empowered the Commission to adopt a binding decision on the Member States 
establishing a communication and consultation procedure. The Court considered that as 
Article 118
"confers a specific task on the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision is 
not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission 
necessarily and per se the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out 
that task."
Therefore,
"the second paragraph of Article 118 must be interpreted as conferring on the 
Commission all the powers which are necessary in order to arrange the 
consultations (...) [e.g.] to require the Member States to notify essential 
information (...) [and] to require them to take part in consultations. "75 
However, the Court considered that the Commission had exceeded the scope of its powers 
under Article 118, in so far as the decision :
"lays down a precise obligation on the Member States and is intended to debar 
them from adopting national measures or concluding agreements that the 
Commission considers not to be in conformity with Community policies and
actions" .^
The Court outlined that :
"the Commission has a power of a purely procedural nature to initiate a 
consultation procedure [and] it cannot determine the result to be achieved in that 
consultation and(...)prevent the Member States from implementing drafts, 
agreements and measures which it might consider not to be in conformity with 
Community policies and actions.”^
However, the most interesting point for the purposes of this chapter is the question 
of whether the fields referred to in the Commission's decision were covered by the social 
field mentioned in Article 118.
Firstly, the Court had to assess whether migration policy falls completely outside 
the social field referred to in Article 118. The Court held that:
"(...) the employment situation and, more generally, the improvement of living and 
working conditions within the Community are liable to be affected by the policy 
pursued by the Member States with regard to workers from non-member 
coun tries"'®
In this respect the Court recalled the repeated explicit statements of the Council in the 
same context. Consequently, the conclusion of the Court was that
"the argument that migration policy in relation to non-member States falls 
entirely outside of the social field, in respect of which Article 118 provides for 
cooperation between the Member States, cannot be accepted".
The Court also ruled out the argument of the French government that all policy on foreign 
nationals falls outside the social field because it involves questions of public security in 
which the Member States have exclusive competence. The Court considered that 756
75 Paragraph 28 of the decision of the Court.
76 Paragraph 35 of the decision of the Court.
77 Idem, paragraph 34.
7® Ibidem, paragraph 16.
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"(... pursuant to their rules governing foreign nationals Member States may take 
measures with regard to workers who are nationals of non-member countries (...) 
which are based on considerations of public policy, public security or public 
health and which are, as such, their own responsibility 
However, the Court concluded that
"(,..)this does not mean that the whole field of migration policy in relation to non­
member countries falls necessarily within the scope of public security ."79
The Court also examined whether part of the matters included in the Commission’s 
decision could fall outside the social field according to the meaning of Article 118. One of 
the objections of the Member States was that the decision could not introduce a 
consultation procedure into the cultural field. Actually, the decision referred to the 
"promotion of integration into the work force, society and cultural life" of migrant 
workers from third countries and members of their families. The Court considered the 
following reference to be legitimate: the reference to "the promotion of the integration 
into the work force of workers from non-member countries(...) in so far as it is closely 
linked to employment". Integration of those workers into society was held to be equally 
covered by the social field of Article 118, "inasmuch as the draft measures in question are 
those connected with problems relating to employment and working conditions”.* 80
However, the Court ruled that the cultural integration of immigrant communities 
from non-member countries cannot be included in the social field according to the 
meaning of Article 118. The Court said that:
"(...) whilst this may be linked, to an extent, with the effects of migration policy, it 
is aimed at immigrant communities in general without distinction between migrant 
workers and other foreigners".
Moreover, in the Court's view, cultural integration only has an "extremely tenuous” link 
with problems relating to "employment and working conditions".
The final conclusion of the Court was that the Commission's decision was void to 
the extent that the envisaged information and consultation procedure covered matters 
relating to the cultural integration of workers from third countries,81 and to the extent that 
one of the objectives of the consultation was to ensure that the draft national measures and 
agreements were in conformity with Community policies and actions.
c) Comments on the Court's Ruling
The ruling of the Court in this case may be analysed from two perspectives: from a 
legal perspective and from a more general perspective - the latter also taking into account 
political considerations and the functioning of the institutional system of the EC.
From a legal perspective, the ruling of the Court was important because migration 
from third countries was recognised as having a place within the activities of the 
Community and, moreover, the powers of the Commission to promote cooperation 
between Member States were consolidated. It is very important that the Court rejected the
Ibidem, paragraph 25.
80 Ibidem, paragraph 21.
81 This ruling could be questioned nowadays, since the new Article 128 of the EC Treaty, as amended by 
the Treaty on European Union, provides for certain Community competences in the cultural field. Article 
128(4), for example, provides that: "The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions of this Treaty".
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view that the whole area of policy on foreign nationals falls outside the social field 
mentioned in Article 118, and therefore of Community Law.
The judgment of the Court in this crucial aspect (as in others) was very much 
influenced by the Opinion of its Advocate General Mancini. He explained at length the 
relevance of national migration policies for the Community, as well as the importance 
attached by several resolutions of the Council to concertation on those policies.82
The Court recognised that immigration from third countries is relevant for EEC 
activities and that it may be the object of a cooperation procedure within its institutions. It 
was the first time that such recognition occurred. This was very important in symbolic 
terms, given the traditional reluctance of the Member States to accept even the mere 
discussion of these matters at a Community level. Some authors even consider that the 
Court's ruling opened the way for the adoption by the Council of legislation on entry and 
residence of third country nationals, in the framework of a future Community policy on 
migration from third countries.83
In any case, compared to the Court's acceptance of the claim that immigration 
from third countries was related to the EC social field, the rejection of the inclusion of 
cultural integration in the cooperation procedure seems clearly to be of secondary 
importance.84
As far as the powers of the Commission are concerned, the Court settled clearly in 
favour of the Commission the old discussion on what it could do under Article 118.85 
Yet, the powers of the Commission, although strengthened, remained only procedural. 
Furthermore, the Court did set limits to the Commission's powers. It ruled that the 
Commission could not define as one of the objectives of the consultation the objective to 
ensure that national agreements and measures be in conformity with, and do not 
compromise the results of, Community policies and actions. In this respect the ruling of 
the Court seems to be particularly open to criticism.86 First, it appears positive to aim at a
82 As Mancini put it: "[oln six occasions the Council stated that consultation is indispensable; twice it 
spurred the Commission on to implement it and, when the Commission decided to act, asked it on a 
further two occasions to inform the Council of its proposals." See ECR, case quoted, at p.3227, point 7 of 
the Advocate General's opinion. In general terms, compare the conclusions of the Court in paragraphs 16 
to 21 of its judgment and Mancini's opinion in its points 5 to 7 ( pp.3224-8) and points 14-15, in the part 
at pp.3238-9.
83 See Mancini, "Il governo dei movimenti migratoriop. cit., at p.237 and Travesa, op.cit., pg.14.
84 See also, e.g., Travesa, op.cit., p.13, who states that: N[p]ur non sottovalutando l'importanza delle 
misure d'integrazione culturale (...) dei cittadini dei paesi terzi, non si può non rilevare che, rispetto al 
numero e all'importanza delle materie elencate dall'articolo 1 delta decisione (...) l'annullamento parziale 
in questione deve considerarsi di portata alquanto modesta."
83 It is generally regarded that in so doing the Court used the doctrine of implied powers. See Hartley, 
ELRt 1988, loc.cit., at p.124 (with a critical view of the way the Court used this doctrine). For a different 
opinion see Travesa, op.cit., pg. 15-16, who, in any case, accepts that the Court looked for the "effet utile" 
of Article 118. Constantinesco.Vlad also refers to this ''effet", in op. cit. at p.493. See also the interesting 
remarks of Mancini, who sustains that the Court did not take formal recourse to the doctrine of implied 
powers - Mancini, "Il governo dei movimenti migratori ...", op. cit, p.238. For a review of the past 
controversy on the Commission powers under Article 118 see the Advocate General opinion in the case, in 
ECR as quoted before, at pp.3220-3224.
86 See also Travesa, op.cit, pg.16-17 and Simmonds, op.cit., p.199.
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global coherence of actions taken both at the national and the Community level. 87 After 
all the Court itself had previously agreed with the Commission in that :
"(...) it is important to ensure that migration policies of Member States in relation 
to non-member countries take into account both common policies and actions 
taken at Community level, in particular within the framework of Community 
labour market policy, in order not to jeopardise the results"^
Secondly, it may be exaggerated to say that the Commission introduced "a precise 
obligation on the Member States" and intended
"to debar them from adopting national measures or concluding agreements that the 
Commission considers not to be in conformity with Community policies and 
actions".'
It seems clear that the Commission could not achieve through a mere "information and 
consultation" procedure under Article 118 what it was possible to attain only under other 
provisions of the EEC Treaty .90 Thus, in this aspect, the Court's ruling could have been 
redundant. Another reason for this aspect of the Court's ruling was the need it felt to make 
some compromise in the dispute at stake, conceding something to the Member States' 
positions in order to allay their fears.91
Although the judgment of the Court in this case received widespread attention, it is 
perhaps not quite correct to characterise it as a milestone as it has been represented. This 
is so for two reasons.
On one hand, it seems that the governments of the Member States did not even 
comply with the Commission resolution, nor did the Commission try to enforce it.92 
Therefore, the Court's validation of the most substantial part of the Commission's decision 
did not entail by itself an important practical progress.
On the other hand, it could almost be said that the Court's decision just reaffirmed 
the fundamental aspects of the status quo. The Court's ruling did "not alter the balance of 
competence as between the Community and the Member States", and its outcome "leaves 
unanswered the real and pressing need for a common Community policy" regarding 
workers from non-member countries.  ^ However, it is hard to imagine how in this case 
the Court could have brought a fundamental change to that situation.
The fundamental problem is that, according to the EC Treaty, the agreement of all 
governments of the Member States is indispensable for the Community to take substantial 
action in the field of third country nationals.^ This necessity exists both for the adoption 87901234
87 One should not forget that, after all, the governments of the Member States are responsible for the 
adoption of Community policies in the Council.
88 Paragraph 16 of the decision of the Court.
89 idem, paragraph 35.
90 For instance: Articles 100 and 235 for the adoption of EC binding measures and Articles 155 and 169 
for the Commission to assure the respect of existing Community rules. See also Article 170 for judicial 
procedures between Member States.
91 According to Hartley, ELR, 1988, op.cit., pg.124, the fact that the Court considered some aspects of the 
decision void, were simply crumbs thrown to the applicant Member States, the decision being a substantial 
victory for the Commission.
92 See Mancini, ”11 govemo dei movimenti migratori op. cit., at pp.238 and 240.
93 O’Keeffe, op.cit., pg.346-347.
94 See, however, the next chapter for a search for means to mitigate this absolute assessment.
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of legally binding measures and for the pursuance of productive cooperation. The 
adoption of EC legally binding measures on third country nationals was and remained 
completely dependent on the will of the governments of the Member States. This is hardly 
surprising, considering the analysis made above of the relevant Articles of the EEC Treaty. 
But neither is it surprising that successful cooperation between EC governments depends 
on their good will. The governments of the Member States may be obliged to provide 
information and take part in consultations. Yet, productive cooperation on national 
policies seems impossible without the will of EC governments to participate. Cooperation 
as such cannot be imposed.
Within the limits of Article 118, reaching a binding legal stage seems impossible in 
any case, let alone reaching it without the agreement of the governments of the Member 
States.T h e cooperation procedure could eventually lead to the approval of Community 
legal binding measures, but these would have to be adopted under the normal rules of the 
Treaty - most probably under Articles 100 or 235, which require a unanimity vote in the 
Council. In other words, the adoption of legally binding measures would be impossible if 
the governments of the Member States refused to adopt them, let alone their refusal of the 
cooperation procedure itself (or information and consultation for it). This seems to be 
particularly obvious in the field of immigration from third countries. Therefore, it seems 
clear that, in itself, the Court's ruling, confirming the duty of Member States' governments 
to participate in the communication and consultation procedure, is less important in 
practical terms than it may seem at first sight.95 6 *
The main political message of this case seems to be quite clear. If some 
governments of the Member States reacted so strongly to the settlement of a mere 
information and consultation procedure, then, EC measures on third country nationals will 
not be easily adopted under Article 100 or 235. Developments of the situation in this field, 
contemporaneous and subsequent to this case, have only confirmed the reluctance of the 
Member States to take measures within the Community framework. This unwillingness 
has been fully protected by the rules of the EEC Treaty, at least until now.
Finally, it must be added that almost one year after the Court's ruling, in June 
1988, the Commission made a "new" decision on the same subject.^? Therein the
95 Mancini believes that there is a contradiction in Article 118. While that provision assumes that 
competence on labour related issues belongs to the Member States, it gives the Commission the task of 
coordinating the actions of the national legislators, with no powers to adopt binding measures for that 
purpose. See Mancini, G. F., "II governo dei movimenti migratori ...M, op.cit., at pp.236-237.
96 For the implementation of the results of any cooperation to be any less dependent on the willingness of 
the Member States, they would have to correspond to existing binding Community Law rules. That could 
be the case, e.g., of the observation of Community rules on the rights of nationals of one Member State in 
the labour market of another Member State. In a cooperation procedure, the governments of the Member 
States could agree to avoid that immigration from third countries prevented unemployed nationals of one 
Member State from getting a job in another Member State. However, if national rules on immigration 
from third countries contravened Community Law in that respect, the relevant Community rules would be 
legally enforced on its own authority, and not, apparently, through Article 118 alone or through the 
cooperation there provided for. See, in any case, the analysis made on the issue of "Community 
preference" in the next chapter.
9^ Commission Decision 88/384/EEC, of 8/6/1988, setting up a prior communication and consultation 
procedure on migration policies in relation to non-member countries, OJL 183 of 14/7/1988.
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Commission removed the two aspects of the former decision that were declared void by 
the Court of Justice.98 Apart from that, the new decision reproduced word by word the 
previous one.99
F) DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES WITH GENERAL SCOPE
The provisions referred to above are certainly insufficient as a legal basis for the 
adoption of, at least, most measures related to third country nationals. Either they are too 
vague to form a basis for substantive legal instruments (Articles 117 and 118), or their 
material scope is simply limited to specific fields (Article 101 and 123, on distortions of 
competition and the European Social Fund, respectively). In the rest of the areas related to 
third country nationals, the only ways for the Community to adopt measures seems to be 
to have recourse to Articles 100 and 235 of the Treaty, or to Article 238, on association 
agreements with third countries.
1 - Article 100 of the EC Treaty
This Article states that:
"The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market."98 100
It seems reasonable to argue that legislative differences on most of the issues 
concerning immigration and immigrants from third countries directly affect the common 
market. This applies to the abolition of internal border controls, as well as to other 
issues.101
Article 100 happens to be the legal basis of two of the three Commission draft 
Directives for the abolition of internal border controls on persons, presented on July
98 These aspects were the reference to the cultural integration of third country workers (and their 
families) and the objective of consultation for ensuring that the agreements and measures of the Member 
States "be in conformity with, and do not compromise the results of Community policies and actions".
99 With only one small difference. While, in the first decision, one of the objectives of the consultation 
was "to facilitate the adoption of a common position by the Member States, particularly as regards 
international instruments relating to migration", the new decision restates the same objective but it is 
referred to as "the adoption of a common policy" regarding the same topic.
100 This is the present version of Article 100. In the previous version, before being amended by the Treaty 
on European Union, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee only had to be 
consulted "in the case of directives whose implementation would, in one or more Member States, involve 
the amendment of legislation".
101 Timmermans sustains that "there can scarcely be any doubt that, the abolition of internal border 
controls of persons* which is part of the completion of the internal market, depends in part on the creation 
of a common regime on a number of issues related to immigration and national rules and policies relating 
to aliens; and that to that extent the Community is competent to enact such a regime by way of 
harmonisation directives under Article 100 EEC." See Timmermans, C.W.A. "Free Movement of Persons 
and the Divisions of Powers Between the Community and its Member States - Why do it the 
intergovernmental way?", in Free Movement of Persons in Europe..., op.cit., pp.352-368, at 361.
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1995.102 Under certain conditions, one of these draft Directives grants to third country 
nationals (who arc lawfully in a Member State) the right to travel in the territories of other 
Member States.103 In the Preamble of this draft Directive it is precisely mentioned that 
"the approximation of Member States' laws on this question affects the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market".104
However, Article 100 may also be used on other issues, which 'directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market’ in other aspects, such as the 
Community labour market. It seems clear, for instance, that the free movement of workers 
that are nationals of a Member State can be challenged if certain Member States rely on 
labour imported from third countries to overcome their lack of manpower, instead of 
making recourse to unemployed nationals of other Member States. The approximation of 
national immigration laws would then be justified with the aim of assuring the effective 
functioning of the common labour market.
However, the adoption of positive measures in favour of third country nationals 
may also be justified in relation to the "establishment or functioning of the common 
market". The labour and social security laws of a certain Member State may give fewer 
rights to third country nationals than to the nationals of a EC Member State. This could 
potentially give the enterprises of that State a competitive advantage over those of other 
Member States that choose to give the same rights to all workers, regardless of their 
nationality. To the extent that the difference in protection is relevant and the workers 
concerned make up an important number, such a situation clearly affects the common 
market. It would, therefore, justify the adoption of measures by the Community under 
Article 100.
2 - Article 100A of the EC Treaty
The Single European Act introduced Article 100A in the EEC Treaty, with the aim 
of facilitating the adoption of Community legislation to establish the internal market. It 
read as follows:
102 Draft Council Directive on the elimination of controls on persons crossing internal frontiers, COM 
(95) 347, final; Draft Council Directive on the right of third-country nationals to travel in the Community, 
COM (95) 346, final; both from 12/7/1995. See chapter 4 for an analysis of these Directives. The third 
Directive for the elimination of controls on persons crossing internal frontiers, was proposed in COM (95) 
348 and is based in Articles 49, 54(2) and 63(2) of the EC Treaty. These are the Treaty provisions which 
based the adoption of the Directives already in force which are to be amended by the proposed draft 
Directive.
103 COM (95) 346, final.
104 Idem, third recital. Note that the present version of Article 100 (as amended by the Treaty on 
European Union) refers to the 'common market' onty, while the Commission refers to the ’internal 
market'. However, this is not really a problem, since the internal market is not much more than a practical 
realisation of a true common market. See further the next chapter, on the relation between the two 
concepts. Note also that Article 100 of the EC Treaty was also the legal basis of a Commission draft 
Directive on the harmonisation of laws of the Member States to combat illegal migration and illegal 
employment - see OJ C 277/2 of 1976 (for the first draft) and OJ C 97/9 of 1978 (for the final draft). The 
Directive would imply the charge of heavy fines on employers knowingly employing an illegal immigrant, 
and more stringent controls on the arrival of new migrants (e.g., by inland checks). The Council never 
approved it.
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"By a way of derogation from Article 100, and save where otherwise provided for 
in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the 
objectives set out in Article 7A. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority 
(...), adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market."103 
However, it was established that this general rule
"shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of 
persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons".105 06
This means that the unanimity vote in the Council is still required to adopt EC 
legislation on the free movement of persons.107 Likewise, the Single European Act did not 
change the decision-making procedure under which Article 235 can be used: it still 
requires an unanimous vote in the Council. This contrasts with the fact that the Single 
European Act amended several provisions of the EEC Treaty on the Community decision­
making procedure. In most fields, after the European Single Act, the adoption of decisions 
by the Council no longer requires unanimity, but a qualified majority. Such a change did 
not occur in Article 100 and 235.
In this way, the drafters of the Single European Act, while establishing a very 
ambitious project in general terms, and facilitating the adoption of EC measures in other 
fields, left unchanged the rules on the decision making procedure related to third country 
nationals.108 In light of the impossibility of a quick judicial enforcement of the obligation 
to establish an internal market, this maintenance of the old rules on decision-making 
procedure represents a real political trap. The Member States prepared the way for leaving 
basically untouched their powers to prevent the adoption of EC measures on the free 
movement of persons, including measures on third country nationals. This intention is to 
some extent also expressed by two declarations annexed to the Single European Act. A 
"General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 of the Single European Act", made by the 
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, stated that: 
"Nothing in [its] provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take such 
measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration 
from third countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit 
trading in works of art and antiques".
105 This ¡s the original version of Article 100A(1), as introduced by the Single European Act. The Treaty 
on European Union amended it only in the procedural aspects, applying the new Article 189B to it.
106 Article 100A (2).
107 It may be interesting to note that, as will be recalled in the next chapter, some times it is sustained 
that the free movement of persons referred to in Article 7A is limited to nationals of Member States only. 
This is argued, for example, by the United Kingdom government. If such an assertion was valid, the 
reference in Article I00A(2) to free movement of persons should be interpreted in a similar manner - and 
considered to refer only to nationals of a Member State. The result would be that EC measures on third 
country nationals could be adopted by qualified majority, i.e. under the general rule of Article 100A(1). 
This result would probably not please the UK government.
108 Note, however, that Article 59(2), on the possibility of extension to third country nationals of rules 
related with the free provision of services, was also changed. Before the E.S.A. a unanimous vote was 
required to adopt measures and after the E.S.A., a qualified majority is sufficient. Nevertheless, this 
provision was not yet used to enact measures within the Community.
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A "political declaration” made on the free movement of persons by the representatives of 
the governments of the Member States, stated that:
"In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall 
cooperate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as 
regards the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries. They 
shall also cooperate in the combating of terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and 
illicit trading in works of art and antiques."
Nevertheless, it may be noted that Article 100A was used to adopt EC legislation 
on issues related to public security, traditionally seen as being an exclusive domain of 
national sovereignty. I refer here to Directives on money laundering,109 insider dealing,110 
and weapons.111 They were all based on Article 100A,112 which requires a connection of 
EC measures with the objectives of Article 7A. Thus, it may be argued that the public 
security aspects of issues concerning third country nationals are not an obstacle for the 
adoption of EC measures, inasmuch as these are justified under the Community objective 
of establishing an internal market.113
3 - Article 235 of the EC Treaty114
Community measures on third country nationals can also be adopted under Article 
235, which provides that:
"If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
109 Directive 9I/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, OJ L 166/77 of 1991.
110 Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ L 334/30 
of 18/11/1989.
111 Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on the control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons, OJ L 256/51-58 of 13/09/91.
112 All were also based on the EC Treaty, in general terms. The Directive on money laundering was, in 
addition, based Article 57(2) thereof.
113 See also paragraph 25 of cases 281, 283-5 & 287/85, Germany et al. v. Commission. There the Court 
of Justice declared that the fact that Member States retain their competence to take measures concerning 
workers who are nationals of non-member countries "which are based on considerations of public policy, 
public security or public health and which are, as such, their own responsibility", does not mean, that "the 
whole field of migration policy in relation to non-member countries falls necessarily within the scope of 
public security".
114 On Article 235 see Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat. op.cit. at pg. 114; Mougin, C. Flaesch's 
commentary to Article 235 in Traité instituant la CEE - commentaire article par article, Kovar, Robert & 
Constantinesco.Vlad et al. (eds.), Paris, Economica, 1992, pp. 1509-1539, at pp. 1512-13; Usher, John A. 
"The Gradual Widening of EC Policy, in Particular on the Basis of Articles 100 and 235 EEC Treaty" in 
Structures and Dimensions of European Community Policy, by Schwarze, J. & Schermers, H. G. (eds.), 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988, at pp.25-36; Weatherill.S. & Beaumont,P., EC LAW - The Essential Guide 
to the Legal Workings of the European Community, London, Penguin, 1993, at pp. 119-122. For an 
analysis of the use of Article 235 in recent times see also Emiliou, Nicholas "Opening Pandora's Box: the 
Legal Basis of Community Measures before the Court of Justice", ELR, Vol. 19, October 1994, No. 5, 
pp.488-506.
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unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures."115
a) The Relationship between Article 235 and Community Objectives
(i) general
This Article (together with Article 100116 17) restricts the principle of Community 
limited powers, by granting the Community what are usually called "residual powers".1,7 
Like Article 100, Article 235 gives the Community a general competence, subject to some 
requirements. Apparently, this Article is less demanding than is Article 100, as the latter 
requires that the instruments to be adopted deal with issues which "directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market". Instead, Article 235 only requires 
the existence of a need to attain "one of the objectives of the Community". Although that 
need must be verified "in the course of the operation of the common market", the link of 
the measure with a strict conception of the common market seems to be less stringent 
here. Thus we may examine the possibility of using Article 235 concentrating on analysing 
it in combination with the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome and its Articles 2 and 3.118
Common measures in relation to third country nationals could be justified on the 
basis of a need for ensuring "the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons". That could be the justification for a common 
immigration policy or the extension to third country nationals of the right of freedom of 
movement for workers. The promotion of "an accelerated raising of the standard of living" 
and even of "an increase in stability" could justify positive action in relation to third 
country nationals, namely action against racism and against discrimination or generally on 
the promotion of their social integration. Moreover, almost any common measure on third 
country nationals could be explained by the broad Community objective of promoting 
"closer relations between States belonging to it."
(ii) The Issue in Other Areas
It is important to emphasise that Article 235 has been used to justify action in areas 
in which the competence of the Community was not explicitly provided for in the EC 
Treaty. In those fields, the political will of the governments of the Member States was 
sufficient to overcome legal doubts on the appropriateness of the adoption of EC 
measures.119
115 See also the equivalent Articles in the ECSC Treaty (Article 95) and in the EAEC Treaty (Article 
203).
116 As well as with the doctrine of implied powers, namely in the Community external relations.
117 See Snyder, F. "Competences", in Butterworths Expert Guide to the European Union, op.cit.
118 See, however, that it is common to consider that the Community objectives referred to in Article 235 
are not only those that are mentioned in general terms in Article 2 and 3 and the Preamble of the Treaty, 
but also the objectives mentioned more specifically in other provisions of the Treaty. See Mougin, op.cit. 
at pp. 1512-13 and Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat, op.cit., at p.l 14.
119 The extent to which political will was here able to overcome the legal objections for such action is a 
good example of how legal arguments are in general of secondary importance. However, it should also be 
noted how the lack of political commitment here prevented the adoption of more ambitious measures. 
Again using legal arguments.
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One example is the area of equal treatment for men and women. It may be 
recalled here the Council Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women which concerned access to employment, vocational 
training, promotion and working conditions.120 In this area the Treaty did not give explicit 
competence to the Community institutions. However, as the Preamble of the said 
Directive states, in its third recital,
"equal treatment for male and female workers constitutes one of the objectives of 
the Community, in so far as the harmonisation of living and working conditions 
while maintaining their improvement are inter alia to be furthered".
Therefore the legal basis of the Directive was declared as being: "the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, and in particular article 235 thereof. Although 
approved later than some would have liked,121 there was enough consensus among 
Member States for the adoption of this Directive.122 The main motivation appears to have 
been that the Community would lose political legitimacy if it were not to act in this field.
Another example can be found in the area of environmental protection. This is 
one of the areas the original Treaty did not explicitly mention. Some EC action was 
nevertheless taken and EC competence concerning the environment was later formally 
incorporated into the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act. In itself, this development 
shows how the political background can determine the interpretation and the use of 
existing competence. To substantiate this idea we may look at an example of Community 
action taken before the European Single Act: the Council Directive of 1979 on the 
conservation of wild birds.123 The necessary specific powers to act in this field had not 
been provided for in the Treaty. Therefore the Directive declared that its legal basis was 
article 235,
"Whereas the conservation of the species of wild birds naturally occurring in the 
European territory of the Member States is necessary to attain, within the 
operation of the common market, the Community's objectives regarding the 
improvement of living conditions, a harmonious development of economic 
activities throughout the Community and a continuous and balanced 
expansion...".124
120 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions, OJ L 39/40 of 14/2/1976. Article 235 was also the legal basis of Council Directive 
79/7/EEC, of 19 December 1978, on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women in matters of social security, OJ L 6/24 of 10/1/79. See also Directive 75/117/EEC on 
the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay 
for men and women, OJ L 39/40, of 14/8/86, which was based exclusively in Article 100.
121 See, for instance, the Defrenne cases - case 80/70 [1971J ECR 445, case 43/75 [1976J ECR 455 and 
case 149/77, Defrenne (III) v. Sabena [1978] ECR 1365.
122 Even if later some of the Member States did not fully comply with its rules. See, generally, the Resolu­
tion of the European Parliament of 10 March 1988 on the lack of respect of the Directives on equality of 
treatment between men and women, especially through indirect discrimination, OJ C 94 of 11/4/1988.
123 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2/4/1979 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 103/1 of 25/4/1979. 
This Directive was adopted in the framework of the Second Environmental Action Programme of 1977. 
See also Directive 80/68 on the protection of ground water against pollution caused by certain dangerous 
substances, OJ L 20/43 of 26/1/1980.
124 Preamble of the Directive. Note also the Council Decision 82/72/EEC concluding the Convention on 
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, OJ L 38/1, of 10/2/1982. Its Preamble states
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This inevitably raises the following question: is EC action on the conservation of wild 
birds* 125 more important to the objectives of the Community than the social integration of 
third country migrant workers? Especially in terms of "the harmonious development of 
economic activities throughout the Community and a continuous and balanced expansion" 
or "the improvement of living conditions"? Is it really possible that, in terms of the 
"economic and social progress"126 of the countries of Europe or "in the course of 
operation of the common market", the life of wild birds is more important than the life of 
workers coming from third countries? It seems difficult to sustain such an argument.127
Similar remarks could be made in relation to other fields in which Community 
action was taken, but for which EC competence was not directly and explicitly provided 
for in the EC Treaty.128
Furthermore, the broad use of Article 235, due to its open-ended nature, is 
facilitated by the difficulty of legally controlling what constitutes an actual need for a
that its legal basis is the EEC Treaty and, "in particular”. Article 235 thereof. Its first recital recalls that 
the aim of the environment policy in the Community (defined in the programme of action adopted by the 
declaration of 22/11/1973, OJ C 112/1, of 20/12/1973, and supplemented by the resolution of 17 May 
1977, OJ C 139/1, of 13/6/1977) was "to improve the setting and quality of life and the surroundings and 
living conditions of the peoples of the Community”. The same recital added that to this end it was "in 
particular necessary to ensure the sound management of resources and of the natural environment and 
avoid any exploitation of them which causes significant damage to the ecological balance”. Article 100 
was also used as legal basis of EC environmental measures before the European Single Act. That was the 
case of the Council decision of 19 June 1978 concerning the conclusion of the European Convention for 
the protection of animals kept for farming purposes, OJ L 323/4 of 17/11/78 (also based on the EEC 
Treaty in general terms and on its Article 43, on common agricultural policy); and the Council Directive 
86/609/EEC of 24 November 1986 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States regarding the protection of animals used for experimental and other 
scientific purposes, OJ L 358/1 of 18/12/1986 (also based on the EEC Treaty in general terms). Indirectly, 
Article 100 was also the legal basis of the Commission Decision of 9 February 1990 setting up an 
Advisory Committee on the Protection of Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes, 
OJ L 44/30 of 20/2/90. This Commission decision was based on the Treaty and on the previously 
mentioned Council Directive 86/609, which in turn was based on the EEC Treaty and on its Article 100.
125 For instance, migrant wild birds coming from the territory of countries which are not Member States 
of the EC.
126 Preamble of the EEC Treaty.
127 Certainly, this does not mean, in the least manner, that protection of wild birds or other environmental 
measures are not important in themselves. It just seems to be the case that EC measures on third country 
nationals are, at least, equally important for the Community.
128 See, e.g., Regulation 724/75 creating the European Regional Development Fund, in OJ L 73/1 of 
1975. Usher recalls also the case of the legislation under which the Community gave the European 
Investment Bank an unlimited guarantee to cover loans to Hungary and Poland. He comments that such 
legislation was adopted "(...) under Article 235 yet the jurisdiction appears to be the historical and cultural 
links with Hungary and Poland. If [one] found this in any objective of the Treaty I would be surprised, but 
nobody has challenged it and everybody thinks it is a good thing." See Report of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities on "Political Union: Law-Making Powers and Procedures", 
Session 1990-91, 17th Report, at pg.5 of the part on evidence. Note also the case of Regulation 3181/78, 
on the European Currency Unit and the European Monetary System, OJ L 379/2, of 30/12/78. It was also 
adopted under Article 235 and it deals with a matter which is traditionally considered to be a domain of 
national sovereignty.
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measure to attain a Community objective. In this respect Mougin seems to be right when 
he argues that:
"Cette notion de nécessité est difficile à cerner car elle revêt des caractères 
différents selon le contexte dans lequel elle est employée. Dans le cadre de l'article 
235, son appréciation n'est pas une operation juridique qui ferait découler, par 
exemple, la nécessité d'une analyse des conséquences d'une absence d'action 
communautaire au regard des objectifs du Traité. Elle procède ici d'un jugement 
de nature économique, technique, politique... mais pas juridique, comme le 
suggère le terme 'apparaît' employé dans le Traité."129 130
In the meantime. Hartley sustains that Article 235 :
"confers what can only be termed a general legislative power.[,3°] For this reason, 
the theory of limited powers does not seem to be part of Community Law, except 
to the extent that the Community may legislate only within the general area 
covered by the Treaties. This consists largely of economic affairs, but social 
policy is also covered."131
The broad possibilities of using Article 235 are only confirmed, in general terms, 
by the legitimate fear harboured by the Parliaments of some Member States of a loss of 
their powers on a general and undefined basis.132 It may also be recalled that the Council
129 Mougin, op.cit. at 1516.
130 Weatherill & Beaumont call it "a very broad law making power(...) to attain one of the objectives of 
the Community", and speak about the "potentially unlimited legislative power of Article 235", see 
Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., at pp.l 20-121. Lenaerts goes even further and sustains that: "[tlhere 
simply is, no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Community." 
See Lenaerts, K. "Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism", AJCLt Vol. 38, 1990, p.205, at 
220. See also Weiler, J. "The transformation of Europe", Yale Law Journal, Vol.100,1991, pp.2403-83.
131 Hartley, T.C. The Foundations of European Community Law* 2nd. ed., op.cit., at p.108. While Hartley 
refers here only to Article 235, similar remarks could be made also in relation to Article 100. As Usher 
notes, in some cases, "the attempt to explain the use either of Article 100 or Article 235 alone (...) would 
be somewhat akin to the medieval theological argument as to how many angels could dance on the head of 
a pin." See Usher, op.cit., at p.35.
132 That fear is shared, for instance, by the parliaments of Denmark and of the United Kingdom. On the 
occasion of the accession of Denmark to the European Communities, this Kingdom declared that it 
acceded to the EEC Treaty on the condition that Article 235 and the theory of implied powers would be 
interpreted in a strict and cautious way. See Lachmann, "Some Danish reflections on the use of Article 
235 of the Rome Treaty", CMLRev, Vol. 18, 1981, No.4, pp.447-461. See the concerns of the UK's House 
of Lords on the same matter in its report quoted supra, at pp.30-31. The House of Lords has even raised 
objections to the use of Article 100A. See the letter written to Jacques Delors, the then president of the 
Commission, by Baroness Serota, on behalf of the House of Lords. It stated the concern on the use of 
Article 100A as legal base for measures whose object was the protection of the environment, of the 
consumer, or the establishment of a new Community policy with substantial budgetary implications. See 
the House of Lords' 12th report, 1988-89, Correspondence with Ministers, at pg.55. On the abuse of 
Article 235 see also Weiler, J, & Lockhart, N. " Taking rights seriously' seriously: the European Court 
and its fundamental rights jurisprudence", Part I in CMLRev„ Vol.32, 1995, No.l, pp. 51-94, at 65. It 
may certainly be sustained that Article 100 and 235, and notably the latter, have been used beyond their 
initial purposes. However, this only emphasises the powers given to the Community by those provisions. 
The difficulty in having a judicial control on their use emphasises the political discretion of the Council to 
adopt measures under them. Moreover, in the light of their objectives, it is as legitimate to question the 
founding of the use of such Articles, as it is legitimate to question the lack of their use (on the political 
level, not the legal level: see paragraph 95 of the case 22/10, Commission v. Council [ERTA], [19711
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itself has already referred to Article 235 as a possible legal basis for Community measures 
relating to third country nationals.133
The conclusion is therefore that the Community has a potential general 
competence to act on third country nationals, on the basis and under the conditions 
established by Articles 100 and 235.134
b) The Unanimous Vote in the Council
It may be said that the objectives of the Community mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 
and in the Treaty Preamble may include an enormous range of subjects, virtually 
everything.135 However, the requirement that the instruments be adopted by unanimity in 
the Council protects Member States against an uncontrolled extension of Community 
competence. Under Article 235, as is the case under Article 100, no Member State is 
obliged to accept any proposal with which it does not agree.136
At first sight, the unanimity requirement of Articles 100 and 235 even appears to 
approximate the decision-making process of the Community with that of the 
intergovernmental cooperation (under the Title VI of the Treaty on European Union). 
However there are some important differences between them. One obvious difference lies 
in the fact that the European Parliament is not so much involved in intergovernmental 
cooperation. Furthermore, that cooperation is in principle completely outside of the
ECR 263), namely on issues regarding third country nationals. It may also be pointed out that a negative 
point in the use of Articles 100 and 235 is the lack of power of the European Parliament to intervene 
substantially in the procedure for the adoption of EC measures. The European Parliament has only to be 
consulted, having no power beyond that. As mentioned supra, before the Treaty on European Union, 
Article 100 only required such consultation "in the case of directives whose implementation would, in one 
or more Member States, involve the amendment of legislation.” However, in any case, the lack of 
perfection of the decision-making procedure of Articles 100 and 235 does not question the fact that they 
may legitimately be used to act on third country nationals.
133 See the Council Resolution of 21/1/1974 concerning a Social Action Programme, OJ C 13/1 of 1974. 
In its sixth recital of the preamble of the resolution it is declared that the items of the programme were to 
be implemented in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Treaties, including Article 235 of the 
EEC Treaty. In the main text of the resolution the Council considered necessary and expressed its resolve 
to promote consultation between the Member States on immigration policies vis-à-vis third countries. The 
Council even declared the principles on which the Community migration policy was to be based in the 
future. One of such principles was said to be the accomplishment of equality of treatment in living and 
working conditions between workers who were nationals of other Member States (and their families) and 
workers who came from third countries.
134 Being a potential competence, by its very nature it is not an exclusive competence as such, but a 
concurrent or shared competence. Only after the Community has acted, if it acts, it then assumes exclusive 
competence in the field it occupies. See, e.g., Weatherill, in Legal issues of the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., 
p.14.
135 We may remind ourselves again that this would be the case, for instance in relation to the objective of 
"promot[ingl throughout the Community(...) an accelerated raising of the standard of living", or of 
promoting "closer relations between the States belonging" to the Community, both referred in Article 2 of 
the Treaty of Rome.
136 See Weatherill, S., in Legal issues of the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., pp.15. Note also that under 
Article 148(3) "[abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption 
by the Council of acts which require unanimity".
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jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Last, but not least, in 
the intergovernmental cooperation the governments of the Member States are not 
dependent on the Commission. In contrast, in the Community framework the Council can 
only act on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, which the latter can always alter 
before its adoption. Besides, the Commission also has the right to withdraw its proposals 
whenever it believes that to be appropriate - for instance when the Commission does not 
agree with the amendments that the Council intends to make such proposals.
4 - Article 238 of EC Treaty and EC external competence in relation to 
third country nationals
As will be described in chapter 5, the Agreements of the Community with third 
countries are one of the most important sources of Community Law on the legal status of 
third country nationals in the Member States. These Agreements are mainly based on 
Article 238 of the EC Treaty,137 which provides that:
"The Community may conclude with one or more States or international 
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights 
and obligations, common action and special procedures."138
When external agreements contain rules on individual persons who are nationals of third 
countries, they usually regulate their rights as workers in the Member States, or their 
rights as relatives of such workers. In some cases they also contain rules on their right of
137 The Agreements of the Community with third countries, which contain rules on third country 
nationals in the Member States, have the following legal basis. The Agreement with Turkey and the 
Additional Protocol to it were adopted by a Council decision (regulation in the case of the Protocol) and 
were based in general terms in the EEC Treaty, and particularly in its Article 238. The Cooperation 
Agreements with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) were adopted by a Regulation and 
are based on the EEC Treaty, namely on its Article 238. The Europe Agreements with Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia (draft Agreement), and the Baltic countries were 
adopted by a Council and Commission decision, with assent of the European Parliament, and are based on 
the ECSC Treaty (in particular on Article 95 thereof in the case of Bulgaria, Slovenia and the Baltic 
countries); the EC Treaty, in particular Article 238 in conjunction with Article 228 paragraph(3) second 
subparagraph thereof (mention is also made to the second sentence of paragraph (2) in the Agreements 
with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia); and also on the EAEC Treaty in 
particular 101 thereof. The draft Partnership Agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the 
Kyrzyg Republic, Kazakhstan, are to be adopted also by a Council and Commission decision, with assent 
of European Parliament, and are based on the ECSC Treaty; on the EC Treaty, in particular Articles 113 
and 235 in conjunction with 228 paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) second subparagraph thereof (and in 
Article 54(2), the closing sentence of Article 57(2), and Articles 73C(2), 75, and 84(2) in the case of 
Belarus); as well as on the EAEC Treaty, in particular Article 101 thereof.
138 This is the last version of this Article, as amended by the Treaty on European Union. The former 
versions also made reference to the internal decision-making procedure for the adoption of Association 
Agreements. This procedure is presently regulated by Article 228 of the EC Treaty, which deals with the 
internal decision making for negotiation and conclusion of external Agreements in general. Both before 
and after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, unanimity in the Council is required for 
the Community to concluded association agreements with third countries.
90
establishment and their right to provide services139 in the Member States.140 The inclusion 
in the external agreements of the Community of such rules on the status of third country 
nationals in the Member States (e.g. migrant workers) raises the issue of Community 
external competence on that status.141
From the point of view of the governments of the Member States, this is usually 
not seen as a problem, since those governments regard such external agreements as mixed 
agreements. This is so because the governments of the Member States considered that 
some matters covered by the agreements are outside Community competence. One of such 
matters is precisely the legal status of third country workers.142 Therefore, these 
Agreements are concluded with third countries simultaneously by the Community and its 
Member States. Besides being approved by the Community institutions, these agreements 
are also ratified by the Parliaments of the Member States.143
In the meantime, the interpretation and control of the application of external 
agreements with rules relating to third country nationals is ensured by the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities. The Court has declared itself competent to interpret an 
external agreement.144 The Court of Justice has based its jurisdiction, namely, on the fact
139 Note, however, that only the draft Partnership Agreement with Belarus mentions as its legal basis 
Article 57(2) of the EC Treaty.
140 See chapter 5 for more details.
141 For an analysis of Community external competence in general terms, see Lang, J.T. "The ERTA 
judgement and the Court's case-law on competence and conflict", YEL, Vol.6,1986, pp.201-218; Lenaerts,
K., "La répercussion des compétences de la Communauté Européenne sur les compétences externes des 
États membres et la question de la 'preemption* ", in Relations extérieures de la Communauté et marché 
intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionels, by Demaret, Paul (ed.), Bruges, College of Europe, 1986/ 
Brussels, Story Scientia, 1988, p.37; Neuwahl, Nanette, Mixed Agreements: Analysis of the Phenomenon 
and their legal Significance, E.U.I., Florence, Ph.D. thesis, 1988; Schermers, H.G. & O’Keeffe, D. (eds.). 
Mixed Agreements, Deventer, Kluwer, 1983; Timmermans, C.W.A. & Völker, E.L.M. (eds.) Division of 
powers between the European Communities and their Member States in the field of external relations, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1981. For recent developments see Opinion 1/94 on the Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, of 15 November 1994, [1994] ECR1-5267; Opinion 2/92 on the Third Revised 
Decision on national treatment of the Council of the OECD, of 24 March 1995, {1995] ECR 1-521 ; the 
Editorial Comments "The aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competences”, CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.2, pp.385-390; and Louis, Jean-Victor , "Les relations 
extérieures de l'Union Européenne: unité ou complémentarité”, RMUE, Vot.4, 1994, No.l, pp. 5-10. See 
also, as far as I.L.O. Conventions are concerned, Emiliou, Nicholas "Towards a clearer demarcation line? 
The division of external relations power between the Community and Member States", ELR, Vol. 19, 
February 1994, No.l, pp.76-86.
142 See the observations of the German and United Kingdom governments in Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] 
ECR 3719, at 3725 and 3729, respectively.
143 On how this procedure began and how it has even been applied even to agreements completely within 
Community competence, see Torelli, M., comments to Article 238, Traité instituant la CEE - 
commentaire article par article, op.cit., pg. 1561 at 1567-8, Torelli refers to the procedure of Article 238 
"Une procédure communautaire sous contrôle national", idem, at 1566. Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat 
sustain also that "mixed agreements continue to be used (...) even though on an broader interpretation of 
the Community’s competence (Articles 113 and 238 EEC) this would be unnecessary", Introduction to the 
Law of the European Communities, op.cit., at pg. 776.
144 See Case 181/73, the Second Haegeman case [1974] ECR 449, paragraphs 3 to 5 of the judgment of 
the Court (in which was at stake an Association Agreement with Greece), and Case Demirel, quoted
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that the agreements are acts of Community institutions» within the meaning of 
subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 177. The jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice also extends to the interpretation of decisions adopted by an organ established by 
the agreement and charged with its implementation.145 Moreover, the Court has ruled that 
the provisions of external agreements could have direct effect, as well as the rules of 
Decisions made by the Association Councils set up in their framework.146
A contradiction could be found in this situation: the Community acts 
simultaneously with its Member States when it concludes mixed Agreements with third 
countries, but the Court of Justice alone has jurisdiction to rule on their interpretation. 
However, insofar as a contradiction exists, it is perhaps not a legal contradiction. There is 
a basis for sustaining that the Community itself has competence to include in association 
agreements with third countries rules on the legal status of third country nationals in the 
Member States. Likewise, when such Agreements are concluded by the Community, it 
acts in the exercise of its own powers. In the Demirel case,147 the Court denied that the 
inclusion of rules on the status of third country workers (in the event Turkish nationals) in 
an Association Agreement makes the latter a mixed Agreement. The Court ruled that 
"(...) Article 238 must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee 
commitments towards non-member countries in all the fields covered by the 
Treaty. Since freedom of movement for workers is, by virtue of Article 48 et seq. 
of the EEC Treaty, one of the fields covered by that Treaty, it follows that 
commitments regarding freedom of movement fall within the powers conferred on 
the Community by Article 238.
Thus the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to rule on die interpretation 
of a provision in a mixed agreement containing a commitment which only the 
Member States could enter into in the sphere of their own powers does not 
arise."148
supra, paragraph 7. For an elaboration on this topic see Weatherill & Beaumont, EC Law .... op.cit., 
pp.244-245.
145 Case 30/88, Greece v. Commission, [1989] ECR 3711, paragraphs 12 and 13. In the last paragraph 
the Court declared that "due to their connection to the agreement that implement, decisions of an 
Association Council are, as the agreement, an integral part of the EC legal order". See also case C-192/89,
S.Z. Sevince V. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR 3461, paragraph 10.
146 See case Demirel, quoted supra, paragraph 14, in which the Association Agreement with Turkey was 
at stake (note that in the case the Court ruled against direct effect of the provisions concretely invoked 
there). Nevertheless the Court ruled that: "A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with 
non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its 
wording and the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise 
obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent 
measure." For the decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council see, e.g., case Sevince, quoted supra, 
paragraph 15, and case C-18/90, Office National de I'Emploi V. Bahia Kziber, [1991] ECR 1-199, 
paragraph 15. See also case 87/75 Bresciani [1976] ECR 129; case 17/81, Pabst v. Hauptzollaml 
Oldenburg [1982] ECR 1331; and case 104/78 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641.
147 Case Demirel, quoted supra.
148 Idem, paragraph 9. The Court rejected the written observations presented by Germany and the United 
Kingdom according to which the jurisdiction of the Court did not extend to provisions of free movement 
of workers, as these were provisions whereby Member States had entered into commitments with regard to 
Turkey in the exercise of their own powers. See paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Court.
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The conclusion is that, in the Association Agreement with Turkey, the provisions 
on free movement of workers were an expression of Community powers and not of 
Member States powers.149 Thus, it could be said that, as far as rules on third country 
nationals are concerned, the external Agreements, concluded by the Community and its 
Member States, are not mixed Agreements in legal terms. They are mixed agreements only 
from a political perspective. The political aspect is here quite important, as it cannot be 
forgotten that the association agreements can only be concluded with the unanimous vote 
of the Council. This explains the power of the governments of the Member States to insist 
on considering the Agreements as mixed Agreements. This explains therefore, why 
association agreements are ratified by national Parliaments.
There is another interesting point regarding the external competence of the 
Community regarding the legal status of third country nationals in the Member States. The 
Community, e.g. following the ruling in Demirei, has competence to conclude Agreements 
containing rules on third country nationals in the Member States. However, it is usually 
considered not to have competence in adopting internal legal instruments on third country 
nationals. This leads to suggest the following reasoning, as a solution for this apparent 
legal discrepancy. Community competence in the external field exists whenever it is 
necessary for attaining a specific objective for which the Community has powers in its 
internal system.150 This is the so-called doctrine of parallel powers - internal and external 
powers. This doctrine could be applied here, only in the reverse manner than usual: the 
Community should have recognised internal powers to enact legislation in the sphere in 
which it has external powers.151
However, this reasoning can only show the paradox to which the political 
operation of the Community leads in this field. In practical and general political terms it is 
certainly interesting that, in several areas, the most important Community rules on third 
country nationals are those contained in Agreements with third countries - not in the 
internal legal instruments of the Community. However, in my view, it should perhaps not 
be said that there is a fundamental discrepancy between the internal and external powers of 
the Community in relation to third country nationals. If my findings above are valid, under 
Article 100 and Article 235 the Community has internal powers to adopt measures relating
149 See Weiler, J. "Thou Shalt Not Opress a Stranger (EX.23:9): On the Judicial Protection of the Human 
Rights of Non-EC Nationals - A Critique”, in Free Movement of Persons in Europe.... op.cit., pp.248-271, 
at 256 and 259. See on the jurisdiction of the Court the annotation to the Demirei case by Nolte, Georg, 
CMLRevt Vol. 25,1988, No.2. pp.403-415, at 407-410.
150 See case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA) [19711 ECR 263, paragraphs 27 to 31 and Opinion 
1/76 [1977] ECR 741, paragraph 3. Hartley recalls that "[a]lthough the European Court has not ruled on 
the question, there is little doubt that the doctrine of parallelism applies not only with reference to internal 
powers granted by the Treaty for specific objectives, but also with regard to such general powers as 
contained in Article 235." See Hartley, T.C., The Foundations of European Community Law, 3rd. ed., 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, at p. 178. See also Snyder, F. "Implied Powers", in Butterworths Expert 
Guide to the European Union, op.cit.
151 Cf. Hartley & Usher, who comment that "The result is that the Community has international 
jurisdiction (treaty-making power) in this field, even though it lacks internal jurisdiction - the reverse of 
the more normal situation. So far, however, no one suggested that the doctrine of ‘parallelism’ should 
apply in reverse”. See Hartley, T.C. & Usher, J.A., The Legal Foundations of the Single European 
Market, Oxford University Press, 1991, footnote 83 at p.109. In the present author's E.U.I. June-paper (of 
1990) that idea was already sustained. See, however, my conclusions on this point in the main text.
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to third country nationals. Thus there is not a discrepancy of powers, but a discrepancy in 
the exercise of powers.
In this respect, it may be useful to recall that the decision making procedure of 
Articles 100 and 235 requires unanimity for the adoption of decisions in the Council, like 
Articles 228 and 238. However, whilst the Community has powers to act internally on 
third country nationals, those powers are not used; they are used in the external 
agreements. This seems to be caused by the political pressures to which Member States 
are subject when negotiating external Agreements, not because there is a real difference in 
the Community's internal and external powers. If a discrepancy or contradiction exists it is 
one of a political nature, not of a legal one.
In any case, the important point to retain here is that, following the Court’s 
jurisprudence in Demirel, there is a basis for sustaining that the Community has itself 
competence to include in association agreements with third countries rules on the legal 
status of third country nationals in the Member States.
CONCLUSION
The answer to the question formulated at the beginning of this chapter is a 
conditional affirmative one. Yes, the Community has powers to adopt measures vis-à-vis 
third country nationals. However, the exercise of such powers is basically dependent on an 
unanimous agreement in the EC Council to use Articles 100 or 235 of the EC Treaty. 
Such an agreement has been impossible to obtain in the past and in the present political 
and legal context it is still unlikely to take place.152
In section A it was seen that clearly there is no exclusive general Community 
competence in relation to issues concerning third country nationals. Furthermore, an 
explicit competence of the Community to act in relation to third country nationals is 
presently accorded only by a few Treaty provisions. These either have not yet been used - 
such as Articles 59(2) and the Article 2(3) of the Agreement on Social Policy - or have a 
limited scope - as Article 100C on visas. Moreover, according to the prevailing view, 
Article 48 of the Treaty does not apply to third country nationals when it provides for free 
movement of "workers" in general terms, or when it envisages "the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States".153
In any case, the relationship between issues concerning third country nationals and 
Community objectives, as defined in the EC Treaty itself, is grounds for sustaining the 
Community competence to act in relation to third country nationals. This relationship was 
emphasised in Section B. There it was shown that such a relationship was already clear 
under the definition of Community objectives made by the original version of the EEC 
Treaty. Furthermore, it was argued that it was reinforced by the objective provided by the 
Single European Act of establishing a single market "without internal frontiers". I suggest 
that this aim has certain implications for third country nationals. For if the aim of setting
152 At least in relation to measures of general scope on third country nationals. See, however the analysis 
made in chapters 8 and 9 of the recent activities of the European Union, notably under its third pillar.
153 See infra the analysis on the personal scope of Article 48, in chapter 4.
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up a market without internal frontiers is to be realised, this implies that third country 
nationals will be able to move freely from State to State. And if this is so, the need for 
some regulation of third country nationals will inevitably arise. Though few regulations 
have been made so far, these are bound, I hold, to be made in the future.154 The logic of 
the internal market will lead to further regulation of third country nationals.
Section C analysed the subsidiarity principle and its relevance for Community 
competence in relation to third country nationals, as far as the for the justification for 
adoption of EC measures on them is concerned. It was submitted that the formal inclusion 
of the subsidiarity principle in the EC Treaty, in the new Article 3B, did not exclude or 
substantially reduce the possibilities for EC action on issues concerning third country 
nationals.
In section D it was suggested that some EC Treaty provisions could be used for 
the adoption of measures of narrow scope concerning third country nationals. Particular 
attention was given to Article 118 and the case Germany et al v. Commission,155 in which 
the Court recognised the relevance for the Community of issues concerning migration and 
migrants from third countries. Still, it was stressed how the case showed the limits of EC 
Law, as fruitful cooperation between Member States is difficult to impose, let alone by the 
sole means of Article 118.
Section F examined the decision-making procedures which could be the basis for 
the adoption of measures with general scope concerning third country nationals.
This section showed that Article 238 can be used in the framework of external 
agreements to regulate the legal status of third country nationals in the Community. It was 
recalled that the Demirel case constitute grounds for sustaining that, when such rules are 
included in external Agreements, the Community is acting in the exercise of its own 
powers. From a legal perspective, such Agreements are not mixed Agreements for this 
purpose.
However, section F concentrated on the analysis of Articles 100 and 235 of the EC 
Treaty. They give the Community a potential general competence of the Community to act 
in relation to third country nationals. They are the main provisions of the EC Treaty under 
which the Community may act in that field. Contrary to Article 238, those provisions may 
be used to adopt internal legislation on issues concerning third country nationals.
It was emphasised that the powers given to the Community by Articles 100 and 
235 are broad enough to enable the adoption of EC measures regarding third country 
nationals. The examples referred to in section F show how the Member States overcome 
legal doubts on Community competence where the political will to do so existed. The 
reference to such examples has a legal interest. I argued that if certain other issues are 
suitably regulated under Article 235, then issues related to third country nationals also 
ought to be regulated under Article 235.156 Could, for example, measures on the 
protection of animals (like migrant birds157) be considered more relevant for the
154 Even if not within the European Community framework, but under Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union.
155 Quoted supra.
156 Likewise, action could also be taken under the similar provision of Article 100.
157 See the quoted supra Council Directive of 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, which was based on 
Article 235.
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Community than measures on human beings who happen to be nationals of third 
countries? Are the former measures more justified than the latter, or more necessary "to 
attain, in the course of operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community"? I do not think so.
The argument for the use of Article 235 can be developed further. The usual 
reasons given by the governments of the Member States for refusing the adoption of 
measures on third country nationals is that the regulation of such matters falls under public 
order and public security.158 Another, more general argument, is that regulation in that 
area belongs to national sovereignty and cannot be dealt with by the Community.
However, two interesting examples serve to question the validity of these 
objections in the context of the use of Articles 100 and 235. One is Regulation 3181/78, 
on the European Currency Unit and the European Monetary System.159 It was adopted 
under Article 235 and deals with a matter traditionally seen as one of the few formal 
requirements for the existence of national sovereignty. Another good example is the 
Directive on the control and acquisition of weapons, namely firearms, adopted under 
Article 100 of the EEC Treaty.160 16This Directive was one of the measures planned for in 
the White Paper for the abolition of border controls on persons. Although it concerns an 
area strictly related to public order and public security, apparently there was no major 
political difficulty in its adoption.
In this respect, let us note the words of Usher, who, in relation to Articles 100 and 
235 of the EC Treaty,
"(...)wonders if it would be an exaggeration to say that the scope of the 
Community's competence is ultimately what the Council of Ministers chooses to 
make it."*61
On the basis of the foregoing my global conclusion is as follows. The Community 
has a potential general competence to adopt measures relating to third country nationals. 
This competence can only be exercised if all governments of the Member States agree to 
do so, and only to the extent that such measures may be related to the common market or, 
at least, to the objectives of the Community. In other words: the Community may adopt 
general measures with respect to third country nationals but mainly under the conditions 
laid down in Articles 100 or 235. However, such measures have not been adopted by the 
EC institutions.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that, although no political will existed to 
adopt EC measures relating to third country nationals, there is no overriding legal obstacle 
to the adoption of such measures. The point is that the relevant Community rules make the
158 See the arguments of the governments of France and the United Kingdom in cases 281, 283-5 & 
287/85, Germany et al. v. Commission, op.cit., at pp.3211 and 3233, and dealt with by the Court at 
paragraph 25 of its decision.
159 Regulation 3181/78, quoted infra.
160 Council Directive 91/477/EEC, quoted infra.
161 Usher, op.cit., atp.36.
9 6
possibility of the adoption of such measures completely dependent on the agreement of all 
Member States.162 Therefore, we may understand Cruz’s statement that:
"The debate over the Community competence in these fields is really quite 
irrelevant when account is taken of the fact that without the approval, co­
operation and political will of the Member States any attempts to assert such 
competence is condemned to failure."163
Perhaps the relevance of the legal debate on the issue of Community competence is 
precisely to conclude that legal aspects are not fundamental, in the sense that the freedom 
of the governments of Member States is clearly demonstrated. The governments of the 
Member States may refuse to adopt EC measures relating to third country nationals, and 
may even get away with it.164 However, they cannot say that the Community does not 
have the possibility of adopting such measures. In this conclusion lies the interest of the 
legal debate.
Therefore, the important issue to be analysed is no longer whether the European 
Community has the legal possibility of taking measures on third country nationals, but 
whether, under the provisions introduced by the Single European Act, it has a legal 
obligation to adopt such measures.
162 In the words of Weatherill & Beaumont, "the limit on Community legislative competence is not the 
constraint of the terms of the EC Treaty, but the ability to achieve unanimity in the Council on a 
legislative proposal", see Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., at p. 120, footnote 34.
163 Cruz, A., op.cit., p.14. He adds that "EC States will merely pursue their own separate policies on 
immigration and third country nationals in accordance with their own interests."
164 See, however, the next chapter.
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PART I - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Chapter 3
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL EFFECTS 
OF ARTICLE 7A OF THE EC TREATY
With Special Regard to Internal Border Controls on Persons

INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to interpret and determine the precise legal effects of Article 7A 
of the EC Treaty.1 This provision was introduced by the European Single Act, and 
provides that:
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing 
the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 7B, 7B, 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1),
84, 99, 100a and 100b and without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Treaty.
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of this Treaty."
Chapter 2 examined, inter alia, how Article 7A could justify the possibility of 
adopting measures on immigration matters. Chapter 3 analyses, whether and to what 
extent Article 7A  establishes a legal duty on the Community to adopt such measures « in 
so far as they are necessary for the establishment of the internal market. This analysis will 
concentrate on the duty to adopt measures to abolish internal border controls on persons, 
including controls o f third country nationals travelling among Member States. This topic is 
relevant to the purposes of this thesis. It highlights the relevance of matters related to third 
country nationals (and their legal position) for the establishment of an essential part o f the 
internal market. Arguably, this is an interesting case study of the place of matters 
concerning third country nationals within EC integration in general terms.
Section A of this chapter will examine the legal content of the concept of an 
"internal market". This concept will be compared with the original and still relevant 
concept o f "common market". Furthermore, an attempt will be made to determine what 
the establishment of an "internal market" requires. It will be discussed whether or not the 
persistence of controls on persons at the internal borders can be reconciled with the 
existence o f an internal market "without internal frontiers".
Section B  proceeds by examining the legal effects o f Article 7A, considering the 
legal remedies available in case of its violation, inasmuch as internal border controls on 
persons were not entirely abolished by the end of 1992. First, Article 7A is analysed to 
ascertain whether, or not, it contains the required conditions for its direct effect in this 
respect. Secondly, the possibility of recognising indirect effect to Article 7A is explored. 
Thirdly, this section will examine the possibility of success o f an action on failure o f EC 
institutions to act to abolish internal border controls on persons. In this context, reference 
is made to the action in which the European Parliament complained to the Court of Justice 
that the Commission had not "put forward the necessary proposals to facilitate achieving *8
1 Originally, this provision was numbered Article 8 A of the EEC Treaty, and renumbered by the Treaty 
on European Union. Here the current number (Article 7A) is used so that it is not confused with the 
current Article 8 A, part of the EC Treaty provisions on Union Citizenship. What were originally Articles
8 , 8 B and 8 C, according to the European Single Act, will be referred to also with their current number, 
according to the Treaty on European Union (i.e. as Articles 7, 7B and 7C) even when reference is made to 
the European Single Act.
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freedom o f movement for persons".2 Some ideas are explored on what could be the future 
judgment o f the Court on the case. Finally, just for the sake o f completeness, reference is 
also made to an eventual non-contractual liability o f the Community for violation of 
Article 7A.
Section C  deals with the legal value, for purposes o f the interpretation of Article 
7A, of the declarations annexed to the Single European Act. Such declarations are 
analysed from the perspective o f the International Law o f Treaties, Community Law and 
national Law.
Article 7A was probably the most controversial, if  not the most important among 
all rules introduced by the Single European Act in the Treaty o f  Rome. It is perhaps the 
provision o f the Single European Act that most symbolises how this Treaty reopened 
many points of discussion in the European Communities. These points include, inter alia, 
old legal concepts, division of powers, the best instruments with which to proceed, and the 
importance of the Law for European integration.
Rather than being a new match in the same game, the Single European Act 
introduced new rules for the players, reshaping the old game. Let us find out how much 
the game was supposed to have changed.
A ) WHAT IS AN "INTERNAL MARKET" ?
1 - Internal Market and Common Market
Literature on Community Law is not unanimous on what is the relation between 
the meaning of the concept of "common market", inscribed on several dispositions o f the 
original Treaty o f Rome, and the meaning o f the concept of "internal market", defined in 
the second paragraph o f Article 7A, introduced by the Single European A ct.
a ) On one side, the most extreme position seems to be that o f Pescatore, when in 
1986 he severely criticised the Single European Act.^ For him the notion o f "common 
market" is summarised in Articles 2 and 3 o f the EEC Treaty, covering a wide range of 
aspects: the free movement of goods, the freedom to provide services, the freedom to seek 
employment, the freedom to economic establishment, the freedom to transfer money (for 
payments and of capital), common rules on competition, rules on non-discrimination, the 
coordination o f economic policies and the harmonisation o f economic legislation, as well 
as a common commercial policy. Thus, the notion of common market virtually coincides 
with the state of European integration at the time, including the Community Law rules in 
force and the case-law o f the Court o f Justice. But, then, in his own words:
2  Case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission, for the abstract of the application of the Parliament see OJ C 
1/12 of 4/1/1994. The written phase of the case is already concluded, but there is, as yet, no date set for 
the oral hearing.
 ^ Pescatore, P., "Some Critical Remarks on the 'Single European Act'", CMLRev, Vol.24, 1987, No.l, 
pp.9-18 at 9 and 17. He stated that "the putting into force of the Single European Act will be a setback for 
the European Community" and that the Act was "the worst piece of drafting I ever came across in my 
practice of European affairs." Pescatore, naturally, made these remarks before reading the Treaty on 
European Union.
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"For the well-balanced and complex notion of a 'Common Market' the Single Act 
substitutes the one-sided notion of an 'internal market' based on an arbitrary 
selection of Community objectives, ignoring essential features such as the rules of 
competition, freedom of current payments, economic policy, commercial policy, 
taxation, non-discrimination, etc.'"*
Furthermore, according to this author, the Single European Act, specially through the new 
Article 7 A, ignored all achievements up to that point and implied that the integration 
process would have to recommence from scratch. The major danger was that it would 
threaten "the legal standards attained by the Community in the fields of free movements of 
goods, persons and services and freedom of financial transfers, as they result, in particular, 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice."^ In brief: the internal market would not only be 
less extensive than the common market, but it could even endanger the achievements of 
the latter.
Forwood & Clough^ agree that the internal market has a narrower scope than the 
common market. While Article 7A would restrict the concept of the internal market to the 
four fundamental freedoms o f movements (of goods, o f persons, of services and of 
capital), Articles 2 and 3 would include "also other matters such as a common commercial 
policy and coordination of economic activities". The internal market would, finally, not 
deal with aspects o f distortions of competition and of failure to complete the common 
commercial policy that do not create barriers between Member States.? Moreover, 
Forwood & Clough’s analysis shows that Pescatore's fears of the Single European Act 
eroding the achievements of the Court’s case-law were not entirely unfounded. They call 
attention to certain ambiguities and inconsistencies in Articles 100A and 100B. They also 
point to the effects that the derogations adopted under them could have
"on the principle of equivalence of national measures established by the European 
Court with regard to the free movement of goods and services, and on the new 
approach to non-tariff barriers in internal trade through the concept of "mutual 
recognition".^
Other authors, however, believe that only in some respects is the notion o f the 
internal market narrower than that o f the common market. For example, the common 
market would guarantee the elimination o f governmental and private restraints to trade, 
while the reference in Article 7A to the absence o f "internal frontiers" would make the 
internal market correspond to the elimination of state barriers only. However this would 
be a logical consequence of the fact that "private attempts to create restrictions on trade 
were likely to be an ongoing problem that required ever ongoing efforts", making it *8
 ^Idem, p.U.
Ibidem, p. 18.
 ^ Forwood, Nicholas & Clough, Mark "The Single European Act and Free Movement - Legal 
Implications of the Provisions for the Completion of the Internal Market", ELR, Vol.l 1, Dec. 1986, No.6 , 
pp. 383-408.
? Idem at p.385.
8  Forwood and Clough, op. cit., at p.399.
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sensible not to include the elimination of private restraints in any programme to be 
completed within a certain time ?
Even Forwood & Clough are not as pessimistic as Pescatore. They consider that 
"the Single European Act takes as its starting point the existing EEC Treaty as interpreted 
by the European Court" and that it is clear, that "the purpose o f  the Single European Act 
is to go forward from the previous Treaties (...) to make concrete progress towards 
European Unity". Therefore, they sustain that Member States "must be encouraged to 
interpret the Single European Act so as not impede the completion o f the internal market, 
or derogate from other objectives of the common market, but rather to achieve the Single 
European Act political objectives". I f  any difficulty in building such a "positive" 
interpretation were to appear, the Commission should obtain the support o f the European 
Parliament for it.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the persistence o f the acquis 
communautaire after the Single European Act is sustained bv the majority o f legal authors 
and by the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.! 1
b ) Secondly, there are those who think that the two concepts are equivalent, that 
there are no substantial differences between the common market and the internal 
market. 12 After all, as Ruyt puts it, 13
"... la libre circulation effective des personnes, des biens, des services et des 
capitaux (...) était déjà l'un des objectifs fondamentaux du Traité CEE..."
He adds that :
"La notion de marché intérieur n'est pas éloignée de celle de 'marché commun1 (...)
Elle est employée, depuis assez longtemps déjà pour définir ce qui touche au 
domaine interne à la Communauté par rapport à ses relations extérieurs."
c ) Thirdly, they are those who believe that the internal market represents more than 
the common market. They stress that the internal market signifies more than the simple 
abolition o f barriers to the four freedoms of movement - which constitute the common 
market. 1^ The internal market would also imply the creation o f conditions o f competition *
® Smit, Hans & Herzog, Peter E., The Law o f the European Economic Community - A Commentary on the 
EEC Treaty, New York, Bender, 1976-..., p.1-122, at p.1-123.
Ibidem, p. 406.
U On this point see Smit & Herzog, op. cit., p.1-124; Ehlermann, C.D., "The Internal Market Following 
the Single European Act", CMLRev, Vol.24, 1987, No.3, pp.363-409 (with annexes at pp.405-409), at pp. 
368-369 and 372; Bosco, Giacinto "Commentaire de L'Acte Unique Européen...", CDE, Vol.23, 1987, 
No,4-5, pp.355-382, at p.371; Glaesner, H.J., "L'Acte Unique Européen", RMC, June 1986, No.298, 
pp.307-321, at p.311, and De Ruyt, Jean, L'Acte Unique Européen, Brussels, U.L.B., 1987, at pp. 159-160.
*2 On this point see Lasok, D. & Bridge, J.W., Law and Institutions o f  the European Communities, 
London, Butterworths, 4th ed., 1987, at p.387. They simply mention that "The Common Market is a 
single 'internal' market embracing several sovereign states(...)". See also Barents, René, who sustains the 
view that the two concepts are identical in practical terms, "The Internal Market Unlimited: Some 
Observations on the Legal Basis of the Community Legislation", CMLRev, Vol.30, 1993, No. 2, p.85, at
p.102-105.
*3 De Ruyt, op.cit., at pp.149-150.
14 Ehlermann, op.cit., pp. 369-370 and Bosco, op.cit. p.371.
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that allow the free circulation of economic factors in an area without internal frontiers. 
This idea was confirmed by the European Court. It considered that environmental 
measures intended to eliminate distortions of competition in the internal market were 
included in the scope of Article lOOA.1  ^ According to others, the internal market would 
include the implementation o f other common policies planned in the Single European Act - 
for example economic and monetary cooperation. 1? The internal market would also go 
beyond the common market, in the sense that the latter "does not necessarily imply the 
elimination of border controls on persons and goods, as long as these controls do not 
constitute a substantial obstacle to the movement of people or merchandise".* 18 The 
internal market includes the elimination of all internal Community borders and therefore of 
all border controls. Such elimination is impossible "without the coordination of measures 
at the Community's external borders" and that, in practice, requires measures concerning 
the relationship of Member States "with third countries and thus concerns more than a 
strictly defined 'internal' market'."19 This is a very important point as it reminds that the 
internal market needs an external dimension for its full existence.20
Pointing in the same direction, i.e. that the internal market is more than the 
common market, the Commission sustains that:
"The concept of an 'internal market' is, in principle, the logical extension of a 
common market - the operation of the Community-wide market under the 
conditions equivalent to those of a national market."21 
According to the Commission these conditions include the abolition o f all checks and 
formalities at the internal borders.
d ) I propose the idea that both concepts, the common market and the internal market, 
should be accepted as being open-ended concepts. In some aspects they have roughly the 
same content and potential, but they have to be interpreted in a certain historical context. 
They have to be interpreted according to the state o f evolution of Community Law, or, in 
other words, o f Community integration.
Only when the economic integration of the Member States attains its perfect state 
will we be able to say that there is a common market in Europe. A market in which all 
internal frontiers, all obstacles to movement of economic factors will have been abolished. 
A market common to all Europeans and to all foreigners allowed to enter therein. A 
market that is no longer internally divided, constituting a real single market. What would
*5 Ehlermann, op.cit., pp.369-370. He recalls for instance that Article 100A(2), a contrario sensu, 
includes measures on fiscal issues and on the rights and interests of employed persons in the scope of the 
internal market programme.
1 Case 300/89, Commission v. Council, "the titanium dioxide case", ECR [1991] 2867, paragraph 23. 
Bosco, op.cit., p. 371.
1 8  Smit & Herzog, op.cit., pp.1-124-5.
1 9  Idem, loc.cit.
2 0  This is valid for goods as for persons. If either of them are to be free to move inside the territory of the 
Community, there must be a uniform control at the external borders and even some type of agreement 
with countries to assure the effectiveness of that control.
2 1  Communication of the Commission to the Council and the Parliament on the abolition of internal 
border controls, of 8  May 1992, SEC (92) 877 final, point 2. See also the Commission Communication on 
the abolition of frontier controls, COM (91) S49, of 18/12/1991.
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be the difference between calling it the common or the internal... market? On that utopian 
day perhaps none. Yet, from our current position it is important to understand why the 
Single European Act introduced a new concept. This occurred because the internal market 
was meant to be a progress within the process of European integration. The establishment 
of the single European market was agreed upon as a means o f developing the state o f the 
common market at the time.
From a legal perspective, all or most o f the measures included in the White Paper 
of the Commission o f 1985 could have been approved earlier, using the competences and 
concepts already available. But they simply were not. Therefore, some progress had to be 
made. The will for progress materialised in the Single European Act. It resulted in the 
creation o f new instruments22 to attain within a certain period an objective now redefined.
The major difference between this new objective, the internal market, and the 
existing common market at the time, is, in concrete and symbolic terms, the abolition of 
internal frontiers. The Community market was supposed to become so perfect as to have 
no frontiers between the Member States, in the sense that they would not be obstacles to 
freedom of movement. The aim was not only that it should be possible to pass across these 
frontiers relatively easily, but that the frontiers controls themselves should disappear 
altogether,23
2 ) What Does the Establishment of an Internal Market Require?24
a ) In general terms
The general definitions o f Article 7A are insufficient to ascertain what exactly is 
required to attain a true internal market. How far should we go to have a complete ’’free 
movement o f goods, persons, services and capital", as if  there were no "internal frontiers"?
Some issues raised in this context are easier to solve than others. For instance it 
may be easily understood that the internal market, as a Community legal concept, would 
have some inherent limitations. These derive from other provisions o f the EEC Treaty, or 
of the Acts o f Accession to it. As these have the same legal value as Article 7A , the latter 
would have to be construed as limited by them. In this way Articles 3 6 ,4 8 (3 ), 56(1) and 
66 of the EEC Treaty25 are still valid after 1992, even though they amount to real 
limitations o f the internal market. In the same position would be the secondary sources of
2 2  E.g. new competences and a greater use of the qualified majority voting in the Council.
2 3  Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council of 28-29 
June, COM (85) 310 final, point 27.
2 4  See, in a deeper perspective, Dehousse, R., Integration v. Regulation? Social Regulation in the 
European Community, EUI Working Paper, Law, No.92/23; Majone, G., Deregulation or Re-Regulation? 
Policymaking in the European Community Since the Single Act, EUI Working Paper, SPS, No.93/2; 
Snyder,F., New D irections in European Community law, London, Wcidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990, chapter 
3; Strange, Susan, "A Dissident View", in 1992: One European M arket?, Bieber, R., Dehousse, R., 
Pinder, J. & Weiler, J.H.H. (eds.), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1992, p.73; Woolcock, S., The Single European 
Market - Centralization or Competition among N ational Rules?, London, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1994.
2 5  As interpreted by the Court of Justice, and provided they were not Community instruments 
coordinating national measures on issues dealt with by those Treaty provisions.
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Community Law having as their legal basis the derogatory provisions of Articles 7C, 100A 
and 100B.26 Similar remarks could apply to exceptions to the internal market made in 
specific fields, such as the movement of toxic waste, or of national treasures and works of 
art. Limitations on their movement are based on legitimate values, protected by 
Community Law.
Y et the problem is not so easy to solve in respect o f other fields, in relation to 
which the complete freedom of movement within the internal market is not fully assured 
either. I refer here to fields like air transport, purchase of cars, or recognition of diplomas. 
As far as these fields are concerned, it may be questioned whether the Community did 
achieve the objective of establishing an internal market in which complete freedom of 
movement would be assured. In some cases the Community has even adopted legal 
instruments to regulate these fields, in which the full implementation of the internal market 
is clearly postponed to after 1 January 1993. However, these instruments do not have as 
their legal basis the provisions of the EC Treaty which would allow for derogations from 
the objective o f Article 7A. Would they not amount to clear violations of Article 7A?
Nevertheless there are still more difficult questions. What would be the necessary 
level of equality o f conditions of competition? In what field? Until what point would 
harmonisation have to go in respect of the obligations of enterprises in the labour and 
social field, for instance? How far would the concept of indirect discrimination have to be 
developed to effectively end barriers o f movement? In an extreme hypothesis, should we 
consider that a community worker, living in a different Member State, should maintain all 
his or her voting rights? To be exercised either on his country of origin, or in that of 
residence? Another relevant issue in this context is reverse discrimination. Is this 
acceptable in a market with no frontiers and with homogeneous conditions of 
competition?27
Probably some answers to any of these questions would constitute a limitation of 
the scope o f a true single market. From this it may be concluded that the internal market 
will only be defined by what the institutions and the Member States of the Community are 
prepared to do at this stage o f European integration. However, what is o f interest here is 
the definition o f the internal market as a legal concept. What was the Community 
supposed to do when the Member States accepted the goal of establishing an internal 
market?
Let us now concentrate on a specific area.
2b Cf. Schockweiler, F., "Les conséquences de l'expiration du délai imparti pour rétablissement du 
marché intérieur’’, RMCUE, 1991, No. 353, pp.882-886, at 885.
2 7  See in section B of the next chapter my remarks on reverse discrimination.
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b ) The case of border controls on persons28
Does the establishment of a market "without internal frontiers", allow the existence 
of controls at the internal frontiers? For instance on persons?
The particular importance o f this issue arises from two facts. On one hand, border 
controls on persons have not yet been entirely abolished and it appears they will be 
maintained in the near future. On the other hand, arrangements for their progressive 
abolition have been taken within the intergovernmental cooperation procedure. Here, I 
will only try to ascertain if an internal market is compatible with the existence of border 
controls on persons, and if  it is, to what extent and under what conditions.
( i ) Firstly, it is important to recall that the objective of eliminating all police and 
customs controls at the frontiers is not at all a new idea. It is not an idea of supporters of 
the European utopia, which had no expression at the level of the Community institutions. 
On the contrary, for more a decade now, it forms part o f the official plans of the latter. 
That objective was already mentioned in the Tindemans report o f  1972.29 Furthermore, in 
the mandate of the European Council o f Fontainebleau, of June 1984, to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the People's Europe, the same objective was said to be part of the measures 
to take to "reinforce and promote the Community's identity and image among its citizens 
and in the world".30
Later on, this objective was placed in the framework o f the completion o f  the 
internal market. The White Paper o f the Commission expressly deals with the issue 
underlining that the objective o f its programme was "not merely to simplify existing 
procedures, but do away with internal frontier controls in their entirety."31 To this end, a 
wide range of measures was proposed. The adoption o f directives on, inter alia, arms and 
drugs' legislation, visa policy, third country nationals legal status', extradition and police 
controls, was planned to establish conditions on which a complete freedom of movement 
of persons could be achieved.
The White Paper programme was approved by the European Council of Milan.32 
It was also mentioned in Declaration No.3 o f the Intergovernmental Conference which 
approved the Single European Act. That Declaration states that:
2 8  For an overview of the problems regarding internal border controls, see Alderson, J., "Are Border 
Controls Necessary?", in 1992: One European M arket?, op.cit,, pp.303-8; Ayral, Michel "La suppression 
des contrôles aux frontières intra-communautaires", in RMUE, Vol.3, 1993, No.l, p.13; and Donner, 
J.P.H., "Abolition of Border Controls", in Free Movement o f Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and 
Experiences, T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. 
et al. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, p.5; and Philip, Allan Butt, European Border Controls: 
Who Needs Them?, RIIA Discussion Papers No. 19, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1989.
2 9  Report by the Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans to the President of the Commission and the 
Conference of Heads of State and Prime Ministers on the further development of the Community, 
Supplement of Bull. EC, 1/1976.
3 0  Bull. EC, 6/1984, p. 11.
3  ^White Paper, quoted supra, point 27,
3 2  It is often said that the Council approved the White Paper of the Commission without reservations. 
However, for details see the conclusions of the European Council of Milan in the Bull. EC, 6/1985. The 
European Council "welcomed the White Paper" and "instructed the Council to initiate a precise 
programme of action for its implementation. It also "requested the Commission to submit its proposals 
swiftly and the Council to ensure that they were adopted within the deadlines established in the
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"The conference wishes by means of the provisions in Article 7A to express its 
firm political will to take before 1 January 1993 the decisions necessary to 
complete the internal market defined in those provisions, and more particularly the 
decisions necessary to implement the Commission's programme described in the 
White Paper on the Internal Market".
Although this was made to justify the limits declared for the date set in Article 7A, it 
nevertheless clearly establishes the programme of the White Paper as the basic reference 
for the content o f  the internal market,33 at least in the minds of those who signed the 
Single European Act.
This is quite an important point as there seems to be no good argument (whether 
literal, systematic, or teleological) to support the idea that the complete abolition o f border 
controls should not be included in the establishment of the internal market.
The Commission, in its Communication presenting its view on the interpretation of 
Article 7A,34 stated that "the continued existence of just one [check or formality at 
internal borders] would undermine the political dimension o f the objective laid down" in 
Article 7A. I would stress that it would also constitute a violation of that rule, a fact of not 
just political, but concrete legal relevance. Further on, in the same document, in order to 
justify that all border controls should be abolished, the Commission invokes the case-law 
o f the European Court that "equated the internal market with a national market".35 
However, this should not overly impress an informed reader, as the case quoted dates 
from a time when the state of development of the Community Law made the Court admit, 
in another case, that Member States could maintain frontier controls on the movement of 
persons, so long as no excessive restrictions were imposed.36 Recent jurisprudence 
generally confirms this idea. Routine and systematic questioning of those entering the 
territory, concerning the purpose and duration of their journeys and their financial means, 
were held contrary to Community Law.37 However, spot checks were permitted.38
timetable". Nevertheless, it did not include in the priority areas the abolition of physical barriers to free 
movement of persons. See Bull. EC, 6/1985, point 1.2.5.1. and also points 1,2.2 and 1.2.3 on the Council 
conclusions on institutional affairs and on "A People's Europe", respectively.
3 3  Cf. Ruyt, op.cit., at 153*4, who, when referring to the same declaration, states that "(...) la référence au 
Livre Blanc qui y figure fait entrer (...) l'ensemble des propositions qu'il contient dans le domaine de la 
compétence communautaire".
3 4  Communication on the lifting of internai border controls, of 8  May 1992, SEC (92) 877 final. See also 
the Commission's statement on the Report of the Ministers responsible for immigration on the 
implementation of Article 8 A (7A) on the free movement of persons (submitted to the European Council 
of Copenhagen of June 1993 - IP/93/434, 3 June 1993; Council Press Release (6712/93, Press 90), 2 June 
1993,
3 5  Idem. The case quoted was Schul. There the common market was defined as involving "the elimination 
of all obstacles to intra-community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market, 
bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market". See case 15/81, 
Schul [19821 ECR 1409, paragraph 33.
3 6  See, e.g., case 118/75, Watson [1976] ECR 1185.
3 7  Case C-68/89, Commission v. Netherlands, [1991] ECR 1-2637. See in particular paragraph 10.
3 8  Case 321/87, Commission v. Belgium [1989] ECR 997. On the case-law of the Court of Justice on 
compatibility of national border controls on persons with Community Law, but independently of Article 
7A, see O'Keeffe, D., "Trends in the Free Movement of Persons", in Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law: Essays in Honour o f  Mr. Justice Walsh, O’Reilly (ed.), Dublin, Round Hall P., 1992, p.263-291, at
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( ii ) Nevertheless, the point remains that border controls on persons should be 
completely abolished in a market "without internal frontiers'*. They should cease to be 
applied to all persons, whether economically active or not, whether nationals o f a Member 
State or not. I would like to put forward two arguments to sustain this viewpoint.39
Firstly, it appears from the wording o f Article 7A and o f other dispositions o f the 
Single European Act, that no difference should exist between the degree o f freedom to be 
attained for movements of persons and for other economic factors. In fact, the second 
paragraph of Article 7B even established that:
"The Council (...) shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary to 
ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned."
In what relates to goods, services and capital, the complete freedom of movement was 
either already achieved or was specifically planned to be so in the EEC Treaty itself. This 
holds even for goods, services and capital authorised to come from third countries. As far 
as goods are concerned, those products and raw materials coming from third countries, 
once allowed to enter into the territory o f a Member State, have for a long time been able 
to enter into free circulation in the Community. Restrictions to this general principle were 
to be abolished by 1 January 1993. Furthermore, as far as capital is concerned, Article 67 
already established the abolition
"(...) of restrictions on movement of capital belonging to persons resident in 
Member States and any discrimination based on the nationality!...)”.
Then, the Single European Act amended Article 70 in order to provide that :
"the Commission shall propose to the Council measures for the progressive 
coordination of the exchange policies of Member States in respect of the 
movement of capital between those States and third countries. (...) It shall 
endeavour to attain the highest possible degree of liberalisation."
Moreover, in the case of services, Article 59, as amended by the Single European Act, 
allowed the Council,
"acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, to extend the 
provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and 
who are established within the Community".
The conclusion is that it does not make much sense if the free movement of 
persons is to be the only fundamental freedom to be interpreted in a restrictive way.
Secondly, this is the only interpretation that gives full utility to Article 7 A. It is not 
possible to control exclusively third country nationals (or any other category o f persons) 
at the Community internal borders. To check the nationality of a person, the police has to 
ask for the identification document o f that person. Thus, everyone crossing borders has to
277-8. See also O'Keeffe, D., "The Free Movement of Persons and the Single Market", ELR, Vol.I7, 
1992, No.l, pp.3-19, at 8-11.
3 9  See also, e.g., the Martin report on the incompatibility of passport checks carried out by certain airlines 
with Article 7A of the EC Treaty, of 17/12/1994, made on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights of the European Parliament, doc.ref. A3-81/94.
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be controlled, at least to ascertain his or her nationality.40 There seems to be no way to 
avoid this.
Following the positions of some Member States, the question has been raised 
whether the reference Article 7A to "persons" includes nationals from third countries or 
only refers to nationals o f the Member States. The government of the United Kingdom 
suggested that the control of third country nationals could only be achieved with specific 
procedures for these people.41 While nationals of third countries would continue to be 
submitted to full checks and procedures at the borders (as they are now), nationals of a 
Member State would only need to pass by a police officer and wave their Community 
passport.42 They would only be submitted to sporadic checks of identity.
4 0  Cf. Jessurun D’Oliveira, H.U. "Fortress Europe and (extra-communitarian) refugees: cooperation in 
sealing off the external borders"; and Timmermans, C.W.A., "Free Movement of Persons and the 
Divisions of Powers Between the Community and its Member States - Why do it the intergovernmental 
way?", both in Free Movement o f Persons in Europe..., op.cit., p.166 at 170 and p.352 at 357, 
respectively.
41 The United Kingdom governments have kept a persistent resistance to the abolition of border controls. 
Their abolition is seen as negative, due to the special situation of that country. The fact of being an island 
is seen as an advantage that would be lost had the border controls have to be abolished. The inconvenient 
of the abolition of border controls was seen as being primarily that of losing an important possibility of 
controlling crime. In this respect the Home Secretary Mr. Baker was reported as having declared that: 
"Britain will not surrender the advantages of being an island, which makes it easy to control drugs, 
terrorists, illegal immigrants and rabies". See Boris Johnson's article "EC Anger at British Stand on 
Frontiers", Daily Telegraph, 16 January 1992(emphasis added). A further inconvenient of the abolition of 
border controls in the UK would be the eventual need to impose, as a compensatory measure, the use of 
identity cards - an idea common in the continental Europe, but unknown in the Anglo-Saxon legal system. 
See O'Keeffe, D. "Non-Accession to the Schengen Convention: The cases of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland" in Schengen en Panne, Pauly, Alexis (ed.) Maastricht, EIPA, 1994, p. 145. Note, in the 
meantime, that in April 1995 the British Prime Minister John Major announced that his government was 
planning to introduce identification cards in Britain. For an analysis of the present issues regarding the 
eventual introduction of compulsory identity cards in the United Kingdom, with reference to the historical 
background, see Thomas, Philip A. "Identity Cards", MLR., Vol.58, September 1995, No.5, pp.702-713, 
and the UK’s government Green Paper on Identity Cards, Cm 2879, London, HMSO, May 1995.
4 2  This was called the Bangeman wave, the name being taken from the European Commissioner who was 
supposed to have agreed with the idea during a visit to the United Kingdom. In this respect it may be 
recalled that, according to the resolution on the adoption of a passport of uniform pattern, Member States 
can grant to "other persons" (which could perhaps be for example third country nationals resident in their 
territory) a passport of the same type as the uniform passport available to nationals of the Member States 
of the European Communities. See point B of Annex II of the Resolution of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States of the European Communities, meeting within the Council, of 23 June 
1981, OJ C 241/1 of 1981 (amended by resolution of representatives of the same governments of 30 June 
1982). This could eventually lead to loopholes in the effectiveness of the Bangeman wave. Note also the 
case of Moluccans, to whom the Dutch government granted passports in which it is stated that they are 
Dutch citizens, even when that is not the case. See Jessurun D’Oliveira, H.U., "Expanding External and 
Shrinking Internal Borders: Europe’s Defence Mechanisms in the Areas of Free Movement, Immigration 
and Asylum" in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, O'Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.), London, 
Chancery, 1994, p.261, at 268-9. Note that several EC Regulations accord the right of entry in another 
Member State on production of a passport of a Member State. See, for example. Article 3(1) of Council 
Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community 
for workers and members of their families, OJ L 257/13, of 19/10/68. That provision establishes that 
Member States shall allow workers who are nationals of another Member State (and their relatives entitled 
to go with them) "to enter their territory simply on production of a valid identity card or passport".
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However feeble that control may seem, it still is a control. It is not typical o f an 
area without internal frontiers. Besides, it is obvious that it could not ensure a high degree 
of security. It would seriously jeopardise the aims of both different policies - total control 
and no control. We, then, have to agree with the Commission when it concludes that:
"The completion of the internal market requires the abolition of physical frontiers 
between Member States so as to ensure the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital under the terms of Article 7A. This objective will not be 
achieved if some goods or persons are still subject to controls when they cross 
internal frontiers. If, for whatever reason, some controls do remain after 1 January 
1993, the Community and the Member States will have failed to fulfil their 
obligation to produce results laid down in the Single European Act."4-^
Yet, the fact that third country nationals would not be controlled when crossing internal 
borders does not mean that they would be granted a right o f residence or even the access 
to economic activities in other Member States.44
I would add one comment to these Commission remarks. Contrary to the 
Commission I do not believe that every frontier control made after the beginning o f 1993 
is necessarily contrary to Community Law. The Commission admitted in its 
communication that:
"As happens in a national market, the Community, or, where appropriate. 
Member States may prohibit or restrict the placing of certain products on the 
internal market within the limits laid down in Article 36 EEC, but the exercise of 
these powers may not involve controls at internal frontiers."45 
However, it could be that, in certain situations, it would be legitimate to make controls of 
persons at the Community internal borders. Such controls would be legitimate provided 
they were justified on compelling reasons of public interest; and they did not represent 
regular border controls in disguise.46 They should also be as sporadic and as legitimate as 
any other police control carried out within the internal territory of a Member State. If  
there was an objective justification for such controls, one could consider them compatible 
with Community Law. However, I refer here to a marginal situation, one that would rarely 
arise, not the one at stake in the every day practice o f border controls. This perspective is 
in accordance with the Court o f Justice's doctrine of limiting the possibilities o f performing
4 5  Commission Communication of 8  May 1992, quoted supra, at point 10.
4 4  The Commission has stated that the establishment of an internal market would entail the right of third 
country nationals to move within the territory of the Member States. However, this right to move, "would 
carry with it no right of residence or work throughout the Community even for those non-Community 
citizens who have been granted such a right in a particular Member State". See "Completing the Internal 
Market: an Area without Internal Frontiers, Progress Report required by Article 8 B of the Treaty", COM 
(90) 552 final, Brussels, 23 November 1990. See also Timmermans, "Free Movement of Persons and the 
Divisions of Powers Between ...", op.cit., at p. 356. In any case, it can be argued that a true internal 
market can only exist if Community rules on free movement of persons apply also to resident third country 
nationals, at least to those who have resided in a Member State for a certain period of time.
4 5  Commission Communication of 8  May 1992, quoted supra, point 5.
4 6  For instance, if a person is kidnapped in a region near a frontier, the police should be allowed to make 
road blocks to search for the kidnappers.
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border controls of EC nationals.47 Rare and duly justified police controls are not a 
problem.48 What should disappear are systematic border controls.
B - REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7A
This section will examine the legal utility of Article 7A. It will analyse its effects 
and the remedies available for its violation.
This section will examine three possible remedies against violation of Article 7A. 
The first concerns its direct effect. The second relates to its indirect effect. The third 
regards legal action against failure of the Community institutions to act (namely the 
Commission and the Council). Finally, this section will also examine the possibility for an 
individual to claim damages from the Community based on its non-contractual liability for 
violation of Article 7A, inasmuch as the objective of the establishment of the internal 
market was not attained due to failure to act of EC institutions. Again, all these questions 
will be analysed having special regard to the abolition o f border controls on persons.
1 - Preliminary Rulings and conditions of Direct Effect
An individual could benefit from the preliminary rulings procedure of Article 177 
of the EEC Treaty when arguing in a national court against a measure maintaining barriers 
to the internal market. However, he or she could only do it successfully if Article 7 A was 
considered to have direct effect.49
The European Court o f Justice has already attributed direct effect to several 
articles of the EEC Treaty,50 even when their implementation was to proceed through
4 7  Timmermans recalls the doctrine of the Court of Justice on the necessity and proportionality of border 
controls, e.g., in case 321/87, Commission v. Belgium, quoted supra, and in case 363/89, Daniel Roux v. 
Belgium [1991] ECR1-273. See "Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers Between in 
Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe.... op.cit., p.352 at 357. Recently, although in relation to goods, the 
Court confirmed its doctrine that systematic inspections are not allowed at the borders of the Member 
States. The Court declared that a rule of EC Law on Agriculture should be interpreted as to allow for spot 
checks only. Furthermore these were declared permissible only because they were aimed at preventing 
fraud with regard to the quality and composition of goods qualifying for export refunds. This aim was 
considered a legitimate concern of the Member States. The Court based its decision on Articles 30 and 34 
of the EEC Treaty. See case C-426/92 Germany v, Deutsches Milch-Kontor GmbH, [1994] ECR 1-2757.
4 8  Note also that Article 2 of the draft Directive on the elimination of controls on persons crossing 
internal frontiers, proposed by the Commission on 12/7/195, allows for the temporary reinstatement of 
border controls, in case of "a serious threat to public policy or public security”. Yet, these controls "shall 
not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat", according to Article 2(3) of the 
same instrument. See the draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 347 final, referred to in further detail 
infra, in the next section of this chapter. That draft Directive is analysed in chapter 4.
4 9  Here what seems particularly relevant is the vertical direct effect of that provision, given the fact that 
internal border controls on persons are usually performed by public authorities. However, the relevance of 
horizontal direct effect of Article 7A, i.e. between private parties, is not to be excluded. Such effect was 
uphold by the Court in relation to other EC Treaty provisions. See, e.g., case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena 
[1976] ECR 455 at 473.
5 0  For a full reference to the provisions of the EC Treaty to which the Court of Justice has already granted 
direct effect, see Lasok, D. & Bridge, J.W., Law and Institutions o f  the European Union, London,
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other instruments of Community Law. These other instruments were either acts o f the 
Community institutions and o f the Member States, or o f the latter acting alone. The point, 
therefore, is to determine whether Article 7A could have direct effect.5 1 1 agree it may not 
be easy to justify the proposition that Article 7A has direct effect, but 1 also believe it is 
not completely absurd to sustain it, at least for some aspects o f  the internal market.
Direct effect is conferred on rules creating obligations considered to be clear and 
precise, unconditional and that leave no margin of discretion to the Community institutions 
or the Member States.52 The following analysis seeks to determine whether Article 7A 
fulfils these conditions.
a ) The obligation should be clear and precise
It has been said that the language o f Article 7A is "less mandatory in tone"53 and 
established a less clear programme than that of Article 7 - which was recognised as having 
direct effect by the European Court. I would like to put forward the idea that perhaps this 
is not a totally valid argument.
The fact is that there were special circumstances surrounding Article 7. It had to 
have such a concrete programme. In order to allow State Parties to derogate from some of 
the duties of the Agreement (namely the most-favoured nation clause), Article X X IV  of 
GATT required a "plan and schedule", to be realised "within a reasonable time". By 
contrast. Article 7 A had no such problems with GATT. Besides, Article 7A should be read 
in relation to other provisions introduced by the Single European Act, like Articles 7B, 
100A and, particularly, Article 100B as a kind of last call for boarding. Thus, it can be 
said that a complete programme was set. Moreover, Article 7A  does not allow for any 
discretion on the final date of its implementation, as does, to a certain extent, Article 7. A 
proposal allowing for the possibility o f the Council, by a unanimous decision, postponing 
the deadline, o f the end of 1992, was raised in the Intergovernmental Conference which 
approved the E .S.A . But it was not a ccep te d .F in a lly , Article 7A imposes on the 
Community the establishment by 31 December 1992 o f an area without internal frontiers. 
Is it not clear that the Single European Act created a new objective in the EEC  Treaty: the 
suppression of internal frontiers and therefore of border controls and formalities? Would it 
be inaccurate to say that, in this regard, the obligation created by Article 7A  is clear and 
precise?
Butterworths, 1994, pp.294-300, particularly at pp.296-7; and Schermers, H.G. & Waelbroeck, D., 
Judicial Protection in the Européen Communities, 5th ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1992, pp. 145-148.
5» For arguments in favour of direct effect of Article 7A see Louis, J.V. and Kovar, M. in L'Acte Unique 
Européen - table ronde de Strasbourg, 14 Mars 1986, Université des Sciences Juridiques, Politiques, 
Sociales et de Technologie de Strasbourg, 1986, at pp. 15,20 and 21.
5 2  Cf., e.g., Kapteyn, P.J.G. & Verloren Van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law o f  the European 
Communities, 2nd.ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989, p.333.
5 3  Smit & Herzog, op.cit., p.1-125.
5  ^See, e.g., Ruyt, op.cit., at 157, As explained below, in the view of the final version of Article 7A and 
of general principles of EC Law, Schermers rejects the compatibility with Community Law of such an 
eventual decision of the Council. See Schermers, H., "The effect of the date 31 December 1992", CMLRev, 
Vol.28,1991, No.2, pp.275-289, at pp.282-285.
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b ) T h e  obligation should be unconditional and unqualified
The time limit of the obligation contained in Article 7A expired on 31 December
1992. Thus, in this respect, the obligation is conditional no more. Other problems, though, 
are still to be solved,
b a) Some argue against the direct effect of Article 7A recalling the final reference of 
both its paragraphs.
The first paragraph prescribes that measures to establish the internal market should 
be taken in accordance with the new articles introduced by the Single European Act and 
"without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty." The second paragraph mentions 
that, in the internal market, "the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." In brief, this would seem to 
imply that Article 7A was of a programmatic nature only, requiring implementing 
measures to be enacted under other provisions o f the Treaty. However, it may be argued 
that this would be only the normal manner for Article 7 A to operate. Its direct effect 
would be exceptional, due to the absence of Community measures implementing the 
objective of the Article. This type of situation is similar to that of several articles o f the 
Treaty for which direct effect has been recognised.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that the signatory governments did add 
those final references in order to diminish the possibilities o f Article 7A being found to 
have direct effect. In fact, the references appear redundant. What was the alternative? If 
the internal market was not to be established according to the rules of the Treaty, then 
according to which rules was it to be established?
However, perhaps one could sustain, on the same grounds, that the phrase "the 
internal market (...) is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty", means 
that the usual provisions o f the Treaty for enforcement o f Community Law would also 
apply to Article 7A. For instance those giving the European Court authority to recognise 
direct effect.
Finally, another point takes us to a curious aspect of "the other dispositions" 
argument, a point which has particular relevance as far as ad hoc intergovernmental 
cooperation is concerned. Part of the ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation functioned 
with Community funds, had the blessing o f the European Council (a Community 
institution), and sought officially to implement part of the internal market. However, it did 
not work under the rules o f the EEC Treaty. Did it, therefore, infringe Community Law, in 
particular the final references of both paragraphs o f Article 7A? 55
bb) Another argument has been presented, which in some measure elaborates on the 
argument related with the final reference of Article 7A  - that the establishment of the 
internal market was to be made in accordance to certain provisions o f the EC  Treaty, 
"without prejudice to the other provisions". It has been claimed that the implementation of 
the internal market requires positive action, which cannot be substituted by any ruling of 
the Court attributing direct effect to Article 7A. Schockweiler has even claimed that what 
was left to be done, i.e. what the Single European Act wanted to abolish, were barriers 35
35 For an analysis of this issue in general terms, see section A of chapter 6 .
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that the Court could not eliminate through the doctrine o f  direct effect.56 This doctrine 
could not eliminate those barriers, either because such elimination would require 
coordination or harmonisation of national rules, or because the barriers are founded on the 
EC's derogatory rules - such as Article 36, or similar, as well as on the "rule o f reason" of 
the Court o f  Justice's doctrine.* 57 *59601
However, it should be stressed that the Court has already considered that, simply 
because a provision includes an obligation to adopt implementing measures, it does not 
follow that its direct effect is dependent on the enactment of those measures.58 This 
dependence would only exist if  the implementing institution or Member State was left with 
some margin o f  discretion. I will discuss this point later. Meanwhile it could, perhaps, be 
noted that there is a specific field in which Article 7A could have direct effect, with no 
special implementing measures being indispensable to achieve that effect. I refer to border 
controls. In this respect the ruling o f the Court of Justice in the Defrenne case can be 
recalled.59 There, Article 119 o f the EEC Treaty (on equal pay for men and women) was 
considered to have direct effect in relation to direct and overt discrimination, but not in 
respect o f indirect and disguised discrimination. So, perhaps it would not be so absurd to 
recognise direct effect for Article 7A - in so far as it relates, for instance, to systematic 
border controls, which clearly violate the objective of establishing "an area without 
internal frontiers".
After all, even Schockweiler himself raised the possibility o f the Court o f Justice, 
after 1 January 1993, broadening its doctrine on the equivalence o f national measures.*® 
This doctrine already applies to goods (on rules protecting health) and to services (on 
rules on imperatives of general interest).
c ) The obligation should leave no margin of discretion
I suggest that, at least as far as the absence o f border controls is concerned, the 
establishment o f  a single market "without internal frontiers" leaves no discretion to the 
Community authorities. They may not decide that there should be more or fewer controls 
at the internal frontiers. They just have to abolish them all. I f  this is so, then direct effect 
could be attributed to Article 7A in that respect, even if  direct effect would not be 
recognised with regard to other aspects of the internal market. Article 7A would thus have 
partial direct effect. The idea o f partial direct effect o f a Community rule was implicitly 
accepted by the European Court in the Salgoil case.61 There, the Court, when examining 
the obligations imposed by two provisions of the EEC Treaty, considered "whether the
5<> Schockweiler, op.cit., p. 883.
5 7  The "rule of reason" is a creation of the Court of Justice and regards the justification of national 
legislation obstructing free movement of goods between Member States. Consistent case-law of the Court 
establishes that such legislation is not prohibited by Article 30 of the EC Treaty (even when it is not 
justified under Article 36 of the EC Treaty) provided it is "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements", or if it is objectively justified. See, e.g., case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG ("Cassis de Dijon"), 
[1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8 .
Case 28/67, Firma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/ Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1968] ECR 
143 at 152.
59 Case 43/75, quoted supra, at 474.
60 Schockweiler, op.cit., p. 885.
61 Case 13/68 Spa. Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade, [1968] ECR 453 at 461.
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Member States may in performing them exercise any discretion such as to exclude the 
above mentioned [direct] effects wholly or in part".62
Moreover, a sort o f institutional argument against the direct effect o f Article 7A 
must be considered. Let us imagine that the expiration o f the agreed date would entail 
automatically the abolition o f all barriers to movement between the Member States. This 
could seriously harm the good functioning of the European decision making process. 
Indirectly, it could even harm the well-being of the Communities. The reason is that most 
of the Community instruments required to establish the internal market are measures on 
the harmonisation or coordination o f divergent national rules - for example those on the 
protection o f workers, general health or the environment. Here, a hypothetical direct 
effect o f the internal market would entail, in each Member State, an automatic recognition 
of the other Member States' rules.
Member States with less protective rules in a certain field would not have to 
bargain with the others. They would not need to negotiate, to make concessions, or to try 
to find a compromise to reach a consensus for adoption o f harmonisation measures for the 
whole Community. They would need to do nothing. Blocking the decision process, they 
would simply wait for the blessed date. After this, they could benefit both from free entry 
to the other countries and from lower standards at home. Consequently, the most 
protective countries would lose out and the level of protection in the Community would 
have a tendency to decreased
However, this argument may not fully apply in the border controls field. If  direct 
effect is recognised only for the abolition of frontier controls and formalities, this 
argument may not be as important as it would at first seem. This is so simply because 
controls within the territory of the Member States would still be allowed, namely in fields 
where harmonisation measures were not taken. Therefore a less protective Member State 
could noi wait for 1 January 1993 to have free access (for instance) to introduce its 
products to the other countries.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that at least one concrete case has been taken to 
court, in which is at stake the eventual direct effect of Article 7A in relation to internal 
border controls on persons. A British immigrant welfare association, the JCWI, lodged a 
complaint with a British court about an incident in which some of its members were 
stopped and examined when returning from another Member State, in May 1993.62 34 They 
refused to show their passports alleging that under Article 7A of the EC Treaty no more 
passport checks should be carried out on people travelling between Member States. After 
being retained for about 4 0  minutes, they were allowed to enter. They sought a judicial 
review o f the decision of the British Home Secretary to maintain immigration controls for 
persons moving between other Member States and the United Kingdom. They sought also
62 Idem, atp.461.
63 This fear resulted in Article I00A (3).
6 4  The main defendant in the case is Don Flynn, European Projects Worker of the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants. The Standing Conference on Racial Equality in Europe (SCORE) has also been 
involved in the judicial procedures. See the JCWI, Annual Report 1992/3. pg. 8 .
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for damages for unlawful detention. On 9 March 1995, the (British) High Court decided 
against them, ruling that Article 7A obliged the Community,
"to do no more than to adopt measures with the aim of establishing the internal 
market by 31 December 1992. It did not ordain the internal market would come 
into being on 1 January 1993."65 6*
Furthermore, the High Court refused the defendants' request that the case be referred to 
the EC's Court of Justice, under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. The High Court considered 
that there was no doubt that the EC's Court of Justice would take a decision no different 
to that of the British High Court. On 7 July, an appeal against the decision of the High 
Court was turned down by the British Court of Appeal. A petition was meanwhile made to 
the House of Lords to refer the matter to the EC's Court of Justice.
Another case has already been decided, but was only concerned with free 
movement of persons in a more general manner. In INPS v. Baglieri^ the Court had to 
decide whether or not Member States had the duty to admit the voluntary inscription to 
their social security systems of persons who were subject to mandatory social security 
contributions affiliation in another Member State, when these persons would eventually go 
back to their Member States of origin. The Italian nationals concerned had invoked Article 
7A for that purpose. The Court ruled that Article 7A of the EC Treaty should not be 
interpreted so that, in the absence of the adoption of EC measures by the end of 1992, the 
expiry of that deadline would automatically entail the mentioned duty for the Member 
States. The Court agreed with the Advocate General in the opinion that such a duty 
presupposed the harmonisation of Member States legislation on social security, which did 
not exist in the current state of Community Law.°7 Nevertheless, what seems to have 
been at stake in this case is the request for a positive action, which differs from the 
absence of border controls, clearly a negative action.
f) Finally, it may be noted that the Commission has maintained an ambiguous position 
on the eventual direct effect of Article 7A, as far the abolition of internal border controls 
on persons is concerned. In the presentation of the Commission’s working programme for 
1995, its President, Jacques Santer, has expressly linked the abolition of internal controls 
with guarantees on security, and with combating drugs and organised crime.68 This 
assertion, even if reasonable in itself, does not seem to strengthen the possibility of Article 
7A having direct effect. However, formally, the Commission has maintained its long 
standing position that internal border controls violate Article 7A. The Commission has, for 
example, dissociated itself from the decision on "joint action" on travel facilities within the 
Union for third country nationals' school children. It stated that its reservations on the 
matter were meant
6 5  See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Flynn, Queen's Bench Division of the 
High Court, March 9, 1995, LEXIS transcript. See also the Financial Times, 10/3/1995; MNSt 8/1993, 
p.3, and of 8/1995, p .l; and the editorial comments "British immigration controls", ELRt Vol.20, 1995, 
No.4, pp.353-354.
6 6  Case C-297/92, INPS v. Baglieri (1993] EC R1-5228.
Idem, paragraphs 16 and 17.
6 8  MNS. 3/1995.
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"to avoid precluding the possibility of a future Community initiative to ensure that 
all persons legally resident can effectively benefit from freedom of movement in 
the meaning of Article 7A of the EC Treaty".^
This ambiguity continued in a rather curious manner in the Community's draft Directives 
for the elimination of internal border controls on persons, presented in July 1995.69 70 
According to the Commission, the main Directive eliminating border controls, "would 
provide a final confirmation that controls at internal borders have indeed been 
eliminated".71 In the Preamble of this Directive it is stated that such confirmation is 
necessary "to fulfil the clear and unconditional obligation enshrined in Article 7A, and in 
the interest of legal certainty". On the other hand, the Commission states also that this 
Directive "would take effect only when the flanking measures were themselves in force", 
since those measures "are considered essential to maintaining a high level of security 
within the area without internal borders".72
The Commission seems to play a delicate double game. It does not wish to 
compromise irremediably the possibility of invoking the direct effect of Article 7A. In the 
meantime, it seeks to tranquillise the Member States' governments and ensure that the 
approval of the relevant measures (either in the Community framework or under Title VI 
of the Treaty on European Union) is not jeopardised either.
2 - Indirect Effect
The Court of Justice has already declared that when Community acts are not able 
of having direct effect, nevertheless, in certain cases, they must be taken into account by 
national courts when interpreting national legislation. This is usually called the "indirect 
effect" of Community acts.73 This effect is based on the supremacy of Community Law 
and on the e f f e t  u t i l e  of the acts concerned.
In Grimaldi,74 for example, the Court ruled that although a recommendation of the 
Commission was not capable of having direct effect, it should, in any case, be taken into 
consideration by national courts in cases submitted to them. That should be particularly 
the case when the recommendations may clarify the meaning of national legislation
69 See the Commission's reply to oral question H-92/95 made by a member of the European Parliament 
(MEP). The Union "joint action" was adopted by the Council on 30 November 1994, OJ L 327/1-3. See 
also the Commission’s reply to a written question by Glyn Ford (also a MEP) on passport checks in 
relation to internal flights: reply to question E-2635/94 given on 9/2/95.
7 0  See below, the subsection on action against institutional failure to act.
71 See the introduction to the Commission draft Directives, proposed in COM (95) 347 final.
7 2  See the introduction to all three draft Directives, namely COM (95) 347 final. Note, meanwhile, that no 
conditional clause for that effect is included among the Directive's provisions (only one of the recitals of 
the Preamble of the Directive proposed in COM (95) 347 reads as follows "(wlhereas the relevant 
accompanying measures have been introduced satisfactorily"). Therefore, one may be somehow deceived 
by the declarations of Commissioner Mario Monti, according to which there "is explicit provision that 
these Directives will not enter into force until the accompanying measures (...) have been definitively 
adopted and implemented". See the Note from the Commission Spokesman, in Agence Europe - 
Documents, No. 1948,5/8/1995.
7 3  See, e.g.. Hartley, T.C., The Foundations o f  European Community Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. 1994, pp. 222-225, at 222.
7 4  Case C- 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionels [1989] ECR 4407.
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adopted to implement them, or when the recommendations were meant to supplement 
binding EC measures.
However, the most extensive case-law on indirect effect concerns Directives.75 In 
Von Colson,76 for example, the Court of Justice ruled that, in the absence of direct effect 
of the provisions of a directive, the national court must:
"interpret and apply the [national] legislation adopted for the implementation of 
the directive in conformity with the requirements of Community Law, in so far as 
it is given discretion to do so under national law."77 
The Court of Justice based this ruling on the duty of Member States, established in Article 
5 of the EC Treaty, to "take all appropriate measures", whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of their Community obligations. The Court of Justice considered that this 
obligation applies to all authorities of the Member States, including the national courts, 
within their jurisdiction.78 This justification was repeated also in later cases. On the other 
hand, the last condition referred to in the Van Colson ruling (the prerequisite that the 
national court has discretion under its law to make the required interpretation) was not 
repeated in the following rulings of the Court on indirect effect of Directives.
In the Kolpinghuis Nijmegen case,79 the Court added that the Von Colson ruling 
was valid even before the expiry of the period in which Member States have to implement 
the Directive. Moreover, in Marleasing80 the Court of Justice applied the Von Colson 
ruling to the interpretation of a national law which had not been adopted to implement an 
EC Directive. Indeed the national law had been adopted before the Directive. The Court 
of Justice was asked how to solve a case in which the Spanish Civil Code was in 
contradiction with an EC Directive not implemented in Spain. The Court ruled that:
"the national court asked to interpret national law is bound to do so in every wav 
possible in the light of the text and the aim of the Directive to achieve the results 
envisaged by it."81
Therefore, the Court ruled that a provision of the Spanish Civil code had to be interpreted 
as not being applicable to the case since it contradicted the EC Directive not implemented 
in Spain.82
A more recent case is ground to sustain that a national law has to be interpreted 
not only in the light of Directives, but of all Community Law.83 In the van  M u n s te r  case, 
the Court ruled that
7 5  See Prêchai, S., Directives in European Community Law - a study o f  Directives and their enforcement 
in national courts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.
7 6  Case 14/E3, Von Colson and Kamman v. Land Nordrhein-Westfallen [1984) ECR 1991.
7 7  Idem, see paragraph 26 and the conclusions of the judgment.
7 8  Ibidem, paragraph 26.
7 9  Case 80/86, Officier van Justifie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraphs 15-6.
8 0  Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA [1990] ECR 1-4135.
81 Idem, paragraph 8 . Emphasis added.
8 2  This case concerned only private parties, and therefore, it raises the question of horizontal direct effect. 
Hartley, op.cit., p.223; and Steiner, J .,  Textbook on EC Law, 4th ed., Blackstone, London, 1994, p.40.
8 3  See Betlem, Gerrit, "The Effet Utile of Indirect Effect, Habermann-Beltermann v. ArbeitrwohlfahrC , 
annotation to case C-421/92, [1994] ECR 1-1657, in Maastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative 
Law, VoI,2, 1995, No.l, pp.73-84, at pp.80-81. Betlem recalls that the requirement that a national law be 
interpreted in conformity with a EC Directive, is part of the principle that requires that any legal act be
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"when applying domestic law, the national couit must, as far as is at all possible, 
interpret it in a way which accords jwith the requirements _of Community 
lawu.)".84
The Court added that:
"(...) for the purpose of applying a provision of domestic law, [in a case in which] 
a national court has to characterise a social security awarded under the statutory 
scheme of another Member State, it should interpret its own legislation in the light 
of the aims of Article 48 to 51 of the Treaty and, as far as is at all possible, 
prevent its interpretation from being such as to discourage a migrant worker from 
actually exercising his right to freedom of movement".85 
This ruling seems to be relevant to assess whether or not the Court of Justice would 
recognise indirect effect of Article 7A, notably as far as the abolition of border controls on 
persons by the end of 1992 is concerned. Article 7A is also part of the EC Treaty and 
likewise concerns freedom of movement of persons. However, in any event, it should be 
recalled that the provisions referred to in the van Munster case (Articles 48 to 51) had 
previously been recognised direct effect.86 In contrast, direct effect was not yet recognised 
to Article 7A.
To assess in general terms the possibility of invoking the indirect effect of Article 
7A, it may be useful to recall Timmermans remarks in this respect. He argues that the 
objective of Article 7A of removing all internal border controls should be given due regard 
when interpreting other EC Treaty provisions.87 In his opinion, at the very least, that 
objective should be taken into account when interpreting the basic prohibitions on free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as well as their exception clauses. This 
would mean, for example, that identity controls on persons, allowed under secondary 
Community Law,
interpreted according to Community Law. Betlem, op.cit. p.81. It was also the same underlying principle 
that was in question when the Court ruled that "where it is necessary to interpret a provision of secondary 
Community law, preference should be given to the interpretation that renders the provision consistent 
with the Treaty and the general principles of Community law". See, e.g., case C-314/89 Rauh [19911 ECR 
I-1647, paragraph 17, quoted by Betlem, idem, p.83.
8 4  Case C-165/91, van Munster [1994] ECR 1-4661, paragraph 34. Emphasis added.
8 5  Idem, paragraph 35.
8 6  To be more accurate, the Court of Justice has conferred direct effect on Treaty provisions on free 
movement of persons - such as Articles 48, 52, 53, 59 and 62. See Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p. 297; and 
Schermers & Waelbroeck, op.cit., pp. 146-147. The latter authors recall that the Watson case is ground to 
sustain that in general terms Articles 48-66 and the measures adopted by the Community in application 
thereof have direct effect, idem, at p.146, footnote 637. See case C-l 18/75, quoted supra. Note, however, 
as far as freedom to provide transport services is concerned, the limits shown in case 13/83, Parliament v. 
Council and case C -17/90, Pinaud Wieger, analysed infra.
8 7  He believes that this is so even "according to the most orthodox interpretation methods developed in 
the Court's case-law", see Timmermans, in "Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers 
Between op. cit., at p.357-8. See also Jessurun D'Oliveira, H.U., "Is Reverse Discrimination Still 
Permissible Under the Single European Act?", in Forty Years On: The Evolution o f  Postwar Private 
International Law in Europe, Deventer, Centrum voor Buitenlands Recht en Internationaal Privaatrecht I 
Kluwer, 1990, pp.84.
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"instead of being a token of liberalisation as was the situation before the [Single 
European Act], now have to be regarded as restrictions to free movement to be 
abolished before the key date of 1 January 1993."88
Timmermans considers also another possibility. The interpretation, in the light of 
Article 7A, of the basic Treaty provisions on free movement of persons could lead to the 
conclusion that, from the end of 1993, controls of persons on internal borders should be 
simply considered as restrictions of free movement prohibited by Articles 48, 52, 59 and
60. In his opinion, that would be "a fairly radical solution". He sustains that this 
interpretation would not be much different than to recognise direct effect of Article 7A. 
This is a quite interesting idea, since it has often been argued that there is not much 
difference between the results of direct and indirect effect.89
However, Timmermans proposes a "much less controversial approach". He 
suggests that, having regard to Article 7A, the Court of Justice applies the necessity and 
proportionality tests much more strictly when it reviews national measures restricting free 
movement, which are allegedly justified by imperative public interests.90
Timmermans' remarks seem to elucidate both the potentialities and the limits of the 
indirect effect that could eventually be recognised for Article 7 A. The consideration of this 
provision (and, thus, of its objective) could certainly make more severe the scrutiny of the 
conformity with the Community Law of national rules on controls of persons at internal 
borders. In this respect, it is not without relevance that, to a certain extent, such scrutiny 
was already performed by the Court of Justice before the end of 1992. National courts 
could, eventually, be required to interpret national legislation on border controls in a 
restrictive manner. This could be required of national courts inasmuch as they have margin 
for doing so - having regard both to the national legal system in general terms, and to the 
specific legal rules in question.
However, it seems highly improbable that the Court of Justice decides that indirect 
effect of Article 7A would make national courts disregard completely national laws 
providing for border controls on persons. This assessment derives from two type of 
considerations. First, from considerations of a judicial policy character. The political 
sensitivity of the abolition of border controls on persons would tend to render such
8 8  Idem, loc.cit.
8 9  Hartley, sustains that the principle of indirect effect "provides a back door route by which something 
approaching the same result [of direct effect] can be attained under the guise of interpretation". See 
Hanley, op.cit., p.222. Van Gerven sustains that since 1986, when in the Marshall I case (case 152/84 
Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health Authority [1986] ECR 723) the Court denied 
horizontal direct effect to directives, the principle of indirect effect has functioned as a surrogate for 
horizontal direct effect. See van Gerven, W., "The horizontal effect of directive provisions revisited: The 
reality of catchwords", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration - Essays in Honour o f  Henry 
Schermerst Vol. II, Heukels, T. & Curtin, D. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, p.335, at 346. 
Note also that, as Betlem points out, "in some of the most forceful rulings on direct effect", the Court has 
used in the operative part the very same language ("Community law precludes...") as it did in Marleasing, 
dealing with indirect effect See, e.g., cases C-19 &20/90 Karelia and others [1991] ECR 1-2691, 
paragraph 36; and C-208/90 Emmott [1991] ECR 1-4269, paragraph 24, quoted by Betlem, op.cit., p.83.
9 0  Timmermans, in "Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers Between...", op. cit., pp.357-
8.
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request by the EC's Court of Justice unlikely. Secondly, from considerations of a more 
legal nature. Article 7A is a provision of the EC Treaty which interpretation and effect is 
not officially determined, unlike the Directives which were granted indirect effect. 
Furthermore, it is rare that national courts be given much discretion to interpret national 
laws on border controls. This relates to an aspect of the case-law on indirect effect of 
Directives. It has been established that national courts have the duty to interpret national 
laws "as far as possible" in the light of the wording and purposes of a Directive. However, 
it is doubtful whether national courts can be required by the Court of Justice to make such 
an interpretation, when national law is ngl "reasonably capable of the meaning contended 
for".91 When the national law is clearly incompatible with a Community Directive it is 
highly problematic to oblige national courts to "interpret" it in the light of the Directive, so 
as to not apply the national law.92 Such interpretation could simply be not "at all possible". 
This seems to be specially the case when the national laws in question were not adopted 
with the aim of implementing the Directive in question. The general appropriateness of the 
Court of Justice to order national courts to make such an interpretation can be questioned. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that national courts would accept such an instruction.
To a certain extent, similar remarks can be made regarding an eventual indirect 
effect of Article 7A, particularly as far as the abolition of internal border controls is 
concerned. National courts may resist instructions of the Court of Justice that they 
interpret national laws clearly providing for border controls,93 in such a manner that these 
laws be in conformity with the objective of Article 7A of... abolishing border controls.
As a conclusion, the case-law on indirect effect of Community acts shows us 
another possibility for the Court of Justice to provide some effect to Article 7A, if it 
should decide to do so. However, it seems unlikely that the indirect effect of Article 7A 
could be used to give a substantive contribution to the complete abolition of internal 
border controls on persons.
3 - Action Against Failure to Act
If direct or indirect effect is not recognised to Article 7A, or if it is not recognised 
as far as the whole internal market is concerned, the only hope would be to take 
procedures based on Articles 175 or 215 of the EEC Treaty. These refer to procedures
9  ^ Steiner, op.cit., p.40.
9 2  In this way. Hartley wonders whether the Marleasing ruling would mean that the result envisaged by 
the Directive had to be attained, "irrespective of whether or not there could be any doubt as to the meaning 
of the national provision and irrespective of whether or not the words of that provision could reasonably 
bear the meaning required by the directive". If the answer to this question was positive, "the effect would 
be that, while pretending to uphold the Marshall principle, the European Court was in fact making 
directives directly effective against individuals". Moreover, the Court would be overstepping its 
competence, since it is for national courts to interpret national law. However, he adds, this may not have 
been the case as, apparently, the Spanish law under examination in the case was not clear on its meaning. 
Thus the national court would have had room to interpret the national law in conformity with the 
Community Directive. See Hartley, op.cit., p. 223-4. See also Weatherill. S. & Beaumont, P., EC Law, 
London, Penguin, 1993, pp.303-4.
9 3  And, for example, providing for criminal sanctions for its disrespect.
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against the failure to act of a Community institution and to the noncontractual liability of 
the Community. I will first examine the possibility of establishing the existence of a failure 
to act, as the Community liability would be related with that failure.
The proceedings of Article 175, on failure to act, are less useful than those based 
on preliminary rulings and direct effect, as private parties have limited access to them. 
Private parties may only complain that "an institution of the Community has failed to 
address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion".^ According 
to the interpretation of the Court of Justice, the act has to be of direct and individual 
concern to the plaintiff. It cannot be an act of general regulatory character.* 95 As a result, 
this type of procedure would not be very helpful for individual complaints on barriers to 
the internal market. However, the procedure could be used by a Member State or by an 
institution of the Community against the Council or the Commission.96
A special two-step procedure is envisaged. First, the institution concerned has to 
be called upon to act. In the case of the Council, this would also require that proposals 
had been presented by the Commission. If the Commission had not presented such 
proposals there would be a failure to act on the part of the Commission, not of the Council 
- as the latter can only act on a proposal from the Commission.97 *In any case, the 
institution concerned has to be called on to act and has two months after that to "define its 
position". It may act or decide not to act. If it decides not to act, the (legal technical) 
failure to act would only exist if this constitutes an infringement of the Treaty. There is a 
relevant failure to act only if the Treaty prescribes a certain action to the institution, which 
it does not perform.
Thus far all the required conditions seem either to have been, or to be amenable of 
being easily fulfilled, as far as the lack of complete establishment of an internal market is 
concerned. The duty to act established by Article 7A on the Community institutions is 
quite clear. The literature on Community Law is unanimous in considering that at least 
Article 7A imposes on the Community institutions a duty to act to establish an internal
market. 9 8
Article 175(3) of the EC Treaty.
9 5  See Steiner, op.cit., p.375-8.
9 6  In case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council, [1985] ECR, 1513, paragraph 17, the Court of Justice 
confirmed that the European Parliament is included among the EC institutions authorised to bring an 
action against failure to act of another EC institution.
9 7  See, e.g., Article 100, 100C, 189B, and 235.
On this point see, for example Ehlermann, op. cit., p. 372; Glaesner, op. cit., p.313 and Jacqué, J. Paul, 
if "manifestement l'objectif ne serait pas atteint", "L'Acte Unique Européen", RTDE, Vol.22, 1986, n.4, 
pp.575-612 at 599. With the same opinion see De Ruyt, op.cit., at p.159, on the condition that "de 
manière flagrante, l'objectif n'a pas été atteint". Schemers sustains that 'The obligation to complete the 
internal market before 1 January 1993 is sufficiently well-defined for disregard of it to be the subject of a 
finding of a failure to act pursuant to Article 175 [of the EC Treaty]." See Schemers, op.cit., at pp.279- 
280, Schockweiler considers that an eventual "constatation de la carence, revêtira essentiellement un 
caractère politique et morale. Toutefois, on ne saurait exclure qu'à l'expiration d'un délai raisonnable La 
Cour puisse elle-même déduire des effets directs des nouvelles dispositions du traité CEE, à l'instar de ce 
qu'elle a laissé sous-entendre dans l'arrêt sur la politique commune en matière de transports." See op.cit., 
p. 885. Schockweiler refers to case 13/83, quoted supra. However, it is generally considered that the Court 
in this case declined to speculate on the consequences of a failure of the Council to comply with the 
Court's injunction for it to act. See, e.g., Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., p.240.
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Meanwhile, it is useful to recall a well-known case. In May 1985, in a case begun 
by the Parliament in September 1982, the Council was considered to have infringed the 
EEC Treaty by its lack of adoption of certain measures in the field of transport. The 
Parliament complained that the Council had not approved measures implementing a 
common transport policy, as provided for in the EEC Treaty. The Court examined the 
kind of measures the Council was supposed to have approved. The objective was to 
determine whether their subject-matter and nature could be determined with a sufficient 
degree of precision "for disregard of them to be subject of a finding of failure to act 
pursuant to Article 1 7 5  ".99
The issue involved the interpretation of several articles of the EEC Treaty. They 
will be briefly reviewed. Article 59 provides that:
"Within the framework set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services 
in the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional 
period(...)"
Article 61(1) states that:
"Freedom to provide services in the field of transport shall be governed by the 
Title relating to transport."
Article 74, the first of the Titles on transport, establishes that:
"The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this Title, be pursued 
by the Member States within the framework of a common transport policy."
Article 75 contains comes more to the detail, saying that:
" 1. For the purpose of implementing Article 74, and taking into account the 
distinctive features of transport, the Council shall (...) lay down (...)
a) common rules applicable to international transport to and from the 
territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member 
States;
b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport 
services within a Member State;
c) any other appropriate provisions.
2. The provisions referred to in (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall be laid down 
during the transitional period."
In the case, the Court considered that:
"the absence of a common policy which the Treaty requires to be brought into 
being does not in itself constitute a failure to act sufficiently specific in nature to 
form the subject of an action under Article 175,"9 100 *
The Council’s argument that it had a discretion in that field, was, "in principle", accepted 
by the Court. It recognised that it is for the Council to determine "the aims and means for 
implementing a common transport policy", "what priorities are to be observed" or "to 
decide what matters [the] harmonisation must cover". 101 Nevertheless, the Court ruled 
that Article 175 "takes no account of how difficult it may be for the institution in question
99 Case 13/83, quoted supra, paragraphs 6 6  and 6 8 .
1 0 0  Idem, paragraph 34-36.
Ibidem, paragraphs 53,49 and 50.
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to comply with the obligation". *02 Therefore, the Court found the Council had failed to 
act "in so far as the obligations laid down in Article 75(1) (a) and (b) relate to freedom to 
provide services*’. In this respect they were considered to be sufficiently well defined for 
the Council's failure to act to be an infringement of the Treaty, as defined in Article 
175.102 03 1045Finally, the Council was given a r e a s o n a b l e  p e r i o d  in which to act.
How can this ruling be of use for the search here undertaken? Can it help us to try 
to predict a possible decision of the European Court on a procedure for the failure to 
implement the internal market? The point is: could it be claimed that the acts required by 
Article 7A have a sufficient degree of precision in their "subject-matter and nature"? Could 
that character be claimed in so far as the obligations laid down in Article 7A relate to the 
complete free movement across borders, with no controls or formalities?
In this context, is also worthy to refer to the Pinaud Wieger case .^  This case 
resulted from the lack of establishment by the Council of complete freedom to provide 
services, in spite of the ruling of the Court in the case discussed above. The proceedings 
were initiated by a private party who asked for a preliminary ruling of the Court. The case 
was not an action against failure to act of the Council, and, consequently, it should be 
appreciated bearing that fact in mind. Nevertheless, the Court addressed the problem of 
the Council's failure to act. The Court ruled that:
"In the view of the complexity of the cabotage sector, considerable difficulties still 
stand in the way of the achievement of freedom to provide services in that sphere.
This can be done in an orderly fashion only in the context of a common transport 
policy which takes into consideration the economic, social and ecological 
problems and ensures equality in the conditions of competition.
(...) That being so, the Council was entitled to undertake the liberalisation of 
cabotage operations in a gradual manner."
Would the Court apply similar reasoning in a case on the completion of freedom of 
movement of persons and the abolition of internal border controls on persons? Would the 
Court invoke the "complexity" of the area at stake and the due consideration to be given, 
for instance, to problems of "social" nature? Would the Court be sensitive to the argument 
that such freedom requires the creation of c o m p e n s a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  to be attained in an 
"orderly manner"? More importantly, what would be the margin of manoeuvre the Court 
would give to the Commission or the Council?
1 0 2  Ibidem, paragraph 48.
1 03  Ibidem, paragraph 6 6  and 6 8 . According to Lasok & Bridge, this was the "only successful action to 
date under Article 175". See Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p.269. They were probably referring only to action 
against the Council.
104 Case C -17/90, Pinaud Wieger GmbH Spedition v. Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr, [1991] 
ECRI - 5253.
105 Idem, paragraphs 1 1 and 12 of the judgment, emphasis added. The Court also pointed out that the 
Council did adopt on 21/12/1989 Regulation 4059/89, laying down the conditions under which non­
resident carriers may operate national road haulage services within a Member State, OJ L 390/3, of 
30/12/1989. This Regulation entered into force on 1 July 1990. In its Article 9 the Council undertook to 
adopt a Regulation laying down the definitive cabotage system by 1 January 1993. This Regulation, was 
adopted after the preliminary ruling request in this very case, but before the Court's judgment on the case, 
which dates from 1 November 1991.
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These questions took on special practical importance with the case brought by the 
European Parliament against the Commission. 106 For a long time the Parliament had been 
complaining about the behaviour of the Commission, sustaining that it was not doing 
enough for true free movement of persons to be achieved. The absence of Commission 
proposals for the abolition of border controls on persons was one of the main points of 
controversy. 107 Therefore, in July 1993, the Parliament decided to initiate proceedings 
against the Commission in that respect. 108 The formal letter of the President of the 
Parliament was sent to the Commission on 20 July 1993, asking it to act within two 
months. The Commission replied to the Parliament in 23 September 1993 denying its 
failure to act contrary to the Treaty. Therefore, on 18 November 1993 the European 
Parliament took the case to Court. The case is an action against the failure to act of the 
Commission. The Parliament complains that the Commission contravened the EC Treaty 
by not present proposals for the adoption of the necessary legal measures to enable the 
achievement of freedom of movement of persons, as required by an internal market, 
according to the second paragraph of Article 7A inserted by the Single European Act.109 106*8
106 case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission, still pending - summary of the Parliament’s application in 
OJC 1/12 of 4/1/94.
10  ^ On 7 December 1988, the Commission stated that in this field it would rely mainly on the 
intergovernmental cooperation, and not on the normal law-making process of the European Communities. 
It explained that, being aware of the sensitivity of the issue, it considered that it should concentrate its 
attention "on the practical results, rather than on questions of doctrine". Therefore, while declaring that it 
was not abandoning its interpretation of the Treaty, the Commission stated that it would propose the 
adoption of Community Law measures in this domain only in the cases "in which the legal certainty and 
the uniformity of the community law will be a better instrument to attain that objective". The Commission 
reserved the possibility of launching Community initiatives in the case that intergovernmental attempts 
fail or would not produce sufficient results. See the Commission's Report on the abolition of identity 
controls at the internal borders of the Community, COM (8 8 ) 640 final, of 7/12/1988, p.6 . Both the 
statement on priorities and on the intergovernmental cooperation set the tone for the subsequent attitude 
of the Commission, at least until the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.
108 See Agence Europe of 14, 15 and 16 July 1993, Nos. 6021 to 6023 (n.s.), respectively. On the 
problems raised by the action of the Parliament against the Commission on its failure to act regarding the 
completion of the free movement of persons, see O'Keeffe, David "Non-Accession to the Schengen 
Convention: The cases of the United Kingdom and Ireland", in Schengen en Panne, Pauly, Alexis (ed.), 
Maastricht, EIPA, 1994, pp. 145-153, at pp. 150-1.
169 it been suggested that an action against failure to act could also be envisaged regarding the 
Commission failure to bring enforcement actions under Article 169 against Member States. This provision 
is to be used against Member State's failures to fulfil an obligation under the EC Treaty. Arguably, these 
failures could concern the continuation of Member State's controls at internal borders. See Timmermans, 
"Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers Between op. cit., at p.363. However, the 
Court has ruled that Article 169 does not oblige the Commission to bring proceedings against Member 
States. It is within the Commission’s discretion not to do so. Therefore, an action against failure to act in 
this respect is inadmissible. See case 247/87, Star Fruit Company v. Commission (1989] ECR 291, 
paragraph 11; and case C-87/89, Sonito and others v. Commission [1990] ECR 1-1981, paragraph 6 . See 
also Kapteyn & Verloren van Themaat, op.cit., p.289; Schermers & Waelbroeck, op.cit., pp.309 and 316; 
Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., p.172 and p.237. See, however, O'Keeffe, who suggests that such 
possibility of action against failure to act could be seen at a different light provided the plaintiffs were 
other EC institutions, and not private parties as in the cases submitted to the Court up to now. See 
O'Keeffe, "Non-Accession to the Schengen Convention...", op.cit., pp. 150-1. The point in discussion here 
is relevant in general terms because the Commission has not taken action against Member States' failure 
to fulfil their Treaty obligations under Article 7A, notably on account of their continuation of internal
125
The Court will have an opportunity to decide what is the best interpretation of that 
provision.
Yet, it is interesting that, meanwhile, from a legal perspective the situation may 
have entered into a grey zone.
First, in November 1993, almost one year after the expiry of the deadline for the 
establishment of the internal market, the Treaty on European Union entered into force. 
The free movement of persons is among the objectives of Title VI of that Treaty.* 110 Under 
this Title, the Commission presented in December 1993 a number of proposals to facilitate 
a complete free movement of persons within Member States, notably the draft External 
Frontiers Convention.111
Secondly, on 12 July 1995, the Commission presented three draft directives aimed 
at abolishing internal border controls on persons.112 These proposals are analysed in 
further detail in chapter 4. Here it is sufficient to recall their most more important aspects, 
and to refer to their consequences for the action brought by Parliament against the 
Commission.
border controls on persons. The Commission has declared that it "has shelved the complaints it received 
in 1993 about checks on individuals at internal borders after 31 December 1992, (...) since the objectives 
laid down in Article 7a can be attained only if the necessary support measures are introduced." The 
Commission added that, as far as these measures are concerned, it had proposed the draft Convention on 
external borders, and the by now approved Regulations on a uniform format for visas (OJ L 164/1, of 
14/7/1995) and determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States (OJ L 234/1, of 3/190/1995). See the Twelfth Annual 
Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (1994), COM (95) 500 final, of 7/6/1995, point 
2.4.2, OJ C 254/1 at 29, of 29/9/1995.
110  For an analysis of the relation between the Community competence and Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union, see infra chapter 7.
111 Commission Communication on a Proposal for a decision, based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union establishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member 
States, presented together with a Proposal for a Regulation, based on Article 100C of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, determining the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 of 
10/12/1993. As mentioned before, this last Regulation was already adopted by the Council. Furthermore, 
in July 1994, the Commission presented a draft Regulation laying down a uniform format for visas, COM
(94) 287 final, of 13/7/1994. This was also adopted, as Council Regulation (EC) No.2317/95 of 25 
September 1995 determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States, OJ L 234/1. of 3/10/1995. Thus, among these three 
Commission's proposals, only the External Frontiers Convention has not yet been adopted. See section A 
of chapter 8  for an analysis of these instruments.
112 Draft Council Directive on the elimination of controls on persons crossing internal frontiers, COM
(95) 347, final; Draft Council Directive on the right of third-country nationals to travel in the Community, 
COM (95) 346, final; and Draft European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for 
workers of Member States and their families and Directive 73/148 on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to 
establishment and the provision of services, COM (95) 348 final. All three draft Directives are dated from 
12/7/1995.
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A framework draft Directive113 provides for the general elimination of controls on 
persons crossing internal frontiers. It establishes that:
"All persons, whatever their nationality, shall be able to cross Member State’
, frontiers within the Community at any point, without such crossing being subject
to any frontier control or formality. " 1 14
1 It is provided also that this general rule “does not affect the exercise of the law-
enforcement powers" of national authorities over their territory. It does not affect either 
legal "obligations to possess and cany documents".115 Furthermore, the draft Directive 
allows the temporary reinstatement of controls, in case of "a serious threat to public policy 
1 or public security".116 Yet, these controls "shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to
respond to the serious threat".117
This framework draft Directive, on the general elimination of internal border 
, controls on persons, is complemented by two other draft Directives. One amends some
rules of secondary Community Law, which did allow for the possibility that Member 
States control persons at internal borders.118 Another draft Directive provides a key 
element for the abolition of internal border controls. It grants third country nationals, 
"who are lawfully in a Member State", the right to travel in the territories of other Member 
States.119 This right is granted both to third country nationals holding a residence permit 
' issued by a Member State120 and to those who do not hold such a permit.121 The right to
"travel" of third country nationals is defined as being:
! "the right to cross internal Community borders and to remain in the territory of a
Member State for a short stay, or to travel onward, without the person concerned 
being required to obtain a visa from the Member State or States in whose territory 
the right is exercised" 1 22
This right does not affect rules on stays other than for a short time, and on access to 
employment and the taking-up of activities as a self-employed person.123
f The presentation by the Commission of these three draft Directives for the
1 abolition of internal border controls on persons may be relevant for the action of the
i
i ---------------------------------------------
' 1 1 3  Proposed in COM (95) 347 final.
, 1 1 4  Article 1(1). Article 3(4) defines that, for the purposes of the Directive, frontier control means "any
control applied, in connection with or on the occasion of the crossing of an internal frontier, by the public 
authorities of a Member State or by other persons, under the national legislation of a Member State". 
Frontier formality signifies "any formality imposed on a person in connection with the crossing of an 
internal frontier and to be fulfilled on the occasion of such crossing".
1 1 5  Idem, Article 1(2).
1 1 6  Article 2 (1) and (2).
1 1 7  Article 2(3).
1 1 8  Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 348 final.
1 1 9  Article 1(1) of the Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 346 final.
1 2 0  Idem, Article 3 and Article 2(2).
121 These will enjoy the right to travel in other Member States in two type of situations. First, if they hold 
a visa which is valid throughout the Community and which is "mutually recognised for the purpose of 
crossing the external frontiers of the Member States" - Article 4 and Article 2(3). Secondly, in case they 
are not required a visa to enter the other Member State concerned.
1 2 2  Article 2(1).
1 2 3  Article 1(3).
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Parliament against the Commission’s failure to act in this respect. It seems that the 
Commission's proposals pursue a double objective.
One is actually to contribute to the abolition of such controls, particularly as there 
has not been much progress in the negotiations of the draft External Frontiers Convention. 
However, the Commission states that the elimination of controls "would take effect only 
when the flanking measures were themselves in force", since those measures "are 
considered essential to maintaining a high level of security within the area without internal 
borders".124 This is a rather curious statement. It may certainly be related with the fact 
that unanimity in the Council is required for the adoption of the proposals, as they were 
presented under Article 100. The Commission did not want to go against Member States 
concerns on security. Why, then, does it not present the draft Directives after the adoption 
of such "flanking measures"? This relates with the other objective of the Commission.
The second likely objective of the Commission concerns the latter's wish to defend 
itself from the Parliament's action on failure to act. In its judgment on this action the Court 
could eventually find that the Commission failed to present proposals to abolish internal 
border controls on persons by the end of 1992. However, at the present moment the 
Commission has already presented several proposals for such abolition - these comprising 
the proposals presented under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union and the three 
mentioned draft EC Directives. It can be argued that they propose the minimum 
indispensable measures to eliminate internal border controls on persons.125 Thus, it is less 
likely than before that the Court will find that the Commission failed to act.
This is explained by a characteristic of the action on failure to act. The objective of 
this action is to make the Court establish an infringement of the Treaty by the Council or 
the Commission on account of their failure to act. The defendant institution is then 
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the Court’s judgment. The point is 
that the Court of Justice has held that, when the institution adopts a measure after the 
action was brought, but before the case is decided, the Court will not give judgment, since 
the subject matter of the action has ceased to exist.126 In the pending case Parliament v. 
Commission the Court would have to decide whether or not the Commission has, by the
124  See the introduction to all three draft Directives. As mentioned before, no conditional clause is 
included in the Directive for that purpose. In the introduction to the three draft Directives the Commission 
declares what are the compensatory measures to which entry into force the Commission refers. Such 
compensatory measures are the three proposals presented by the Commission (External Frontiers 
Convention, Regulation on a uniform format of visas, and Regulation on the list of countries whose 
nationals have to hold a visa to enter a Member State) as well as the Dublin Convention (determining the 
State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States) and the draft 
Convention on a European information System. The later draft Convention is still being negotiated under 
the Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. The Dublin Convention has not yet been ratified by all 
Member States.
125 Naturally, the draft External Frontiers Convention requires several implementing measures yet to be 
negotiated, not to mention to be formally adopted and implemented. Likewise, the Convention on the 
European Information System is quite important for the abolition of internal border controls on persons. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Commission has presented proposals for the main measures 
required for such abolition. It is harder now than it was before to say that the Commission did not yet 
make a minimum institutional effort to push forward such abolition.
1 2 6  See case 377/87, European Parliament v. Council [1988] ECR 4017, paragraph 10; and case 383/87, 
Commission v. Council [1988] ECR 4 [1988] ECR 4051, paragraph 10.
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time the case will be decided, fully complied with the duty to present proposals to 
establish an internal market - as far as abolition of internal border controls on persons is 
concerned.
At the present moment, further progress for that abolition depends mainly on the 
negotiations in course within the Council, and not so much on the presentation of 
additional proposals by the Commission. To the extent that the Commission has presented 
relevant proposals, an action against failure to act would be o f interest if presented against 
the Council, not against the Commission anymore.
Furthermore, and in any case, in a ruling on failure o f the EC institutions to act to 
bring about full free movement of persons, the Court could repeat some considerations of 
the kind it made in the cases analysed above, concerning the transport sector. That is to 
say: even if  the Court admits that the Commission or the Council should have done more, 
it may also consider that the problems at stake are o f such a nature that a quick solution 
could not be demanded.127 In the end, even if the Commission or the Council are found to 
have failed to act in some degree, the Court's ruling may not be strong enough to push 
forward the complete abolition of internal border controls on persons.
On the other hand, it should also be said that an action against failure to act o f the 
Commission or the Council seems likely to be more successful than an action asking for 
the direct or even indirect effect of Article 7A. By simply declaring that the Commission 
or the Council should have done (something) more to abolish internal border controls on 
persons, the Court would contribute to that objective. A moral victory for the European 
Parliament would be better than plain defeat. Moreover, as mentioned before, it is also 
conceivable that the Court qualifies its ruling so that the failure to act of the EC 
institutions could be considered partially justified under the circumstances. A careful and 
balanced judgment could eventually attain two objectives simultaneously. It could uphold 
in general terms the objective o f Article 7A, but not uphold strongly the abolition of 
border controls. In perhaps the best o f hypothesis, it could contribute to that abolition, 
while avoiding the negative effects o f  what, in the present political context, could be seen 
as an interventionist decision.128
In any case, too much speculation is fruitless. It is better to wait for the judgment 
of the Court.
1 2 7  Note that the previous relevant case-law of the Court, and thus the general uncertainty on the outcome 
of an action against the Commission's failure to act, led some members of the European Parliament to 
admit that judicial procedures were perhaps not the best way of ensuring the completion of the internal 
market. See Agence Europe of 2 April 1993, No.5953 (n.s.),
12 8  See, e.g., Agence Europe of 8  December 1992, No.5874(n.s.), on critics of the German government, 
both at the federal and state level (of Bavaria). The German minister for social affairs is quoted as having 
said that "the Court has to defend the law and not to impose it". He added that "European judges all too 
often exceed their role, notably where social legislation is concerned." The critical opinion of the 
governments of the Member States in relation to the European Court of Justice is also somewhat reflected, 
for example, in the fact that the Court was not given competence on measures dealing with "Justice and 
Home Affairs", adopted under the framework of the cooperation procedure of Title VI of the Treaty on the 
European Union. See chapter 7 for a discussion on the role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, with full reference to the literature on the subject.
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4 - Non-Contractual Liability of the Community129
For the sake o f  completeness, I will now examine whether the Community could 
be held liable for damages caused by the failure o f its institutions to establish an internal 
market, as far as the abolition o f internal border controls on persons is concerned.
Article 215(2) o f the EC Treaty establishes that:
Tn the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with 
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any 
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties. " 1 3 0
An action on this basis would have the advantage o f being open to private parties, 
in contrast with the simple action for failure to act o f  a Community institution. Under 
Article 175(3) o f  the EC  Treaty, an action against failure to act can only be initiated by a 
private party, when "an institution o f the Community has failed to address to that person 
any act other than a recommendation or an opinion". As mentioned above, the Court of 
Justice has interpreted this rule restrictively, considering that the act in question has to be 
o f direct and individual concern to the plaintiff, not an act o f general regulatory character. 
This type o f restriction does not exist as far as action for non-contractual liability o f  the 
Community is concerned. The Court has ruled that action on this basis is an independent 
form of action, being admissible even if  another type of action is not. It may be noted that 
Article 176(2) o f  the EC  Treaty provides that, when the Court finds a violation o f  an 
obligation to act, such finding does not affect any obligation resulting from non­
contractual liability o f the Community, as defined by Article 215(2).
According to the case-law o f  the Court o f Justice on the matter,131 there are three 
cumulative requirements for non-contractual liability o f the Community to be found. First, 
there must exist a wrongful act or omission on the part o f a Community institution, or its
129  On the non-contractual liability of the Community see Fines, F., Étude de la responsabilité 
extracontractuelle de la  Communauté Économique Européenne: de la référence aux principes généraux 
communs à  Védification jurisprudentiel d'un système autonome, Paris, LGDJ, 1990; Hartley, op.cit., 
pp.467-482; Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., pp.48-56; Schermers, H., Heukels, T., & Mead, P. (eds.) Non­
contractual Liability o f  the European Communities% Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988; Steiner, op.cit., 
pp.388-402; and Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit, pp.269-273. See also van Gerven, W., "Non-contractual 
Liability of Member States, Community Institutions and Individuals for Breaches of Community Law with 
a View to a Common Law for Europe", in M aastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative Law, Vol.l, 
1994, No. 1, pp.6-40.
1 3 0  According to Article 43 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, actions "against the Community in matters arising from non-contractual liability shall be 
barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto". The Court has held 
that the limitation period of five years does not begin before all requirements for liability, particularly 
damage, have materialised. The same Article 43 provides also for interruption of the maximum period of 
five years if proceedings are instituted before the Court or an application is made to the relevant 
Community institution.
131 See, e.g., case 26/81, Oleifici Mediterranei Sa v. EEC [1982] ECR 3057, paragraph 16. See also 
Steiner, op.cit., p.389, Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p.50; and Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., p.270.
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servants.132 Secondly, there must be a damage to the plaintiff. Thirdly, there must exist a 
causal connection between the conduct o f the Community and the damage in question.
As far as the first requirement is concerned, it includes also the wrongful failure of 
an EC institution to adopt a binding act when the institution had a duty to do so.133 It was 
argued above that Article 7A o f the EC Treaty established a duty of the Community 
institutions to adopt measures to abolish internal border controls on persons by the end of 
1992.134 Provided that the existence o f  this duty is recognised, the lack of action o f the 
Community institutions would amount to a wrongful failure to act, which in principle 
would be capable o f engaging the Community into non-contractual liability.135
However, this issue should be examined with due care, as far as non-contractual 
liability is concerned. The objective here is to assess properly whether the Community 
could be held liable for not having abolished internal border controls on persons by the end 
o f 1992. For this purpose it is useful to refer to some case-law on non-contractual liability. 
When, for example, what is at stake is a legislative measure involving choices of economic 
policy,136 the Court has consistently held that the Community is not liable unless it has 
seriously breached a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual.137
First, in this context a legislative measure can be any binding act which purports to 
lay down general rules.138
Secondly, as far as a superior rule of law is concerned, it can correspond to a 
Treaty provision, or to any general principle of law developed by the Court.139 The
1 3 2  Although it is not strictly required by Article 215(2), the Court requests proof of fault in the conduct 
of the Community institution which has caused damages. See, Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p.49; and Hartley, 
op.cit., 479.
* ^ 3 Steiner, op.cit., p.390. A mere power to act is not enough ground for liability, Hanley, op.cit., p.480.
1 3 4  Action on non-contractual liability of the Community could eventually be also justified on another 
ground. This would be the failure of the Commission to bring enforcement actions under Article 169 
against Member States who after 1992 performed border controls on persons contrary to Article 7A. The 
possibility of action against the Commission's failure to act was suggested by O’Keeffe & Timmermans, as 
referred to supra. Yet, as mentioned supra, up to now the Court has refused such possibility in cases where 
the plaintiffs were private persons. In any event, Schermers & Waelbroeck explain how existing case-law 
of the Court supports the possibility of asking for damages for the Commission's failure to exercise 
adequate control of Member States’ conduct. In joined cases 5,7,13-24/66 Kampffmeyer (the first case) 
[1967] ECR 278, an illegal act had been committed by the German government and expressly approved by 
the Commission. The Court of Justice accepted the existence of a causal link between the damage suffered 
and the approval by the Commission of the illegal act of the German government. See Schermers & 
Waelbroeck, op.cit., p.364. However, it should perhaps be recalled that action against the Commission (on 
account of its failure to bring infringements against Member States' violation of Article 7A), would 
presuppose that this provision had direct effect, or, at least, some sort of indirect effect.
1 3 5  See Hartley, op.cit., p.480; and Lasok & Bridge, p.51. As the adoption of Community legislation in 
this field depends basically on the Commission and the Council, a plaintiff could name as defendants one 
or the other institution, or even both of them - depending on their responsibility in the precise situation of 
the case. See Hartley, op.cit, p.470.
1 3 6  See also Schermers & Waelbroeck, who sustain that the "failure to adopt a legislative act involving 
choice of economic policy may, under certain circumstances, also give raise to damages." They recall in 
this respect case 56-60/74, Kampffmeyer (the fifth case) [1976] ECR 744, paragraph 15. See Schermers & 
Waelbroeck, op.cit., p.346.
!37  This is usually called the "Schöppenstedt formula", adopted in case 5/71, Schöppenstedt v. Council 
[1971] ECR 975, paragraph 11.
1 3 8  Steiner, op.cit., p.392.
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principle of protection of legitimate expectations is one of these general principles.139 40 The 
Court has ruled that the principle of legitimate expectation forms part of the Community 
legal order, and thus any failure to comply with it is a violation of the EC Treaty or "any 
rule of law related to its application, within the meaning of Article 173".141 A legitimate 
expectation is "one which might be held by a reasonable person as to matters likely to 
occur in the normal course of his [or her] affairs".142 The violation of this principle has 
already been the basis of Court decisions annulling Community acts, or deciding that their 
interpretation had to respect the principle.143 Furthermore, this principle has already been 
successfully argued in claims for damages.144
A rather interesting case in this respect is the CNTA case.145 It concerned a system 
of monetary compensatory amounts to make up for losses arising from fluctuations in 
exchange rates. This system was established in 1971 for the trade of colza and rape. 
However, the Commission abolished the system as from 1 February 1972. The CNTA, an 
enterprise involved in the colza business, complained that it had suffered loss as a result of 
the sudden and unexpected abolition o f the scheme. No provision had been established to 
regulate transactions entered into during the time the system was in force. The Court held 
that:
"In the absence of an overriding matter of public interest, the Commission has 
violated a superior rule of law, thus rendering the Community liable, by failing to 
include in the Regulation [which abolished the system of monetary compensatory 
amounts] transitional measures for the protection of confidence which a trader 
might legitimately have in the Community rules".146 
This case concerned a legislative measure, but the violation o f the principle o f legitimate 
expectations was declared to be the result o f an omission o f the Commission: its failure to 
include appropriate transitional measures to protect the legitimate expectations o f the 
relevant traders. Thus, this case can be a ground to argue for liability of the Community in 
the case o f damages caused by its failure to abolish internal border controls on persons.147
139  Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., p.270. See also Steiner, op.cit. p.392.
140  On the principle of legitimate expectations (and legal certainty) in Community Law see Hartley, 
op.cit., at pp. 149-155; Schermers & Waelbroeck, op.cit., pp.52-69, in particular at pp.65-68; Schwarze, J., 
European Administrative Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, pp. 942-953; Wyatt, D. & Dashwood, A. 
et al., European Community Lawt 3rd. ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, pp. 91-5. Schermers 
explored also the possibilities of using the principle of legitimate expectations, by recalling the case-law of 
the Court of Justice, in "The effect of the date op.cit., at pp.280-285.
141 See, e.g., case 112/77, Töpfer (II) [1978] ECR 1019, paragraphs 18 and 19.
142  Steiner, op.cit, p.67.
143 See, e.g., as far as annulment is concerned, case 81/72, Commission v. Council (Staff Salaries case) 
[1973] ECR 575; and case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij (1988] ECR 2321; and, 
as far as an interpretation which respects the principle is concerned, case 78/74 Deuka etc v. Einfuhr-und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1975] ECR 421. See Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p. 165.
144  See, e.g., case C-152/88, Sofrimport SARL v. Commission [1990] ECR 1-2477.
145 Case 74/74, CNTA v. Commission [1975] ECR 533.
1 4 6  Idem, paragraph 44.
147 See also Schermers, who sustains that H[f]or years, the Community as well as the Member States have 
announced that there would be a single internal market before 1 January 1993. Traders could legitimately 
expect that barriers would be lifted before that date and one could maintain that the Community will be 
liable if, in the absence of any overriding matter of public interest, internal barriers are maintained." See 
Schermers, in "The effect of the date op.cit., p.282, Schermers refers also to case 127/80, Grogan
132
JSuch damages could, for example, be incurred by a transport enterprise which, by the end 
of 1992, had made investments counting on the abolition o f internal border controls by 
that date. Such an enterprise could argue that it had acted "according to the letter and the 
spirit of the law in confidence that his fidelity to the law [would] be reciprocated".148
However, the ruling of the Court in the CNTA case embodies also what can turn 
out to be an important limitation for a claim for damages based on lack of respect of 
legitimate expectations. The qualified ruling of the Court, above quoted, would allow it to 
deny damages, by upholding a claim by a (defendant) Community institution that there 
was an overriding public interest in maintaining internal border controls on persons after
1992. Such interest could allegedly correspond to the need o f safeguarding public safety, 
or the need to control the traffic o f drugs or illegal immigration - particularly while 
adequate compensatory measures on the abolition of internal border controls were not yet 
adopted.149 The permanence o f internal border controls on persons has indeed often been 
justified in this manner.150
The third condition to establish the existence o f a wrongful conduct o f a institution 
is that the breach o f the superior rule o f law (such as the principle o f legitimate 
expectations) has been a "sufficiently serious breach". The Court demands that the 
Community institution concerned has "manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the
[1975] ECR 549 (paragraphs 41-44); and case 66/84, Feniere di Borgaro, [1985J ECR 927 (paragraphs 
21-2). He sustain that the Grogan case is ground to argue that after having for a number of years 
mentioned the date of 1/1/1993 for the establishment of the internal market, "the Community may not be 
entitled to change the situation it created without compensating those who have made investments based 
on that date”. The Ferriere di Borgaro case would be basis to argue that a "possible failure of the 
Community to announce in good time that there will not be one internal market by 31 December 1992 
could make it impossible to producers to plan their production correctly, which may cause damages." He 
adds that ”[e]ven accepting that the producers ought to be able to predict a delay the Community 
nonetheless may bear responsibility for such damages." See Schermers, idem, pp.282-285. On the last 
aspect, on the relevance of the behaviour of the plaintiffs who suffer the damages, see infra in the main 
text.
1 4 8  Lasok & Bridge, op.cit., p.166.
1 4 9  This ground could also be invoked as far as action for failure to act is concerned, as referred supra, in 
relation to the case Pinaud Wieger, quoted supra. There the Court ruled that the Council was allowed to 
adopt measures to ensure free movement of services in a gradual manner, because M[t]his can be done in 
an orderly fashion only in the context of a common transport policy which takes into consideration the 
economic, social and ecological problems and ensures equality in the conditions of competition." Case 
Pinaud Wieger, quoted supra, paragraph 11. Note also that, as mentioned supra, the Court of Justice 
created a "rule of reason”, by which it accepts the compatibility with Article 30 of the EC Treaty of 
national legislation obstructing free movement of goods, even when it is not justified under Article 36 of 
the EC Treaty, provided such legislation is "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements". This is 
another example of the acceptance by the Court of exceptional motives for disregard of Community 
positive rules (at least on a strict interpretation of these rules).
1 5 0  See, e.g., the summary of the conclusions of the report 1992: Border Control o f  People, of the Select 
Committee for the European Communities of the House of Lords, Session 1988-1989, 22nd report, p.32; 
and the declarations of the Commission's president Santer on the presentation of the Commission's 
programme to the European Parliament, on 15 February 1995, see MNS, 3/1995.
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exercise of its powers".151 To assess the existence of such behaviour the Court has looked 
to the effect o f the measure in question and to the nature of the breach, i.e. to the way and 
the extent to which the institution was culpable.152 As far as the effect o f the measure is 
concerned, the Court has ruled that, in order to award compensation for damages, it was 
relevant whether or not the damages were significant, and whether they were the result of 
a normal level o f risk inherent in the economic activities in question (including, e.g., 
whether the institutional behaviour in discussion was unforeseeable153). As far as the 
nature o f the breach is concerned, the Court considers whether the Community institution 
has failed completely to take into account the interests of the concerned traders, "without 
invoking any higher interest",154 and whether institutional mistakes can be regarded as 
"verging on the arbitrary", or were a pure technical error. Again, these conditions are 
formulated in such an indeterminate manner that they can be invoked by the Court to 
refuse to award compensation for damages caused by the non abolition of internal border 
controls by the end of 1992.
Besides the existence of a wrongful act or omission o f a Community institution, to 
find non-contractual liability o f the Community there must be a damage to the plaintiff. 
Following its general trend as far as non-contractual liability is concerned, the Court has 
been rather restrictive in the definition o f the damages that can be compensated.155 The 
plaintiff must be able to prove the nature and extent of the injury. He or she has to prove 
that the damages are actual, certain and concrete. The economic losses have to be specific 
and not speculative. They must not have been passed on to other parties. More 
importantly, the plaintiff will receive compensation only if  he or she showed reasonable 
diligence in limiting the extent o f the damages.156
The final condition to establish non-contractual liability o f the Community is the 
existence o f a causal link between the damage of the plaintiff and the conduct o f the 
Community institution. The damage must not be a remote consequence o f the unlawful 
conduct o f the Community institution concerned, but it has to be "a sufficiently direct
151 See cases 83/76 at a!., Bayerische HNL Vermehningsbetiiebe GmbH & Co. KG v. Council and 
Commission (Second Skimmed Milk Powder) (1978] ECR 1209 and case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady GmbH v 
Council and Commission [ 1979] ECR 2955.
15^  Steiner, op.cit., pp.393-6.
153 See, e.g., case 59/83 Biovilac v. EEC [1984] ECR 4057. According to Schwarze, "[t]he expectation of 
the person in question, which must have a subjective basis, must also be recognisable to an outsider and 
therefore be capable of acquiring an objective dimension.M This would entail that the plaintiff "must not 
have acted in a such way as to preclude his reliance on the expectation". Furthermore, as Schwarze points 
out (recalling Advocate General Mayras in cases 44-51/77, Union Malt v. Commission [1978] ECR 57 at 
90), the "frustration of the alleged legitimate expectation by the infringement of the acquired legal 
position or of the individual interest must not have been foreseeable by the person affected". He adds 
(recalling Advocate General Reischl in case 108/81 Amylum v. Council [1982] ECR 3107, at 3148) that 
only "if the persons in question, on the basis of 'all the essential factors known at the time', were entitled 
to assume that the rights or interests acquired by them would remain guaranteed, could there be said to 
exist a legitimate expectation worthy of protection'See Schwarze, op.cit., pp.951 -2.
1 5 4  Case C-104/89 & C-37/90, Mulder v. Council and Commission [1992] ECR 1-3061.
155 Steiner, op.cit., p.397.
1 5 6  Case Mulder, quoted supra, paragraph 33.
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consequence" of such conduct.157 If the applicant is partly to blame for his or her loss, 
compensation for damages may be granted, but is reduced.158 Likewise, the plaintiffs are 
expected to act as prudent persons. For example: the causal link between damages and a 
misleading information provided by a Community institution will only be recognised if the 
information would have caused an error in the mind o f a reasonable person.159
It is quite clear that the case-law of the Court o f Justice gives it a large margin of 
manoeuvre to refuse to award damages for the failure of the Community institutions to 
ensure, by the end of 1992, the abolition of internal border controls on persons.160 It is 
certainly true that the EC Treaty provisions and the relevant case-law of the Court of 
Justice contain all the necessary principles to award damages on that basis. Such award 
could be justified in a manner compatible with previous case-law. However, the Court has 
submitted those general principles to a considerable number of exceptions and 
qualifications. These limitations would facilitate the Court's justification o f a refusal to 
award damages for such failure to act.161
As mentioned above, the Court could accept that public safety was an "overriding 
public interest" justifying the failure to abolish internal border controls on persons. In the 
light of this "public interest", the nature of the breach of the institutions' duty to act could 
be considered not sufficiently serious for damages to be awarded. It would not be "verging 
on the arbitrary". Moreover, the defendant institution could sustain, and the Court could 
accept, that a prudent or reasonable person could have foreseen that internal border 
controls on persons would not have been abolished by the end of 1992. The Commission 
declarations that border controls would not be compatible with Community Law after 
1992 could justify expectations that such would actually be the case.162 But it could also 
be pointed out that contradictory statements were made on the matter by different 
Community institutions (and even Member States). Moreover, it could be said that before 
the end of 1992 the Commission presented no proposal for secondary EC legislation 
abolishing internal border controls on persons. It could be argued before the Court that 
this should have been enough to make a prudent person not count on the expectation that 
those controls would be completely abolished by that date. All these arguments go against 
the award o f damages on the basis analysed. It seems rather unlikely that the Court would
1 5 7  Cases 64 & 113/76 et al., P. Dumortier Frères SA v. Council (1979] ECR 3091. See also Lasok & 
Bridge, op.cit., p.51, who note that the failure to act of a EC institution has not only to constitute a breach 
of a duty to act, but has also to be the "direct cause of loss or damage".
1 5 8  In the Adams case, the compensation for damages caused by the Commission’s breach of confidence 
was reduced to half of the calculated amount of losses, as Adams was considered to have contributed to 
such losses by not protecting adequately his interests. See case 145/83, Adams v. Commission (No.l) 
[1985] ECR 3539.
1 5 9  Case 169/73, Compagnie Continentale France v. Council [1975] ECR 117. See also Schermers & 
Waelbroeck, op.cit., p.364.
1 6 0  A part of the case-law analysed supra refers to unlawful acts, but it has also been applied, or could be 
easily applied to unlawful omissions.
161 It would be also possible that Community institutions would be found to have failed to act, but that 
damages would not be granted to a private plaintiff, due to the restrictive conditions for awarding 
damages due to non-contractual liability.
1 6 2  See supra, the Commission documents pointing in this direction, e.g., SEC (92) 877.
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actually grant them. After all, it must not be forgotten that, in practical terms it is very rare 
that individuals obtain damages from the Community.163
As a conclusion, an eventual Court decision on this matter would depend less than 
usual on strict legal considerations and on the specificity o f the actual situation in 
question. Given the relative indeterminacy of the relevant case-law,164 a decision on this 
topic would depend more on how the situation would be legally framed. Ultimately, the 
Court's judgment would be more dependant than usual on the practical result searched for 
by the Court itself. It would be more open to considerations of judiciary policy and general 
politics, than to strict legal factors.165
C - LEGAL VALUE OF THE DECLARATIONS ANNEXED TO THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
Finally I will refer to the discussion as to whether some o f the Declarations put 
together in a "Final Act", annexed to the Single European Act, could entail a restrictive 
interpretation, if  any at all, of the new Article 7A of the EEC Treaty.
Three o f these Declarations are relevant for the purposes o f the present search. 
Two o f them were adopted by the Conference of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States that signed the Single European Act. One is on Article 7A o f the 
EEC Treaty. After reaffirming the conference's "firm political will to take before 1 January 
1993 the decisions necessary to complete the internal market", it states, however, that: 
"Setting the date of 31 December 1992 does not create an automatic legal effect."
The other is a "General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 o f the Single European Act" and 
reads as follow s:
"Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take such 
measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration 
from third countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit 
trading in works of art and antiques".
A third important "political declaration" was made on the free movement of persons by the 
representatives o f  the governments o f the Member States. According to that declaration: 
"In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall 
cooperate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as 
regards the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries. They
163  See Steiner, op.cit., p.382 and 391; and Weatherill & Beaumont, op.cit., pp.269-170. The latter 
authors recall the information given by the Commission's IVth General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities (on the year 1990). In this report it is mentioned that, as of 31 December 1990, 
among the cases brought before the Court on Community non-contractual liability, only in 4 per cent of 
them (13 out of 329) had the Court found in favour of the applicant in respect of at least one of the 
applicant's main claims. See the Commission's report, at p. 449. Likewise, Schwarze confirms that "it is 
only very seldom that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations has ultimately benefited the 
individual citizen". Schwarze, op.cit., p.950.
1 64  Schwarze, op.cit., p.950.
16 5  Schermers & Waelbroeck refer in general terms to the fact that "the decision on the non-contractual 
liability of the Communities will often entail passing judgment on Community policy", op.cit., p.329.
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shall also cooperate in the combating of terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and 
illicit trading in works o f art and antiques."
The first declaration mentioned is a reaction to the Commission's initial proposal, 
which was quite clear on the force to be given to the mentioned date. That initial proposal 
stated that:
"The Community internal market shall be progressively established during the 
period expiring on 31 December 1992".
If by such date the Community Institutions had not adopted provisions for its 
establishment, each Member State would simply have to recognise the equivalence o f the 
rules of the other Member States concerning persons, goods, services and capital. 166
The two other Declarations quoted recall both versions of Article 2 o f  the 
Commission's initial proposals. The first version, 167 of 16 September 1985, proposed 
that:
"Without prejudice to specific provisions of the Treaty (...) unanimity shall be 
required, until 31 December 1992, for the adoption of measures concerning the 
entry, movement and residence of persons on the territory of the Member States".
The second version, o f 5 October 1985, stated that:
"Without prejudice to the powers of the Community, the Member States shall 
cooperate in conjunction with the Commission, with the aim of achieving the 
internal market in relation to persons, in particular as regards entry, movement 
and residence of nationals of non-Community States, and the combating of crime 
and of traffic in d r u g s . "  168
The assessment of the legal value of these Declarations is important for the 
interpretation o f the contents and the legal effects of Article 7A. The literature on 
Community Law is not unanimous on that topic. Some claim that the declarations are 
legally binding between the Member States, 169 while others consider they have no binding 
legal force and cannot even affect the interpretation o f the Single European Act by the 
European Court. 170 In order to determine their legal value, I will examine them (1) from 
the point o f view o f the relevant rules o f Public International Law,171 then (2) in the light 
o f Community Law and finally (3) from the perspective o f the national Law of the 
Member States.
1 - The Single European Act is, naturally, a treaty o f international law, subject therefore to 
the rules o f treaties. To examine the problem from the perspective of the relevant Public 
International Law rules, we may make recourse to the Vienna Convention o f the Law on 167890
166 See Articles 2 and 4 of the first proposal of the Commission, published in the annex of Ehlermann's 
article, "The Internal M a r k e t o p .  cit., at p, 405.
167 Idem, loc.cit..
168 ibidem, p. 408. Emphasis added.
169 Schermers, Henry G., "The effect of the date...", op.cit., at 276.
170 Toth, A.G., in "The legal status of the Declarations annexed to the Single European Act", CMLRev, 
Vol.23,1986, No. 4, pp.803-812 at 812.
171 On the issue, in general, see Horn, Frank, Reservations and interpretative Declarations to 
Multilateral Treaties, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1988, at pp.98 and 229.
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Treaties. 1^2 Despite not having been ratified by all Member States, 173 the Convention is 
considered to be the expression o f the rules of customary international law on the 
subject. 174 in its light, what is, then, the international legal status of the Declarations?
They are not an integral part o f the Single European Act. 175 This, as an 
amendment to the EEC Treaty, had to be ratified by all Member States. In fact it was. 
However, the Final Act, which contains the Declarations, was not included in the 
instrument ratified by the Parliaments o f  some Member States - for instance in France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands. As a result, it cannot be considered an integral 
part o f the Single European Act. Nor can the declarations of the "Final Act" be considered 
reservations within the meaning o f Article 2(1 )(d) o f the Vienna Convention, as they are 
not unilateral statements. Furthermore it would not be very logical if the governments of 
the Member States agreed "on one thing in the main body o f the treaty and then agree[d] 
on something else in an annexed text". 176 Thus, they could perhaps be considered simple 
interpretative declarations, meaning that they should be taken into account when 
interpreting the Single European Act. 177 This would be possible, for instance, if  they 
could be considered part of the context o f the treaty. In fact, Article 31 o f the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that:
" l . A  Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms o f the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: *173456
*72 Concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980, UN Doc A/Conf. 39/27, 1969; 
UNTS. Vol. 1115, p.331; or ILM, Vol.8,1969, p.679.
173 France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal are not yet parties to the Convention. Among these four 
countries only Luxembourg signed the Convention.
174 Bernhardt, Rudolf "Interpretation in International Law", in Encyclopaedia o f Public International 
Law, Bernhardt, Rudolf (ed.), Amsterdam, North Holland, 1984, Vol.7, p.318 at 321. See also Schermers, 
"The effect of the date...", op.cit., at p.276, and Schermers & Waelbroeck, op.cit., p.102, note 463.
175 This assertion does not raise controversy, even among those who would not agree with my 
conclusions. See, e.g., Schermers who states that "[s]trictly speaking the [first] declaration on Article 8 A 
[Article 7A] is not part of the Single European Act. It was adopted at the time of signing of the Act, but it 
was not incorporated in the Act itself, nor was it signed by the representatives of the Member States or 
ratified by their Parliaments(...)", see "The effect of the date ...", op.cit. at 275-6. Actually, the Final Act 
was signed by the same national plenipotentiaries that signed the European Single Act itself.
176 Toth, op.cit., pp. 803-805.
177 Schermers goes a bit further and sustains that "[t]he Declaration on the date of 31 December 1992 
must be seen as authentic interpretation of the use of that date in the Single European Act (...)", in "The 
effect of the date ...", op.cit. at p.276, emphasis added. In this respect. Bernhardt, Rudolf (op. cit. at 325) 
sustains that: n[t]he notion of 'authentic interpretation' is not a substantive rule of interpretation; rather, it 
denotes the result of an interpretation made by the competent decision-maker. Authentic interpretation 
means binding or legally conclusive interpretation which no longer can be challenged as erroneous." The 
point here is that the declarations were not made by the relevant "competent decision-maker", nor 
accepted by all of them. This is due to the fact that, in my view, the competent decision-maker should be 
understood to be the competent organ (or procedure) to ratify the European Single Act: i.e. national 
parliaments (or popular referenda). See infra.
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a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty^...)"178 *
All three Declarations were agreed on by the representatives o f the governments o f all 
Member States, as well as being made in connection with the Single European Act. 
Therefore, in principle, they could be considered part of its context. In this respect I 
should say that I do not agree with Toth's argument that there is
"an absolute bar which prevents the European Court of Justice from taking any of 
the Declarations into account as part of the 'context* ”.170 
The bar he refers to would be Article 31 of the Single European Act. This article provides 
that the provisions o f the original Community treaties "concerning the powers of the Court 
o f Justice (...) and the exercise o f those powers shall apply only to the provisions o f Title 
II and to Article 32" o f the same Single European Act. Because the said declarations were 
not incorporated in the Single European Act, they are not an integral part o f it. Thus, they 
are not under the jurisdiction o f the Court. According to Toth, this would mean that the 
Court of Justice could not interpret the Declarations, nor take them into consideration 
when interpreting the Single European Act.
I fail to see the relation between these two last assertions. What seems to be at 
stake is not the interpretation o f the Declarations in themselves, but the interpretation of 
the main text of the Single European Act. At most, if the Declarations were interpreted, 
that would only be done to assess the sense of the provisions o f the main text of the Single 
European Act. On the latter the European Court’s jurisdiction is not discussed.
In my opinion there is a different obstacle to considering the Declarations as part 
o f the context of the Single European Act. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, above 
quoted, provides that, for the purpose of the interpretation o f a treaty, its context shall 
include, inter alia:
"any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty".
Therefore, for the Declarations to be considered part o f the context of the treaty, parties 
would have to be understood here as being the mere representatives of the Member States; 
not the States themselves functioning throughout the national authorities with the 
constitutional powers to assume international obligations. These authorities are the 
national parliaments; or, in some cases, the people expressing itself by referendum.180
1 7 8  Emphasis added. This statement on what comprises the context of a treaty, and is therefore relevant 
for its interpretation, does not seem to tally exactly with Schermer's assessment of the issue, according to 
which, "for the purpose of its interpretation 'a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty' 
See Schermers, "The effect of the date...", op.cit., at p.276 (emphasis added). Besides, there are more 
elements to be taken into account in the context of the treaty, like its preamble, for example.
17 0  Toth, op.cit., pp. 810-811.
180 i believe that, in what concerns Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, parties 
are the States who ratify an international treaty. The representatives of States’ governments to the act of 
signature of a treaty are not to be identified with the respective States themselves. This is so as long as - as 
happened for the Single European Act - they do not have treaty making power themselves, this power 
being exercised by an act of ratification of the Parliaments, or by a people's referendum. Here, clearly the 
Parliaments or the peoples (indirectly) are the ones who have treaty making power. Therefore, in my view, 
a declaration of the governments' representatives (who do not have power to engage their States) is not an 
agreement made between the parties to that treaty. Otherwise, the representatives of a (government of) a
139
Here, only the Parliaments (or the people by referenda), may engage their States in 
international obligations. The fact that the Final Act was not ratified by all the Parliaments 
of the Member States, precludes the declarations from being considered as part o f the 
context o f the Single European Act, whatever their relevance as such could be.181
2 - Whatever is the value o f the declarations in the light o f  Public international law of 
treaties, the Court of Justice o f the European Communities has exclusive jurisdiction to 
assess their value in Community law terms. According to Article 219 of the EC Treaty, the 
Member States agreed to "not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for 
therein."
As far as Community Law is concerned, first I will refer to the relation o f such 
Declarations with the Single European Act; and then I will recall the Court o f Justice’s 
doctrine on the relevance o f similar declarations to the scope and legal effects of 
Community instruments.
First it must be recalled that in all the founding treaties and Acts of Accession 
there is an express provision incorporating the annexes and protocols in the related *1
State could, indirectly, engage their countries in international obligations without the consent of the 
national institutions having treaty making power. As long as the national institutions with treaty making 
power do not ratify themselves the declarations of their representatives, such declarations are not binding. 
This seems to have relevance both from the point of view of international Law of treaties, and that of the 
national constitutional Law of each Member State. Moreover, it may be recalled that Article 33 of the 
European Single Act establishes that the Act "will be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements". Furthermore, Article 14(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties confirms that such a provision of the European Single Act means that 
the consent of a State to be bound by the treaty is made through the ratification. Thus, we may concluded 
that the State is not bound by instruments which were not ratified by the national institution with treaty 
making power. This seems to be evident in the light of national Law, which is relevant for the purposes of 
Article 46 of the same Convention, thus excluding any commitment of the States undertaken against their 
own Law on competence to conclude treaties. Note also in this context the reference to the Antonissen 
case made infra, on the value of the declarations under Community Law.
I81 This seems to be confirmed by Whiteford's argument on the status of the two declarations made by the
11 Member States' governments to the Social Agreement adopted in the framework of the Treaty on 
European Union. The Final Act of the latter Treaty declares that the Protocol on Social Policy (to which is 
annexed the Social agreement, to which in turn are annexed the two declarations) will be annexed to the 
EC Treaty. Whiteford has argued that the declarations "would thus seem part of the Treaty signed by the 
government representatives which the national legislatures [were] asked to ratify". This would contrast to 
the remaining declarations which "are annexed to the Final Act of the Conference and not to the [EC] 
Treaty", and as such were not laid before the national parliaments for ratification. Thus, she suggest that 
there is a difference between the two type of declarations. This difference would mean that the 
declarations annexed to the Social Agreement "should with the Agreement, be treated as part of the 
Treaty". See Whiteford, Elaine A., "Social Policy After Maastricht", ELR, Vo!.18, 1993, No.3, pp.202- 
222, at 210. I am not too certain that the intention of the drafters of the Final Act of the Treaty on 
European Union was that of annexing the declarations (annexed to the Social Agreement, in turn annexed 
to the Social Protocol) to the EC Treaty as such. In any case, Whiteford's argument is interesting in that it 
stresses the importance of the fact that national parliaments ratify declarations to a Treaty, for such 
declarations to have binding value.
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treaty.182 However, there is no such provision in the Single European Act. I f  the 
governments o f the Member States had wanted to make clear the limits of the Single 
European Act rules, the Declarations should have been incorporated in the main 
Treaty.183 The Court has already stressed the importance o f  the incorporation of annexes 
and protocols by a explicit provision, in order for them to be "equally binding " in relation 
to the main text o f the ECSC Treaty.184 *
Furthermore, the Court of Justice's doctrine on the value of declarations on 
Community instruments has been rather disappointing for those who sustain the legal 
importance of such declarations. The Court has never contradicted the normal scope of a 
provision by using a declaration alone. It has used a declaration o f the Council, but only to 
confirm the meaning of a Community act, which had already been interpreted by other 
methods. ^
More recent cases only confirm the above. In 1991, for example, in the Antonissen 
case, the Court examined the value of a statement made by all members of the Council and 
entered in the Council minutes at the time of its adoption o f Regulation 1612/68186 and 
Directive 68/360/EEC187. Such declaration made a restrictive interpretation of certain 
rules of these instruments. The Court decided that:
"(...)such a declaration cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting a provision 
of secondary legislation, where, as in the case, no reference is made to the content 
of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question. The declaration 
therefore has no legal significance. " 18 8
Would the ruling of the Court have been similar if  the provision at stake had been a 
primary source o f Community Law?
3 - In any case, at the level o f the national legal orders, the problem seems to find its 
definitive solution. The legal value o f the Declarations is, at least, considerably weakened 
because they have not been ratified by all the Parliaments.189 Accordingly, if  they have any
1 8 2  Articles 84 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 239 of the EEC Treaty, 207 of the Euratom Treaty, Article 
158 of the Act of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom, Article 150 of the Act of 
Accession of Greece and Article 400 of the Act of Accession of Portugal and Spain. See also the Final Act 
of the Treaty on European Union, which incorporates its protocols to the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, or to the Treaty on European Union itself.
183 yet, it is unusual for such Declarations to be incorporated in a treaty.
1 8 4  Case 7 & 9/54, Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourgoises v. High Authority, (1956] 
ECR 175.
1 8 3  Case 136/76, Auer [1979] ECR 437, paragraphs 25 and 26.
1 8 6  Regulation 1612/68/EEC of the Council on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 
OJ L 257/2 of 19/10/68, later amended.
187  Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for workers and members of their families, OJ L 257/13, of 19/10/68, later amended.
1 8 8  Case C-292/89, Antonissen [1991] ECR 1-745, paragraph 18, emphasis added. With the same 
reasoning see case 237/84, Commission v. Belgium, [1986] ECR 1247, paragraph 17. Note that the same 
type of question arises in relation to eventual declarations by Member Stales' governments to the (draft) 
Convention on External Borders, see infra, point 1-d) of section A of chapter 8 .
189 In the Member States where the Parliaments have the power to do so. Furthermore, in the Member 
States where the Final Act was not included in the due act of ratification, it was not officially published 
either, a further argument to deny the legal relevance of the Final Act and its declarations.
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legal value at all, it can only be of secondary importance, at most.190 The Declarations 
should be considered as having a political, rather than a legal value.191
Besides the problem of their legal relevance, the declarations could only be useful 
for the interpretation of the Single European Act in so far as they expressed the common 
intentions of those who approved it. However, to this effect, it would be necessary to find 
out the intentions o f the Parliaments and the people who approved that treaty. This would 
be a formidable task, which, in any case, would probably not provide uniform conclusions. 
Furthermore, the problem is more acute i f  we consider that the Declarations themselves do 
not seem to be very clear. In the first Declaration, which stated that 1992 would have no 
"automatic legal effect", the governments o f the Member States expressed their intention 
of not being taken to the letter. But then, what is the remaining legal effect o f the 
mentioned date? Is it only a basis for procedures on the failure to act?
The other two Declarations do not seems to be very clear either.
The second declaration quoted deals with issues that require new measures to 
abolish the present controls on internal borders. Does the declaration mean that Member 
States only remain with competence beyond what is necessary to abolish all controls? 
Alternatively, does it mean they retain all their old competence, even over measures 
directly aimed at the abolition o f controls? If this is so, why does Article 7A say "The 
Community shall adopt measures (...) in accordance with the provisions (...) o f  this 
Treaty"? Should it not, then, just provide that "the Community may adopt measures" or 
that "the governments o f the Member States may, or shall, adopt measures"?
The third declaration envisages the cooperation of Member States on the free 
movement of persons, "without prejudice to the powers o f the Community, in particular as 
regards the entry, movement and residence o f nationals of third countries." The reference 
to the Community competence seems to show that the governments of the Member States 
did not consider intergovernmental cooperation as being possible over the whole field. 
Nor could this field be of Community competence only, as this would render the
1 9 0  Cf. Schockweiler, op.cit, at p.884.
191  See, e.g,, Kapteyn & Verloren van Themaat, according to whom the two last declarations examined 
"can be at best regarded as mere statements of political intent*'. The first declaration (on the lack of legal 
effect of the date of 31 December 1992) "would not prevent an action being brought for flagrant failure to 
achieve the objective of the establishment of the internal market by 1992". In Kapteyn & Verloren Van 
Themaat, Introduction to the Law..., op. cit. 2nd.ed., pg.102, footnote 190. On the other hand, Schermers 
sustains that (unless the declarations are in conflict with the S.E.A. itself) they "should be regarded as 
legally binding between the Member States", see "The effect of the date...", op.cit. at p.276. In the same 
direction seems to point the argument of the Council in the case Antonissen (case quoted supra, op.cit., at 
p.757), according to which a declaration of the members of the Council on a point dealt by Regulation 
1612/68 and Directive 68/360/EEC constitutes a compromise which is only effective between those who 
produced it. The problem is that, according to an established view and a consistent doctrine of the Court 
of Justice, the EC Treaty differs from the classical type of the treaties between States, as it confers rights 
directly to individuals. Therefore the declarations may well be of some relevance between the governments 
of the Member States (as a kind of soft law), e.g., in what concerns the compromise to cooperate in the 
areas they mention. However the same declarations can never diminish the rights and duties of 
individuals, EC institutions, and Member States, in so far as those rights and duties have their basis in the 
new rules introduced by the Single European Act.
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declaration useless. Could it be that third countiy nationals were seen as an issue to be 
dealt with at both Community and intergovernmental level; while measures on "combating 
of terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works of art and antiques" 
were to be object o f intergovernmental cooperation only? Did the governments mean to 
draw a line between them? However, in that case, why does the second Declaration not 
make any clear distinction between the two groups?
The conclusion of this whole exercise is that these Declarations do not seem to be 
able to help us too much in the interpretation of the Single European Act. They only leave 
clear the idea that somehow the governments of the Member States wanted to limit the 
scope and effects of the Single European Act provisions.192 Yet, was not the Single 
European Act, however, presented to national Parliaments as representing the possibility 
of finally having an internal market with no frontiers?
It is suggested that the declarations have no legal value, or at least not a value of 
an overriding nature, for them to have a decisive influence on the Court's interpretation of 
Article 7A. What is certain is that the main text of the Single European Act was approved 
by all Member States as it was drafted. Consequently, in order to find the precise meaning 
of Article 7 A, we would do better to concentrate on other means of interpretation.193 The 
Court of Justice should be considered free to do the same.
CONCLUSION
In the last section we saw why, from a legal point of view, the declarations 
annexed to the European Single Act cannot have a definitive influence on the Court's 
decision on the meaning and legal effects of Article 7A.
Therefore, the interpretation of that provision can follow the suggestions presented 
in section A. In a market "without internal frontiers", there should be a complete abolition 
o f controls on persons a t ... internal frontiers. These controls should cease to be applied to 
all persons, whether economically active or not, whether nationals of a Member State or 
not. This would be coherent with the objective of Article 7A to abolish obstacles to 
movement of persons, services, capital and goods in a similar manner. Furthermore, this 
would be the only way of making full use of Article 7A. It is not possible to control 
exclusively third country nationals at the Community internal borders. Otherwise, the 
objective o f Article 7A in this respect would be deprived o f any practical effectiveness. 
Therefore, it was argued that, after 1992, and at least in the absence of special
1 9 2  In this respect Weiler, J.H.H. recalls that "(...) the attempt to exclude some matters from the 
Community process and discipline might turn out to be a self-fulfilling wish", "Neither Unity nor Three 
Pillars - The Trinity Structure of the European Union", in The Maastricht Treaty on European Union - 
Legal Complexity and Political Dynamic, Monar, Joerg et al. (eds.), Brussels, European Interuniversity 
Press, 1993, p.49, at 51. The lack of progress on the activity of the Community on dismantling internal 
border controls of persons demonstrates the validity of Weiler’s assertion. The latter will only be mitigated 
if any of the judicial procedures examined supra manage to force the Member States to adopt measures at 
the Community level in fields where they otherwise would be reluctant to intervene.
193  As I tried to do in the previous section.
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justifications o f  a temporary nature, controls on persons at the Community internal 
frontiers violate Article 7A of the EC Treaty.
Concentrating on this violation, Section B examined the legal effects o f Article 7A, 
considering the legal remedies available in case of its infringement. Some arguments were 
presented in favour o f direct effect of Article 7A. It was argued that that provision could 
have at least partial direct effect, precisely as far as abolition o f internal border controls on 
persons is concerned. However, it seems politically unlikely that the Court would 
recognise direct effect o f Article 7A in that respect. It also seems unlikely that an eventual 
recognition o f the indirect effect o f that provision would be able to make a substantive 
contribution to the abolition o f those controls. Another remedy analysed was action 
against the EC institutions failure to act to establish an internal market. It is arguable that 
Article 7A establishes a legal duty on the Community to adopt measures to that effect, for 
example in so far as that is necessary for the abolition o f internal border controls on 
persons. The possibility to invoke failure to act by the EC institutions was examined 
particularly with reference to the action the European Parliament initiated against the 
Commission for the latter not having "put forward the necessary proposals to facilitate 
achieving freedom o f movement for persons'*.194 Finally, reference was also made to the 
possible liability o f the Community for violation of Article 7A. It was seen how unlikely it 
was that a private plaintiff be awarded damages caused by the failure of the EC  institutions 
to adopt measures to establish a complete internal market.
As a summary, we cannot place much faith in the possibility that, whatever their 
legal value, any o f the remedies explored above will push the internal market into practice, 
in so far as the complete abolition of internal border controls o f persons is concerned. 
Even what seems to be the available remedy most likely to succeed (action on the failure 
of EC institutions to act to abolish controls) cannot be fully trusted as a means to achieve 
such abolition o f controls. It seems that the action o f the Parliament against the 
Commission, for example, will face important legal and political obstacles.
On the legal side, the prudence o f the Court o f Justice in the ruling on the failure 
of the Council to act in the area o f  transport policy is notable. Besides, one has to keep in 
mind that free movement o f persons is included in the objectives o f Title VI o f the TEU . 
The Commission has already presented under that Title proposals to facilitate a complete 
free movement o f  persons within Member States, such as the draft External Frontiers 
Convention. Moreover, in July 1995, the Commission presented three draft Directives for 
the elimination o f border controls on persons at internal borders. In any case, it may take a 
considerable time before a Court decision is reached, and such decision may well turn out 
to be only a general declaration, giving more time to the Commission to act. Finally, 
inasmuch as the Commission has presented relevant proposals, an action on failure to act 
would be o f greatest interest if  brought against the Council, rather than the Commission.
T o some extent, it is the Community legal system itself that is organised in a way 
that allows for such institutional failure to act. The system is weak as far as action against 
the EC institutions failure to legislate is concerned. However, in my view, it is not so 
much that the Community system is imperfect, but rather that it was deliberately drawn up
1 9 4  Case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission, quoted supra.
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to work in that way.19  ^ It is not easy to force a legislator to act by judicial means. This is 
also true for the Community in its role as legislator. In this regard we might note the fate 
of Article 138 o f EC  Treaty, on a uniform procedure for all Member States for elections to 
the European Parliament.* 196 Unanimity may have some advantages, but is often the path 
to deadlock.
On the political side, it could be said that we are facing a problem in which all legal 
considerations are ultimately pushed aside by political factors. A case on the full 
implementation o f the internal market may turn out to be one of the most sensitive 
decisions required from the EC's Court o f Justice. The issue at stake is o f extraordinary 
importance and any ruling against the Commission (and later eventually against the 
Council) would have huge political and, in general, practical repercussions. We cannot 
expect the European judges to be immune to the criticism the Court has been receiving 
and to the impact that a more interventionist ruling might have in the present troubled 
phase o f European integration. In a future Court's ruling, some legal arguments may 
ultimately be used solely to disguise the political motivations for that ruling. Any decision 
of the Court will certainly be carefully weighted and worded.
In any case, it should be remembered that the practical importance o f the abolition 
o f internal border controls can be obfuscated by the way in which it will be put into 
practice. The current trend in the organisation of the abolition of internal border controls 
presents a real danger that police controls, previously carried out at the borders, will be 
substituted by more intrusive controls performed inside the territory of the Member States. 
These controls may include, or do already include: the excessive reinforcement of controls 
at the external frontiers; the introduction of identification cards and their obligatory 
holding, as well as the register of foreigners when entering a Member State; and spot 
checks inside the territory, which often discriminate on grounds of race. The situation may 
ultimately reach such a point that it may not be absurd to wonder whether it would have 
been better to keep old border controls.
In the near future the Court o f Justice will rule on the correct interpretation and 
the legal effects o f Article 7A of the EEC Treaty. It is even possible that the Court will
195 Like Rebecca, the animated cartoon character of Spielberg's movie "Who framed Roger Rabbit", who 
said "I am not a bad girl, 1 was just drawn like this".
1 9 6  Note the case C-41/92, The Liberal Democrats V, European Parliament (1993] ECR 3174. On 14 
February 1992 the British Liberal Democratic Party presented in the Court of Justice a case against the 
Parliament on this topic. It complained of the Parliament's failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 
138(3) of the Treaty of Rome to adopt proposals for a uniform electoral system for European elections. On 
10 June 1993 the Court rejected the application since, meanwhile, on 10 March 1993, the Parliament had 
adopted resolution A3/381/92 to that effect. However, Advocate General Darmon, while proposing that 
rejection, upheld the argument that the Treaty must be also applied with regard to the electoral system at 
European elections and that the institutions are required to act to this purpose. He opened the way for 
future judicial action against the Council. According to Article 138(3) this institution is now responsible 
for laying down the appropriate provisions on the matter, "which it shall recommend to Member States for 
adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements". See also Agence Europe of 
29/6/1993, No.6011(n.s.).
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make a balanced judgment and thus contribute somehow to the completion o f the internal 
market, as far as the abolition of internal border controls on persons is concerned. 
However, a Court decision reacting strongly against the EC institutions failure to act is 
not likely. European integration is a gradual process, in which limited progress is achieved 
at a slow pace, inseparable from political ambiguity. Therefore, for now, we would be 
better o ff accepting that, in the world o f politics, Law is a tool o f minor importance.
PART I - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Chapter 4
COMMUNITY RULES ON FREE MOVEMENT
CONCERNING
THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS
INTRODUCTION
The traditional and simplistic idea that third country nationals are outside the scope 
of Community Law has been gradually eroded both by the work of the EC institutions and 
by the legal literature. As far as substantive Community Law is concerned,* the two main 
areas of discussion have been the situation of third country nationals who are relatives of a 
migrant national of a Member State, and the Agreements concluded with third countries 
containing rules on their nationals working in the Union.
In this chapter, Community rules on third country nationals will be examined from 
the point of view of Community Law alone. The next chapter will examine Community 
Law as resulting from external agreements. Sections A and B of this chapter will analyse 
the rules on third country nationals relating to the freedom of movement within the 
European Union. Section C of this chapter examines the personal scope of other 
Community legislation applicable to third country nationals.
Section A of this chapter examines the rights granted to third country nationals in 
their very capacity. I will review the rules of free movement, in order to ascertain whether, 
and to what extent, third country nationals are able to benefit from them.
I will start with what is arguably nowadays a moot point: whether third country 
nationals should be included in the personal scope of Article 48, i.e., whether they should 
be considered as beneficiaries of the free movement of workers. This is an important point, *92
* For a long time the leading Article on the legal status of third country nationals in Community Law was 
the one of Oliver, Peter, "Non-Community Nationals and the Treaty of Rome", YEL, Vol.5, 1985, pp.57-
92. See also Duyssens, Daniel "Migrant Workers from Third Countries in the European Community", 
CMLRev, Vol.14, 1977, No.3, pp.501-520; Falchi, G. "Le regime definitif de la libre circulation et 
l'immigration des pays tiers", Droit Social, 1971, No.l, p.16; Greenwood, Christopher "Nationality and 
the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons in Community Law", YEL, Vol.7, 1987, pp. 185-210, 
particularly at pp.205-210; Maresceau, M. "La libre circulation des personnes et les ressortissants d'États 
tiers", in Relations extérieures de la Communauté Européenne et m arché intérieur: aspects juridiques et 
fonctionnels, Demaret, P. (ed.), Bruges, College of Europe, 1986 / Brussels, Story Scientia, 1988, pp.109- 
136; Plender, Richard, International Migration Law, 2nd.ed., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, pp.193- 
225; Stein, Torsten & Thomsen, Sabine "The Status of the Member States’ Nationals under the Law of the 
European Communities", in The Legal Position o f  Aliens in National and International Law, Vol.2, 
Frowein, J.A. & Stein, Torsten (eds.), Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1987, pp.1775-1826; Sundberg-Weitman, 
Brita, Discrimination on Grounds o f  Nationality - Free movement o f  workers and freedom  o f 
establishment under the EEC Treaty, Amsterdam, North-Hoi land, 1977. For more recent bibliography, see 
Evans, Andrew "Third Country Nationals and the Treaty on European Union", EJIL, Vol.5, 1994, No.2, 
p. 199; Hoogenboom, Thomas & D'Oliveira, Hans Ulrich "The Position of Those Who Are Not Nationals 
of a Community Member State" in Human Rights and the European Community: Methods o f Protection, 
vol. II of European Union - The Human Rights Challenge, Cassese, A., Clapham, A. & Wei 1er, J. (eds.) 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991; Lanfranchi, M.-P. L'Entrée et la circulation des travailler migrants 
ressortissants d'etats tiers dans la Communauté Européenne, PhD Law thesis, Marseille, Université de 
droit, d'economie et de sciences politiques d'Aix-Marseille, 1992, and her Droit Communautaire et 
Travailleurs Migrants des États Tiers - Entrée et Circulation dans la Communauté Européenne, Paris, 
Economica, 1994; Reischle, Matthias The Legal Status o f Non-EU Nationals residing in the European 
Union from  a  Community Law perspective, Bruges, College of Europe, April 1994, (Paper for the Master's 
Degree); and Stangos, Petros N. "Les ressortissants d'états tiers au sein de l'ordre juridique 
communautaire", CDE, Vol.28,1992, No.3-4, pp.306-347.
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as it will help us to assess the significance of the legal arguments in the decisions taken on 
the matter, as well as in the political discourse on the issued It will place those decisions 
in their proper context. Then, the particular situation of refugees will be examined, as far 
as the EC right of free movement of workers is concerned. Finally, in the context of EC 
rules on the free movement of workers, I will analyse the so-called principle of 
"Community preference" in the access to the labour market of Member States.
I will then examine the EC rules on freedom of establishment, free movement of 
services, capital and goods. The analysis of the provisions on the free movement of 
services will include the examination of the issues raised by the situation of third country 
nationals working for an EC enterprise which provides services in a Member State other 
than that in which it is established. Finally, I will refer to the Commission proposals on the 
right of third country nationals to travel within the Community.
Section B of this chapter examines the rights granted to third country nationals 
deriving from a family relationship with a migrant national of a Member State, where the 
latter benefits from freedom of movement within the Community. It will be emphasised 
that these rights are subordinate rights, granted only so as to allow those third country 
nationals to accompany a migrant national of a Member State, who actually exercises his 
or her right to free movement. The issue of reverse discrimination, raised by this situation, 
will be examined. Then, particular attention will be paid to two points. Firstly, an overview 
of the mentioned relatives' rights will be provided. Secondly, a careful examination will be 
made of the right of residence of a third country national who is the spouse of a migrant 
national of a Member State - particularly in the event of the divorce of the couple and 
when the couple is not married. The extent to which Community Law on the matter 
conforms with the rules of the European Convention on Human Rights will be questioned.
Section C will examine the personal scope of Community legislation on social 
policy (excluding free movement of persons) and on education, to determine whether and 
to what extent such legislation can also be applied to third country nationals. A brief 
reference will also be made to other Community rules applicable to third country nationals, 
namely on officials of the institutions of the European Union and on procedural rights.
In the concluding remarks a global analysis will be made of the rules of free 
movement, as far as third country nationals are concerned. I will try to highlight the 
inconsistencies and contradictions of the Community legal regime, and to question the 
extent to which they are related to the attempt to resist according to third country 
nationals resident in the Union the lull benefits of the free movement rules. I will, 
therefore, question whether from the perspective of the coherence of the system, as well 
as from a practical point of view, it is worthwhile continuing to basically exclude third 
country nationals from the benefits of free movement of persons.
2 And, indirectly, also on the Community competence in the matter.
149
A) RIGHTS ASSIGNED TO THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS 
IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP WITH A 
NATIONAL OF A MEMBER STATE
This section will analyse the rights enjoyed by third country nationals under 
Community Law on free movement themselves, independently of any family relationship 
with a migrant national of a Member State. This section will not examine the rights 
granted to third country nationals as a result of being relatives of migrant nationals of a 
Member State. Such rights will be analysed in section B of this chapter.3
1 - Rights in the Framework of the Free Movement of Workers
a) The law as it stands
(i) Contrast between rights of Member States' nationals and rights of third country 
nationals residing in the Union
The rights enjoyed by third country nationals under EC Law on free movement of 
persons contrast sharply with those enjoyed by nationals of a Member State. This is 
particularly clear as far as freedom of movement of workers is concerned.4
According to the relevant rules in force, and to their interpretation by the Court of 
Justice, nationals of a Member State have a wide range of rights protecting their freedom 
to migrate to another Member State to work there. Some EC Treaty provisions and 
several instruments of secondary Community Law assure and protect that freedom of 
movement.
As far as workers are concerned, this freedom is regulated primarily by Article 48 
of the EC Treaty, which provides that
"1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by 
the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employ­
ment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
3 In the beginning of that section reference will also be made to the issue of reverse discrimination.
4 For an overview of the rights enjoyed by nationals of Member States within the framework of free 
movement of workers see, e.g., Johnson, Esther & O'Keeffe, David "From discrimination to obstacles to 
free movement: Recent developments concerning the free movement of workers 1989-1994", CMLRev. 
Vol.31, 1994, No.6, pp. 1313-1346; Lasok, D. & Bridge, J.W., Law and Institutions o f  the European 
Union, London, Butterworths, 1994, pp.435-453; Mattera, A. "La libre circulation des travailleurs à 
l'intérieur de la Communauté européenne”, RM UE, 1993, No.4, pp.47-108; Steiner, J., Textbook on EC 
Law, 4th.ed., London, Blackstone, 1994, pp.208-230; Weatherill, S. & Beaumont, P., EC Law - The 
Essential Guide to the Legal Workings o f  the European Community, London, Penguin, 1993, pp.481-502.
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(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance 
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in 
that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing 
regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public 
service."5
Articles 49, 50 and 51 of the EC Treaty elaborate further on the activities to be developed 
to attain a true freedom of movement of workers.
Moreover, these Treaty provisions were implemented by several instruments of 
secondary Community Law. These instruments also developed additional rights for 
nationals of Member States.
Regulation 1612/68, for example, establishes the general framework for the 
development of free movement for workers within the Community.6 It forbids 
discrimination in a wide range of aspects related to the migration of nationals of one 
Member State to work in another Member State. Its detailed rules prohibit discrimination 
in the access to employment in a Member State by a worker who is national of another 
Member State.7 He or she must not be discriminated against either as regards any 
conditions of employment or work,8 "social and tax advantages",9 access to training in 
vocational schools and retraining centres.10 Furthermore, the worker must be assured 
equality of treatment as regards membership of trade unions and the exercise of rights 
attaching thereto - including the right to vote and to be eligible for the administration and 
management posts of trade unions.11 He or she also has "the right of eligibility for 
workers' representative bodies in the undertaking" where he or she works.12 Moreover, he 
or she must not be discriminated against as regards rights and benefits "in matters of 
housing, including ownership of the housing he [or she] needs."13 In addition, to facilitate 
the worker's movement to another Member State, the worker's close relatives have the 
right to move with him or her to that country.14 Other relatives shall have their admission 
facilitated.15 The relatives with the right to be admitted who may also work in the host
5 Emphasis added. This Article was not amended, either by the European Single Act, or by the Treaty on 
European Union.
6  Regulation 1612/68/EEC of the Council on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 
OJ L 257/2 of 19/10/68, later amended.
7 Articles 1 to 6 of Regulation 1612/68, quoted supra.
8 Idem, Article 7(1).
9  Ibidem, Article 7(2).
10 Article 7(3).
11 Article 8.
12 Idem.
13 Article 9.
14 Article 10(1), under the conditions established in Article 10(3). These conditions were interpreted in a 
manner that protects the worker and his or her family in case 249/86, Commission v. Germany, (Re 
Housing Conditions) [1989] ECR 1263, explained in section B of chapter 8.
15 Provided they are dependent on the worker or are living with him or her when the worker moves to 
another Member State - Article 10(2).
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Member State,16 and the children of worker’s family, if residing in the host Member State, 
may have access to educational and vocational training courses in conditions similar to 
those of the children of national workers.17 Finally, Regulation 1612/68 also includes 
special provisions for clearance of vacancies and on applications by workers who are 
nationals of one Member State for employment in another Member State.18
Other instruments of secondary Community Law complement this Regulation. 
Directive 68/360, for example, provides detailed rules for the abolition of restrictions 
concerning on movement and residence within the Community of workers and members of 
their families.19 Directive 64/221 regulates the limitations mentioned in Article 48(3), by 
coordinating measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals that 
are justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.20 Regulation 
1251/70 establishes, under certain conditions, the right of the workers to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed there.21 Moreover, Regulation 
1408/71, regulates the application of social security schemes to employed persons and 
their relatives moving in the Community. It is meant to diminish the eventual negative 
effects that freedom of movement may have on the social security rights of migrant 
workers and their families. It forbids discrimination on the grounds of nationality against 
migrant nationals of a Member State who are covered by the Regulation. It also arranges 
for the aggregation for social security purposes of periods of insurance, residence and 
employment.22
These instruments, considered as a whole, provide a broad range of rights to 
nationals of Member States who migrate as workers to another Member State. 
Nevertheless these rights have been expanded even more, namely as a result of two 
factors.
W First, the Court of Justice has taken a rather liberal attitude in this field. In general 
terms the Court has adopted a doctrine that is quite protective of the rights of migrant 
workers who are nationals of a Member State. The tendency of the Court has been to
16 Article 11.
17 Article 12.
18 Articles 13 to 23 of Regulation 1612/68, quoted supra.
19 Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for workers and members of their families, OJ L 257/13, of 19/10/68, later amended.
20 Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health, OJ 56/850 of 4/4/64, later extended in scope - see OJ L 14/14, of 20/1/75. On the judicial 
protection to be secured to persons covered by this Directive, namely third country national relatives of a 
migrant national of a Member State, see joined cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Massam Dzodzi v. Belgian 
State, [1990] ECR I- 3763.
21 Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission on the right of the workers to remain in the territory 
of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ L 142/24 of 30/6/1970.
22 Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of the Council on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, OJ L 
149/2 of 05/07/71; latest consolidated version in OJ C 325/1, of 10/12/92 (initially applied only to 
employed persons and their families, it was extended to self-employed persons and members of their 
families by Regulation (EEC) 1390/81 of the Council, OJ L 143/1, of 29/5/1981).
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"construe broadly"23 Community rules granting rights related to the free movement of 
workers, while re t^nctively n^terpreting Community rules_allowing for the limitation^ of 
such rights. Only a few examples of this tendencylieed tol>e recalled at this instance. 
Some other examples will be mentioned later in this chapter. The Court has stated, for 
example, that rights to free movement are conferred directly by the Treaty provisions. 
Secondary Community Law implementing this provision does not create new rights, but 
merely gives closer articulation to the Treaty provisions, by determining the scope and 
detailed rules for the exercise of the rights directly conferred by the Treaty.24 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the notion of a "worker" used by EC Law is not to be 
defined by national legislation, but has a Community meaning.25 Thus, the Court was itself 
able to interpret that notion and has done so in quite a liberal manner. It has considered, 
for example, that a part-timer, in spite of having a salary below the minimum subsistence 
level and having to rely on public financial assistance of the host Member State, was 
nevertheless a worker for Community Law purposes.26 Moreover, according to the Court 
of Justice, the concept of public policy, which may constitute grounds for limiting freedom 
of movement, is to be interpreted restrictively.27 Likewise, the Court of Justice restricted 
substantially the material scope of the reservation clause of Article 48(4), which excluded 
in generic terms employment in the public service from the provisions on free movement 
of workers.28 Furthermore, a protective doctrine of the position of migrant workers who 
are nationals of Member States has usually been applied by the Court as far as instruments 
of secondary Community Law are concerned. This has occurred on various occasions. The 
interpretation of the material scope of Regulation 1408/71, on application of social 
security schemes to migrant employed persons and their relatives, is one of such cases.29 
Another well-known example concerns the interpretation of the concept of non­
discrimination on social advantages mentioned in Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68. The 
Court has interpreted this concept in a very broad manner.30
23 See, e.g., case 139/85, Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (19861 ECR 1741, and case 316/85, Lebon 
[1987] ECR 2811, paragraph 23.
24 Case 48/75, Procureur du Roi v. Royer [1976] ECR 497, paragraphs 23 and 28.
25 Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, paragraph 11.
26 See case 139/85, quoted supra, paragraph 14.
27 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 18; and case 30/77, R v. 
Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 33.
28 The Court restricted this reservation to "posts which involve direct and indirect participation in the 
exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the 
State or of other public authorities". See Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium, [1980] ECR 3881, at 
3900. See also the opinion of Advocate General Mayras in case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v. 
Deutsche Bundespost, [1974] ECR 153. This opinion influenced very much the definition given by the 
Court in the former case.
29  See Wyatt, D. & Dashwood, A. et al., European Community Lawt 3rd. ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
chapter 11; and Steiner, op.cit., chapter 21.
30 See below, section B. Another example is case 249/86, Commission v. Germany, quoted supra and 
explained in section B of chapter 8. In that case the Court restrictively interpreted Article 10(3) of 
Regulation 1612/68, which requires that for the family members of a migrant worker to install themselves 
with him or her in another Member State, the worker must have available for them "housing considered as 
normal for national workers in the region where he is employed".
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Secondly, rights related to freedom of movement for nationals of a Member State 
have been further expanded by instruments not directly related to the free movement of 
workers. Community rules on the free movement of services and on the freedom of 
establishment develop further the rights that nationals of Member States have to migrate 
to work in another Member State. Likewise, the three Directives adopted in 1990 on the 
right of residence of students, of pensioners and of other nationals of Member States, 
increase the possibility for nationals of Member States to move within the Community.31 *
Finally, after the entry into force of the implementing instruments of the relevant rules of 
the Treaty on European Union, migrant nationals of a Member State may even vote and be 
elected in European and local elections in the host Member State.
The conclusion is that nationals of Member States who move to another Member 
State are, under Community Law, positioned in the host Member State in a situation very 
similar to that of the nationals of the latter country. They enjoy there a legal status that 
includes a wide range of rights, particularly as far as the social and economic areas are 
concerned.
The legal status of nationals of one Member State can in this respect be compared 
to that of third country nationals residing in Member States. What rights of freedom of 
movement do third country nationals enjoy, independently of any relationship with a 
national of a Member State?
The answer is none.
Third country nationals residing in Member States have no rights related to the 
freedom of movement of persons, independently of a family relationship with a migrant 
national of a Member State, or of the fact that they work for an EC enterprise providing 
services in another Member State.
(ii) Legal basis for the exclusion of third country nationals from the personal scope 
of freedom of movement of workers
Article 69(1) of the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community and Article 
96 of the European Atomic Energy Community, make explicit provision that the free 
movement of workers that they envisage is for nationals of Member States.32 jn the 
meantime, in the Treaty of the European Economic Community, the first paragraph of 
Article 48 established that freedom of movement "for workers” was to be secured "by the 
end of the transitional period at the latest". According to its paragraph 2, such freedom of
31 Sec the following Directives, analysed infra in section B: Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29/10/1993 
on the right of residence for students, OJ L 317/59 of 18/12/1993; Council Directive No. 90/365/EEC on 
the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational 
activity, OJ L 180/28, of 13/7/90; and Council Directive No. 90/364/EEC on the right of residence for 
persons who do not enjoy this right under other provisions of Community Law, OJ L 180/26, of 13/7/90.
Although in other Articles of the same treaties general reference is made to "workers"; for instance in 
the field of wages or health and safety. See Articles 46,48, 56,68 and the very Article 69(4) of the ECSC 
Treaty and Articles 2 and 30, as well as 97,148 and 196 of the EAEC Treaty.
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movement entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality "between 
workers of the Member States”.33 34*6
Meanwhile, several instruments of Community Law, adopted to implement Article 
48 of the E(E)C Treaty, reserve for nationals of the Member States only, the rights to the 
free movement of workers.
That is the case of Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community and of Council Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions on 
movement and residence within the Community for workers and members of their 
families.34 Both these instruments put the close relatives of the workers who are nationals 
of a Member State under the protection of Community Law, regardless of the nationality 
of the former. Thus, third country nationals who are relatives of migrant workers nationals 
of a Member State do enjoy some rights of free movement when joining the latter in their 
movements within the Community. Nevertheless, under the instruments already referred 
to, workers who are nationals of third countries and reside in a Member State, do not, 
themselves, have the right to move to another Member State and work and reside there.
However, certain third country nationals do have Community Law rights under 
Regulation 1408/71, on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, 
self-employed persons and their relatives moving in the Community.35 This regulation 
was adopted in pursuance of Article 51, which envisages the enactment of "measures in 
the field of social security as are necessary to provide free movement of workers".36 The 
Regulation covers not only workers who are nationals of a Member State and the 
members of their families (even if they are third country nationals), but also covers 
workers who are stateless persons or refugees, as well as the members of their families 
(including their survivors), if they are residing in a Member State.37 38
In the Meade case,38 the European Court of Justice held admissible the exclusion 
of third country nationals from the scope of the EC Treaty rules on free movement of 
workers, namely ArticIe 487 This was~rfone in an implicit but absolutely clear manner. This 
judgment is the main reason for sustaining that, under the EC Treaty, the free movement 
of workers is limited to nationals of Member States. It leaves no doubts as to the state of 
the law regarding the issue. However, the Court did not contribute to the discussion with 
any arguments. From a theoretical perspective, therefore, the discussion remains open.
33 Emphasis added.
34 See Article 1 of Regulation 1612/68/EEC of the Council on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community, OJ L 257/2 of 19/10/68, later amended; and Article 1 and 2 of Council Directive 
68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for 
workers and members of their families, OJ L 257/13, of 19/10/68, later amended. See also Article 1 of 
Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health, OJ 56/850 of 4/4/64 - later extended in scope, see OJ L 14/14, of 20/1/75,
33 See Article 2(1) of Regulation 1408/71, quoted supra.
36 The same Article also refers that "to this end [the Council) shall make arrangements to secure for 
migrant workers and their dependants: (...) b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of 
Member States",
37 See Article 2(1) and (2) of the same Regulation, quoted supra.
38 Case 238/83, Caisse d’Allocations Familiales de la Région Parisienne v. Mr. and Mrs. Richard Meade, 
[1984] ECR 2631-9. See in particular 2638-9.
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b) Discussion on the personal scope of Article 48 of the EC Treaty 
(i) general overview
The legal literature was, and still is, split on the precise personal scope of Article
48.39 40
On the one hand, there are those who believe that nationality of a Member State is 
the sole possible criteria for determining who may benefit from this freedom. In the most 
extreme formulation of this perspective, it is sustained that it would otherwise mean "that 
the Treaty intended to grant immigration rights to workers from the whole world ".40 This 
pushes the argument too far, to say the least.
As Hartley puts it, we may at least think about two criteria, nationality and 
residence; emerging with four possible solutions. The freedom would include either:
- all nationals of Member States, irrespective of their place of residence;
- all residents in the Member States, regardless of their nationality;
- all nationals who are also residents; or, finally,
- all persons who are either nationals or residents.
Hartley believes nationality is the correct criterion, but he is honest enough to 
admit that the "Treaty gives no clue as to which of these [four possible solutions] is 
correct".41
(ii) comparison with other provisions on free movement
In this context, it is useful to make a comparison between Article 48 and the other 
Articles on free movement in the European Union.
As already mentioned, the Treaties on the ECSC and the EAEC explicitly reserve 
free movement of workers for nationals of Member States. The same also happens, under 
the EC Treaty itself, in relation to the beneficiaries^ of the freedom of establishment and 
of free movement of services - according to Articles 52 and 59, respectively.^ Article 
59(2) even makes explicit mention of the possibility of extending rules on free provisions 
of services to third country nationals established within the Community.
39 in favour of the position that Article 48 does not preclude persons other than nationals of the Member 
States to benefit from free movement of workers, see Bohning.W.R., The Migration o f  Workers in the 
United Kingdom and the European Community, London, Oxford University Press for the Institute for 
Race Relations, 1972, p. 136; Campbell, A., Common Market Law, London, Longman, 1969, Supplement 
2, 1971, p.226; and Plender, International Migration Law, op.cif, pp. 197-8. For an overview of the 
discussion of the matter, including on the proposals for the application of Article 48 to third country 
nationals residing in the Union, see Lanfranchi, M.-P., Droit Communautaire et Travailleurs.... op.cit., 
po. 20-41.
40 Oliver, op. cit. at p. 62.
41 Hartley, T.C., EEC Immigration Law, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1973, p.54. Hartley believes that a 
restrictive interpretation, based on nationality, "fits in with the provisions concerning establishment and 
servicesN and adds that there "can be no doubt that it is correct". See infra, my analysis of this issue in the 
main text.
Here, I refer only to natural persons; for legal persons see infra, in the main text.
143 However, no such measures were yet adopted. Free movement of services only exists now in relation to 
1 nationals of a Member State.
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All these rules are different from Article 48, in that they clearly make a distinction 
between nationals of Member States and third country nationals * excluding the latter from 
their scope, except in Article 59(2).
We may think it is not just a casual difference that the other provisions establish an 
explicit delimitation of their personal scopes whilst Article 48 does not. It could be that in 
Article 48 it was not the intention to establish any distinction between persons working in 
the Member States.44 45*789In this view, the expression "workers of the Member States" would 
contain no reference to their nationality and would simply mean workers within the  ^
economies of the Member States, i.e. in their labour market.4*
The contrasting argument, that if Articles 52 and 59 only grant rights to nationals 
of a Member State, then Article 48 should be understood as doing the same,4  ^appears to 
be less consistent. Several arguments have been put forward sustaining that the differences 
between the provisions could have a rational explanation.
It could be that "the draftsmen wished to leave open, in 1957, the possibility that ƒ 
the Community might develop a common market in labour corresponding with the j 
common market in goods”, accompanied by a common external policy dealing with labour 
from third countries and freedom of movement within the Community for established 
immigrants.4?
Moreover, in relation to workers, the most important economic consideration is ( 
mobility, but in the domain of the freedom of establishment, for instance, this is less 1 
important. As Plender states, the "freedom of an unemployed person in France to take up 
employment in the F.R.G. wUl be beneficial to both countries, even if the migrant is a l 
Moroccan." However, the granting to third country nationals, e.g. the right to free ] 
establishment, could create serious problems - like those related to mutual recognition of J 
qualifications and admission to professional organisations.4^
The fathers of the Treaty may also have foreseen the possibility that if "nationals of 
the Member States were to be the sole recipients of the expensive privileges given to 
migrant workers they would become less attractive to prospective employers than 
nationals of third countries", whereas in the case of establishment, the persons are by
definition self-employed.4^
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the rules on freedom of establishment and 
on free movement of services apply to legal persons too. The Treaty authors could have
4 4  See Campbell, op.cit., Supplement 2, 1971, p.226; Böhning, W.R. The Migration o f  Workers in the 
United Kingdom and..., op.cit., p.81; and Plender, International Migration Law, op.cit., p.197. See also 
Böhning, W.R. "The Scope of the E.E.C. System of the Free Movement of Workers: A Rejoinder", 
CMLRev, Vol. 10, 1973, No.l,p.81,at 83.
45 See Plender, R. "An Incipient Form of European Citizenship", in European Law and the Individual, 
Jacobs, F.G. (ed.), Amsterdam, North Holland, 1976, p.43.
4^ See, e.g.. Hartley op.cit. pg. 54 .
47 plender. International Migration Law, op.cit, p. 197. Lanfranchi points out that such a common 
external policy has not been accomplished and that Article 48 had been given direct effect by the Court of 
Justice. See Lanfranchi, M.-P., Droit Communautaire et Travailleurs..., op.cit., p.26. However, this 
observation does not seem to invalidate Plender's assessment, as such.
48 Plender, "An Incipient Form of European Citizenship", op.cit., p. 43, footnote 24.
49 Idem, p.43.
157
wanted their scope to be more limited as far as third country nationals are concerned, than 
the scope of Article 48.50
(iii) other points in the discussion
. , s Plender recalls that the term "worker" is also used in other Community instruments
HbVii  „ "without an implied reference to nationality" !^ Such a use occurs, for instance, in some 
Directives on the approximation of laws for the protection of workers, like those relating 
i to collective redundancies,52 to employees' rights in the transfer of undertakings  ^ or to 
1 the insolvency of their employer.54 plender argues that "it might be assumed at first sight 
| that a single term has a single meaning in a single body of law."55
This seems a perfectly logical argument. As is suggested in section C of this 
chapter, it would be difficult to argue that those Directives do not apply to workers who 
reside in the Community but who are nationals of third countries. However, perhaps 
Plender's argument has to be seen in a critical perspective as far as the point just 
mentioned is concerned. The issues at stake in the Directives and in Article 48 are 
qualitatively different. It is one thing to establish that, under instruments of secondary 
Community Law, in certain cases, once third country nationals have the right to work in a 
Member State, they should be as much protected as workers who are nationals of a 
Member State. Another, very different thing, is to accept that third country national 
workers, residing in a Member State, have the right to free movement within the Union.56 501234
50 Evans, A. C. "Nationality Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the E.E.C.: with Special reference 
to the British Nationality Act 1981", YEL, V ol.2,1982, pp.173-189, at 177.
51 See Plender, "An Incipient Form of European Citizenship", op.cit., p. 43.
52 Council Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, OJ L 48/29 of 22/2/75, amended later, OJ L 245/3 of 26/8/92.
53 Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees* rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
businesses, OJ L 61/26 of 5/3/77.
54 Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20/10/1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 283/23 of 
28/10/1980, amended later - OJ L 66/11 of 11/3/87. Note that all these three Directives were adopted 
under article 100 of the EC Treaty, on approximations of provisions which "directly affect the 
establishment or the functioning of the common market".
j 55 gee piender, "An Incipient Form of European Citizenship", op.cit., p. 43.
i 56 j n a common or internal market, it would certainly be more coherent that, once a person is admitted to 
I the labour market of one Member State, that person have all the rights of other workers, including the 
' I right to move residence to work in another Member State. However, the issue here is to know whether 
such arguable coherence was intended to have legal force by the Community legislator, when it adopted 
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty and the Directives mentioned by Plender. It does not seem possible to 
conclude that the Community legislator had such an intention by virtue of the simple fact that the 
mentioned Directives include third country nationals in their personal scope. Meanwhile, one may note 
that a distinction similar to that made in the main text was also made by Advocate General Lenz in the 
Reed case, analysed in section B. He analysed the reference made in Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 to 
the enjoyment by migrant nationals of one Member State of the same social advantages "as national 
workers” of the host Member State. He sustained that this rule applied only to the delimitation of the 
rights of workers entitled to be admitted, and not to the delimitation of the category of persons entitled to 
be admitted. See the A. G. Lenz's opinion, in case 59/85, Netherlands v. Ann Florence Reed (1986] 1283, 
at p.1292. The Court (and rightly so) did not accept such distinction in that case. Nevertheless the 
distinction may be useful for questioning the validity of Plender's view that "a single term has a single
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Therefore it is possible that the same words, in a different context, could intentionally have 
a different significance.* 57 *
Pointing to the difference between the expression "workers” used in the first 
paragraph of the Article 48, and that of "workers of the Members States" in its second 
paragraph, some authors sustain that the two paragraphs have different personal scopes. 
The first paragraph, establishing the freedom of movement "for workers" in general, 
would apply to all workers. Meanwhile, the second paragraph, prohibiting discrimination | 
"between workers of the Member States", would benefit only nationals of these states.^ j 
Thus, third country national workers would have the right to move freely within the 
Union, but could be discriminated against, especially in relation to workers who are 
nationals of a Member State. This reasoning, while trying to give some protection to third 
country national workers, in fact gives support to the idea that the expression "workers of 
the Member States", in article 48(2), means workers who are nationals of a Member State. 
However, it is not clear why that should be the case, nor the reason for differentiating 
between the scope of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 48. It may be noted that paragraph 2 
refers to paragraph 1 of the Article, when establishing what "such freedom of movement" 
must entail. Moreover, as the "Spaak Report" mentions, it was clear from the beginning 
that a true freedom of movement of workers necessarily entails that "toute discrimination 
est effectivement interdite entre travailleurs nationaux et travailleurs immigrds".59 To a 
certain extent this goes against the idea that freedom of movement could exist without 
discrimination against its beneficiaries being prohibited.
(iv) the case of Regulation 1408/71 on social security
Article 2 of Regulation 1408/71,60 on the application of social security to workers 
moving within the Community, states that the Regulation applies to three groups of 
persons:
"(1) (...) to employed or self-employed persons (...) who are nationals of one of the 
Member States or who are stateless persons or refugees residing within the 
territory of one of the Member States, as well as to the members of their families 
and their survivors";
meaning in a single body of law", this body being composed by Article 48 of the EC Treaty and secondary 
instruments of EC Law on workers' protection. See supra in the main text. x
57  Furthermore, the Directives mentioned use only the word "employees”, or "workers", and not "workers 
of Member States", as Article 48 does - even if only in its second paragraph. This difference would be \ 
relevant if the prevailing interpretation that "workers of Member States" means workers who are nationals / 
of a Member State was correct. .
See Campbell, A., Common Market Law, London, Longman, 1969, Supplement 2, 1971, p.226, who ! (
sustains that "the scope of paragraph 1 of Article 48 is clearly and intentionally wider than that of n r , 
paragraph 2." See also Bôhning, "The Scope of the E.E.C. System of the Free Movement of Workers...", 
op.cit., p. 83.
See the Spaak report, "Rapport des chefs de Délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères by the 
"Comité Intergouvememental créé par la Conférence de Messine, Mae 120 f/56(corrigé), Bruxelles, 
21/4/1956 (Secretariat), at p.89 - alineas b) and c). See also Neri, S. & Sperl, H., Traité instituant la 
Communauté Économique Européenne • Travaux Préparatoires, Déclarations interprétatives des six 
Gouvernements, Documents Parlementaires, Luxembourg, Cour de Justice des Communautés 
Européennes, 1960, at pp. 147-148.
60  Quoted supra.
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"(2) (...) to the survivors of employed and self-employed persons (...) irrespective 
of the nationality of [the latter], where their survivors are nationals of one of the 
Member States, or stateless persons or refugees^  * residing within the territory of 
one of the Member States"; and
"(3) (...) to civil servants and to persons who (...) are treated as such(...)".* 62 *64
The relationship between the persona] scope of this Regulation and of Article 48 
was put to the test in the Meade case.63 This case concerned a couple, an English woman 
and an American citizen, both living in France, where only the latter worked. One of their 
children went to study in England and, due to this fact, the family allowance that they had 
received until then was withdrawn by the French authorities. The couple contested this 
decision, invoking both article 48 of the EC Treaty and Regulation 1408/71. As it was 
clear that Regulation 1408/71 did not apply to the case, the aim was to know if the 
Regulation contravened Article 48, by limiting its scope to workers who are nationals of a 
Member State.
The Court took only one paragraph to deal with the question of the personal scope 
of the freedom of movement, stating that;
"According to its article 2 (I), Regulation 1408/71 only applies to the workers of 
one of the Member States and to the members of their family, as well as article 48 
only grants the freedom of circulation of persons to the workers of the Member 
States. As we can see in the file the question of the national court was related to a 
situation where a child has a father who is a citizen from a third country and a 
mother who is not an employed person. In these circumstances Regulations 
1408/71 is not applicable."
In the end the Court concluded that:
"neither Regulation 1408/71 nor Article 48 of the Treaty prevents family 
allowances from being withdrawn pursuant to national legislation, on the ground 
that a child is pursuing its studies in another Member State, where the parents of 
the child concerned are nationals of a third country or are not employed 
persons."65
The Court referred to none of the arguments adduced above, nor to any other, that 
question the exclusion of third country nationals from the personal scope of freedom of 
movement of workers. In dealing with the issue so briefly, the Court seems to have taken 
the view that it was obvious that article 48 does not apply to third country nationals. The
As defined by the New York Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, of 28/9/1954 
(UNTS, Vol.360, p. 117) and the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, of 28 Jul. 1951 
(UNTS, Vol.189, p.137), respectively. The latter Convention was ratified by all Member States of the then 
EEC, and also by all of the present European Union. The Convention on stateless persons was ratified by 
all Member States, except Austria, Portugal, and Spain.
62 Cf. Article 4 of the European Convention on Social Security, of 1972, ETS, No.78. This Convention 
was ratified by Austria, Belgium. Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. See supra, 
chapter 1, section B. The fundamental difference between the two provisions is that in Regulation 1408/71 
stateless workers are entitled themselves to rights of the Regulation, which is not the case in the 
Convention - see Article 4(1 )(a) of the latter.
Quoted supra.
64 Idem, paragraph 7 of the judgment.
65 Ibidem, paragraph 10.
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Court limits itself to stating this, but it does not explain why that is so. Therefore, it did 
not make a contribution to the substantial discussion on the issue. The Court just solved 
the issue by simple virtue of its power, not its arguments.66
The restrictive interpretation of Article 48 by the European Court of Justice 
contrasts with its decisions in other matters, where the Court adopted a more liberal 
interpretation of rules on free movement of workers. Such liberal interpretation occurred, 
for example, with regard to Article 48(4), which establishes that the free movement of 
workers does "not apply to employment in the public service”. The Court restricted this 
reservation to "posts which involve direct and indirect participation in the exercise of 
powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general interests of 
the State or of other public authorities" .6?
Clearly, as a matter of judicial policy, it was easier for the Court to extend the 
material scope of the free movement of workers to the public service, than to extend its 
personal scope to third country nationals. However, this reason has nothing to do with 
legal considerations.
Meanwhile, it may be interesting to examine in detail the legal basis of Regulation 
1408/71. The first considerandum states that its legal basis is: "the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, and in particular articles 2, 7 and 51”. The indispensable 
reference to article 51 takes on a rather curious aspect in this context. Article 51 allows 
the Council to "adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to 
provide freedom of movement for workers". Thus it unquestionably relates its personal 
scope to that of Article 48, yet this was previously considered by the Council to include 
only nationals of the Member States.^ ®
Naturally, there is a general reference to the EC Treaty. This could be sufficient to 
cut short the argument that the Council accepted the idea that the provisions of the 
freedom of movement for workers could also be applicable to community foreigners. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Council did not feel the need to specifically invoke 
Article 235 to justify the application of a Regulation 1408/71 to some third country 
national workers.
Incidentally, it should be noted that later modifications of the Regulation, made in 
a different time and in a different context, already make express reference to Article 235 as 
part of their legal basis.^ 678
66 Yet, it is submitted that perhaps the Court should be persuasive, or at least it could try to be so.
67 See cases 149/79, and 152/73, quoted supra.
68 For instance, when enacting Regulation 1612/68.
6^ The reference to Article 235, as the legal basis of the amendments to Regulation 1408/71 has been 
made since Regulation No.1390/81 (O J L  143/1 of 29/5/1981) extended, to self-employed persons and 
members of their families the personal scope of the former. Later on, after Regulation 1660/85 (O J L 
160/1 of 20/6/85), the previously constant reference to Articles 2 and 7 (as part of the legal basis) was 
abandoned. In this regard it may be stressed that while the need to invoke Article 235 as legal basis of a 
Regulation was not felt to grant rights to refugees, the need to invoke it was felt necessary in relation to 
the free movement of self-employed persons (with the nationality of a Member State) and members of 
their families. The interesting point is that the free movement of the latter had already its basis on clear 
Treaty provisions.
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(v) conclusion
It is submitted that Article 48 could be understood as applicable also to all third 
country nationals with permanent residence in the Community. A judicial interpretation of 
the personal scope of the free movement of workers could consider third country nationals 
as permanently resident in the Community if, under national laws, they had an unlimited 
right of residence in one Member State. In addition, all third country nationals who have 
resided in one or more Member States, for more than a total of ten continuous years, or 
fifteen non-continuous years, should also be considered as being permanent residents of 
the Community. However, an optimal solution would have to have a legislative character, 
in which free movement of workers would be gradually extended to third country 
nationals residing for a minimal period of time in the European Union. In the meantime, 
the suggested judicial interpretation of Article 48 could be applied.
For all the reasons already mentioned, this seems to be the best interpretation of 
Article 48. However, there is one point which is perhaps even more important than 
arguing for such an interpretation. What is crucial to emphasise is that, undoubtedly, 
Article 48 is not entirely clear as far as its personal scope is concerned. It is not clear 
enough to facilitate an indisputable interpretation. Thus, it could, at least, be accepted that 
the restrictive interpretation of Article 48, is from a legal point of view, the only 
possible and reasonable interpretation, even if it was the better one. Perhaps it could be 
accepted that another interpretation, one that includes third country nationals legally 
resident in the Community, is not absurd from a legal point of view. The conclusion seems 
logical: a restrictive interpretation seems, at least, to be as much based on a political 
choice as it is on strictly legal arguments. In so far as it is based on a political choice, it is 
better to submit it to political debate, not only to a legal discussion, strictly speaking.
It may also be relevant to recall the context in which the decisions on the personal 
scope of the freedom of movement of workers were taken. Article 48, with a general 
reference to "workers" and “workers of the Member States", was adopted in 1957. By 
that time, the majority of people immigrating to each of the then six Member States were 
nationals of another Member State. Immigration from third countries was only about one 
third of the total immigration to the then 6 Member States. By 1968 the situation had to 
some extent been reversed. Immigration from other Member States was approximately 
one third, and immigration from third countries two thirds of the total immigration to 
Member States.70 By then, Regulation 1612/68 limited free movement of workers to 
nationals of a Member State and their families. *1968
70 In 1958, when the EEC Treaty entered into force, 62,5% o f the immigration to the then six EEC 
Member States came from another Member State, while only 37,5%  of it came from a third country. In
1968, 31,4%  of immigrants came from one Member State, while 68,6% came from a third country. The 
statistics for 1956 and 1967, that could be in the mind of those deciding on the personal scope of free 
movement o f workers, do not change this assessment. See the data gathered in Eurostat, Foreign 
Population and Foreign Employees in the Community, 1985, Luxembourg. This data is analysed in 
Straubhaar, Thomas, "International Labour Migration within a Common Market: Some Aspects of EC 
Experience", JCMS, V ol.XXVII, 1988, N o.l, pp.45-62; see particularly Table 1, at pp.52-3. Note also 
that, according to Falchi, in 1968, in the 6 Member States there were a total of 2.560.000 employed 
foreigners, 843.000 o f whom were nationals of a Member State and 1.717.000 who were third country 
national. See Falchi, op.cit., p.19. Note also that in 1983, the year's statistics which the Court could
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In 1971, the Commission proposed to equalise gradually and completely the legal 
status of migrant workers from third countries to that of nationals of Member States.'* 
However, the Council never took any measures in this direction.
In July 1984, when the Court of Justice ruled on the Meade case, it was already 
too late for any large scale change to be made by the judiciary alone. By this time, the 
political and economic situation in the Community had changed considerably. 
Unemployment had been rising since the oil crisis of 1973 and the strength of the extreme 
right-wing had dramatically in c re a s e d .^  Xo declare that Article 48 was applicable to third 
country nationals was more difficult than in 1968, when Regulation 1612/68 was adopted.
Moreover, the Court lacked the flexibility of the politicians in extending the BC 
rules on free movement of workers to third country nationals. By 1984, the legal dynamics 
were completely different to those of 1968. The transitional period had already ended and 
Article 48 had already been held to have direct effect. If the Court of Justice had at that 
stage declared that Article 48 applied also to third country nationals resident in the EC, 
millions of them would have immediately acquired the right to work and live in another 
Member State. A compromise solution, such as a gradual programme of liberalisation of 
the movement of third country national workers within the Community, could have been 
established by the EC Council, but hardly by the Court.73
Finally, it must be noted that the argument in favour of the application to resident 
third country nationals of EC rules on freedom of movement of workers is also justified on 
important substantial grounds. Third country national residing in the Union should be seen 
as members of European society. Most of them reside here for quite a long time, or were 
even bom here. It is a matter of material justice to grant such a right to them. 
Furthermore, the right to such freedom could improve their social integration, which is a 
matter of common interest to the Union. This is particularly relevant since they are a very 
large number of people, and their social marginalisation already has negative social effects 
and may even have more in the future. Moreover, they contribute to the objectives of the *7123
eventually have in mind when deciding the Meade case, in the then 10 Member States there were a total 
of 12.709.068 persons living in a State which was not the one of their nationality. 9.105.077 of them were 
third country nationals residents (71,6%  of the total foreigners) and 3.603.991 were nationals of a 
Member State residing in another Member State (28,3% of the total foreigners). This numbers are based 
on data taken from Demographic Statistics, Eurostat, several volumes from 1984 to 1990 and from 
Censuses o f  Population in the Community Countries 1981-1982, Eurostat, 1988. The data is from 1983, 
except for Italy and Luxembourg (concerning which data is based on the 1981 censuses) and for France 
(based on the 1982 census) and Greece (also based on 1982 data). See also Lebon's estimations for the 
foreign population residing in 1986-7 in the then 12 Member States, Lebon, A. "Chronique Statistique: 
Ressortissants communautaires et étrangers originaires des pays tiers dans l'Europe des douze", Revue 
Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Vol.6 , 1990, N o.l, p.185.
71 "Preliminary Guidelines for a Community Social Policy Programme", by the Commission of the 
European Communities, o f 17 March 1971, in Supplement 2/71 annexed to Bull. EC, 4/71.
72 Two years later, in 1988, Mr.Le Pen obtained 15% of votes in the French presidential elections.
73 It may also be noted that the Meade case was decided by the third chamber of the Court, with three 
judges only. This could have been one further reason for them to refrain from making what could be seen 
as an innovative judgment, were it to extend to third country nationals Community rules on freedom of 
movement o f workers.
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Community as defined in Article 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty,74 and should also share the 
advantages of living in the Union.
Until the present date several proposals have (unsuccessfully) been presented to 
extend the rights of free movement of workers to third country nationals. The European 
Parliament has presented several proposals to that effect.75 As far as the Commission is 
concerned, it announced in its "Medium Term Social Action Programme” for 1995- 
1997,76 that it planned to present in the first half of 1996 a recommendation to the 
Member States inviting them to give employment priority to
74 Note, e.g., the Interinstitutional Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia of 11 June 1986, which 
refers that the signatory institutions were "[mjindful of the positive contribution which workers who have 
their origins in other Member States or in third countries have made, and continue to make, to the 
development of the Member State in which they legally reside and of the resulting benefits for the 
Community as a whole". See the last recital o f the Preamble of the resolution, Doc.ref. 86/C 158/01, O J C  
158/1 of 25/6/86. See also O'Keeffe, who sustains that "the principle of equal treatment under Community 
law should be applied to third country workers and self-employed already resident and working in the 
Community. Such migrants should also enjoy the right of free movement within the internal market. I f  the 
Community is to have an area without internal frontiers, it becomes progressively absurd that non- 
Community nationals established in the Community should not be afforded the protection of Community 
law. If third country nationals work and reside in the Community, as they will in increasing numbers, 
thereby contributing to the achievement o f the aims of the EEC Treaty, the Community has a duty to come 
to terms with the phenomenon." See O'Keeffe, D. "The Free Movement of Persons and the Single 
Market", ELR, Vol. 17, 1992, No.l, pp.3-19, at 17.
75 See, e.g., the following Parliament resolutions: on the Commission’s draft EEC Council Resolution on 
Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration, of 1 March 1985 (COM (85) 48 final), in which the 
Parliament sustained that freedom of movement and social security rights should be extended to non­
community nationals - resolution's point 3-F) and J), PE DOC A 2-4785; on the right of asylum, 
sustaining that "recognised refugees in the European Community [should] have the same rights and 
obligations as Community citizens from other Member States" - resolution’s point I r) of DOC. A2-227/86 
of 12 March 1987; on the Joint Declaration against racism and xenophobia and an action programme by 
the Council o f  Ministers, in which the Parliament called for the extension of Treaty provisions on free 
movement o f workers, self-employed persons and providers of services to ’’all persons residents within the 
territory of a Member State, irrespective o f nationality", resolution of 14 February 1989, Doc. A2-261/88, 
OJ C 69/40 o f 20/3/1989; on the Commission proposals for amending Regulation 1612/68, in which the 
Parliament called for the application o f the Regulation to third country nationals "who, before having 
reached the age of six years, were resident in a Member State and have since regularly held residence 
there, as well as to recognised political refugees and displaced persons in a Member State who hold resi­
dence there(...)" - proposed amendment 76, O J C  68/93 of 19/3/1990; on the Commission's action 
programme relating to the implementation o f the Community Charter o f fundamental social rights for 
workers - priorities for 1991-1992", calling for a directive granting citizens of non-EEC Member States, 
who have been legally resident for five years in the Community, the same rights of free movement of 
persons and rights of establishment as Community citizens - point 33, g) of resolution of 13 September 
1990, Document A3-175/90, OJ C 260/167 of 15/10/1990; and on Union Citizenship, proposing that a 
wide range o f rights be granted to "Union citizens and their families and, under conditions laid down by a 
Union law, other persons resident in a Member State(...)", including not only "the right to move and 
reside freely throughout the Union" and "to exercise any professional or economic activity without 
discrimination", but even "the right to exercise any lawful activity on the same terms as citizens of the 
Member Sates concerned" - proposals N o.l(i) and No.4 of resolution of 21 November 1991, OJ C 326/205 
o f 16/12/91.
76 Commission communication on a "Medium Term Social Action Programme 1995-1997", COM (95) 
134, of 12/4/1995.
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"third country nationals permanently and legally resident in another Member State 
when job vacancies cannot be filled by EU nationals or nationals of third countries 
legally resident in the Member State concerned."77 
If accepted, this proposal could be the beginning of a slow process in the right direction, 
towards the extension of the EC rules on free movement of persons to third country 
nationals residing in the Union. However, it is more likely that it will only turn out to be 
the confirmation of the political strength of the current status quo, which excludes them.
c) EC social security rights78 *
As mentioned above, stateless persons, refugees and their family members or 
survivors are included in the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71 if they are residing in a 
Member State. Such persons are protected by the Regulation despite the fact that they do 
not have any Community right to move within the EC. Furthermore, this Regulation also 
benefits a surviving family of a third country national worker, provided that the members 
of that family are nationals, stateless persons, or refugees residing in one Member State. 
After the death of the worker, these persons will be protected to the same degree as if the 
deceased worker was a national of a Member State. This appears to be quite a sensible 
rule in itself. However, its own limits, together with the limits of the system in general, 
may lead to some peculiar situations.
First, not only do those (third country national) workers have to die in order for 
their family to fully benefit from their work; but their family will benefit from their work in 
a way that they themselves never could. For example, those workers cannot benefit 
themselves from the Regulation by asking for an aggregation of periods of insurance to 
obtain benefits related to old age. In the case of the workers' permanent incapacity to 
work, neither the relatives of the third country national workers, nor the workers 
themselves, are protected by the Regulation. This seems to be a really strange situation79 
The family is legally protected only if the worker dies, not otherwise - no matter what the 
physical, mental, or financial condition of such workers (or their relatives) may be.
Secondly, the application of the criteria of nationality to the protection of relatives 
of the worker following his or her death is not less disturbing. The protection of a national 
of a Member State who is a spouse of a third country national worker contrasts sharply 
with that of a spouse who is a national of a third country. The latter cannot benefit from 
the Regulation. The children of a third country national worker are in an equally 
incomprehensible situation when some of them have the nationality of a Member State and 
others do not. Here the nationals of a Member State may benefit from the work of their 
deceased father or mother, while the others may not. Just because of their nationality!
77  Idem, point 3.3.5.
78 On matters regarding the application of the equality principle between nationals of a Member State and 
nationals of a third country, who have been authorized to reside and work in a Member State and who 
have accomplished periods of work under the social security legislation of more than one Member State, 
see La securité sociale en Europe - Egalité entre nationaux et non nationaux - Proceedings o f  a  
European colloquium at Porto, November 1994, Lisbon, Departamento de Relaijoes Intemacionais e 
C onverses de Seguranza Social, 1995.
7® One could say it is really surrealistic.
165
This is clearly a highly deplorable rule. It is unfair for the persons concerned and 
unjustified in the context of current European integration.
It seems clear that in these cases not only is there a differential treatment, but there 
is indeed discrimination. The differential treatment, it is submitted, is not legitimate. It 
does not respect the principle of equality, which is a principle of Public International Law. 
According to this principle equal situations should be treated in an equal manner. The 
relevant elements of the situation seem to be exactly the same whether the relatives of the 
dead worker are or are not nationals of a Member State. Clearly, the work which the dead 
worker performed, the taxes that he or she paid and the Social Security contributions he 
or she made did not differ according to the nationality of his or her relatives.
The worst aspect of this situation is that national sovereignty would not be 
challenged if this Regulation were applied to the worker who is a national of a third 
country. That worker would have no entitlement to the freedom of movement within the 
Community. He or she could only work in different Member States as long as national 
governments allowed for such work. Still, he or she is not entitled to ask for a 
coordination of social security schemes. This situation may prevent him or her from 
moving within the Community, even in a situation when, indisputably, this would be in the 
interest of the Member States concerned and of the Community as a whole.
As far as the general reference to Article 2(3) of the Regulation to "civil servants" 
is concerned, it would seem that it could be interpreted as including third country nationals 
working as civil servants in the Member States. In the preceding paragraphs, the 
Regulation was very careful in stating its precise personal scope. So one would presume 
that it was not pure chance that civil servants were only referred to in a general way. 
However, the practical importance of this provision is considerably reduced by Article 
4(4), which excludes from the scope of the Regulation "special schemes for civil servants 
and persons treated as such".
Note, finally, that in the Commission "Medium Term Social Action Programme" 
for 1995-1997, the Commission announced its intention to propose, in the second half of 
1996, instruments to "extend to third-country nationals the provision of immediate medical 
care and other limited benefits".80
d) Refugees and EC rights on free of movement of workers81
As mentioned above, stateless persons, refugees and their family members or 
survivors are included in the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71 if they are residing in a 
Member State. The Commission had suggested that freedom of movement of workers 
within the Community applied to refugees and stateless persons, irrespective of their
80 Point 3.1.9. of COM (95) 134, of 12/4/1995.
81 See Towle, Simon, The Development o f  a  Policy on Asylum fo r  the European Community: in the 
context o f  the completion o f  the internal market, EU I PhD thesis, 1992, particularly at pp. 150-2.
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nationality.82 However, this possibility was not accepted by the Council and Regulation 
1612/68 does not grant them such a right.83
In any case, the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council, adopted two declarations related to the movement of refugees within 
the Community.84 The declarations refer to the admission of refugees (established in one 
Member State and recognised as such under the Convention of 1951)85 to work as 
employed or self-employed persons in another Member State. The declarations state that 
such admission was to be examined with "particular favour" to allow such refugees to 
enjoy a treatment as favourable as possible in the territory of that other Member State.
The first declaration is from 1964 and concerns the movement of refugees to work 
as employed persons. It was adopted on the occasion of the approval of EC Regulation 
No.38/64, on the freedom of movement of workers within the Community. The 
declaration stated that the situation of refugees cannot be settled within the framework of 
Articles 48 and 49 of the EC Treaty. The second declaration dates from 1985. It 
mentioned that the first declaration applied to refugees exercising in an employed capacity 
activities included in Directive 85/384/EEC.86 This Directive deals with the mutual 
recognition of diplomas and other formal qualifications in the field of architecture, 
including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services. The second declaration extended the treatment provided for 
by the first declaration to access in a non dependent capacity to activities included in this 
Directive, as well as to its exercise in the capacity of establishment or of provision of 
services.
It already seems odd that the situation of refugees did not receive more attention 
by the Council in the context of freedom of movement of persons to work within the 
Community. However, it looks even stranger that a declaration on the facilitation of 
access of refugees to work (as self-employed persons) in another Member State regards 
only architecture.87 One cannot but be baffled by such a limitation. There is no doubt that
82 See Lanfranchi, M .-P., Droit Communautaire et Travailleurs..., op.cit., p.27.
83 See Article 1 of that Regulation, quoted supra.
84 Declaration 64/305/EEC of 25 March 1964 by representatives of the governments of the Member States 
of the EEC, meeting within the Council, concerning refugees, OJ 78/1225, of 22/5/64; and the 
Declaration o f the representatives of the governments of the Member States o f the European 
Communities, meeting within the Council, concerning refugees, OJ C 210/2, o f  22/8/1985.
85 Geneva Convention relating to the Status o f Refugees, of 1951, quoted supra.
86 Directive 85/384/EEC on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications in architecture, including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of 
establishment and freedom to provide services, OJ L 223/15, o f 21/8/1985.
87 Note that this declaration follows another declaration of the representatives of the governments o f  the 
Member States of the European Communities, meeting within the Council. This declaration concerned 
persons of Greek origin and language, but who were nationals o f  third countries having a land border with 
Greece. It dealt specifically with the situation of these persons who having concluded their studies in 
architecture in a Member State, hold a diploma in the area of architecture recognised by Greek Law and 
are authorised by this Law to enrol themselves in the relevant Greek technical registry. The declaration 
stated that Member States shall examine with particular favour the access of these persons to an activity 
included in Directive 85/384 (quoted supra) and their exercise o f such activity, in order to allow those 
persons to enjoy a treatment as favourable as possible in their territory. See Declaration o f the
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to always expect to find a complete coherence in the behaviour of EC institutions and 
national governments is a childish illusion. But this certainly goes too far.
There is another interesting aspect in the above mentioned declarations. As 
mentioned above, both of them state that the admission of refugees to work in another 
Member State is to be examined with particular favour to allow such refugees to enjoy a 
treatment as favourable as possible in the territory of that other Member State. This 
expression echoes Article 7(4) of the UN Convention on Refugees of 1951.88 That 
provision establishes that the Contracting States "shall consider favourably the possibility 
of according to refugees" rights and benefits beyond the minimum threshold provided by 
the previous paragraphs of the same Article. This minimum threshold obliges the 
Contracting States to accord to refugees "the same treatment as is accorded to aliens 
generally".89 Furthermore, after three years of residence all refugees shall even "enjoy 
exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States".90
In the meantime it may be noted that the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment is specifically regulated by Article 17 of the Convention. Its first paragraph 
provides that Contracting Parties shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory 
"the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same 
circumstances".91 Paragraph 2 of the same Article provides that restrictive measures 
imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour 
market shall not be applied to the refugee, inter alia, if he "has completed three years' 
residence in the country". Finally Article 7(3) provides that the Contracting States "shall 
give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to 
wage-earning employment to those of nationals".
It seems clear that the Convention itself does not grant to refugees living in a 
Member State the right to go and work in another Member State. This is due, namely, to 
the fact that the Convention imposes obligations on each State in relation to the refugees 
residing in that very State, not as far as refugees residing in another State are concerned.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the objective of the Convention is the progressive 
equalisation of the rights of nationals of the Contracting States and refugees living 
therein.92 Arguably, this would be constitute sufficient ground for justifying the extension 
of EC Law on the free movement of workers (and of persons in general terms) to refugees
representatives of the governments of the Member States of the European Communities, meeting within 
the Council, concerning nationals of third countries who are of Greek origin and language, O J C 210/1, of 
22/8/1985.
88 Quoted supra.
89 Idem, Article 7(1).
90 Ibidem, Article 7(2).
91 The meaning of the expression "in the same circumstances" is established in Article 6 o f the 
Convention, which states that it "implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and 
conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment 
o f the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of the 
requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling". Note, meanwhile, that an 
equivalent rule to that o f  Article 17(1) of the Convention is provided in Article 18 for self-employed 
persons and Article 19 for liberal professions. See also with Article 24, providing for equal treatment with 
nationals on labour legislation and social security.
92 See, e.g.. Article 34 o f the Convention, on facilitation o f the naturalisation o f refugees.
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residing for more than three years in a Member State. This is the period which is often 
required by the Convention to equalise the legal status of refugees with that of nationals of 
the country of residence.
e) The issue of "Community preference"
It is often considered that there is a principle of Community preference in access to 
jobs in Member States. According to this principle, workers who are nationals of Member 
States would have precedence in access to jobs, over workers who are third country 
nationals. In my view, this is not an entirely accurate assessment of the Community rules 
in force.
(i) the legai regime in force
The relevant provisions in this respect are the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of workers and Regulation 1612/68.
The Treaty provisions only establish a principle of equality of treatment among 
nationals of Member States93 and include no requirement that nationals of a Member State 
have preference over third country nationals.94 On the other hand there is Regulation 
1612/68, which is less simple to be analysed in this respect. It governs freedom of 
movement of workers in the Community and provides for the clearance of vacancies and 
applications for employment in Member States, so that workers who are nationals of one 
Member State may go to work in another Member State. The Regulation establishes that 
these workers
"have the right to take up available employment in the territory of another 
Member State with the same priority as nationals of that State.”95 
To facilitate the movement of workers within the Community, the Regulation establishes 
that the "specialist service” of each member State shall "regularly" send to other Member 
States "details of vacancies which could be filled by nationals of other Member States" and
93 See Article 48(2), according to which freedom of movement for workers "shall entail the abolition of 
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions o f work and employment." Article 48(3) provides that such freedom 
shall also entail the right "to stay in a Member Slate for the purpose of employment in accordance with 
the provisions governing the employment o f nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action".
94 Kapteyn &  Verloren Van Themaat recall that "[flrom the start it has been disputed whether a Member 
State is entitled to confer on workers from third countries an equal right to equal treatment to that of 
workers from other Member States. Indeed, it can be argued that Article 1(2) of Regulation 1612/68 
appears to presuppose priority of workers from the Community, but without prescribing it. It is submitted 
that even the Treaty does not prohibit the extension of the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality to nationals of certain third countries." See Kapteyn, P.J.G. & Verloren Van Themaat, P., 
Introduction to the Law o f  the European Communities, 2nd.ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989, p.415. Article 
1(2) of Regulation 1612/68 is referred to in the subsequent remarks in the main text.
95 Article 1(2) of Regulation 1612/68, quoted supra. This rule is an elaboration of the right provided in 
Article 1 ( 1) o f the same Regulation, according to which "[a]ny national of a Member State, shall have the 
right to take up an activity as an employed person, and to pursue such activity within the territory of 
another Member State in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action governing the employment of nationals o f  that State."
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also "of vacancies addressed to non-Member States".96 When another Member State has 
available manpower for any of such vacancies, its services communicate the details of 
suitable applications for employment to the services of the first Member State - the one 
where the vacancies exist.97 The applications for employment, made by those who have 
formally expressed a wish to work in another Member State, have to "be responded to by 
the relevant services of the Member States within a reasonable period, not exceeding one 
month."98 According to the Regulation, when they process those applications,
"The employment services shall grant workers who are nationals of the Member 
States the same priority as the relevant measures grant to nationals vis-à-vis 
workers from non-Member States."99 
Furthermore, it is also provided that
"The Member States shall examine with the Commission all the possibilities of 
giving priority to nationals of Member States when filling employment vacancies 
in order to achieve a balance between vacancies and applications for employment 
within the Community. They shall adopt all measures necessary for this 
purpose."100
Finally, Article 42(3) establishes that Regulation 1612/68 shall not affect the obligations of 
Member States arising out of:
" - special relations or future agreements with certain non-European countries or 
territories, based on institutional ties existing at the time of entry into force of this 
Regulation: or
- agreements in existence at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation 
with certain non-European countries or territories, based on institutional ties 
between them."
It is interesting to note that, before being amended in 1992,101 Regulation 1612/68 
established slightly different rules for processing applications for employment coming from 
another Member State. First, it was provided that vacancies for employment would be 
communicated at least monthly to other Member States. However, the vacancies to be 
communicated were "vacancies unfilled or unlikely to be filled bv manpower from the 
national labour market".102 Such reference to the national labour market disappeared with
96 Article 15(1) (a) and (b) of Regulation 1612/68. The last sentence o f Article 15 provides that the 
"specialist service of each Member State shall forward this information to the appropriate employment 
services and agencies as soon as possible." The "vacancies which could be filled by nationals o f  other 
Member States" are defined in Commission decision o f 22 October 1993 creating EURES, OJ L 274/32 of 
6/1 1/93. They are "vacancies more likely to be filled if advertised at Community level, as more quality 
applications will be received", see point 2.1.1. o f that decision and its Annex II. The European Parliament 
had proposed that these vacancies be communicated to other Member States, "at the express request of the 
employer". This was not adopted by the Council. See the Legislative Resolution o f the 
European Parliament adopted on 11 March 1992, doc.ref, A3-84/92, OJ C 94/205, of 13/4/1992.
97 Article 16(1). Before the amending Regulation of 1992 (Regulation 2434/92 of 27/7/1992, OJ L  245/1, 
o f 26/8/92) this rule was provided by the first sentence of Article 16(2),
98 Article 16(2) and Article 15(l)(c).
" A r t ic le  16(3).
100 Article 19(2).
101 By Regulation 2434/92 of 27 July 1992, OJ L  245/1, of 26/8/92.
!°2  See the previous version of Article 15 ( l) (a )  of Regulation 1612/68 (emphasis added). A similar 
reference was made by the previous version of the first sentence o f Article 16(1).
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the amending Regulation of 1992.103 Secondly, before 1992, Regulation 1612/68 provided 
for what could be called a priority period for workers of other Member States, as regards 
the processing of their applications by the employment services of the Member State with 
the vacancies. During the 18 days after the date in which the other Member State received 
the communication of the vacancies, the first Member State (the one with vacancies) had 
to submit the applications for employment "to employers with the same priority as that 
granted to national workers over nationals of non-Member States."104 During those 18 
days the employment vacancies could not be communicated to "non-Member States".105
Two exceptions were provided to this priority period. First, in general terms, the 
Member State with the vacancies could consider that for the occupations in question, 
there were "insufficient workers available" who were nationals of the Member States". In 
that case, that Member State could communicate the vacancies to third countries.106 
Secondly, in exceptional cases defined in detail, the Regulation also authorised that the 
available vacancies not be communicated to other Member States, and instead be offered 
to "workers who are nationals of non-Member States".107 It may be assumed that the 
reference made by this second exception to third country national workers was meant to 
concern workers who were in third countries. This may be concluded from the fact that 
the possibilities of hiring third country national workers related, for example, to "the 
recruitment of homogeneous groups of seasonal workers", and to vacancies offered by 
employers to workers residing in regions adjacent to "the frontier between a Member 
State and a non-Member State.108
On the other hand, two relevant aspects of the regime of the Regulation on 
processing vacancies and applications for employment were not changed by the amending 
Regulation of 1992. Before and after 1992, Member States were generally required to 
examine with the Commission,
"all the possibilities of giving priority to nationals of Member States when filling 
employment vacancies in order to achieve a balance between vacancies and 
applications for employment within the Community."109 
They were also required to adopt all necessary measures to achieve this purpose.110 
Likewise, before and after 1992, Article 42(3) of the Regulation 1612/68 provided that the 
latter does not affect obligations of Member States arising out of "relations or agreements 
with certain non-European countries or territories, based on institutional ties between 
them."
As mentioned above, the rules presently in force provide in general terms that each 
member State shall "regularly" send to other Member States "details of vacancies which
103 According to Article 1(3) of the amending Regulation 2434/92, quoted supra.
104 Second sentence o f Article 16(2) of Regulation 1612/68, in the version in force before the amending 
Regulation of 1992.
105 Idem, last sentence.
106 Ibidem.
107 Article 16(3) and Annex to the Regulation 1612/68, in the version of the latter previous to the 1992 
amending Regulation.
108 See Article 16(3)(b) and (c) in the version previous to the 1992 amending Regulation.
109 Article 19(2).
110  Article 19(2), in force before and after the 1992 amending Regulation.
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could be filled by nationals of other Member States" and also "of vacancies addressed to 
non-Member States".111 There was also a change concerning the obligation to submit the 
employment applications "to employers with the same priority as that granted to national 
workers over nationals of non-Member States."112 While before 1992 this obligation 
lasted only 18 days, since 1992 it applies with no temporal limitation.113
(ii) assessment and interpretation of the legal regime114
In order to clarify the legal regime in force (and also the one previous to 1992) it is 
useful to distinguish between priority in access to employment, in general and absolute 
terms, and priority in the processing of applications for employment, which is only one of 
the instruments of access to employment. In this respect, Regulation 1612/68 seems to 
establish, at most, a priority (in favour of nationals of a Member State over third country 
nationals) in the processing of applications for employment and not a priority in access to 
employment as such. As far as priority in access to employment is concerned, the 
Regulation repeats the EC Treaty principle of non-discrimination regarding nationals of 
the host Member State. It is submitted that any priority in the processing of applications 
must be understood in light of this non-discrimination principle. To complete the 
clarification of the legal regime, one may also distinguish between priority of nationals of 
Member States (in access to employment or in processing applications for employment) 
over third country national workers who are residing in the host Member State, or over 
those who are residing in a third country.
As far as access to employment is concerned, it is submitted that the present legal 
regime provided for in Regulation 1612/68 does not establish an obligation to give priority 
in the access to employment to workers who are nationals of another Member State and 
who come to work in the host Member State, over third country national workers who are 
already residing and working in the latter Member State. It is never established that 
employers have to give priority in access to employment to nationals of other Member 
States over third country national workers authorised to work in the host Member State. 
What is established is that Member States are obliged to give to workers who are nationals 
of other Member States the same priority in access to employment that nationals of the 
host Member State have.115
However, it may simply be the case that workers who are nationals of the host 
Member State do not have priority in access to employment over third country national
111 Article 15(1) (a) and (b) of the present version o f  Regulation 1612/68.
112  Second sentence o f Article 16(2) of Regulation 1612/68, in the version in force before the amending 
Regulation o f 1992.
113  Furthermore, as mentioned supra, and contrary to what happened before, after 1992 there is no 
mention that the vacancies to be communicated to other Member State were "vacancies unfilled or 
unlikely to be filled bv manpower from the national labour market". See the previous version of Article 15 
( 1 ){a) of Regulation 1612/68 (emphasis added).
114  A rather detailed analysis of the legal regime previous to 1992 is made by Lanfranchi, M.-P., Droit 
Communautaire et Travailleurs.... op.cit., pp. 185-201.
115  Article 1(2) of Regulation 1612/68.
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workers previously admitted to work in that Member State. An equality in access to 
employment may derive from international agreements concluded by the host Member 
State with third countries.116 Furthermore, it may also be the case that in the national law 
of the relevant host Member State there is a principle of equality of treatment between 
nationals of that state and third country nationals residing therein. This equality principle j 
may apply, inter alia, to access to employment of third country nationals who reside in that 
Member State and who already have the right to work in that Member State. That equality 
principle may even be enforceable against employers. Moreover, such a principle may 
derive from Community Law itself. That is the case with Turkish workers, who in this 
respect may be protected by EC Law. The Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council provides that, after four years of legal employment in a Member State, Turkish 
workers "duly registered as belonging to the labour force of [that] Member State", may 
have access to employment there in equal conditions to those of workers who are 
nationals of the Member States of the Community.*17
In case a principle of priority over third country national workers does not exist as 
regards nationals of the host Member State, such a priority cannot apply to nationals of 
other Member States either. All that can exist, and all that Regulation 1612/68 and the EC 
Treaty require is that there will not be discrimination between nationals of the host 
Member State and nationals of other Member States.118
Furthermore, in Regulation 1612/68, the practical as well as the legal strength of a 
principle of priority (in access to employment of nationals of other Member States over 
third country nationals) seems to be questionable even when third country nationals are 
living in a third country. To a certain extent this is demonstrated by the existence of the 
"Resolution on limitations on admission of third country nationals to the Member States 
for employment".119 This resolution is a non-legally binding document adopted in the
116  That is the case, inter alia, with Denmark and citizens of the other countries of the Nordic Union and 
with Portugal and Brazilians, particularly those benefiting from the regime of equality o f rights, which 
includes also a partial equality of voting rights. As far as Denmark is concerned, it may be noted that in 
Germany et al. v. Commission case, on the Commission's decision on concertation of migration policies, 
the Danish government contested the principle of Community preference as such. See joined cases 281, 
283 to 285 and 287/85, Germany et al. v. Commission [1987] ECR 2303, at 3218. Note also that no 
reference was made in the Portuguese accession Treaty to Article 42(3) of Regulation 1612/68. Therefore, 
it may be presumed that such rule is in force as far as Portugal is concerned.
117  Third indent of Article 6(1) of the decision. Moreover, under the EEA Agreement nationals of 
Norway and Iceland are assimilated to national of Member States of the European Union, inter alia, for 
the purposes o f free movement of workers.
118  Note also the reference in the Preamble of Regulation 1612/68 to the fact that the principle of non­
discrimination between "Community workers" entails that all nationals of Member States have the same 
priority as regards employment that is enjoyed by national workers "(sixth considerandum), as well as the 
reference to equality in priority "on the labour market" between nationals of other Member States and 
nationals of the host Member State (third considerandum of amending Regulation 2434/92). On the 
contrary, the Preamble o f both Regulation 1612/68 and 2434/92 do not refer to priority over third country 
national workers.
119  For its content see the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/94/128 
(20.6.1994); and also Agence Europe, No.6255 (n.s.), 20/21 June 1994, pp.7-8 and No.6259 (n.s.), 25 
June 1994, p . l l ;  and C ELEX PRES/94/252. This resolution does not apply to third country nationals 
legally resident in a Member State "on a permanent basis" who do not have the right of entry and
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framework of intergovernmental cooperation. It states that Member States will consider 
requests for admission into their territories for employment:
"only where vacancies in a M em ber State cannot be filled by national and 
Community manpower or by non-Community manpower lawfully resident on a 
permanent basis in that M ember State and already forming part o f the M ember 
State's regular labour market".* 120
If an absolute priority over third country nationals residing in a third country is doubtful, a 
fortiori it is even more so as regards third country nationals residing in the host Member 
State.
As far as priority in the processing of applications is concerned, it again seems that 
the important principle is equality with nationals of the host Member State. Article 16(3) 
provides that, in processing applications,
"The employment services shall grant workers who are nationals o f the M em ber 
States the same priority as the relevant measures grant to nationals vis-à-vis 
’ r workers from  non-Member States."r\
This confirms my assessment that the applicable principle is equality with nationals of the 
! host Member State, and not necessarily priority over third country national workers 
I residing in the host State. Naturally, there is also Article 19(2), imposing an obligation for 
^Member States and the Commission to examine "all the possibilities" and take all measures 
necessary for
"giving priority to nationals o f M em ber States when filling employment vacancies 
in order to achieve a balance between vacancies and applications for employment 
within the Community."121
Nevertheless, this rule is not an imperative principle, being at most an obligation to act. 
More importantly, this mie should not be construed to mean an absolute priority over 
third country national workers resident in the host Member State. It should be seen more 
as an attempt to avoid that Member States make recourse to the labour force of third 
countries. The reference in the above quoted Article 19(2) to balance "within the 
Community" constitutes grounds for sustaining this view. Besides, this view is further 
reinforced by the reference in Article 15(1) to communication of vacancies addressed to
residence in another Member State. The Council agreed to examine at a later date matters related with the 
admission o f such persons to another Member State. See chapter 8 , section B , for an examination o f this 
resolution.
120 To ensure that Community workers are indeed not available, Member States will make use of the 
EURES system. This is the network of European Employment Services responsible for exchanging 
information on clearing vacancies and applications for employment, created by the Commission decision 
of 22 October 1993, which implemented Part II o f Regulation 1612/68, as amended in its second part by 
Regulation 2434/92, quoted supra.
121 See also the Commission decision of 22 October 1993 creating EURES, namely the last sub-indent of 
the last indent o f  its point 2.1.2.2.; its point 2.2.1.; its point 2.2.2.; the second indent of point 2.3.2.2.; and 
the last sub-indent o f its point 7.1. This Commission decision seems to be based above all on Article 44 of 
the Regulation 1612/68, which provides that the "Commission shall adopt measures pursuant to this 
Regulation for its implementation." Thus, the assessment made in the main text on the rules on priority of 
Regulation 1612/68 seems to have to be applied also to this Commission decision.
1 7 4
non-Member States.122 In any case, it may be recalled that Article 19(2) is also subject to 
the reservation clause of Article 42(3), which excludes the application of the Regulation if 
it is incompatible with the above mentioned agreements with non-European countries or 
territories.123
A final reference must be made to the situation of Turkish workers in the context 
of priority in access to employment in the Community, The legal position of Turkish 
workers in the Community is regulated by the EC-Turkey Association Agreement and by 
the decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council.124 The relevant rule for this purpose 
is now Article 8 of Decision 1/80 of that Association Council. Article 8(1) provides that, 
in certain circumstances, Member States "shall endeavour(...) to accord priority to Turkish 
workers". This priority will be accorded when a Member State authorises a call on third 
country national workers, when it is not possible to meet an offer of employment in the 
Community "by calling on the labour available on the employment market of the Member 
States". This seems to refer to a priority when recruiting labour force residing in third 
countries, which contrasts with Article 8(2) apparently referring to priority within the 
workers residing within the Community". This Article provides that, when the "duly 
registered Community labour force" has not been able to fill vacant positions registered in 
the employment services of the Member State, these services "shall endeavour to fill" them 
"with Turkish workers who are registered as unemployed and legally resident in the 
territory of that Member State."125
Therefore, there is a kind of secondary preference for Turkish workers when filling 
vacancies by employment services of the Member States. However, the obligation of
122  Note also the reference in the last sentence of Article 16(2) of Regulation 1612/68 (in the version in 
force before the amending Regulation of 1992) that vacancies could not be communicated to third 
countries. It was not established that vacancies could not be filled by third country nationals residing in 
the host Member State. In this respect see Biihning &  Stephen, according to whom the priority established 
in old Article 16(2) in processing applications for employment "accords with the general EEC view that 
workers from within the EEC should fill jobs before any non-EEC nationals are brought in from outside." 
See Bdhning, W.R. & Stephen, David "The EEC and the Migration of Workers", London, Runnymede 
Trust, 1971, p.22. Likewise, Campbell refers that the priority established in (the old version of) 
Regulation 1612/68 is a "priority over applications from workers from outside the Community". See 
Campbell, A., Common Market Law, London, Longman, 1969, p. 45. See also Falchi, op.cit., pp. 17-9; 
Heide, H. "The Free Movement of Workers in the Final Phase", CMLRevt Vol.6 , 1968-9, pp.466-477, at 
472 ; Lewin, K. "The Free Movement o f Workers", CMLRev, Vol.2, 1964-65, pp.300-324, at 312.
123  It could be said that this is an example that, in more general terms, in the light of the relevant 
national. Community or international law, it may happen that there are no "possibilities" to grant that 
priority to nationals of Member States when filling employment vacancies. This, is, naturally, subject to 
the principle o f primacy o f Community Law. But this principle will only function within the limits of the 
specific behaviour required by EC Law.
124  See next chapter for more details.
125  Note the third recital o f  decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council: "[wjhereas, in the social 
field, and within the framework of the international commitments of each of the Parties, the above 
considerations make it necessary to improve the treatment accorded to workers and members of their 
families(...)M. A Council statement concerning this recital and Article 8 o f the decision, declares that "(...) 
the 1954 Nordic Labour Market Agreement is an international commitment such as is mentioned in the 
3rd recital to the Association Council Decision. The Council notes that Article 8 of the Decision does not 
affect Denmark's obligations under the Nordic Labour Agreement".
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Member States is that they "endeavour to fill" vacancies with those Turkish workers. 
Nothing more.126 1278
As a way of conclusion it is submitted that Regulation 1612/68 only guarantees 
priority of workers that are nationals of other Member States over third country national 
workers in a quite limited scope. Priority in access to employment exists onlyjnsofar as 
national^ of tin', hmt Member-State havr priority over third country nationals. In legal 
terms this priority may be quite limited, particularly as far Us third country national 
residents in the host Member State are concerned. Furthermore, priority in the processing 
of applications for employment only exists within the limits of the functioning of the 
system of clearance of vacancies, as provided by the Regulation itself.
In this respect it seems inaccurate to speak of a principle of Community 
preference, which would favour nationals of Member States over any third country 
national in access to the Community labour market.
2 - Rights in the Framework of the Right of Establishment and Free 
Provision of Services
a) Establishment
Article 52 of the EC T re a ty  127 envisages the abolition of "restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State." Therefore it applies only to nationals of one Member State. Meanwhile, 
Article 58 provides, that, for the purposes of the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment, 
"Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered, central administration or principal place of business within 
the Community shall (...) be treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of a Member State."
Therefore, one way in which third country nationals may benefit from the freedom of 
establishment is to found a company in a Member State according to the laws of the latter. 
Such a company will be entitled to set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries in the territory 
of another Member S ta te . 128 Community Law only requires that its activity "shows a real
126 Note also that, as mentioned supra, in its "Medium Term Social Action Programme" for 1995-1997, 
the Commission announced it plans to present in the first half of 1996 a recommendation to the Member 
States inviting them to give employment priority to "third country nationals permanently and legally 
resident in another Member State when job vacancies cannot be filled by EU nationals or nationals of 
third countries legally resident in the Member State concerned." See COM (95) 134, of 12/4/1995, point 
3.3.5.
127 As well as the stand still provision o f Article 53.
128 According to Article 52 of the EC Treaty. Note that under the framework of Article 220 of the EEC  
Treaty a EEC Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies was drafted, signed in 29 February 
1968, in Brussels (see Bull. EC Supp.2/69). It contained a Protocol (signed in Luxembourg on 3 June 
1971) which empowered the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on its interpretation, O J L 
204/28. It never entered in force, as it was only ratified by 5 Member States. Previous attempts at an 
international recognition of legal persons also failed. That was the case of the European Convention on 
the Establishment of Companies, concluded in the framework of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, in 
20 January 1966 (ETS, No.57) and the "The Hague Convention concerning Recognition of the Legal
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and continuous link with the economy of a Member State or of an overseas country or 
territory". However such "a link shall not be one of nationality, whether of the members of 
the company or firm, or of the persons holding managerial or supervisory posts therein, or 
of the holders of the capital, who wish to set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries in a 
Member State." 129
As we can see, Community Law conditions for a legal person to benefit from the 
rules on freedom of establishment are not very demanding. There is absolutely no control 
on the nationality or on the residence of the owners of the capital, nor even on the origins
of the latter. 130
Nevertheless, when recruiting employees, the companies are subject to the national 
laws (of the MembèPStâte ol the new estabtiriimcnt) sudi ÆT i Iioîju pertaining to^ 
immigration, residence and access to the labour market. It may happen that an enterprise 
benefiting from freedom of establishment has among its employees a third country national 
worker. However, there is no explicit Community rule granting this type of worker the 
right to go and live in another Member State to work for the enterprise. Such a 
Community right does not even exist for the managers of the enterprises, in cases where 
they are third country nationals. 131 They are not granted the right to go there even on a 
"temporary basis", e.g. for assisting in the establishment of a subsidiary. This impossibility 
is not consistent with the possibility of movement allowed to (third country national) 
workers of an enterprise that provides services.129 3032 I t  seems obvious that the ruling of the^ 
Rush Portuguesa and Van Elst cases,133 to be examined below, should apply to the right I 
of establishment also.134 Neither does that impossibility seem consistent with Articled 
54(2)(f) of the EC Treaty, which requires the "progressive abolition of restrictions on 
freedom of establishment", namely in what relates to
Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations and Foundations", from 1956 (Hague VII, RCH p.16, 1 
A JCL 277). Neither have ever entered into force, due to lack of a sufficient number of ratifications.
129 Title 1 (on the beneficiaries) of the General Programme for the Abolition of Restrictions to the 
Freedom of Establishment, OJ 2/36 o f 15/1/62. The General Programme has no binding legal force, but in 
the case Thieffry it was considered by the Court to give "useful guidance for the implementation o f the 
relevant provisions of the Treaty, case 71/76 [1977] ECR 765, at 777.
130 As referred by Burrows, "for the purposes of applying Article 52 to companies, Article 58 either 
replaces all considerations as to nationality or spells the sole test o f nationality that is to be applied for the 
purposes of both Articles." In his view, the conclusion quoted is the more consistent to the Court of 
Justice's doctrine according to which fundamental freedoms of movement should not be narrowly 
interpreted. See Burrows, F. Free Movement in European Community Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1987, pp.182-183, where a more general analysis of the issue o f the nationality of the legal persons is 
made. See also Cath, Inne G. F., "Free Movement of Legal Persons", in Free Movement o f  Persons in 
Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law, Session 
X X I, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, pp.450-471.
131 Not even for a limited period of time, like in the beginning o f the activity of the enterprise in the new 
Member State.
132 Under the EC rules on free provision of services, the employees of a provider of services (even if they 
are nationals of third countries) have the right to go to another Member State to work there for the clients 
o f  their enterprise, even if  only on a "temporary" basis. See infra in the main text.
133 Case C - I13/89, Société Rush Portuguesa V. Office National d'lmmigration, [1990] ECR 1-1417.
134 See Peers, S, "Indirect rights for third country service providers confirmed", CMLRev, Vol.20, 1995, 
No.3, pp.303-9, at 308.
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"the conditions governing the entry o f personnel belonging to the main 
establishment into managerial or supervisory post in such agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries...".
Finally, the right of third country nationals to move for the purposes of establishing or 
helping to establish a company in another Member State would be consistent with an 
identical right included for "key personnel" of companies, which is granted by the Europe 
Agreements and Partnership Agreements, as explained in chapter 5.
Another point of interest is that third country nationals are not covered by the 
scope of Article 221, which establishes that :
”(...)M em ber States shall accord nationals o f  the M em ber States the same 
treatment as their own nationals as regards participation in the capital o f  
companies or firms within the meaning o f Article 58(...)'\
This leads us to a rather curious situation, as it is accepted that this provision applies also 
to legal persons, in the sense of Article 58.135 If third country nationals own or control 
such a legal person, they may use this position to benefit from Article 221. Yet, if they 
want to buy, for themselves, a part of the capital of a company in another Member State, 
they do not have a Community right to do so.
b) Services 
(i) general
Article 59 of the EC Treaty provides that:
" 1 . W ithin the framework o f  the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively 
abolished during the transitional period in respect o f  nationals o f  Member States 
who are established in a S tate  o f  the Community other than that o f  the person for 
whom the services are intended."
2 . The Council may, acting by qualified majority on a  proposal from  the 
Com m ission, extend the provisions o f  the chapter to  nationals o f  a third country 
who provide services and who are established within the Community."
The first paragraph seems to make clear that only nationals of a Member State may 
benefit from free movement as providers of services. The second paragraph of the article 
might have changed this situation, but no measures based on it have yet been a d o p te d . 136 
The original version of the provision was amended by article 16(3) of the Single European *
135 5 ^  Bischoff, J.-M ., comentary to Article 221, in Traité instituant ta CEE - commentaire article par  
article, Kovar.R. &  Constantinesco.V. et al. (eds.), Paris, Economica, 1992, p. 1386; Smit, H, & Herzog, 
P., The Law o f  the European Economic Community - A Commentary on the EEC Treaty, 6 vol., New 
York, Mathew Bender, 1984, No. 221-06; and Thiesing, Jochen, commentary to Article 221, No.6 , 
Groeben et al (eds.) Kommentar zum E.W.G.-Vertragt 2nd. vol., 3rd. ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos-Verlag, 
1983.
*36  it could appear that this provision would be useful within the framework of relations with third 
countries. The Union could give rights to nationals o f third countries and those countries could do the 
same to nationals of a Member State. However, these issues will probably be dealt with under the legal 
framework of Article 238 o f Association Agreements of the Community. That was the case of the EEA 
Agreement, analysed in Chapter 5.
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Act, which changed the previous requirement of unanimity to a qualified majority in the 
voting procedure. However, to date, this change has not been sufficient in bringing about 
the approval of the envisaged measures on third country nationals.137 In any event, given 
the wording of paragraph 2 of Article 59, it seems clear that those measures could only 
apply to third country nationals who are providers of services.
In any case, to make a general analysis of the position of third country nationals 
from the perspective of the rules of the free movement of services, it is interesting to refer 
to the different situations which may arise. Two parameters are used. One is the 
nationality of the persons involved, i.e., whether the persons concerned are nationals of a 
Member State or are nationals of a third country. The second is whether there is a need of 
physical movement of persons for the service to exist.
In a first group we can consider the situations where both the provider and the Q  
recipient of services are nationals of a Member State. As long as an inter-state element 
exists, these situations are under the scope of Community Law. Both the provider and the 
recipient have rights protected by Community Law.
In a second group we have the situation where both the provider and the recipient 
of services are nationals of third countries. The relations between them may have an inter­
state element and may be completely legal under the national laws of the Member States 
involved. However, those relations are completely outside the scope of Community Law.
There is a third group which covers the situation where one of the persons 
involved is a national of a Member State and the other is a third country national. 1*8 " 1
The legal position of nationals of a Member State in such a relationship appears to 
be quite clear. It seems only logical to sustain that they shall benefit from all Community 
rights granted to a provider or recipient of services. *39 fq0 rale of free movement of i *139
*37 See however that the Commission proposed that Article 59(2) be one of the legal bases o f a draft 
Council second Directive on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to direct insurance other than life insurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise 
of freedom to provide services, OJ C 32/2 o f 12/2/1976. Article 15 of that draft Directive would make that 
instrument applicable to "agencies and branches established within the Community and belonging to 
undertakings whose head office is outside the Community which are subject to and which satisfy the 
provisions o f Title III of the first coordinating Directive." The Council did not adopt this provision, nor 
did it accept the Commission's suggestion of using Article 59(2) as part o f the legal basis of the Directive. 
This must have been the reason why the Commission proposal for a third Directive in the same field (as 
well as the final version of such Directive as adopted by the Council) did not mention that provision 
anymore.
13o Nationals of a Member State, or third country nationals, here would include legal persons: companies 
or firms in the sense o f Article 58, by reason o f the reference made by Article 66.
139 Oliver, op.cit., p. 87, footnote 109, sustains that "a Member State may not restrict the rights of a 
person wishing to receive services under Article 59 by requiring him to prove that the person providing 
them is a national of a Member State. He invokes, "generally", case 199/82, Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595. See, however, that in the same page, in the main 
text, Oliver states that: "The right to receive services under the Directive does not extend to services 
provided by non-Community nationals: these are not services carried out in accordance with Community 
Law. Accordingly, the families of recipients of such services derive no right from the Directive." He was 
referring to Council Directive 75/34/EEC, concerning the right of nationals of a Member State to remain 
in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed 
capacity, OJ L 14/10 o f 20/1/75.
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services distinguishes the rights of nationals of a Member State, on the basis of whether 
the receiver or the provider of the services is or is not a national of a Member State.
Third country nationals^  themselves, do not have a Community right to receive or 
provide services in relation_to__natipnals of a Member State who come from or simply 
"reside in another Member State. However, the former may take mdirect benefit from freiT 
"movement of services when nationals of a Member State have the Community right to 
receive from or provide services to them.
Nevertheless, third country nationals are not protected under Community Law in 
their relationship with such a national of a Member State. Formally, this lack of protection 
is due to the fact that Community Law does not protect their relationship as such, but only 
the right of the national of a Member State to receive or provide services. It would even 
be difficult to sustain that third country nationals enjoy rights derived from those of 
nationals of a Member State, as do third country national relatives of beneficiaries of the 
free movement of persons.
The benefits which third country nationals may take from their economic 
relationship with a national of a Member State are, apparently, purely economic and 
indirect Their position and interests are only legally protected as long as the positiorTof 
the national of a Member State is protected and as long as the latter is willing to defend his 
or her own rights.
It is submitted that this regime is not perfect. Unless they are relatives of a national 
of a Member State, third country nationals are kept completely outside the scope of 
Community rules on services. This seems particularly questionable when, for the provision 
or receipt of services, third country nationals do not enter into conflict with the Member 
States laws on immigration and access to their labour market.
That is the case for third country nationals, residing in a Member State, who 
without leaving their Member State of residence, receive services from a national of a 
Member State residing in another Member State, It is submitted that these third country 
nationals should be covered by the scope of Community Law. That should be the case 
even when they go to another Member State to receive services there. Particularly 
inasmuch as they conform with the national laws regarding the entry and stay of 
foreigners, there appears to be no important reason for their legal position not to be 
protected by Community Law.
Meanwhile, according to Article 66, Article 58 applies to services and is thus 
applicable to the rules regarding legal persons benefiting from free movement in the 
Community. This means, for example, that third country nationals may set up a legal 
person, in the sense of Article 58, and that such a person has the Community right to 
provide services in another Member State.
“  In the field of services, we could also have to consider the possibility that legal 
persons be recipients of services.140 This would seem quite normal in simple cases, such as
140 See also the interesting remarks o f Peers, who recalls paragraph 13 of the Court's ruling in Case C- 
43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v, O.M.I. (France), [1994] E C R 1-3803. There, the Court of Justice declared 
that "nationals of the Member States of the Community have the right to enter the territory of the other 
Member States in the exercise of the various freedoms recognised by the treaty, and in particular the
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an advertising company giving advice to an enterprise located in another Member State. 
This may be considered to be quite a simple situation for the purposes of this analysis. 
However, other, somewhat more complex cases may also come under the scope of 
Cbmmunity Law. This might be the case of a cooperative totally or partially founded by 
third country nationals resident in a Member State.141 Let us imagine that the purpose of 
such a cooperative is to provide medical assistance to its members. Doctors of other 
Member States could be contracted to go and take care of the cooperative members in the 
State of residence of the latter. The contract between the cooperative and doctors 
established in another Member State would be covered by the rules of free movement of 
services. Under Community Law, the cooperative has the right to search in other Member 
States for providers of services for its members. However, the members of the 
cooperative, who are nationals of third countries, may also need to go to another Member 
State to receive treatment by doctors under contract with the cooperative. In that case it 
seems difficult to sustain that, in the light of current Community Law, the referred patients 
have a (Community Law) right to go to another Member State, simply because the 
cooperative is a recipient of services under Community Law.
The opposite case, that of a legal person provider of services, will be analysed 
thoroughly, in relation to its employees who are nationals of third countries.
(ii) Services - free provision of services and the posting of workers in another 
Member State
Within the framework of the freedom of services it is interesting to examine the 
issues regarding the work of third country national workers for enterprises of a Member 
State that provide services in another Member State.14^
In the Webb case,143 the Court of Justice dealt with the provision of manpower for 
another person, for hire or reward and otherwise than in pursuance of a contract of 
employment with that other person, for the performance of the work usually carried on in 
his or her undertaking. The Court ruled that such provision was a service within the 
meaning of the Treaty rules on free provisions of services.144
freedom to provide services ... enjoyed by both providers and by recipients of services". Peers sustains that 
it is a "straightforward application o f the Court's view of Articles 59 and 60 EC in this case" to suggest 
that a third country national employed by a Community company may enter other Member States as a 
recipient of services. See Peers, op.cit, at p.308.
14 1 Let us presuppose that this legal person could be included under the scope of the definition given in 
Articles 52 and 58, on the characteristics o f the legal persons relevant for Community Law purposes in 
this field.
14^ On this topic see House of Lords - Select Committee on the European Communities, "Protection of 
Posted Workers"(with evidence), 5th Report, Session 1992-93, London, HMSO, 1993; Robin, Sophie 
"L'application du droit social français aux entreprises prestataires de services établies à l'étranger", Droit 
Social, Feb. 1994, No.2, pp.127-135; Sécheltes, Alain D. "Free Movement of Workers and Freedom to 
Provide Services - considerations on the employees of the provider of services with specific references to 
France", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe.... op.cit., pp.472-484.
143 Case 279/80, Alfred Webb [1981] ECR 3305.
144 Idem, paragraph 11.
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One year later the Court dealt with a related problem in Seco & Giral.14^  Those 
two French enterprises were experts in building the infrastructure of railway networks. 
Both used third country national employees146 to perform several works in Luxembourg. 
The authorities of this country asked the two firms to pay some social security 
contributions related to those employees. However, the enterprises had already paid social 
security contributions in France. Moreover, the workers did not receive any benefits from 
the enterprises' required payments to the Luxembourg's authorities. Finally, the latter did 
not apply the same requirement to the employees who were nationals of a Member State 
working in Luxembourg for enterprises from other Member States.
The argument used by the government of Luxembourg to justify the competence 
to ask for the payment of those contributions was that if the authorities of Luxembourg 
could prohibit third country nationals from undertaking paid employment in their country, 
a fortiori they could also impose conditions on their work there. The Court ruled out the 
argument of Luxembourg stating that:
"A  M em ber State's power to control the employment o f  nationals from a non 
member country may not be used in order to impose a discriminatory burden on 
undertakings from another M em ber State enjoying the freedom under articles 5 9  
and 60  o f the Treaty on the freedom to provide services. ^
The Court added that:
"Nor should such a requirement be justified if  it were intended to offset the 
econom ic advantages that bringing these workers would permit to obtain.”
Some years later, the French authorities began proceedings against a Portuguese 
company - Sociedade Rush Portuguesa Lda.14® This building and public works enterprise 
concluded a subcontract to build some parts of the railway of the new "TGV Atlantique*' 
in the West of France. To do this, it brought 58 workers from Portugal. Rush was 
required by "L'Office National D'lmmigration" to pay some fines because its employees 
were not brought to France through the office's services, neither had the firm obtained for 
them work permits from the French authorities.
The relevant legal provisions in the case were article 341 (6) and (9) of the French 
"Code du Travail" and article 216 of the Treaty of Accession of Portugal and Spain. The 
French Code gives the "O.N.I." the exclusive right to engage foreign workers coming to 
work to France and imposes the obligation of having a work permit to all foreigners 
carrying out employed activities in the country. Article 216 of the Treaty of Accession 
established that articles 1 to 6 of Regulation 1612/68 did not apply to Portugal until the 145
145  Case 62 & 63/81. Seco and Desquene &  Girai Sa. v. E.V.I. [1982] EC R  223.
146 In the proceedings there is no reference to their actual nationality. 
l 4  ^See note 23, paragraph 12, case quoted.
I4  ^ Case C -l 13/89, Rush Portuguesa v. O.N.I., quoted supra. On this case see "Affaire C -l 13/89, Rush 
Portuguesa", J.D.I., V o i.118, 1991, No.2, pp.471-3; Gormley, Laurence, "Workers and Services 
distinguished", ELR, Vol.17, 1992, N o.l, pp.63-67; Jal les, I. "Annotation to the case Rush Portuguesa", 
Colectánea Anotada de Jurisprudencia Comunitària (os casos portugueses), Lisbon, Ministério da Justina 
- Gabinete de Direito Europeu, 1992, pp.204-211; Marshall, Kimberly "Case C -l 13/89, Rush Portuguesa", 
Georgia Journal o f  International and Comparative Law, V ol.21, 1991, No.3, pp.557-573 and 
Verschueren, H. "L'arret Rush Portuguesa: un nouvel apport au príncipe de la libre circulation des 
travailleurs dans le droit communautaire". Revue du droit des étrangers, 1990, No.60, p .231.
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beginning of 1993.149 Workers did not yet have a Community right to emigrate and to go 
to work in another Member State.* 150 *However, provided they were already in the latter 
State on the date of accession, they would benefit from the Community principle of non­
discrimination. 151 Moreover, the Treaty of Accession allowed for free provisions of 
services between Portugal and the other Member States.
In this case, France tried to ensure that as much as possible the evaluation of the 
situation be made in the framework of the rules related to employed persons. France 
sustained that the fact that an enterprise benefits from the freedom to provide services 
does not necessarily mean that all its employees are providers of services. Only part of 
these could be considered providers of services for community law purposes, namely "Le 
personnel de confiance de la société”, carrying on a task typical of the managers of the 
enterprise who are able of undertake the society vis-à-vis other parties. Another group of 
employees that should not be considered normal workers would be those who perform 
activities as high skilled workers.
This last idea recalls the content of the then in force Article 16 of Regulation 
1612/68.152 This provision authorised that certain employment vacancies did not be 
communicated to the employment services of other Member States. Instead, those 
vacancies could be offered to workers who are nationals of non-Member States, provided 
the offer of employment was made to a "named worker and is of a special nature in view 
of: (...) the requirement of specialist qualifications .^.)".153 In the Annex of that Regulation 
it was specified that
"The expression 'specialist' indicates a high or uncommon qualification referring 
to a type of work or a trade requiring specific technical knowledge(...)."*54
*49 And in relation to Luxembourg until 1/1/1995. Later on rules were changed under the impact of 
German reunification. See Regulation (EEC) No 2194/91 of the Council on the transitional period for the 
freedom of movement of workers between Spain and Portugal, on the one hand, and the other Member 
States, on the other hand, OJ L 206/1 of 29/7/91. Freedom of movement of workers applied equally to 
Portugal and Spain after 1/1/1992, except as far as Luxembourg is concerned in relation to which it 
applied since the beginning of 1993 only.
150 This applies both Portuguese workers going to another Member State, and to nationals from another 
Member State going to Portugal.
*51 That is to say from the advantages included in Articles 7 to 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and in other 
relevant instruments o f secondary Community Law.
152 See supra, the analysis made on the issue o f the "Community preference".
153 Article 16(3)(a)(i) o f Regulation 1612/68.
154  N0te that this expression is retaken by the rules of the Europe Agreements and of the Partnership 
Agreements that define the key personnel of a company which benefits from the right of establishment in 
a Member State. That "key personnel" can enter a Member State to work there for such companies. As far 
as services are concerned, in step with a general liberalisation process, some "temporary" movement of 
natural persons is allowed for by the Europe Agreements. It is limited to natural persons providing the 
service and to persons employed as "key personnel" by the company providing the service. The definition 
o f "key personnel" is the same of that made by the Agreements for the purposes of establishment. 
Therefore, it is also based on the expressions used by the Annex of Regulation 1612/68 (before this annex 
was deleted by Article 1(8) of Regulation 2434/92 of 27 July 1992, OJ L  245/1, of 26/8/92). According to 
the Europe Agreements, the movement of natural persons may also include the movement of 
representatives of the company provider of services, when they seek temporary entry into a Member State 
to negotiate the sale o f services, or to sell services for the company. However, such representatives may 
not make direct sales to the general public or supply the services themselves. See Article 55(2) o f the
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The Commission, as well as the Advocate General, took the side of the French 
government, invoking the terms used in the rules of the General Programme of 1961 for 
the Suppression of the Restrictions to the Freedom to Provide Services.* 155 The 
Commission only asked the Court to define clearly the concepts of the different categories 
of employees, while presenting its own ideas on the subject.
However, the Court accepted the thesis of the Portuguese enterprise and 
government. It stated that:
"articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty preclude a Member State from prohibiting a 
provider of services established in another Member State from moving freely in its 
territory with all its employees; or that a Member State submits this movement to 
restrictive conditions as if they were going to get an employment there, or to an 
obligation of authorisation of working."
In the Court's view, these restrictions would amount to discrimination
"in relation to its competitors established in that host Member State, who may use 
freely their own personnel and would affect its ability to provide the service."*5^
According to the Court, the scope of article 216 of the Treaty of Accession was 
only the prevention of perturbations in the labour market with "important and sudden 
movements of workers."157 The Court considered that in the situation of the case was 
different, since there were only temporary movements of workers, who were working in 
the framework of the provision of services by their employer.
"In fact, those workers return to their country of origin after the accomplishment 
of their mission, without ever having access to the employment market of the host 
country."158
The Court added that such would not be the case of a company established in 
another Member State whose activity was to provide working force. Even if it were a 
provider of services in the sense of the relevant Treaty provisions, such an enterprise 
"carries out activities which object is precisely to make workers have access to the labour 
market of the host Member State."159
Having already decided the case in favour of the Portuguese enterprise, the Court 
allowed itself to be moderate. It elaborated its conclusion allowing Member States to 
verify that such a Portuguese company does not use the freedom to provide services as a 
way to circumvent article 216 of the Treaty of Accession. However, it declared that
Community Agreements with Hungary and Poland; Article 56(2) of the o f the Agreements with Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Article 51(2) with Estonia, Article 52(2) with Latvia and 
Lithuania; and Article 53(2) with Slovenia. For an analysis of this issue, see section B  of chapter 5.
155 General Programme for the Suppression o f the Restrictions to the Freedom to Provide Services, 
adopted by the Council on 18/12/1961, O J 32/62, o f 15/1/1962.
* See paragraph 12 o f judgment, quoted supra.
157 Paragraph 13.
158 Paragraph 15.
*5^ See paragraph 16 o f the judgment. The Webb case can be seen as different because there the workers 
remained under contract with the provider of services during all the period that they were working in 
another Member State. Clearly, the very activity o f  providing work force should have been distinguished 
from the work force itself. What the Court seems to reject in the paragraph quoted are intermediaries of 
labour who never actually hire workers, but just put them in contact with prospective employers.
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"Such controls have (...) to respect the limits o f Community law, and namely those 
deriving from the concept o f the free movement o f services, which can not be 
made illusory and which use can not be submitted to the discretion o f the 
administration." 160
To this extent,
"Community law does not prevent Member States from extending their legislation 
or collective agreements (...) to every person doing a remunerated work, even 
temporary, on their territory, whatever the country o f establishment o f the 
em ployer." 161
This idea echoes not only (to some extent) the Seco c a s e ,  162 but also the first draft of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.163 Article 6 of this 
Charter provides that:
"The wage conditions, as well as other social benefits relating to the wage applied 
in the host country, must in particular be guaranteed to workers of other EC 
M em ber States performing work for the account o f  a sub-contracting undertaking 
in the host country concerned."
This article disappeared on its way to the final version, where only a general declaration of 
the French Presidency in the same sense can be fo un d . 164 This appears to be proof that 
the governments of the Member States prefer to remain with their present legal differences 
and the underlying conditions for competition (and to retain their competence on these 
issues), than to make those conditions uniform and avoid distortions in competition.165
What seems to be at stake, after all, is competition in the labour market, as far as 
its limits and the grounds to authorise it are concerned. The Court of Justice may have 
said that the Portuguese workers do not have access to the "employment market."166 In 
this way the Court introduces a subtle difference between that expression and the more 1602345
160 Paragraph 17 of the judgment.
161 Idem, paragraph 18.
162 N0t in the final conclusion, but as far as the reasoning of the case is concerned, see case quoted supra.
163 The events of the Rush case occurred in January 1987, a long time before the adoption of the 
Community Social Charter. The Charter was adopted in December 1989 and the Court of Justice decided 
the case on 27 March 1990. Whether the Charter inspired the Court is uncertain, but possible. Moreover, 
it is likely that the Charter expresses the concerns o f the French government on this type of cases.
164 gee paragraph 9 of the report of the Presidency of the European Council, annexed to the Community 
Charter. However, the idea was taken up again by the Commission in its Action Programme to Implement 
the Social Charter in what concerns the application of binding collective agreements of the host country - 
COM (89) 568 final, o f 29/11/1989, pp. 22 and 24.
165 Tbe carefulness of the Member States in avoiding such a provision being part of the final draft has, 
however, a limited utility regarding the ruling of the Court of Justice on the matter. However there is a 
slight but important difference between their content. The Article of the Draft Community Charter, would 
impose an obligation on the enterprises, whereas the ruling of the Court allows the Member States to 
decide if they want to impose their rules on them. An obligation on the enterprises would also be imposed 
by the Commission draft Directive presented in August 1991, and amended in 1993, as mentioned below 
in the main text.
166 This is mentioned in paragraph 15 o f the Rush Portuguesa case as "marché de l'emploi", although it is 
translated in the English versions o f the Rush Portuguesa case and of the Van Elst case as "labour 
market". Thus, in the English version the subtle distinction of the Court between employment and labour 
market is simply lost, apparently without any major linguistic justification. Cf. also the Court's 
Proceedings, No.9/90, which translate "marché de l'emploi" as "employment market", idem, p.21.
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used Labour Market concept.167 Actually, it would have been difficult to say that workers, 
working in France, certainly taking the place of French or other workers resident there, 
are not in the French labour market. In a certain sense, the Portuguese workers were not 
only competing in that market, but competing successfully. Even if they were there on a 
"temporary" basis.
On the other hand, one could be led to say that the host countries have tackled the 
problem in the wrong way. They could have simply imposed their wage regulations on the 
work of the third country national employees, as suggested by the Court. This would not 
have contravened Community Law.168
It should be noted that the Rush Portuguesa case may be better understood if put 
in the framework of the events that had been unfolding in France for quite some time. For 
some years a legal battle evolved in the French courts between Portuguese immigrants and 
the French authorities. The former, claiming to be self-employed persons asked for 
residence permits. The mies on freedom of establishment, like those on services, had been 
in force since 1986, the date of accession of Portugal. Usually, however, the French 
authorities ("préfeture") took two or three years to answer the requests and in most cases 
refused them. Dozens of persons were "invited" to leave the country. Meanwhile, there 
were thousands of cases in Court, because the Portuguese claimed the application of 
article 5 of Council Directive 64/221, which provides that decisions on this matter have to 
be taken, at the latest, 6 months after the request. It was estimated that about 100.000 
Portuguese were in this situation, 20.000 of them in Paris alone. It would not be surprising 
if part of them turned out to be fake self-employed persons. Yet, surely not all of them.169
The rigorous, and even over-zealous application of national and Community rules 
by the French authorities, however, cannot be regarded without some interest. It highlights 
the eventual practical importance of the weak or uncertain points of the Court's ruling. For 
example: before the Van Elst case,170 and in spite of the Seco case, it was possible to 
wonder what the response of the Court of Justice would have been if the employees in 
question were not Portuguese, but nationals of a third country, Brazilians for instance. In 
any case, even now there are still some open issues. Let us imagine that a Brazilian 
enterprise sets up in Portugal what is a de facto branch, although legally a Portuguese
167 This distinction could eventually be justified as far as the provisions of the Act o f Accession of 
Portugal on free movement of workers are concerned. However, it does not seem to be justified as far as 
provision of services as such is concerned.
168 However, in practice it could be more difficult to impose such national regulations on the enterprises 
than to prevent third country national workers coming from another Member State from working in the 
host Member State. The application of such national regulations would eventually require some degree of 
collaboration with the public authorities by the workers, who, in this situation, are in a particularly 
precarious position regarding the employer.
169 In Spain also, lawyers tried to circumvent migration laws under the provisions on the freedom of 
establishment. They used the concept of "comunidad de bienes” -  a kind of partnership or common 
property on certain things or rights. Formally, this is a kind of co-operative where everyone is the owner, 
but in practice it may be a normal enterprise where some people control the business and the profits and 
the others work for them.
170 Quoted supra and analysed infra, in the main text.
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company. In a first phase it would only perform works in Portugal, m  Later, it would try 
to take Brazilian employees to France and build there the railway of some line of the TGV. 
Could the enterprise do that? Using another activity as an example, if the enterprise 
worked in the field of offices and factory cleaning, could it take its Brazilian employees 
and go to Germany to clean the "ADIDAS" headquarters? What about if it got a public 
contract in Denmark for restoring some old buildings in a historical town? Could the work 
be performed by some of the same Brazilians? Could the enterprise later move them from 
there to Belgium to do a similar job? And then again to yet another destination? For how 
long would the "temporary movement of workers", as described by the Court be 
considered really temporary? This seems to be a point in relation to which the concept of 
service would eventually have to be better defined.
In the meantime, as planned in the Action Programme of the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, the Commission 
presented in August 1991 a draft proposal for a Directive on the minimum rights to be 
guaranteed to workers who are employed in a Member State and moved to another to 
work under a sub-contract, as part of the enterprise which "provides services."* 172 This 
Directive would establish a set of rights that all workers would enjoy, including third 
country national workers. Besides establishing that the most favourable173 labour law 
would apply to those workers, the draft Directive provides for the respect of their basic 
human rights. It establishes that they cannot be discriminated against on grounds of sex 
"colour, race, religion, opinions, national origin, social background or sexual 
orientation."174
The draft proposal took some time to be approved by the Commission. This was 
due to disagreement among the Commissioners on the period of provision of services after 
which the Directive would be applicable. The Commissioners from the more developed 
countries of the Union considered too long the period of three months proposed by their 
colleague Mrs. Papandreou.175 In the beginning this was the duration of the period set, but 
later the proposal was amended and the period was reduced to one month only.
This draft Commission Directive is still being discussed in the Council. The same 
issue that was object of controversy between Commissioners (the period of work after 
which the Directive may be applied) is still blocking its approval by the Council. The 
Member States that have been most opposed to the approval of stringent rules are Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom, the countries from which more posted workers 
come from. The countries that favour more stringent rules are Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. These Member States prefer the so-called zero option,
17 1  And would continue to carry these out, so that the requirement of the economic link with a Member 
State was fulfilled.
172  See the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, COM (91) 230 final, SYN  346, o f 1/8/1991, amended by COM 
(93) 225 final, SYN 346 of 15/6/1993.
173 Between the one of the country where they are employed and the one of the country where they are 
actually working for the time being.
174 See its Article 3(1) (b)(vii) as amended in COM (93) 225 final - SYN 346, p. 13. See "Posted workers 
draft strengthened", E.l.R.Rev.t 1993, No.236, pp.22-24;
17  ^Who in this aspect was supported by southern European countries, including Portugal.
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that is: of applying the Directive on the veiy first day of employment in the host Member 
State.176 Meanwhile, in view of the delays in the adoption of the draft Directive of the 
Commission, Germany has even prepared legislation designed to implement rules similar 
to that of the draft Directive.177
After the presentation of the Commission's draft Directive of the Commission, in 
the Vander Elst case,178 the Court of Justice confirmed its ruling of the Rush Portuguesa 
case. The new case concerned a Belgian citizen, Van Elst, who provided demolition 
services. He sent eight of his employees, including four Moroccans legally resident in 
Belgium, to work for one month in Reims, in France. The Moroccans workers had entry 
visas to France, but not French work permits. The French authorities charged Van Elst 
with violation of the relevant French Law, which obliges enterprises in that situation to 
obtain working permits for third country national workers from the French national 
immigration office and to pay a fee for the services rendered. He was also fined 30.000 
French francs for not having done so.
The Court ruled that Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty prohibits Member States 
from requiring an enterprise of another Member State to obtain working permits for its 
third country national workers from a national immigration body and to pay to that body a 
fee for the services rendered, before sending those employees to provide services in that 
Member State. The Court added that imposing an administrative fine on the employer who 
does not fulfil such requirements was in violation of Community Law.
While this ruling does not seem to change the Rush doctrine much, it is interesting 
to analyse some of its aspects. The Court ruled that the payment of the sums (and fines) 
requested by the French authorities to Van Elst could constitute a substantial economic 
burden to his enterprise.179 Then, the Court recalled its doctrine on restrictions of 
provision of services, in general. It stated that Article 59 of the EC Treaty requires not 
only the elimination of any discrimination, on the grounds of nationality, against a provider 
of services established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction to 
such freedom, even if it is equally applicable to national providers of services and to those 
of other Member States. For this restriction to be forbidden by Article 59, it would be 
sufficient that it was liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he or she lawfully provided similar 
services.180
The Court added that, as one of the fundamental principles of the EC Treaty, 
freedom to provide services may be restricted only by mies which
"are justified by overriding reasons in the general interest and are applied to all 
persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the State where the service
176 MNS, 4 ,6  &  7/1995.
177 It is estimated that in Germany there are some hundreds of thousand o f illegal construction workers, 
almost half o f which would be nationals o f a Member State. See MNS, 7/1995.
178 Case C-43/93, Vander Elst v. O .M .I., quoted supra. This case is analysed by Peers, op.cit.
179 Paragraph 12 and 15, recalling the Seco and Säger cases in the latter paragraph. In the Säger case, the 
Court ruled that national legislation which submits the provision of services in the national territory, by a 
enterprise established in another Member State, to the issue of an administrative authorisation constitutes 
a restriction to free provision o f services. See case C-76/90, Säger [1991] ECR 4221, paragraph 14.
180 Paragraph 14.
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is provided, in so far as the interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the 
provider of such service is subject in the Member State where he is 
established .^.)".181 
Furthermore, as the Court added,
"(...) a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory 
subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment and 
thereby deprive of all practical effectiveness the provisions whose object is to 
guarantee the freedom to provided services".182
In this light, the Court considered that the requirements demanded by the French 
government to Van Elst were contrary to Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty, since they 
did "go beyond what may be laid down as a precondition for the provision of services".183 
The Court justified this by noting several points. _
First, the Moroccan workers employed by Van Elst who worked in France for one (j/ 
month, were lawfully resident in Belgium, where Van Elst himself was established, and 
had work permits issued by that country.184
Secondly, the Court recalled that the short-stay visas held by the Moroccan , 
workers, issued by the French government, "constituted valid documents permitting them 
to remain in France for as long as necessary to cany out the work". The Court concluded 
that
"Consequently, the national legislation applicable in the host State concerning the 
immigration and residence of aliens had been complied with".185 
This is, in my view, a problematic statement, to put it mildly. It seems to be clear that, if 
the Moroccan workers had told the responsible French services that they wanted the visas 
to go to work in France for one month, they probably would not get those visas. Contrary 
to what the Court mentioned, the French immigration legislation was not complied with, 
because the workers could not enter the country with short term visas if, from the 
beginning, they had the intention of working there. This consideration of the Court also 
raises another issue: was it relevant for the decision of the case that the French , 
government issued visas to the Moroccan workers? It seems difficult to sustain so. If Van j 
Elst has the right to send third country national workers to France to provide services 
there, it should make no difference whether the workers were granted French entry visas, 
as it makes no difference whether they were granted French work permits.186 Thus, the
181 Paragraph 16 of the judgment. As Peers recalls, the case-law of the Court concerning measures which 
are "equally applicable" to foreign and domestic service providers, accepts that such measures "can justify 
restrictions on free movement of services only where the restrictive effects are necessary and proportional 
to the aim of the legislation, where the subject has not been the issue of Community harmonisation 
measures, and where mutual recognition of other Member States' rules is not feasible. See Peers, op.cit., p. 
304. See, generally, O'Leary, S. & Fernández Martín, J.M., "Judicial Exceptions to the Free Provision of 
Services", European Law Journal, V o l.l, 1995, No.3, pp.308*329.
182 Paragraph 17.
183 Paragraph 22,
184 Paragraph 18.
185 paragraph 19.
186 It follows from this that France should be considered to be under a duty to issue the necessary visas. 
See Peers, op.cit., p.307.
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Court’s consideration of this aspect seems to be more a sort of political argument than a 
legal one.
The third point mentioned by the Court is related to the work permits, which, as 
the Court recalled, are required by French law for any undertaking established in that 
country, whatever the nationality of the employer. In the words of the Court,
"Such a system is intended to regulate access to the French employment market 
for workers from non-member countries"187 
However, in the view of the Court
"Workers employed by an undertaking established in one Member State who are 
temporarily sent to another Member State to provide services do not in any way 
seek access to the employment market of in that second State, if they return to 
their country of origin or residence after completion of their work. (...) Those 
conditions were fulfilled in the present case."188
To some extent the Court repeats here its ruling in the Rush Portuguesa case. It is true 
that in the Van Elst employees did work in France for one month only and did return to 
Belgium after that period. However, the Court did not define accurately the temporary 
period in which third country nationals working for an enterprise provider of services may 
work inanother-MembeiLState. This may berelevant for future cases, particularly taking 
into account the fact that this type of situation has arisen several times in different Member 
States and that decision in a case by the EC’s Court of Justice takes considerable time. 
Moreover, another aspect of the Rush Portuguesa ruling is also repeated here. The Court 
takes up again its reference to the fact that the relevant third country national workers do 
not seek access to the employment market of the host Member State. Arguably, in this 
manner the Court does not justify why those workers should be given access to the labour 
market of that Member State at all. Access to and competition in that labour market, in 
more general terms, seems to be the relevant issue here.
Finally, the Court responded to the objections of some intervening governments 
that the application of the French legislation was justified in the light of the aim of 
protecting workers and ensuring competition.189 It pointed out that the Moroccan 
workers had Belgian work permits and that Articles 40 and 41 of the Association 
Agreement with Morocco prohibited any discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
between Moroccan workers and workers nationals of Member States as far as working 
conditions, remuneration, and social security is concerned.190 Therefore, the Court 
considered that, the application of the relevant Belgian regime excluded significant risks of 
exploitation of workers and distortion of competition between enterprises. The Court took 
that conclusion referring also to the possibility that the French rules on public order be
187 Paragraph 20. As mentioned supra, the French version of the text of the Van Elst judgment (as the 
Rush Portuguesa one) refers to "marché de l'émploi", although its official English translation refers to 
"labour market". In the quotation, I used the "employment market" expression, which seems to me more 
close to the intention o f  the Court in its judgment.
188 Paragraph 21.
189 See paragraphs 24 and 25.
190 See the next chapter for an analysis o f the rules o f  this Agreement.
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applied regarding workers posted in that country in the framework of provision of 
services.
The ruling of the Court of Justice in the Van Elst case seems to be more elaborate 
than in the Rush Portuguesa case. Besides, it is also put more into the framework of the 
Court's doctrine on restrictions to provision of services, while the Rush Portuguesa case 
dealt much with the Act of Accession of Portugal and Spain. The Van Elst ruling brought 
some clarification to the one in Rush Portuguesa. However, some points remain to be 
better defined, while the adoption of the Commission draft Directive on posting of 
workers is also awaited.
3 - Rights in the Framework of the Free Movement of Capital and 
Current Payments
The rule relating to the free movement of capital, which remained in force until 1st 
January 1994, was Article 67(1) of the E(E)C Treaty. It envisaged the progressive 
abolition between Member States of
"all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in the 
Member States and any discrimination based on nationality or on the place of 
residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested."
It was clear that this Article applied to all residents in the European Union, 
whatever their nationality.*  ^ Furthermore, the Directives for the implementation of 
Article 67 also made a general reference to "persons resident in Member States", without 
mentioning their nationality.*92 The problem was that there was neither a Community 
definition of residence for general purposes, nor for the purposes of the free movement of 
capital. According to the Explanatory Notes of the Nomenclature annexed to the Two first 
capital Directives: "residents and non-residents" were the "natural and legal persons *93 
according to the definitions laid down in the exchange control regulations in force in each 
Member State." However, this would imply an unacceptable situation, that is the existence *192
*9* Furthermore, it would apply only to residents, not including nationals o f a Member State who do not 
reside in the Union. It should be noted, meanwhile, that, as Burrows puts it: "(i]t is unusual for the Treaty 
to make residence rather than nationality the test, but the practical reasons for this is that national 
exchange control laws are usually based on residence", see Burrows, F., op.cit. at p.280. The nationality 
rule here would not be as effective as in other fields of free movement. In fact, it would be very easy to 
circumvent a rule that prohibited a third country national from sending his capital to another Member 
State as it would be easily to find a national of a Member State to do it for him or her. A similar situation 
could not happen, for example, in the free movement of workers.
192 Article I o f Directive 88/361/EEC of the Council for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 
O J L  178/5 of 8/7/88. See also Article 2 (referring to "non-residents") and Article 7 of the same Directive, 
as well as Articles 1(1), 2(1) and 3(1) (all referring to residents of Member States) of the repealed First 
Council Directive of 11 May 1960 for the implementation of Article 67 o f the EEC Treaty, OJ L  921/49 of 
12/7/1960, amended by Council Directive 63/21/EEC of 18 December 1962, O J 62/5 of 22/1/63.
193According to Oliver, it is obvious that these legal persons (with or without the nationality of a Member 
State) may be controlled by a natural or legal person who is a national of a third country. This fact cannot 
prevent the person residing in the Community from enjoying the rights o f free movement of capital. See 
Oliver, opxit., p.90.
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of different definitions of beneficiaries of free movement and leaving it to each of the 
national legislators to decide to whom Community Law may apply. *94
Meanwhile, in relation to current payments, the old Article 106(1) of the EEC 
Treaty established that when a third country national could benefit from any of the four 
fundamental freedoms of the EC, he or she would be allowed to make any payments or 
any transfers of capital and earnings between Member States. Clearly, this regime did not 
constitute a substantial addition to the rights of third country nationals in Community 
Law. It was merely a requirement for the operation of the few rights already granted to 
third country nationals.
After 1 January 1994 a new and simpler regime was established in what relates to 
free movement of capital and current payments. On that date, the new provisions on free 
movement of capital of the Treaty on European Union came into force. They repealed the 
old Articles 67 to 73 of the EEC Treaty, as well as Article 106.195
The new Article 73B establishes in its first paragraph that :
" 1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States 
and third countries shall be prohibited.*'
Its paragraph 2 repeats the same rule in relation to payments. *1964
I®4 A similar situation may be found in cases Hoekstra and Levin - case 75/63, Hoekstra, bom Unger
[1964] ECR 177, and case 53/81, Levin, quoted supra. In the latter, the Court stated that the "term 
'worker' and ’activity as an employed person' (...) may not be defined by reference to the national laws of 
the Member States but have a Community meaning. I f  that were not the case, the Community rules on free 
movement of workers would be frustrated, as the meaning of those terms could be fixed and modified 
unilaterally, without any control by the Community institutions, by the national laws which would thus be 
able to exclude at will certain categories o f persons from the benefit of the Treaty.” Idem, paragraph 11. 
Thus, Oliver suggested the use mutatis mutandis o f  Article 58 of the Treaty - Oliver, op.cit., at p. 89. That 
Article defines the legal persons that for the purposes of freedom o f establishment are to be treated in the 
same way as natural persons who are nationals o f Member States. I f  the use o f Article 58 seems entirely 
justified in what relates to legal persons, as far as natural persons are concerned, it appears more 
reasonable to take recourse also to other legal sources. These sources could be, for example, the Member 
States rules of Private International Law and Article 1(h) of Regulation 1408/71 on Social Security, that 
defines as relevant residence the "habitual residence". According to the Regulation, the latter concept is 
different from a mere "temporary residence", or "stay". Note also that the Mikkelsen case does not seem to 
apply here. In that case the Court of Justice considered that the meaning of the term "employee" to be 
protected by Directive No.77/187 (quoted supra, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees* rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or 
parts o f businesses) was equivalent to that of the persons protected as employees under national 
employment law. The Court referred to national law to define the precise meaning of a Community rule, 
justifying this with the fact that the Directive did not intend to establish a uniform level o f protection 
throughout the Community on the basis o f common criteria. The point is precisely that such does not seem 
to be the case here, as regards the definition of residents for the purposes of a fundamental freedom of 
movement, like the freedom of movement of capital. See case 105/84, Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i 
Danmark v. A/S Danmols Inventaar, in liquidation (Mikkelsen) [1985] ECR 2639, paragraphs 26-8.
195 To ^  precise, the original version of Article 106 was replaced in the Treaty on European Union by 
the "new" Article 73H, which had almost exactly the same content as the former provision. The latter 
provision entered into force with the Treaty, but was repealed by the entry into force on 1st January 1994 
o f the new Articles 73B to 73G o f the EC Treaty.
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The general principle of this provision is subject to some restrictions based mainly 
on fiscal reasons or on grounds relating to monetary movements with third countries. 
However the provision is drafted in quite absolute terms 196 and js even broader than the 
old Articles 67 and 106. Now, to benefit from the free movement of capital or from the 
freedom of payments, it is not even required that a person be resident in a Member State. 
Moreover, insofar as capital movements are fully liberalised, it is not necessary to discuss 
whether they are justified by rights relating to freedom o f movement of persons, services 
or goods.
Therefore an interesting situation arises. A third country national may be allowed 
by the national laws o f the Member States to travel between them and to work and receive 
or provide services. This is not within the scope of Community Law. The third country 
national simply has no Community right to move within the Union, or to request services 
from another Member State. Yet, in these cases he or she does have a Community right to 
make any bank transfer related with those activities. This is so because he or she has a 
Community right to transfer money to another Member State, both to transfer capital and 
to make payments.
4 - Rights in the Framework of the Free Movement of Goods
Community Law regarding the free movement of goods applies to all products 
originating in the various Member States, as well as to goods originating in a third country 
which have been put into circulation within the Community. Therefore Community Law 
rules on the matter may be fully relied upon by third country nationals.
The relevant provisions o f  the EC Treaty, that is Articles 12 to 37,197 make no 
direct or indirect* 98 reference to the nationality of the traders involved.*99 Neither do they
*9b See Usher,J.A. in Plender and Usher's Cases and Materials on the Law o f the European 
Communities, London. Butterworths, 1993, p.490. Note that certain restrictions on the absolute freedom of 
movement are allowed, mainly based on fiscal reasons or in relation to monetary movements with third 
countries.
* 9 7  Correspondent to the Title I (on "Free Movement of Goods”) of Part Two (on "Foundations of the 
Community") of the EC Treaty.
*9 8  I mean here a reference of the type made in Article 48 ("workers of the Member States"), which, 
according to the dominant view, refers to nationals of Member States only.
* 9 9  A single exception exists in Article 37. When referring to limits on the activities of State monopolies 
of the EC countries, this Article obliges Member States to "progressively adjust any State monopolies of a 
commercial character" so that by the end of the transitional period "no discrimination regarding the 
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States." 
While this rule could be seen as a proof that the free movement of goods would only apply to nationals of 
a Member State, in fact it does not seem to invalidate the assessment made in the main text. It should 
rather be understood as a defective application (resulting from the main and normal concern on traders of 
the EC, but not necessarily excluding others) of a more general principle stated generally in Article 9 and 
repeated, e.g., in Articles 10(1), 12, 13, 16, 30, 31, 32, 34 and 36(in fine) of the Treaty. Besides this 
attempt at a contextual analysis, the interpretation submitted is in practice indispensable for the full 
achievement of the purpose of the Treaty rules: the building up of a true common market on goods. Note 
finally the ruling of the Court referred to supra, in the main text, in relation to pecuniary charges on 
imports and exports.
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refer to their place o f residence. Consequently, it may be concluded that the governments 
of the Member States may not discriminate between traders on the grounds of nationality 
or residence. This idea was partly confirmed by the Court o f Justice, when stating that:
"The Treaty prohibits any pecuniary charge on imports and exports between 
Member States, irrespective of the nationality of the traders who might be placed 
at a disadvantage by such measures."2®®
What seems to be important for Community Law is the promotion of free trade within the 
EC, regardless o f  exactly who is going to be the primary beneficiary from it.
5 - The Right to Travel
a) The Proposed Right to Travel in the Framework of the Abolition of Internal 
Border Controls
As mentioned in the previous chapters, on 12 July 1995 the Commission presented 
three draft directives aimed at abolishing internal border controls on persons.* 201 These 
Directives have not yet been adopted by the Council.202 They deal with some inward 
aspects o f  the abolition o f internal border controls on persons in the Union. The draft 
External Frontiers Convention is instead the main instrument dealing with matters that 
concern such abolition but that are related to the control o f the external borders o f  the 
Union. This Convention is analysed in chapter 8.
One o f the three draft Directives is a framework Directive203 providing for the 
general elimination o f controls on persons crossing internal frontiers. It establishes that all
2®® Cases 2 & 3/69, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. Brachfeld and Cougal [1969] ECR 211, 
at 223.
2 0 1  These are the Draft Council Directive on the elimination of controls on persons crossing internal 
frontiers, COM (95) 347, final; the Draft Council Directive on the right of third-country nationals to 
travel in the Community, COM (95) 346, final; and the Draft European Parliament and Council Directive 
amending Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for workers of Member States and their families and Directive 73/148 on the abolition of 
restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with 
regard to establishment and the provision of services, COM (95) 348 final, all three draft Directives are 
dated from 12/7/1995. The first two draft Directives are based on Article 100 of the EC Treaty. The third 
draft Directive mentioned (the one proposed in COM (95) 348) is based in Articles 49,54(2) and 63(2) of 
the EC Treaty. These are the Treaty provisions that based the adoption of the Directives which are to be 
amended by this draft Directive.
2 0 2  This draft Directive is meant to be implemented by the end of 1996. At the moment of writing this 
seems a somewhat ambitious objective. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the introduction of the 
Commission communication to the three draft Directives asserts that they are meant to be adopted after 
the approval of compensatory measures that guarantee security in the Union. However, there is no 
conditional clause in the main text of the Directives to that effect In any case, and taking into 
consideration that unanimity in the Council is required for the adoption of these draft Directives, it is 
likely that their adoption will only be possible after the adoption of compensatory measures for such 
abolition. The problem is that the negotiations on the draft Convention on controls on persons crossing 
the external frontiers of the Member States [hereinafter External Frontiers Convention], and on the 
Convention on the European Information System are quite delayed - notably as far as the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice on them is concerned.
2 0 3  Proposed in COM (95) 347 final.
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persons, "whatever their nationality" can cross Member State frontiers within the 
Community "at any point" and "without such crossing being subject to any frontier control 
or formality."204 Another draft Directive amends some rules o f secondary Community 
Law, which allowed for the possibility that Member States control persons at internal 
borders - namely nationals of third countries.205
A key element for the abolition o f internal border controls on persons is provided 
by another draft Directive. It would grant to third country nationals "who are lawfully in a 
Member State" the right to travel in the territories of other Member States 206 This draft 
Directive does not affect Community Law already applicable to third country nationals, 
namely the Community rules on relatives o f migrant nationals o f Member States and the 
EEA Agreement. Thus, they may eventually benefit from the draft Directive provisions, 
but these cannot affect rights already enjoyed by those persons under Community Law.
The right to "travel" of third country nationals is defined as 
"the right to cross internal Community borders and to remain in the territory of a 
Member State for a short stay, or to travel onward, without the person concerned 
being required to obtain a visa from the Member State or States in whose territory 
the right is exercised" ,20 7
Yet, Member States may require persons exercising the right to travel to report their 
presence in their territories.208
The right to travel does not affect rules on stays other than for a short time, nor 
rules on access to employment or on the taking-up o f activities as a self-employed 
person.209 In any case, the right to travel, as above defined, is granted both to third 
country nationals holding a residence permit issued by a Member State210 and to those 
who do not hold such a permit, but who entered the Union for a short stay.
Residents in another Member State, provided they possess a valid travel document 
and a valid residence permit, can travel to the territories o f the other Member States for a
2 0 4  Idem, Article 1(1). Article 3(4) establishes that, for the purposes of the Directive, frontier control 
means "any control applied, in connection with or on the occasion of the crossing of an internal frontier, 
by the public authorities of a Member State or by other persons, under the national legislation of a 
Member State". Frontier formality signifies "any formality imposed on a person in connection with the 
crossing of an internal frontier and to be fulfilled on the occasion of such crossing". The general 
elimination of border controls is not meant to affect "the exercise of the law-enforcement powers" of 
national authorities over their territory, nor legal "obligations to possess and cany documents" - Article 
1(2). Temporary reinstatement of controls are allowed in case of "a serious threat to public policy or 
public security", provided these controls "shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the 
serious threat" - Article 2.
2 0 5  Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 348 final.
2 ° 6  Article 1(1) of the Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 346, final. Cf. the rules of this draft 
Directive with those of the draft External Frontiers Convention on the same topic, notably its Article 8 . 
This draft Convention is analysed in chapter 8  and has many points in common with the corresponding 
provisions of the draft Directive. For the relation between the two instruments see also the Commission's 
introduction to the draft Directive, particularly in the comments specifically related with the Directive 
provisions, at points 28 to 45.
2 0 7  Article 2(1) of the Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 346, final.
2 0 8  Article 5.
2 0 9  Idem, Article 1(3).
2 1 0  Ibidem, Article 3 and Article 2(2).
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continuous period of up to three months.211 The draft Directive provides that Member 
States shall readmit third country nationals to whom they issued residence permits and 
who are found unlawfully residing in another Member State. The conditions for the 
existence o f the duty of readmission are spelled out in an Annex to the Convention. This 
Annex provides, for example, that the Member State o f residence has the duty to readmit a 
third country national holding a residence permit issued there, "within a period o f up to 
two months after the expiration of the validity of the residence permit". However, the 
authorities o f the Member State where the person is found during an illegal stay have to 
lodge the request o f  readmission within one month after "becoming aware o f the person’s 
unlawful presence in the Member State".212
Third country nationals who do not hold a residence permit in a Member State, 
and who entered the Union for a short stay, will enjoy the right to travel in other Member 
States in two types o f situations.213 First, if  they hold a visa which is valid throughout the 
Community and which is "mutually recognised for the purpose o f crossing the external 
frontiers o f the Member States."214 Secondly, in the case that they are not required to hold 
a visa to enter into certain other Member States where they are going to travel. In the first 
case, i.e. if  they hold a Community valid visa, they may travel in the territory o f  the 
Member States during the period o f stay permitted by the visa, and provided "they are in 
possession o f a travel document bearing the valid visa". In the second case, if third country 
nationals do not have a Community valid visa, they may be either exempted from visa 
requirements by all Member States, or subject to them in some Member States only. I f  no 
Member State requires them to have a visa, then, provided they possess valid travel 
documents, they may travel in the territory o f the Member States for up to three months 
within six months after the date o f  the first entry in one Member State. If  only some 
Member States require them to have a visa (and they do not have a Community valid 
visa), they also have to possess valid travel documents to enjoy the right of travel. 
However, they can travel only to Member States that do not require them to have a visa. 
Finally, explicit provision is made for the possibility that a Member State authorises visa 
holders to stay in its own territory for more than three months.
In the meantime it should be noted that any third country national covered by the 
draft Directive can be expelled from a Member State for several reasons.215 First, 
provided he or she
2 1 1  See, generally. Article 3.
2 1 2  Note that, in contrast, the draft Convention on the External Borders does not contain detailed 
provisions on the readmission by a Member State of third country nationals who are unlawfully resident in 
another Member State, but who hold a residence permit issued by the former Member State. Article 8(3) 
of the draft Convention only makes a general provision for the duty of readmission of Member States, 
adding that it will be subject to "conditions determined by measures to give effect to [the] Convention".
2 1 3  See, generally. Article 4.
2 1 4  Article 4 and Article 2(3).
2 1 5  This applies both to third country nationals who hold a residence permit of another Member State and 
to third country nationals who do not hold such a residence permit. In the latter case, the first sentence of 
Article 4(5) refers that expulsion is possible when they were "allowed to enter the Community for a short 
stay." See also Article 4(4), providing that Article 4 does not preclude Member States to authorise third 
country nationals to stay in their territory for more than three months. The situation of third country 
nationals who are authorized to stay for more than three months, but not as residents (e.g. asylum 
seekers), does not seem to be addressed by the draft Directive in an explicit manner. See, however. Article
196
"represents a threat to public order or public security in the Member State in 
which he is exercising the right to travel, or to its international relations.*'216 
Secondly, if he or she does not "have sufficient means of subsistence". These must enable 
them to financially cover the period of the intended stay or transit. Moreover, they must 
enable them to return to the Member State where they are resident, or to go to another 
country where they are certain to be admitted.217 Finally, a third country national can also 
be expelled if  he or she does not possess the required documents, or if he or she stays in 
the territories o f Member States for a longer period than he or she was allowed.
As a general assessment o f this draft Directive it could be said that it would have a 
positive effect for third country nationals, since it would facilitate their movements and 
those of their families within the Union. However, it is easy to see that the regime it 
provides is rather partial and incomplete.218 First, the rules of the draft Directive use a 
, number of concepts which are not defined in the least manner, such as "sufficient means of 
^subsistence", or "threat to public order or public security in the Member State in which [a 
third country national] is exercising the right to travel, or to its international relations". 
How the possibility o f expulsion relates to the respect o f the fundamental human rights of 
the person concerned - such as the right to freedom of expression and the right of asylum 
is not clear. Secondly, several aspects of the right to travel of third country nationals, as 
proposed by the draft Directive, are clearly connected with aspects of the draft External 
Frontiers Convention - such as matters related to visas. That Convention is has yet to be 
concluded, not to mention fully implemented. Only then would a general and coherent 
legal framework be set up, as far as the right to travel is concerned. Finally, it should b e 1 
recalled that third country nationals, themselves, do not have a Community right to receive 
or provide services in another Member State. It does not seem coherent that third country 
nationals only have a Community right to travel in other Member States, without having at 
least a Community right to be tourists there and thus to be recipients of services. Some
3(4) and the Commission remarks' in the introduction to the draft Directive, point 39. In the meantime, 
one may note that in this respect the rules of the External Frontiers Convention seem more elaborated, 
since they envisage the existence of third country nationals with "provisional residence permits". See 
Article 8(2) of that Convention and chapter 8  for more details.
2 1 6  Article 3(3) and Article 4(3). Cf. with Article 7(1 )(c) of the draft Convention on External Frontiers, 
discussed in chapter 8 .
2 1 7  The possession of sufficient means of subsistence is both a condition for the exercise of the right to 
travel and a justification of expulsion. See, Article 3 (respectively paragraph 1 and 3) and Article 4 
(respectively paragraphs I and 2, and paragraph 3). By contrast, the threat to the public order, to the 
public security, or to the international relations of the Member State where the person is exercising the 
right to travel is only a ground for expulsion from that State. The difference in practice is presumed not to 
exist, since controls at the borders are to be eliminated, according to the draft Directive proposed in COM 
(95) 347. However, the difference may have some relevance if the draft Directive on the third country 
nationals' right to travel is approved before the framework Directive on general abolition of internal 
border controls. The possibility of this prior adoption of the former Directive is suggested by the 
Commission in point 3 of the introduction of the draft Directives.
2 1 8  This could eventually be explained by the fact that, as referred to in chapter 3, the presentation of 
these Directives is most probably also related to the action of the European Parliament against the 
Commission for its failure to act to abolish internal border controls on persons by the end of 1992. See 
chapter 3, section B.
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Community regulation of their position as tourists, and recipients of services in general 
terms, only seems logical. This has yet to be achieved.
b) The Right to Travel to European Works Council meetings
At least in one situation it seems arguable that third country nationals (in their 
capacity as workers in a Member State) may enjoy a Community right to travel to another 
Member State under an already existing instrument o f Community Law. This right to 
travel can be construed on the basis o f the European Works Council Directive.219 If  a 
third country national worker is a representative on a European Works Council, when the 
latter meets in another Member State, that worker220 should be considered to have a 
Community right to go there to attend the meeting.221
Naturally, it would only be necessary to invoke this right inasmuch as the 
previously mentioned draft Directive on the right of third country nationals to travel 
between Member States for a short period is not in force. As explained above, it is not 
certain whether this draft Directive will be adopted soon. Furthermore, even if it were to 
be adopted as the Commission proposed, it would have to be implemented by the end of 
1996, while the European Works Council Directive has to be implemented by 22 
September 1996, at the latest. The Commission draft Directive on the right o f third 
country nationals to travel between Member States may not be in force by then. In that 
case, one may wonder what would be the legal regime to apply concretely to the right that 
third country national workers have to travel to another Member State - for a meeting o f a 
European Works Council in which they are representatives. Arguably, this legal regime 
could be inspired by the relevant rules applicable to the movement of nationals of Member 
States to another Member State to receive services. Alternatively, or as a complement, it 
could be inspired by the regime applicable to cases o f third country national workers 
employed in an EC  enterprise providing services in another Member State.222 Another 
possibility would be that such regime be inspired by the very rules of the Commission draft 
Directive on the right o f third country nationals to travel to another Member State.
Finally, note also that, the Justice Council has adopted under Title VI o f the Treaty 
on European Union, a joint action to facilitate the travel within the Union for third country 
nationals' school children.223
2 1 9  Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council 
or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254/64, of 30/09/94. This Directive was based on 
"the Agreement on social policy annexed to the Protocol 14 on social policy annexed to the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 2(2) thereof*, as mentioned in its 
Preamble.
2 2 0  The same may be sustained for a representative of an employer.
2 2 1  This could, for example, be considered included in the (usual) clause contained in Article 14 of the 
European Works Council Directive, according to which Member States shall take all necessary steps 
enabling them at all times to guarantee the results imposed by the Directive.
2 2 2  The regime of free movement of persons in this cases is examined below in this section.
2 2 3  Decision 94/795/JHA on a joint action concerning travel facilities for school pupils from third 
countries resident in a Member State, adopted by the Council on 30 November 1994, OJ L 327/1-3.
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6 - Other situations
Unless they are close relatives of nationals of a Member State, third country 
nationals are excluded from the scope of the Directives on the right of residence for 
students,224 for retired persons225 and for persons who do not have that right under other 
instruments of EC Law.226 *The right of residence provided by these Directives is limited 
to "nationals of Member States" and some of their relatives.22 /
The same situation holds for the provisions establishing European citizenship in the 
Treaty on European Union. The new Article 8 of the EC Treaty establishes that "every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union". No 
possibility is envisaged for the direct acquisition of European citizenship by third country 
nationals, that is without acquisition of the nationality of a Member State. This issue will 
be deal with in Chapter 7, in which the new rules introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union are analysed.
i
2 2 4  Students in a vocational training course, see Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29/10/1993 on the right 
of residence for students, OJ L 317/59 of 18/12/1993. This Directive was adopted by the Council following 
the annulment of Directive No. 90/366/EEC on the right of residence for students, OJ L 180/30 of 
13/7/90. This latter Directive was annulled because the Court ruled that its legal basis should have been 
Article 7(2) and not Article 235 of the EC Treaty. According to the Court, acts adopted under Article 7(2) 
of the EC Treaty should not be necessarily confined to the regulation of rights deriving from the first 
paragraph of Article 7. Such measures may also deal with aspects which regulation seems necessary to the 
effective exercise of such rights. In this context the Court considered that the right of residence of 
students' relatives is an indispensable element for the effective exercise of the right of residence of 
students. Therefore the Court annulled Directive 90/366, while maintaining its effects until the entry into 
force of the new Directive adopted on the appropriate legal basis. See case C-295/90, European Parliament 
v. Council [1992J ECR 1-4193. The justification for the ruling of the Court is quite interesting, since it 
confirms that the right of residence for relatives of a migrant national of a Member State is an 
"indispensable" condition for the exercise by that migrant national of his or her freedom of movement. To 
certain extent, this part of the Court's ruling draws an interesting light on the analysis made infra on the 
right of residence in another Member State of third country nationals who are relatives of a migrant 
national of one Member State, when the latter moves to that other Member State. The right to move with 
one's family is indispensable for the freedom of movement of the migrant national of a Member Stale, 
himself or herself.
2 2 5  Council Directive No. 90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons 
who have ceased their occupational activity, OJ L 180/28, of 13/7/90.
2 2 6  Council Directive No. 90/364/EEC on the right of residence for persons who do not enjoy this right 
under other provisions of Community Law, OJ L 180/26, of 13/7/90. These three Directives will be 
referred to as the "three Directives of 1990 on the right of residence", although, as mentioned supra, 
Directive 90/366/EEC on the right of residence for students, was annulled and replaced by Council 
Directive 93/96/EEC.
22  ^Article 1 of all the three Directives.
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B) RIGHTS GRANTED TO THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS DUE 
TO THEIR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP WITH A NATIONAL OF A
MEMBER STATE
1 - RELATIVES OF A MIGRANT NATIONAL OF A MEMBER 
STATE
a) G enera l a spec ts
(i) subordinate rights and reverse discrimination
Third country national relatives of a Member State national who exercises his or 
her right to free movement within the Union, are granted under Community Law the right 
to move from one Member State to another with that Member State national. The aim of 
this right is to put the national of a Member State with third country national relatives in 
the same position as that of a national of a Member State whose family is entirely made up 
of Member State nationals. Therefore, Community Law relating to the freedom of 
movement o f persons entitles relatives of nationals of a Member State to a certain number 
of rights, making explicit provision that these rights be recognised irrespective o f the 
nationality o f such relatives.
The rights o f  third country national relatives are Subordinate) rights. They are only 
granted so as to allow those persons to accompany a migrant national of a Member State. 
They can only be enjoyed if the national o f a Member State actually exercises his or her 
right to free movement.228 This raises the issue of reverse discrimination, as exemplified 
by the Morson & Jhanjan cases.229 in these cases two Surinamese mothers o f two Dutch 
lationals claimed the right to reside with their sons in the Netherlands, under Article 10 of 
Regulation 1612/68.230 The problem was that their sons, who were working and residing 
in that country, were never employed, nor worked in another Member State. For this 
reason, they could not benefit from the Community rules regarding the free movement of 
workers and, thus, their Surinamese mothers could not reside with them in the 
Netherlands.
This is a typical case of reverse discrimination, i.e., the possibility that Member 
States treat less favourably their own nationals under national law, than they do have to 
treat nationals o f other Member States who are protected under Community Law.* 293031 This
2 2 8  xhis jSt after all, the same requirement that applies to the nationals of a Member State, themselves: 
they may only enjoy the rights related to free movement if they actually move within the Community.
229 See Cases 35 & 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan V. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723.
2 3 0  See below, in this section, for an analysis of this provision.
2 3 1  On reverse discrimination and Community Law, see Druesne, G., "Remarques sur le champ 
d'application personnel du droit communautaire: des discriminations à rebours peuvent-elles tenir en 
échec la liberté de circulation des personnes?", RTDE, Vol. 15, 1979, No.3, pp.429-439; Greenwood, C., 
"Nationality and the Limits of the Free Movement of Persons in Community Law", YEL, Vol.7, 1987, 
pp. 185-210, particularly at pp. 192-205; Jessurun D'Oliveira, H.U., "Is Reverse Discrimination Still 
Permissible Under the Single European Act?", in Forty Years On: The Evolution o f Postwar Private 
International Law in Europe, Deventer, Centrum voor Buitenlands Recht en Internationaal 
Privaatrecht/Kluwer, 1990, pp.71-86; Johnson & O'Keeffe, op.cit., pp. 1313-1346; Kon, S.D., "Aspects of
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idiscriminatory treatment is allowed for under Community Law, although Article 6 of the 
EC Treaty forbids discrimination on the grounds of nationality, simply because this 
prohibition applies only to cases which are considered to be "within the scope of 
application o f this Treaty", as required by that Article. This problematic can be analysed 
from two perspectives. On one hand it is possible to examine the manner in which the 
scope of application of Community Law is defined. On the other hand, in a more 
fundamental manner, reverse discrimination can be questioned in itself.
Reverse discrimination has been cleared by the Court of Justice, as far as 
Community Law is concerned, when the situations at stake are "purely internal cases", i.e. 
cases "where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations o f Community 
Law".232 The Court of Justice has held, for example, that cases such as Morson & 
Jhanjan, referred to above, were purely internal cases. In those cases the nationals o f a 
Member State, i.e. the children o f the plaintiffs, never exercised the right to freedom of 
movement, they did never went to another Member State to work. Thus they could not 
ask for the advantages of the provisions adopted for the persons who do exercise such 
rights, like the provisions establishing the right of relatives to follow nationals o f a 
Member State to another Member State.233
However, in certain cases, Community Law on free movement may be invoked by 
a national of one Member State against the authorities of that very State. In the Knoors 
case,234 a Dutch national residing in Belgium, where he worked as a plumber, sought 
permission to work in the Netherlands. The Dutch authorities refused this request because 
he did not have the required Dutch qualifications, only the Belgian ones. Had he been 
Belgian, under Community Law the Dutch authorities would have had to accept his 
qualifications for him to work in the Netherlands. The Court o f Justice denied that this 
was a purely internal case. The Court considered that the situation o f Mr.Knoors, who had 
resided in another Member State and had obtained qualifications there, could "be 
assimilated to that o f any other persons enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the 
Treaty" 235 This was held to be so despite the fact that Article 52 grants the right to
Reverse Discrimination in Community Law", ELR, Vol.6 , 198!, No. 1, pp.75-10!, particularly at pp.75-9I 
and 100-101; Pickup, David M.W. "Reverse Discrimination and Freedom of Movement for Workers", 
CMLRev, Vol. 23. 1986, No.l, pp. 135-156.
2 3 2  Case 175/78, Regina v. Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, paragraph 11. This case was related to 
freedom of movement of workers. The same ruling was applied to a case related to freedom of provision of 
services, in case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Debauve [1980] ECR 833. Here the Court of Justice ruled that 
"the provisions of the Treaty on freedom to provide services cannot apply to activities whose relevant 
elements are only confined within a single Member State". See idem, paragraph 9.
2 3 3  See Morson & Jhanjan cases, quoted supra, paragraph 18. See also, in the field of derived rights under 
Regulation 1408/71 (quoted supra) case 147/87 Zaoui v. Caisse régionale d’Assurance maladie de Tile de 
France [1987] ECR 55! 1, paragraphs 14-16; and case C-206/91, Ettien Koua Poirrez [1992] ECR 6685. 
See also case C-297/88 and C-197/89, Massam Dzodzi v. Belgian State, [1990] ECR I- 3763, paragraphs 
23-4.
2 3 4  Case 115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [1979] ECR 399.
2 3 5  Idem, paragraph 24. The Court stated also that exception to this finding could arise, considering "the 
legitimate interest which a Member State may have in preventing certain of its nationals, by means of the 
facilities created by the Treaty, from attempting wrongly to evade the application of their national 
legislation(...)." See paragraph 25. This was not the case of Knoors, considering that the length of periods 
during which the activity in question must have been pursued excluded abuse. See paragraph 26.
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freedom o f establishment to "nationals o f a Member State" who wish to establish 
themselves "in another Member State".
This teleological and not literal interpretation o f Community rules may perhaps be 
considered an example of the more positive side of the Court of Justice's doctrine 
concerning the scope of Community Law, as far as reverse discrimination is concerned.236 
However, in other cases it does not seem to be so clear that the solution and the 
justification used by the Court are justified.237 More broadly, legal literature has 
questioned the Court's criteria to decide whether or not a case, in which a national o f a 
Member State invokes EC rules against its own State, is within the scope o f Community 
Law.238 It has been argued that the definition of what is a purely "internal case" should not 
be limited to taking into consideration "some sort o f catalogue of contacts or factual 
points o f reference" o f a case. Instead, examination should also be made o f  the 
"Community norms and principles that, given their purposes and policies, claim application 
to certain category o f cases". It "is important to determine the object and scope of 
Community rules" and consider "the very teleology and dynamics o f the Community legal 
system".239
From a more fundamental perspective, reverse discrimination can be questioned in 
itself, as far as its justification is concerned. It has correctly been argued that reverse 
discrimination is less and less sustainable in an internal market "without internal frontiers", 
as required by Article 7A.240 As Jessurun D'Oliveira recalls:
"it now becomes extremely difficult to uphold the distinction, drawn until now, 
between 'purely internal' cases and 'Community cases'. Aiming at an internal 
market, or completing it, while at the same time continuing to attach importance to 
the crossing of national frontiers is self-contradictory. " 241
In fact, the very logic o f the internal market may justify the prohibition of 
discrimination against persons who stay in their Member States of origin, and whose 
situation may thus be considered not to have any "contact" with another Member State. 
The objective of an harmonious and balanced development of economic activities and the
However, that consideration may justify the requirement that freedom of movement under Community 
Law be exercised a period long enough so that (in the specific circumstances of the situation at stake) it 
may be considered a true exercise of such freedom, and not a mere fraud to national law, through the use 
of Community Law.
2 3 6  See also the below examined case C-370/90, Surinder Singh, [1992] ECR1-4265.
2 3 7  See case 175/78, Ann Saunders, and cases 35-6/82, Morson & Jhanjan, quoted supra and criticised by 
Jessurun D'Oliveira, op.cit., pp.78-9, and 80 respectively. The former case is also criticised by Kon, 
op.cit., at pp.90-1. Particularly open to criticism is case 180/83, Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemburg 
[1984] ECR 2539. This case is critically analysed by Pickup, op.cit., pp. 135-7 and 154.
2 3 8  See, e.g., Greenwood, op.cit., p.205, who sustains that the criteria is vague and difficult to apply, 
although he states that "in view of the complexity of the subject", and considering the lack of need to do so 
in the specific cases before the Court, "it is perhaps unreasonable to blame the Court for not going out of 
its way" to elaborate on the criteria.
2 3 9  Jessurun D'Oliveira, op.cit., pp.74-5.
2 4 0  See Jessurun D’Oliveira, op.cit., pp.82-6. The same type of argument is also mentioned by Weatherill 
& Beaumont, EC Law - The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings o f the European Community, London, 
Penguin, 1993, p.540.
2 4 1  See Jessurun D'Oliveira, op.cit, p.84.
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raising o f the quality of life,242 for example, may be inconsistent with the practical 
incentive for a person to go to another Member State, just to benefit from Community 
provisions. As in the Morson & Jhanjan cases, these provisions could, for instance, give a 
person the right to bring his or her relatives from a third country (or indeed from another 
Member State) to the Member State o f residence (different from the country of origin of 
the migrant national of a Member State).243 If this person goes to another Member State 
just for the purpose of benefiting from Community rights (e.g. on family reunification) the 
objective of optimal economic performance in the Union may be jeopardised. For if that 
person stays in his or her Member State of origin, he may be able to contribute more to 
Community objectives, than if  he or she is obliged to go to another Member State just to 
exercise a fundamental human right like family life.
Furthermore^reverse discrimination may also raise the issue of violation o f the 
principle o f equallity enshrinedin several Member States* constitutions244 and in Article 10 
of the European Convention o f Human Rights. A differential treatment based on whether a 
person has or has not exercised the Community right to freedom of movement of persons 
is likely to be entirely illegitimate. To the extent that such differential treatment may be 
justified by a legitimate interest, for example to compensate migrants for the eventual 
disadvantages arising from their migration between Member States, it may happen to be 
disproportionate to the aim pursued. It may be discriminatory.
(ii) overview of the relatives' rights
To start with, it may be recalled that, according to Article 1 of Regulation 
1612/68, the right to take up employment in another Member State applies to "[ajhy 
national o f a Member State irrespective o f his [or her] place o f residence". Therefore, it 
seems clear that this right (including the right to move with family members to the other 
Member State) also applies to nationals o f a Member State who do not reside, or indeed 
did never reside in any Member State. These nationals include, naturally, persons who o  
obtained the nationality of one Member State while living in a third country, namely their 
own third country o f origin. This also results from the difference between the wording of 
Article 48 and Article 59, the latter requiring that to enjoy freedom of establishment, the 
national o f a Member State must be established in one Member State.
In any case, the legal status o f third country national relatives of a national o f a  \ 
Member State is not the same in all situations protected by Community Law. The type of 
relatives protected under that Law, their rights and the extension of these rights, depends 
very much on the title under which the national of a Member State moves within the
2 4 2  As mentioned in Article 2 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union.
2 4 3  See, e.g., Gutmann, who points out that "Germans seeking family reunion may find it advisable to 
move around the European Union before seeking [their relatives 1 admission to Germany", op.cit., p.98. 
See Gutmann, R., "Discrimination against own nationals: a brief look at European Union and German 
immigration law", !NLPt Vol.9,1995, No.3, pp.97-99.
2 4 4  See case C -l32/93 Volker Steen v. Deutsche Bundespost [1994] ECR 1-2715, paragraph 11, in which 
the Court of Justice ruled that "Community Law does not preclude a national court from examining the 
compatibility with its constitution of a national rule which, in a situation unconnected with any of the 
situations contemplated by Community Law, treats national workers less favourably than nationals from 
other Member States."
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Union. Here only an overview of these rights and of the beneficiaries of these rights will be 
made. A more in depth examination will be made later regarding the legal issues relating to 
the rights o f residence, work, education, social and tax advantages, and social security.
The idea behind the rights granted to the relatives of a national of a Member State 
is to facilitate the movement of the latter within the Community. Therefore, his or her 
close family has the right to move with him or her to another Member State and to live 
there in similar conditions to those of the nationals of that State.
The relatives who may move with the national of a Member State within the 
Community differ according to the reason why he or she enjoys freedom o f movement: 
whether the migrant national of a Member State has the right to move to another Member 
State under the EC  rules on free movement of workers, of self-employed persons, of 
students, o f pensioners or of persons "who do not enjoy this right under other provisions 
o f Community Law."
The precise extent of the rights of the relatives o f a migrant national o f a Member 
State also depends on the reason for which he or she is a beneficiary of free movement. 
Generally speaking, however, it may be said that his or her relatives are entitled to leave 
the Member State o f origin where they previously resided245 and enter another Member 
State246 and reside there.247 When third country national relatives enter a new Member 
State, they may be required to have an entry visa or equivalent document by that State. 
However, Member States "shall accord to such persons"248 "every facility for obtaining 
any necessary visas".249 This has not always been applied in practice, and on a number o f
2 4 5  Specifically mentioning this aspect there is Article 2 of Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the 
abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers and members of 
their families, OJ L 257/13 of 19/10/68, later amended - OJ L 2/1 of 1/1/73. That Article applies *mutatis 
mutandis" to the relatives of the beneficiaries of the three sister Directives of 1990 on the right of 
residence, due to Articles 2(2) of the latter. Referring to the right to leave the former Member State of 
residence there is also Article 1 of Council Directive 73/148, of 21/5/1973 on the abolition of restrictions 
on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to 
establishment and the provision of services, OJ L 172/14 of 28/6/1973.
2 4 6  Article 3 of Directive 68/360, applicable to relatives of workers and to relatives of the beneficiaries of 
the three Directives of 1990 on the right of residence, according to their Articles 2(2). See also Article 2 of 
Directive 73/148 (quoted supra) for the relatives of self-employed persons.
2 4 7  See infra for details.
248 or "shall endeavour to afford to such persons" in the words of Article 2(2) of Directive 73/148 (for 
self-employed persons).
2 4 9  Article 3(2) of Directive 68/360, applicable to workers and students, pensioners and "others", 
according to Articles 2(2) of the three Directives of 1990 on the right of residence. See also Article 2(2) of 
Directive 73/148 for self-employed persons, quoted supra. Note that, as mentioned supra in section A, in 
one of the three Directives proposed by the Commission to abolish internal border controls on persons, the 
Commission proposed the deletion of some rules of EC secondary legislation allowing Member States to 
request visas (or other formalities) for the entry of third country nationals in their territories. See Article 1 
of the draft Directive presented in COM (95) 348 final, of 12/7/1995, final. Note, however, that the 
adoption of this draft Directive seems to entail a somewhat contradictory or not entirely clear regime. The 
proposed new version of Article 3(1) of Directives 68/360 and 73/148 would allow to the beneficiaries of 
the freedom of movement (including their relatives) the entry to the territory of Member States. They 
could even cross the Member State's external borders by simply presenting a valid identity card or 
passport. The problem is that the present Article 3(2) of both Directives would remain unchanged. It 
provides that Member States may require visas for the entry in their territory of relatives of primary 
beneficiaries of the freedom of movement, provided those relatives are not nationals of a Member State.
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/occasions, the European Commission has initiated the action in Court provided by Article 
169 of the EC Treaty against certain Member States that were charging money for the 
issue of such visas.250
While living in a host Member State, the relatives o f a migrant national o f a 
Member State may work there, and the children of that migrant (and the children o f the 
migrant's spouse) are entitled to attend school.251 Moreover, in order to guarantee the 
complete integration o f a migrant national of a Member State into a host Member State, 
he or she is given certain rights that are directly relevant to the situation o f his or her 
family. If the national of a Member State is a worker, he or she is given, for example, the 
right to enjoy all rights and benefits accorded to nationals of the Member State in matters 
of housing.252 Furthermore, he or she has the right to benefit from the same "social and 
tax advantages" as national workers.253 Finally, in certain circumstances, when a national 
of a Member State is employed or self-employed, his or her relatives may even stay in the 
host Member State after his or her activities have ceased.254
b) Right of Residence
As far as migrant workers are concerned (when they are nationals o f a Member 
State) the right enjoyed by his or her relatives to reside in the host Member State is 
regulated by Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68.255 It provides that:
"(1) The following shall, irrespective of their nationality, have the right to install 
themselves with a worker who is a national of one Member State and who is 
employed in the territory of another Member State:
Thus, while the new Article 3(1) would grant them the right to enter Member States, and the right to cross 
their external frontiers by simply showing a valid identity card, Article 3(2) would continue to allow 
Member States to ask them for a visa. Moreover, this does not seems to be consistent with the objective of 
the draft Directive on the right to travel of third country nationals, presented in COM (95) 346. This draft 
Directive would grant the right to travel without the need of obtaining a visa, to all third country nationals 
residing in the Union, as well as to those who enter it for a short stay - under the conditions explained 
supra, in section A.
2 5 0  See Commission of the European Communities, 7th Annual Report on the Control of the 
Implementation of Community Law - 1989, COM (90) 288 final, 1989, published in OJ C 232/1 of 
17/9/90, at p.19. Proceedings of the Commission against Member States for their failure to respect 
Community rules on free movement of persons are not rare. Note, for example, that the Commission has 
decided to commence infringement proceedings under Article 169 against nine Member States for 
incorrect transposition of one or more of the three sister Directives of 1990 on the right of residence in 
another Member State. See Twelfth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 
(1994), COM (95) 500 final, of 7/6/1995, point 2.4.2, OJ C 254/1 at 29, of 29/9/1995.
251 See infra for details.
2 5 2  Article 9 of Regulation 1612/68.
2 5 3  Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68.
2 5 4  Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission on the right of the workers to remain in 
the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ L 142/24 of 30/6/1970, and 
Article 3 of Council Directive 75/34/EEC concerning the right of nationals of a Member State to remain 
in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed 
capacity, OJ L 14/10 of 20/1/75.
255 Quoted supra.
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(a) his spouse and their descendants who are under the age of 2 1  years or are 
dependants;
(b) dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and his spouse.
(2) Member States shall facilitate the admission of any member of the family not 
coming within the provisions of paragraph 1 if dependent on the worker referred 
to above or living under his roof in the country hence he comes. " 2 5 6
t
As we can see, the migrant worker's relatives that have a Community right of 
residence in the host Member State are the spouse and their descendants under the age of 
21 years, and also, provided they are dependent, their ascendants, as well as descendants 
over the age o f 2 1 ,257 According to the Court’s ruling in the Lebon case, the dependency 
of relatives on a national of a Member State is a matter o f fact and the reasons for its 
existence are irrelevant.258 *
The group of relatives o f migrant workers with the right of residence may be 
compared with the relatives of self-employed migrants having such right. The spouse and 
children under the age of 21 of a self-employed person have also the right o f residence in 
the host Member State. However, all o f  his or her descendants (apart from his or her
Î children under the age of 21), and all those o f his or her spouse are not entitled to follow the family if  they are not dependent.259 Therefore, the difference between the worker's 
relatives and those o f a self-employed migrant, is that in the case o f the latter, no child o f 
the spouse has a right to reside without being dependent. Instead, the children o f  the 
spouse of the migrant worker who are under the age o f 21 do have the right o f residence 
even if they are not dependent.
P It is submitted, however, that a proper interpretation o f the Treaty provisions on 
) the free movement o f persons entails that the children o f the migrant national o f a Member 
State, and the. children o f that migrant’s spouse, have theTarnejCommunity rights in the 
host Member State. This principle should apply to the right of residence and to any other 
Community right in the host Member State.260 
U  On the other hand, a feature common to the regime of workers and that o f  self- 
employed migrants is that the ascendants o f  the migrant, and o f the migrant’s spouse, may 
move with them to another Member State, provided the ascendants were dependent on 
them in the first Member State.261
2 5 6  Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that for "the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the worker 
must have available for his family housing considered normal for national workers in the region where he 
is employed; this provision, however, must not give rise to discrimination between national workers and 
workers from other Member States." The Court has interpreted this rule in a manner that protects rights of 
the migrant workers and their relatives. See the reference made to case 249/86, Commission v. Germany, 
in section B of chapter 8 .
2 5 7  Note also that the relatives of a migrant worker who is national of a Member State benefit almost in 
the same way as the latter ffom the rules on the basic conditions for free movement of persons, as laid 
down by Council Directives 68/360, and 64/221, both previously quoted. These state the conditions and 
formal requirements that can be applied to a worker or a member of his family who wishes to enter and 
stay in another Member State.
2 5 8  Case 316/85, Lebon , quoted supra, paragraph 22.
25  ^Article 1 (c) and (d) of Directive 73/148/EEC.
2 6 0  See also Steiner, op.cit., p.213.
2 6 1  Article 10 (I)(b) of Regulation 1612/68 and Article l (d) of Directive 73/148/EEC.
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Meanwhile, it is established that Member States shall "facilitate the admission of 
other members o f the family" of migrant workers and self-employed persons.262 *264 A 
restrictive interpretation of this rule would only require Member States to use their best 
endeavours and would confer no rights to individuals.263 a , less narrow interpretation is 
sustained by Wyatt & Dashwood^fr* in relation to the worker’s relatives. They believe that 
all dependent relatives should be given a right of residence?They base their position on the 
general references made by the provisions of Directive 68/360. Article 4(1) of the latter 
provides that Member States shall grant the right of residence to the persons referred in 
Article 1 o f the same Directive. This, in turn, provides that Member States shall abolish 
restrictions on the movement and residence of migrant nationals of other Member States 
and their relatives as defined by Regulation 1612/68. This Regulation refers indeed to all 
relatives of the migrant national of a Member State, although making the distinction 
referred to before - i.e. granting the right of residence to some relatives265 and providing 
that other relatives shall have their admission facilitated.266
I suggest that, at least, Article 10(2) of Regulation 1612/68 should be seen as a 
stand-still clause. The provision states that the Member States "shall facilitate" the 
admission o f other relatives of migrant nationals of a Member State. Thus, it could be 
interpreted as meaning that Member States cannot make the admission of other relatives 
o f those nationals o f a Member State more difficult than the admission of relatives of their 
own nationals, as this stood at the time the relevant EC rules entered into force.
Nevertheless, to achieve the best interpretation of Community Law in this respect, 
a substantial criterion that is more elaborate and general should be sought. Under EC Law 
on the free movement of persons, the right of residence could perhaps be extended to any 
relative of a migrant national o f a Member State if two conditions were met. The first is 
that his or her particular circumstances are such that a right o f residence is important, or 
indeed indispensable, in deciding to move to another Member State. The second condition 
is that the granting o f the right o f residence to a particular relative or group of relatives 
should not conflict with the interests of the host Member State, these interests being 
understood as those of a democratic society..
Each of these two conditions should be viewed in the context of the other. To 
some extent this is already done in positive Community Law - in the instruments with 
specific rules on the rights of relatives o f a migrant national o f a Member State. However, 
in these instruments the relative importance of the two conditions - that is o f the national 
o f a Member State to move with his or her family, and the interests of the host Member 
State - is expressed through legal presumptions only. Consequently, from the point of 
view of formal, positive Law, the spouse of a national of a Member State has the right of 
residence in the other Member State, even if the couple has been separated for a
262 According to article 10 (2) of Reg. 1612/68 and Article 1(2) of Directive 73/148.
263 Pointing in that direction see Hartley, op.cit., p. 132.
264 Wyatt, D. & Dashwood, A. European Community Law, 3rd.ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, at 
pp.245-6.
Article 10( 1) of Regulation 1612/68,
266 ¡n case they are dependent on the worker or live under his or her roof in the country whence he or she 
comes. Idem, Article 10(2).
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considerable p e r io d .267 Xhis right of residence of the spouse applies even if it is not 
important, or indeed is irrelevant, in the decision of the national of a Member State to 
move. The right o f residence of the spouse exists because it is simply presumed to be 
essential in order for the national of a Member State to move. An opposite case occurs 
when a national o f a Member State genuinely wishes to move to another Member State, 
but is prevented from doing so because a third country national relative is disqualified 
from moving with him. For example a national of a Member State has a two year old 
brother who became an orphan due to an accident in which both his or her parents have 
died. The baby is a third country national and has no one else to take care o f him.267 68 269His 
or her older brother may consider the possibility of giving up a new job in another 
Member State because his or her young brother could be refused a right o f residence 
there. In this case, secondary Community Law presumes that the brother is not important 
for the situation, whereas in fact he or she is. Arguably, it would amount to a violation of 
the Treaty piles nn free movement not to grant to such a baby the right to follow an older 
■brother to the host Member State. "
'  IT Is suggested that the best judicial interpretation of the EC Treaty could make 
exception to positive rules of CommuniiyJLawjand give proper attention to the aims o f the 
Tree movement o f persons. Another, although secondary point o f reference could be the 
legal duties of the migrant national of a Member State, for example the duty to take care 
of a dependent brother, sister, or child of the deceased spouse.
Nevertheless, there are also situations where the right o f residence would be 
denied to take into due account the interests of the host Member State. Clear examples are 
those covered by the clauses relating to public policy, public security or public health, 
which are included in the Treaty of Rome and in secondary Iegislation.269
Moreover, it appears obvious that the reasoning suggested would apply equally to 
relatives who are third country nationals and also to nationals o f a Member State, if 
necessary.
There is a peculiarity concerning the right of residence o f  relatives o f nationals o f a 
Member State who are providers or recipients of services. It is due to the temporary 
character o f the activity. This character explains the fact that the right o f residence is
267 geCi somewhat in that sense Case 267/83, Aissatou Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567. See also 
the analysis on this case to be made below.
268 ^  us ¡magine an extreme case, just to show that perhaps the wrong legal position is to take the 
positive rules too much by the letter. See also, in this respect, section B of chapter 8 , as far as family 
reunification is concerned. There it is recalled, for example, that in recommendation No. 1082/1988 of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it was proposed that admission for family reunification 
of foreigners (including even resident third country nationals) be authorised to the following relatives: the 
married or unmarried spouse who has been living with the joined foreigner for more than a year; the 
underage children of the couple or of one of its members; the children of full age if they are dependent 
because of a disability or illness; and dependent ascendants (proposal 2 ).
269 See Articles 48(3), 56 and 6 6  of the EC Treaty and also Council Directive 64/221/EEC, quoted supra.
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limited to the period during which the services are provided 270 that there is no right 
to remain in the host Member State after that period.
As referred to above, in 1990 three new Directives extended the right o f residence 
to virtually any national of a Member State. However, a very important limitation of this 
right is that all beneficiaries27 1 may only acquire it if they prove to have "sufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member 
State during their period of residence" and to "be covered by sickness insurance in respect 
of all risks in the host Member State".272 This applies both to the national o f a Member 
State directly entitled to the right of residence, as well as to the members of the family.
This requirement is fundamentally different from the instruments regulating the 
right o f nationals o f  a Member State who move to work in another Member State, because 
the right o f residence o f these persons is independent of any condition related to their 
precise economic situation - besides by virtue of working there.27?p\
Another interesting aspect o f these Directives is thaL^Wdents may only be f  
accompanied by their spouse and their dependent children; but pensioners and "other" o  
migrant nationals o f a Member State may be followed by the spouse, and, if they are 
dependent, by their descendants and ascendants.270 *374 It is curious that students are those 
with the least rights, even less than those who have never worked. One might wonder 
about the justification for this limitation might be. An assumption that students are too 
young to have dependent ascendants does not appear to legitimate a complete prohibition 
on the right of residence of these relatives. The restriction can exclude situations perfectly 
worthy of protection, however statistically unimportant they may appear.
270 Article 3 (2) and (3) of Directive 73/148. The same could be considered to be applicable to the receipt 
of services, according to the Court of Justice's doctrine that freedom of services applies to providers and 
recipients. See cases 286/82 & 26/83 Luisi & Carbone [1984] ECR 377, at 401.
27 * The person directly entitled to the right of residence, as well as the members of the family.
272 Articles 1 of all three Directives. See the critical remarks on this point by O'Keeffe, according to 
whom the three new Directives on the right of residence create "a class of second-rate Community citizen" 
and a dangerous precedent. See O'Keeffe, D., "Comments on the Free Movement of Various Categories of 
Persons", Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe..., op.cit., pp.515-520, at 516. In fact it seems that such a 
limitation represents an interesting application of the differential treatment in relation to foreigners. A 
Member State could decide to limit the beneficiaries of its health care and social assistance systems, for 
instance excluding from their scope foreigners who come for studying. In this way, instead, it is the right 
of residence in the country that is limited. Therefore, the exclusion from the national welfare system is 
made at the border, not inside the country. However, perhaps it was also possible to imagine a co­
ordination of the national welfare systems in such a way that the State of origin of the person would be 
responsible for social assistance benefits. This could be done at least within the limits of the benefits 
enjoyed in the Member State of origin by its own nationals, as is already done in relation to 
unemployment benefits when the nationals of one Member State go to another in search of work.
273 Save |n What concerns the requirement that the migrant national of a Member State has to have 
"normal" housing for his family, as provided in Article 10(3) of Regulation 1612/68. However, see, again, 
the ruling of the Court of Justice in case 249/86, Commission v. Germany (Re Housing Conditions) 
[1989] ECR 1263.
274 Articles 1(2) of Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residence for students. Directive 90/365/EEC on 
the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational 
activity, and Directive 90/364/EEC on other nationals of Member States, "who do not enjoy this right 
under other provisions of Community Law."
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The effect o f the restriction is, in principle, limited to ascendants o f students or 
their spouses when the former are third country nationals. Nationals of a Member State 
should, at least, be able to invoke the Directive on the general right of residence. The 
restriction does not seem particularly reasonable in view o f the fact that, under the general 
requirements o f the three Directives of 1990, it has to be proven that such relatives have 
medical insurance and will not need social assistance in the host Member State, in order to 
acquire the right o f  residence. Furthermore, according to Directive 93/96/EEC, the right 
of residence is limited "to the duration o f the courses o f studies in question". Thus, there is 
no great danger that the third country national relatives will stay permanently in the host 
Member State.275
Finally, relatives of migrant nationals of a Member State have the right to remain in 
the host Member State as long as that migrant, with whom they moved, has the right to 
remain there. However, relatives o f  nationals of a Member State may also acquire the right 
to remain in that new country, on a indefinite basis, once the national of a Member State 
with whom they moved acquires that right.276 This is not the case for persons under the 
three 1990 residence rights Directives.^'7
c) R ight to  W o rk
According to article 11 of Regulation 1612/68:
"Where a national of a Member State is pursuing an activity as an employed or 
self-employed person in the territory of another Member State, his spouse and 2756
275 Note aiso that, according to Article 2(2) of all the three sister Directives of 1990 on the right of 
residence, Article 6 of Directive 68/360 (as well as Articles 3 and 9 of such directive) applies to 
pensioners and "other" nationals of a Member State, but not to migrant students and their families. Article 
6 of that Directive establishes (1) that the beneficiaries of free movement have the right to have a 
residence permit valid throughout the territory of the Member State, that residence permit being valid for 
at least five years from the date of issue and automatically renewable. Moreover, (2) breaks in residence 
not exceeding six consecutive months and absence on military service shall not affect the validity of the 
residence permit. The difference could be seen as negative for the situation of students, if they have to 
fulfil their military duties in their country of origin. However, if such situation really happens, it seems 
clear that, when they are able to retake their studies, they should be able to obtain again such residence 
permit.
276 Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission on the right of the workers to remain in 
the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, OJ L 142/24 of 30/6/1970, and 
Article 3 of Council Directive 75/34/EEC concerning the right of nationals of a Member State to remain 
in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-employed 
capacity, OJ L 14/10 of 20/1/75.
277 in any case, again, if a national of a Member State cannot benefit from the right of residence under 
Directives 90/365 or 93/96, he can always remain in the other Member State under Directive 90/364 - the 
Directive on the "general" right of residence. But, as already mentioned, to benefit from this latter 
Directive he has to prove that he has medical insurance and sufficient resources not to need social 
assistance in the host Member State. The fact of the matter is that no such requirement exists in the 
Commission Regulation 1251/70, nor in Council Directive 75/34, (quoted supra) concerning the right of 
employed and self-employed workers, respectively, to remain in another Member State after having 
worked there.
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those of the children who are under the age of 21 years or dependent on him shall 
have the right of take up any activity as an employed person throughout the 
territory of that same Member State, even if they were not nationals of any 
Member State."278 279*
In the GUI case,279 the Court defined this right in relation to a third country 
national husband o f a British worker employed in Germany. Gul was a Cypriot graduate 
who had been allowed to practice medicine in Germany for a limited period to gain 
expertise and qualifications, with the understanding that, when his training was complete, 
he would go to work in another country. Instead, when that period was over, he asked 
permission to work as a doctor in Germany. The German authorities refused the request 
on the grounds that article 11 only gave him the right o f access to the general employment 
market. The Court rejected this view, holding that the provision included the right to cany 
out, as an employed person, any occupation for which he had the required l 
qualifications.280 j n practice, to this extent, he had to be accorded equal conditions to \ 
those of German nationals. -J
However, the relatives of  the workerjcan only work as employed personsf not as___
self-employed whjph is rather odd. Especially regarding third country nationals,
as they do not benefit (directly) from the free movement of services281 or establishment.
As a result o f this, Gul could not work for himself but only for someone else, which is 
somewhat strange for a doctor.282 283He could work for an hospital, but could not work in a 
self-employed capacity. To this extent, if  he had come from another Member State (where 
he had obtained the professional qualifications), he would have an incentive to go back 
there, together with his wife. This would be contrary to the objective of free movement of 
persons.
In the meantime, it may be noted that all three o f the 1990 Directives on the right 
o f residence entitle the spouse o f the migrant and their children (who may move to the 
host Member State), to work there too - anywhere within its territory. It makes no 
difference if  they want to work there as employed or self-employed persons?83'I t - i s —  
strange that a worker's relative would have less rights than, lor instance, a pensioner's 
relative. The former does not have a right to work as a self-employed person, while the 
latter does. It is submitted that it would be in the interest of the coherence o f  Community 
Law to grant the right to work as a self-employed person also to the worker's relative.
Furthermore, it could also be argued that, as long as third country nationals are 
within the scope o f Community Law, they should not be discriminated against on the
278 Emphasis added.
279 Case 131/85, Emir Giil (1987] ECR 1573.
28® The Court even said that he could rely on Article 3(1) of that Regulation.
281 The worker's third country national relatives may benefit from the right to provide services, but only 
under the Court's rulings in Rush Portuguesa and Van Elst (quoted supra), which are clearly of a quite 
limited interest for a person residing in the host Member State. See Peers, op.cit., at 308.
282 Another example of a case where a Community right to work in a self-employed capacity would be 
denied is a 19 year old Tunisian girl who is a shoe mender, and lives in Belgium with her French father 
who is employed there.
283 Second phrase of Articles 2(2) of all three Directives 90/364,90/365 and 93/96.
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grounds o f nationality.284 Thus, third country national relatives of migrants who are 
nationals o f a Member State should be considered to be entitled under Community Law to 
have their diplomas recognised in another Member State, in identical conditions to those 
of a migrant national of a Member State.285 *This would be coherent with the GUI ruling 
and with the objective of free movement of nationals of Member States (their relatives 
primarily entitled to move under Community Law).
Finally, it may be noted that, although dependent(^scendants)of a migrant national 
of a Member State (and of the migrant's spouse) may move with the latter to another 
Member State, they are not entitled to work there, whatever the title under which that 
migrant is protected by Community Law may be.
d) Right to Education
Article 12 o f  Regulation 1612/68 provides that:
"The children of a national of a Member State who is, or has been employed in the 
territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State’s general 
educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same condi­
tions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its territory 
(».)" -
284 This could be based in Article 6 of the EC Treaty or, eventually in Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, 
inasmuch as it is relevant for the integration of the migrant national of a Member State, to whose family 
the relevant third country nationals belong. Alternatively, Article 7(2) could be applicable following the 
Reed doctrine, in case the relative of a national of a Member State could obtain such recognition.
285 See also Peers, who maintains that after the Van Elst ruling (case quoted supra) "it seems likely that 
Member States will not be able to bar companies from using third-country nationals to provide services by
refusing to recognise qualifications or experience gained in the Community." See Peers, op.cit., at p.306. 
Note, meanwhile, that the recognition of diplomas obtained in a third country was already addressed by 
the Court of Justice, but only as far as nationals of a Member State are concerned. See case C-319/92 
Salomone Haim v. KassenzahnSrztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [1994] ECR 1-425; and case C-154/93, 
Abdullah Tawil-Albertini v. Ministre des Affaires Sociales [1994] ECR 1-451. The Court considered in 
both cases that diplomas of nationals of a Member State obtained in a third country (in Turkey and 
Lebanon, respectively) do not have to be recognised in another Member State under Directive 78/686/EEC 
of 25/7/1978 concerning mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of the forma! 
qualifications of practitioners of dentistry, including measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the 
right of establishment and freedom to provide services, OJ L 233/1 of 24/8/1978. The first case concerned 
the situation of an Italian national who held a diploma in dentistry awarded in Turkey and had previously 
been authorised to exercise in Italy. Holding a diploma obtained in a third country, he had none of the 
qualifications mentioned which according to Directive 78/686 had to be automatically recognised. 
However, the German authorities had accorded to him the status of dental practitioner and he could 
practise there as a self-employed dentist. Therefore the Court ruled that the German authorities could not 
refuse him appointment as a dental practitioner of a social security scheme on the grounds that he did not 
complete a preparatory training period required by the legislation of the host Member State. They had to 
examine whether and to what extent his experience (which was, in fact, obtained because he hold such a 
diploma) was equivalent to that required by the host Member State. Otherwise Article 52 would be 
violated. See paragraphs 27 to 29 of case Haim, quoted supra. One could conclude that experience 
obtained by holding a diploma of a third country may be relevant for Community Law purposes. 
Nevertheless, it was also important in this case that the person concerned had already been admitted to 
work as a dental practitioner in the host Member State.
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This article has been broadly interpreted by the Court of Luxembourg and, 
naturally, third country national children of workers who are nationals of a Member State 
benefit from that case-law. One example is the Michael S. case.286 There, the Court 
included in the scope of that article the right to special edumtinn and r^hnliilitiifinn n f-¡r 
paraplegic child o f an Italian employed in Belgium. However, in itself the article is 
restrictive as it onljTapplies to children and not other descendants of the workers nor to 
any descendants of his or her spouse only.
Another issue is to know whether a child, being a student in the school o f a 
Member State where his or her parent worked, may remain there even if the parent leaves 
to go to another Member State. It is not clear what the judgment of the Court on this case 
would be. Yet, two arguments can be put forwral-yi favour of the existence o f the right to 
remain. One is based on the reasoning that to deny such a right woukHndirectly violate the 
principle of non-discrimination against the worker himself. The otnerris that it should be 
considered as already included in article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, to be analysed below.
Concerning the right o f education of children of self-employed persons, even 
though no rule of positive Community Law explicitly recognises it, in order to ensure an 
effective right to the freedom of establishment of their parents, it should be understood as 
included within their right of residence.287
Finally, it must be noted that in thcjGaal c ase288 the Court ruled that the definition 
of children for the purposes of the above quoted Article 12 o f Regulation 1612/68, is not 
subject to the same conditions of age or dependency as are the rights governed by Article 
10(1) and Article 11 of the same Regulation - which deal with^he right to enter, to reside 
and to work in the host Member State.
e) Social Advantages289 290*
Article 7(2) o f Regulation 1612/68 states that in the territory of a Member State a 
worker who is a national of another Member State:
"Shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers."
In the Even case,29® the Court stated that these should be understood to cover all benefits 
that,
"whether or not linked with a contract of employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by 
virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory and the extension 
of which to workers who are nationals of other Member States therefore seems 
suitable to facilitate their mobility within the Community."
In this way the Court was able in Deak2 9  ^ to consider that the refusal by the Belgium 
authorities, on the sole grounds of nationality, to grant a young Hungarian a special
286 7 6 /7 2 , Michael S. v. Fonds National de Reclassement Social des Handicappés, [19731ECR 457.
28  ^See Oliver, op.cit., p.71.
288 Case C-7/94, Landesamt für Ausbildungsfôrderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Lubor Gaal, [19951 ECR 
1-1031.
289 See O’Keeffe, D., "Equal Rights for Migrants: the Concept of Social Advantages in Ait.7(2), 
Regulation 1612/68", YEU Vol.5,1985, pp.93-123; and Steiner, op.cit., p.218.
290 Case 207/78 Ministère Public v. Even [19791 ECR 2019.
291 Case 94/84, Office National de l'Emploi v. Joszcf Deak, [1985] ECR 1873 at 1881.
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employment benefit for youngsters leaving the school was contrary to that Article.292 
Other cases have concerned only nationals of a Member State but the rulings can also be 
applied to third country nationals, insofar as they are protected by the freedom of 
movement o f workers. In other cases the Court ruled that members of the worker's family 
had the right: to be granted reductions on rail fares to which large families are entitled,293 
to obtain interest loans from a public bank294 and to receive non-contributory age 
allowances.295 With respect to all those matters, the members of the family should be 
treated in the same way as relatives of a national of the Member State in question. A case 
which has yet to be decided will examine the conformity with Article 7 (2) o f a social 
security aid intended to cover the funeral expenses o f a family member which applies 
exclusively to funerals held in the Member State concemed.296
f) Social Security
As we have seen in section A o f  this chapter, Regulation 1408/71 on the social 
security o f migrant workers applies to migrant employed or self-employed persons "who 
are nationals o f one o f the Member States or who are stateless persons or refugees, as well 
as to the members o f  their families and their survivors." In addition, it also applies to the 
survivors o f employed or self-employed persons irrespective of the nationality o f the latter, 
"where their survivors are nationals o f one o f  the Member States, or stateless persons or 
refugees residing within the territory o f one o f the Member States. "297
In the Kermaschek case,298 the Court held that members o f the family o f a worker 
may only claim derived rights under Regulation 1408/71 as worker's relatives;29 34*899 no^_as 
former employed or self-emploved persons, i n this case a Yugoslavian woman, married to 
a German worker, relied on her status as his wife and on the social security contributions 
paid while she was in the Netherlands, to ask for an unemployment benefit in Germany. If 
the interpretation o f the Court can hardly be challenged from the point o f view of 
secondary Community Law, it seems rather difficult to sustain that the woman should not 
be allowed to receive the unemployment benefit, at Ieast__a^iong_ as Dutch law would 
entitle her to receive such a benefit i f  she resided inihe-Netherhmds.
292 initially the question was put in the framework of Regulation 1408/71 on Social Security 
Coordination, but the Court held that the Regulation did not apply.
293 Case 32/75, Cristini v. SNCF [1975] ECR 1085.
294 c ase 65/81, Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg [1982] ECR 33.
293 Case 157/84, Frascogna v. Caisse des Dépots et Consignations, [1985] ECR 1744.
296 Case C-237/94, J.O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officer. This case is still pending and no date has yet been 
fixed for a hearing.
292 Article 2 of the Regulation.
298 Case 40/76, Kermaschek v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, [1976] ECR 1669.
299 See also case 147/87 Zaoui, (paragraphs 11 and 12); and case C-206/91, Ettien Koua Poirrez; both 
quoted supra.
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2 - TH E  SPO USE'S R IG H T O F RESIDENCE - Specific Situations
The right o f  residence in the host Member State of the spouse of a migrant national 
of another Member State has already been examined in general terms.300 301*Two issues will 
now be developed. First,Ctne legal consequences of the divorce of the couple on the 
residence status o f the third country national spouse, when they are living in the host 
Member State. Secondly^tne legal position of this kind of couple (of mixed nationality and 
moving to a different Member State) when they are not married, but live together as a 
family.
These situations will be examined not only from the perspective of the rules of 
Community Law, but also with reference to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter E.C.H.R.] and to the case-law 
o f the Commission and Court o f Human Rights of Strasbourg. Particular attention will be 
given to the analysis on the conformity with the E.C.H.R. of Community Law rules on the 
matter.
The Community Treaties do not explicitly provide for a general protection of 
human rights in the application and adoption of Community rules. However, the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities has repeatedly held that:
"fundamental human rights form an integral part of the general principles of 
Community Law, the observance of which is ensured by the European Court of 
Justice"3®!
It has also declared th at:
"International treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community Law"3®3 
The European Convention of Human Rights is one o f such international treaties. In fact, 
the Court has often used the Convention rules as a standard to review the legality o f acts 
under the scope o f Community Law.3®3 Moreover, Article F  o f the Treaty on European 
Union provides that:
"The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law."
Thus, there is a strong case for sustaining that the Law o f the European Union, including 
Community Law, is subject to the rules o f the E.C.H.R. Therefore, the Convention will be 
used in the analysis o f certain situations related to Community Law.3®4
300 See also, on the legal status of the spouse of the migrant worker who is national of a Member State. 
Steiner, op.cit., pp.211-2.
301 See, for instance. Case 29/69, Stauder [1969] ECR 419; Case 4/73. Nold (II) [1974] ECR 491; Case 
44/79, Hauer [1979] ECR 3727; and Case 136/79, National Panasonic [1980] ECR 2033.
3®3 Second Nold case, quoted before, at paragraph 13 of the judgment, at p.507.
303 See, e.g., Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1232 and Case 63/83, Kirk, [1984] ECR 2718.
3®4 However, two important issues for this analysis will not be examined. One is the precise relationship 
between Community Law and the E.C.H.R. The other is whether the situations I will examine here come 
under the scope of Community Law, or belong, instead, to the field of competence of national legal orders. 
In this text it will be assumed that, in the application of Community Law. the standards of the European 
Convention of Human Rights are to be respected and that the situations under examination come under
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As explained in section B of chapter 1» the Commission and the Court of Human 
Rights of Strasbourg have considered that the right to residence or to enter a Contracting 
Party, as well as the right of asylum and the freedom of expulsion, are not, as such, 
protected by the E.C.H.R.305 However, these organs have also considered that migration 
measures adopted by a Contracting State may put certain rights protected by the 
Convention at stake. I believe that such a risk may exist in the situations discussed 
below.306
a) the divorced spouse of the worker
The issue is as follows. Two persons get married. One is a national o f a Member 
State and the other is not. They move from one Member State to another under the 
Community rules on free movement of persons. What are the legal consequences for the *195
the scope of Community Law. It may be doubtful whether the Court of Justice would fully agree with these 
presumptions. However, it can be argued that they are valid. Moreover, it should be noted that the EC 
Commission proposed the accession of the European Communities to the E.C.H.R., on which an opinion 
on the compatibility with the EC Treaty was requested by the Council to the EC Court of Justice (Opinion 
2/94, not yet adopted). See by the International Commission of Jurists. The Accession o f  the European 
Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Position Paper, Geneva, 1993. On human 
rights and Community Law see also Capelletti, M. & Golay, D. "The Judicial Branch in the Federal and 
Transnational Union: Its impact on Integration" in Integration Through Law: Europe and the American 
Federal Experience, Capelletti, M ., Seccombe, M. & Weiler, J. (eds.), Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1986, 
Vol. 1, Book 2, pp.261-351; Clapham, A., European Union - The Human Rights Challenge, vol. I - 
Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical Overview, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991, 
particularly at pp.33-55; Coppel, J. & O'Neil, A., "The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights 
Seriously?", CMLRev, Vol.29, 1992, pg.669 (this title echoes a previous book of Dworkin, Ronald , 
Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1978); Gaja, G., "Aspetti problematici della tutela dei 
diritti fondamentali nell' ordinamento comunitario", Rivista di Diritto Internationale, Vol.71, 1988, No.3, 
pp.574-589; Jacobs, F.G., "The Protection of Human Rights in the Member States of the European 
Communities: The Impact of the Case-Law of the Court of Justice", in Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law: Essays in Honour o f  Mr. Justice Walsh, O'Reilly (ed.), Dublin, Round Hall P., 1992, p.243; Jacobs, 
F.G., "European Community Law and the European Convention of Human Rights", Institutional 
Dynamics o f European Integration • Essays in Honour o f  Henry G. Schermers, by Curtin, D. & Heukles, 
T.(eds.), Vol. II, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 561-571, at pp. 564-565; Lang, J.T., "The Sphere 
in Which Member States Are Obliged to Comply with the General Principles of Law and Community 
Fundamental Rights Principles", UEI, 1991, No.2, pp.23-35; O’Leary, S., "The relationship between 
Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community law", CMLRev, Vol.32,
1995, No.2., pp.519-554; Régis, Brilliat "La participation de la Communauté européenne aux conventions 
du Conseil de l'Europe", Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1991, Vol.XXXVII, pp.814-832; 
Schermers, H.G., "The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Rights", CMLRev, Vol.27, 1990, 
No.2, pp.249-258; Weiler, J., "Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the European Court 
of Justice in the Legal Order of the European Communities", Washington Law Review, Vol. 61, July 1986, 
pp.l 103-1142; Weiler, J. & Lockhart, N. "Taking rights seriously' seriously: the European Court and its 
fundamental rights jurisprudence - part I", CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.l, pp.51-94, and part II in 
CMLRev, Vol.32, No.2., 1995, pp.579-627. See also Mancini, G.F., "The Making of a Constitution for 
Europe", CMLRev, Vol. 26, 1989, p.595.
305 See, e.g., Commission decision of 24/4/1965, in Application No. 1855/63, Yearbook of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Vol. VIII, p. 203, and judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Abdulaziz et al., of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 94, p.67. See, furthermore, section B of chapter 1.
306 See also Steiner, op.cit., p.213.
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residence status o f the third country national spouse3*1? in the new Member State if the 
couple divorces? A relationship between two persons is always a delicate matter. 
Interference by the law is an even more delicate matter. Therefore, no jurist can overlook 
the position in which a spouse may be put by the effect o f the law. The third country 
national spouse may be in a very critical position if her^^8 residence status is completely 
dependent on that of the community spouse. There is, in fact, a real danger that the spouse 
national of a Member State may abuse his or her power in requesting the divorce.
If  the third country national spouse is unable to obtain an autonomous right of 
residence, she can find herself in a nightmare situation, obliged to accept any demand 
made by her husband. She may also go to Court and obtain a decree o f divorce, i.e. in 
which the husband is considered the responsible party for the failure o f the marriage. 
However, if  she is then expelled from the country in which she was already integrated, it is 
difficult to sustain that her basic human rights were respected.* 30809 This situation harms the 
normal dynamics o f the relationship o f a married couple. The power of each of the spouses 
to end the relationship is artificially unbalanced. This grossly violates the right to freedom 
of marriage (and divorce) and may expose the spouse o f the worker to a degrading 
situation. The same is true for any legal regime which allows for such a situation, 
providing no protection for the third country national spouse.310
(1) Community Law perspective
On two occasions the Court o f Justice of the European Communities has ruled on 
a case concerning the position of divorcees under the Community Law on free movement 
of persons.311
The first was the Diatta case.312 Here, the Senegalese wife of a French national, 
who lived and worked in Berlin, was denied a renewal of her residence permit in Germany, 
because she had moved out o f the family home and intended to divorce her husband. The 
Court considered that Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68,313 could not be interpreted in a 
restrictive way, requiring cohabitation in order for a wife o f a national of a Member State 
to have the right of residence in the Member State where her husband was working.
This issue is also important for divorcees who are nationals of a Member State, but only to the extent 
that they are not able to acquire a right of residence on their own.
308 Or his, of course. For the sake of simplicity here I will refer to the (still) nowadays prevailing 
situation, in which the wife follows the husband to a new country. See, however the Singh case, quoted 
infra.
309 In particular, if she cannot return to the previous Member State of residence. Such impossibility may 
be also due to the fact that she did not live in one Member State long enough to acquire the right of 
residence there or the nationality of that country.
310 See for the legal and social situation in the United States the excellent Article by Anderson, Michelle 
J., "A License To Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants'*, The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol.102, 1993, No. 6, pp.1401-1430.
311 In the Kus case (case C-237/91, Kus v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECRI - 6781) the Court 
of Justice also dealt with the situation of a Turkish divorcee. However, this case is not very interesting for 
the purposes of this sub-section, namely because it was dealt with by employing rules adopted in the 
framework of the Association Agreement with Turkey. This Agreement and this case will be analysed in 
the next chapter.
3 12 Case 267/83, Aissatou Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567.
313 Especially paragraph 3 of that Article, quoted supra, when requiring the worker to "have available for 
his family housing considered normal for national workers".
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According to the Court, the German immigration authorities could not regard their marital 
relationship "as dissolved so long as it had not been terminated by the competent
authority."3 ^
The Court did not expressly deal with the argument o f the Commission that a 
person, acquiring the right of residence under the above mentioned Article 10, retains that 
right even she ceases to be a part o f the worker's family. This would probably be a too 
liberal a view for the Court to accept, as its interpretation o f the article's expression 
"install with the worker", in a certain sense, open-minded.
Although the Court did not take an explicit stand on the position o f divorcees, it 
did take an implicit position by interpreting Article 11 o f  the same Regulation. This 
provision grants the right to work in the territory o f the Member State to which the family 
moved, to some relatives of the migrant worker (who is national of one Member State). 
The relatives with the right to work are those referred to in Article 10 o f the Regulation - 
namely the worker's spouse. The Court considered that while Article 11 granted the right 
to work, it did not imply the granting of a right o f residence independent from that of 
Article 10.315 Nevertheless, Article 11 was invoked to allow Diatta to stay in Berlin, 
despite the fact that she no longer cohabited with her husband. The Court, when 
interpreting Article 10, had already decided that she could remain there. Thus, the Court's 
ruling on Article 11 seems to be useful insofar as it excludes an autonomous right of 
residence for divorcees.
This judgment was sharply criticised by Weiler, who used two lines o f reasoning. 
On one hand, he pointed out that the restriction on the rights o f  divorcees has a negative 
impact on the free movement o f workers. The decision of a couple to move to another 
Member State will be negatively affected by the fear o f the third country national spouse 
that, in the new Member State, she may lose her right of residence if she divorces. The 
interpretation o f the Court did, therefore, "act as an impediment to truly effective free 
movement".3 ^  j t may ^  added that the objective o f the Community rules on free 
movement is, in principle, to make it as easy for workers to move between different 
Member States, as it is between different regions of the same State. Only this way will the 
Community labour market function satisfactorily. The automatic removal o f the right of 
residence o f the worker's spouse, as soon as their marriage ends, does not contribute to *31
3 *4 Paragraph 20 of the judgment.
313 Apparently, the Commission took this ruling into consideration when it made its proposal to amend 
Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68, quoted supra. A second paragraph would be included in Article 11 
providing that: "The death of the worker on whom the members of the family are dependent or the 
dissolution of marriage shall not affect this right" (the right to work in the territory of the Member State). 
The objective of the proposed amendment was stated as being to "prevent serious social and moral 
consequences for the non-Community widow and divorced wife as well as for any other members of the 
family depending exclusively on her". See Proposal for a regulation amending Council Regulation 
1612/68, COM (88) 815 final, SYN 185, OJ C 100/6 of 21/4/1989. Likewise, the European Parliament 
suggested extending the Commission's draft amendment, in which the dissolution of the marriage of the 
worker would not affect the right of the worker's ex-spouse to reside and work in the territory of the host 
Member State, to "the de facto separation of the couple". See the resolution adopted by the European 
Parliament on 14 February 1990, OJ C 68/87 of 19/3/1990, amendments Nos. 11 and 64, and 68. *niese 
proposals of the Commission and the Parliament, were not approved by the Council.
416 Weiler, Joseph H. "The Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals", in EJIL, 
Vol. 3,1992, No.l, pp.65-89, at p.89.
2 1 8
this objective. Indirectly, the worker is put in an unprivileged position in relation to his or 
her fellow workers who move inside the same country.
Weiler’s second point was that the Court did not deal with the issue of Diatta's 
human rights. He believes, and rightly so, that this is unacceptable. The Court, apart from 
considering the correct interpretation of the Regulation, should also have examined 
whether it conformed with fundamental human rights.31? In fact, the Court should have 
examined whether Diatta's human rights were respected, namely as far as her human 
dignity  ^18 ancj her right to family life were concemed.319 Furthermore, from a broader 
perspective, Diatta should not have been treated as a mere instrument for the 
accomplishment o f the Community objective of freedom of movement o f nationals of 
Member States. Attention should have been paid to her as a person, who is entitled to 
protection of fundamental human rights.320 As Weiler puts i t :
"There is an inevitable violation of human dignity in a legal construct which 
insists on seeing an individual not as an end in itself, but solely as a means and 
instrument at the service of other persons and other goals. (...) Once an individual, 
for whatever reason or on whatever basis, comes within the field of application of 
Community law, his or her fundamental rights must be guaranteed."^ I
The second case concerning a divorcee in this type of situation was that of 
Surinder Singh. 322 The Court avoided dealing with the issue of the position of divorcees 
very carefully, declaring that this issue had not been included in the request for a 
preliminary ruling. This clearly contrasts with the usual behaviour of the Court, which ”is 
not formalistic with respect to the formulation of requests for preliminary rulings."323
The case concerned the deportation order of Mr. Surinder Singh, an Indian 
national, whose wife was a British national. They had lived together for two years in 
Germany, from 1983 to 1985, where they were employed. Returning to the United 
Kingdom, at the end of 1985, they opened a business. Later, their marriage failed and a 
decree nisi o f divorce was pronounced against Mr. Singh in proceedings brought by his 
wife. The British authorities immediately revoked his right to remain in the country (as the 
spouse of a British national). Even before the pronunciation of the decree absolute of 
divorce, he faced a deportation order. The deportation order referred to his situation 3201
31^ As he states:"(...) simply to construe the Regulation in accordance with the wishes of the Community 
legislator is not what judicial protection of human rights is all about." Weiler, idem., p.88.
3™ Recognised in Article 1 of the European Parliament "Declaration of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms", according to which "Human dignity shall be inviolable". The declaration of the 
European Parliament was approved by a resolution of 12 April 1989, OJ C 120/51 of 1989.
31® If, for instance, she had children in Germany.
320 Even when analysing the situation in the light of a teleological interpretation of the rules on free 
movement of workers. An optimal interpretation of these rules would entail that the persons protected by 
them could not have their fundamental human rights put in jeopardy in the host Member State. See, by 
analogy, in next chapter the considerations of Advocate General F.G. Jacobs in case C-168/91, Christos 
Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I* 1191, notably paragraph 46 of his opinion.
321 Weiler, "The Judicial Protection of the Human Rights...", op.cit. p.88.
322 o r a  C-370/90, The Queen and Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte: 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1992J ECR 1-4265.
323 Schermers, H.G. & Waelbroeck, D. "Judicial Protection in the European Communities", Deventer, 
Kluwer, 1992, p.425.
2 1 9
rbefore the final decision on divorce. Thus, in the proceedings brought by Mr. Singh 
against the deportation order, the question was referred for a preliminary ruling o f the 
Court o f Justice as if he was still married. However, by the time the preliminary ruling was 
sought, the decree absolute o f divorce had already been pronounced. Therefore, the Court 
of Justice stated that:
”(...) although the marriage was dissolved by the decree absolute of divorce 
delivered in 1989, that is not relevant to the question referred for a preliminary 
ruling, which concerns the basis of the right of residence of the person concerned 
during the period before the date of that decree."324 
One cannot but admire how the legal niceties of the proceedings forced the Court of 
Justice to give an answer to a question which was no longer important for the case in 
hand. In fact, the British immigration authorities wanted to deport Mr. Singh because his 
marital relationship with a British national had finished. Their decree absolute o f divorce 
was pronounced even before the immigration case reached the British highest court. 
However, the latter court in its preliminary ruling refers to Mr. Singh as married person - 
as a person in a normal, effective marriage.
Consequently, it seems clear that the British authorities, after the Court o f  Justice's 
judgment, could simply make another deportation order, this time on the basis of the 
actual divorce. In this case, the preliminary ruling would have served only to delay the 
final decision, the decision on his personal situation - as a divorcee.
Thus, this ruling of the Court o f Justice is important, but mainly regarding his 
(previous) situation as a married person. The Court declared that he had a right to reside 
in the U K, under Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome and under Directive 73/148/EEC324 25 - 
both on freedom of establishment. They were invoked because his wife, on their return 
from Germany, had set up a business in the UK. Thus the Court stated that:
"A national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving his country of 
origin in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person as 
envisaged by the Treaty in the territory of another Member State if, on return to 
the Member State of which he is a national in order to pursue an activity there as 
an employed or self-employed person, the conditions of his entry and residence 
were at least not equivalent to those which he would enjoy under the Treaty or 
secondary law in the territory of another Member State.”326 327
Perhaps I am wrong, but there seems to be a false comparison here. I f  a person is 
not to be deterred from leaving his or her country of origin, he or she has to be given the 
same advantages^^7 as if he or she had stayed there, rather than the advantages o f staying 
abroad. These are only relevant if, conversely, the person is to return from abroad to his or 
her country o f origin - which was precisely the case at stake. Although the Court reached
324 Paragraph 12. Note also that the Court never referred to the Diatta case, even though, when the 
deportation order was made, Mr. Singh was in a similar position to hers. See supra the analysis of the 
Diatta case.
325 On the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of 
Member States with regard to establishment and the provisions of services, quoted supra.
326 Case C-370/90, quoted supra, paragraph 19.
327 por instance, as far as the residence status of his or her close relatives is concerned.
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a correct conclusion regarding the position of married persons, it may have failed to 
address the problem in a proper way.
This case is typical o f what could perhaps be called a second generation of 
situations in the freedom of movement. In the first generation, people moved from their 
country o f origin to another Member State. In the second generation, they move from the 
latter, either back to their country o f origin, or to a third Member State. Obviously, 
Community Law has to protect all these situations alike. The Court, however, used a 
reasoning valid for the "first generation" of situations only, considering how a person 
"might be deterred from leaving his country of origin". This aspect, in the case, appears to
be irrelevant.328
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a contradiction between the judgment of 
the Court and British immigration rules; except in relation to the implicit restatement of 
the Diatta ruling. Apparently Mr. Singh could have been allowed to stay in the UK as the 
spouse o f a British national. Thus, there is no contradiction between the ruling o f the 
Court in this case (and, hence, o f Community Law) and the application of the British 
Immigration rules. The only difference may be that the deportation order of Mr.Singh 
precedes the final decision on his divorce. This may not conform with the Diatta ruling. 
However, probably because o f the fact that the decree absolute of divorce had already 
been pronounced, the Court did not deal with that issue.
Thus, if I am right, the Court addressed neither the most important issue in 
question - the position of a divorcee - nor the situation in which the disputed deportation 
order was made, that of Mr. Singh with a decree nisi o f divorce.
(ii) E.C .H .R. perspective
The rules of the European Convention of Human Rights, as interpreted by the 
Commission and Court of Human Rights, can only be o f little help to alien divorcees. 
Alien divorcees may be given the right to stay in the country o f residence after the end of 
their marriage, but only if their expulsion entails a violation o f Article 3 or Article 8 o f the
E.C.H.R. Divorcees are not, as such, the object of special consideration by the 
Commission and Court of Human Rights. The circumstances o f their cases may, however, 
fulfil the general conditions required to declare a violation o f the E.C.H.R. They may, for 
instance, have children from the ceased marriage living in the relevant country.
Such was the case o f Mr. Abdellah Berrehab, a Moroccan who married a Dutch 
woman, Mrs. Sonja Koster, in October 1977.328 29 He then was granted permission to stay in 
Netherlands "for the sole purpose of enabling him to live with his Dutch wife". The couple 
had a child in August 1979, whose name was Rebecca. However, their marriage did not 
work and three months later their divorce was granted at the request of Mrs. Koster. The 
Court appointed her guardian o f the child. Simultaneously, Mr. Berrehab was appointed 
auxiliary guardian o f his daughter and ordered to pay maintenance costs for the child. At 
the birth o f Rebecca, both parents agreed to ensure that the child would have frequent 
contacts with the father, which indeed seems to have been the case while Mr. Berrehab 
was in Netherlands.
328 Although this was the problem in the Diatta case. However, there, the Court did not use a similar 
reasoning to rule on the Singh case, as perhaps it should have done.
329 case Berrehab v. Netherlands, judgment of 21/6/1988, Series A, No. 138.
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However, since he was no longer married to a Dutch citizen, he was deported to 
Morocco in 1984, after having fought the deportation order in Court, with no success. In 
that year, Rebecca and her mother went to visit Mr. Berrehab in Morocco for two months. 
He was only allowed to go back to Netherlands in the summer of the following year,
1985. There, he remarried Mrs. Koster and was again granted a residence permit "for the 
purpose of living with his Dutch wife and working during that time".
During the procedures before the Commission and Court o f Human Rights of 
Strasbourg, Mr. Berrehab and his daughter alleged that his expulsion violated their family 
life, as protected by Article 8 of the B.C.H.R. The Commission agreed with them. The 
Court analysed the problem, according to the now classical three phase procedure. First, 
the Court held that Mr. Berrehab and his daughter Rebecca did have a family life. 
Although they no longer lived together, the fact that he visited her four times a week, for 
several hours each time, was considered enough to prove the existence o f their family life. 
Secondly, the Court declared that the refusal to grant Mr. Berrehab a new residence 
permit and his resulting expulsion were an interference with the family life between him 
and his daughter. It held that such measures "prevented the applicants from maintaining 
regular contacts with each other", these contacts being "essential as the child was very 
young".330 Finally, the Court examined the Dutch government's justification for such an 
interference. The Court recognised that the expulsion measure corresponded to a 
legitimate aim, the preservation of the country’s economic well-being (the regulation o f the 
labour market, taking into account the population density)3 3 1 but not the aim of 
prevention of disorder, as the Dutch government had claimed and to which the 
Commission had agreed to 332
Nevertheless, the Court held that a proper balance between the interests in 
question had not been achieved. Therefore, the behaviour o f the Dutch government 
violated Article 8 o f the E.C.H.R. According to the Court, the measures adopted against 
Mr. Berrehab were not "necessary in a democratic society" ,333 as they did not correspond
to a pressing social need and were not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.* 3234 
These are quite important criteria to take into account in migration cases, as in other cases 
of the restriction o f the exercise o f fundamental human rights.
T o find that the Dutch government did not respect those criteria in the Berrehab 
case, the Court gave special consideration to 3 factors. First, for several years there were 
very close ties between Mr. Berrehab and his daughter. Thus, "the refusal o f an 
independent residence permit and the ensuing expulsion threatened to break those ties", 
especially as the child was very young.33^ Secondly, Mr. Berrehab was already installed 
and integrated in the Netherlands: he had lived there for several years and he had a home
33® Idem, paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment.
33* One may wonder what the assessment of the Court would be if Mr.Berrehab were a small 
entrepreneur creating jobs for Dutch nationals.
332 paragraph 79 of the Commission opinion.
333 As required in the second paragraph of Article 8 of the E.C.H.R.
334 Note also that the European Court of Human Rights has often declared that governments have a 
margin of appreciation, but they have to achieve a fair balance between the interests of the community's 
well-being and the effective enjoyment by the individual of the rights protected by the E.C.H.R. This was 
once more confirmed in case Lopez Ostra, judgment of 9/12/1994, Series A, Vol.303.
333 Paragraph 29 of the judgment in case Berrehab, quoted supra.
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and a job  there. Last, but not least, the "Government did not claim to have any complaint"
against Mr. Berrehab. 33 6
It is interesting to mention that Dutch law had already tried to protect divorcees 
who are third country nationals. However, Mr. Berrehab did not meet the legal 
requirement of three years o f marriage and one year of residence with his wife in the 
Netherlands.
With the help of this case, Jet us now try to assess the precise extent to which 
Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. may protect divorcee spouses.
First, it seems reasonable to claim that such protection would result in the reverse 
situation of the Berrehab case. That is to say: if the male spouse was Dutch and the female 
spouse was alien.337 If they divorced, the latter, as mother of their child, would in 
principle be appointed her (main or sole) guardian. Meanwhile, the father would be in a 
secondary position - probably having the right to visit the child regularly. In this case, it 
would be in the interest of the (national) father that his (alien) ex-spouse remained in the 
country. Otherwise, his ex-spouse would take their daughter with her, preventing him 
from maintaining frequent contact with the child. Therefore, the alien ex-spouse should be 
allowed to stay in the country.338 This would be an indispensable condition if the right of 
the father to maintain his relationship with his daughter is to be respected.339
Furthermore, a careful application of the Berrehab solution should avoid discrimi­
nation between men and women in the context of post-divorce situations. Modem family 
laws in European countries share the view that in the event o f divorce, when deciding the 
parent with whom the children should stay, the factor to take into consideration is the 36789
336 Idem. His only defect was to be a foreigner. Probably, for this reason the Court disregarded the Dutch 
government's claim that its behaviour in the case pursued the legitimate aim of prevention of disorder.
337 For the purposes of this thesis: if she was not a national of a Union Member State. Similar comments 
are valid for nationals of the Community where they cannot obtain an autonomous right of residence 
under the relevant Community rules.
338 This is only coherent with the Ben-ehab judgment, quoted supra. If a Dutch mother should not be 
obliged to follow the Moroccan father abroad (taking the child with her), a national father should not be 
obliged to do so either, in order to retain his ties with his daughter. Obviously, the situation would become 
more complicated if the mother no longer wanted to stay in the country. However, this problem is already 
outside the scope of this thesis.
339 Actually, as in the Berrehab case, another right is at stake here, even if it is not expressly mentioned. 
This is the right of the national parent to remain in his own country and maintain family life with his or 
her child. Contrary to when family ties continue between the relevant persons, the Commission and Court 
of Human Rights of Strasbourg never considered the possibility of the divorcee going abroad to permit 
his/her (alien) ex-spouse to retain ties with their common child. Once divorced, the ex-spouses no longer 
have a family relationship. Thus, the "elsewhere test" (according to which there is no violation of the 
E.C.H.R. if the family can live together in some other country) cannot be applied here, in the situation 
regarding the two ex-spouses. See van Dijk, P. & van Hoof, G. J. H. Theory and Practice o f  the European 
Convention o f  Human Rights, Deventer, Kluwer, 1990, p. 389. However, such a test, could eventually be 
applied by the Court in relation to the family life of the wife and child, thus considering whether the 
national father could move to the mother's country to keep contacts with their common daughter. 
Apparently, an "elsewhere test" in this situation would be coherent with other cases already decided by the 
Court and Commission of Human Rights. However, the merits of its use on such a case would be highly 
questionable. In a way, it shows, once again, how the "elsewhere test" is open to criticism. See, in general 
terms, the analysis of Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. made in section B of Chapter 1.
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interest of the children themselves. This usually means that the children stay with the 
mother, while the father has only the right to be with them for short periods. It seems clear 
that, in the context of migration cases, no argument should be made to the detriment of 
the father340  based on the sole fact that his family life with his children is restricted to the 
possibilities available for him after the divorce. It is well known that contacts between 
child and father are important for the psychological growth of the fo rm e r .^  
Consequently, these contacts should be protected.
Meanwhile, according to Article 8, a divorcee may be allowed to remain in the 
country for other family reasons, not only because o f the circumstances specifically related 
to the divorce. That may happen, for instance, because he or she has a very close 
connection with that country, it is very difficult or impossible for him or her to live in 
another country and he or she has "family life" with other relatives living in the country. 
Such justification is particularly important for divorcees without children. An alien 
divorcee with children entitled to reside in the country concerned, should have fewer 
difficulties in persuading the government to give him or her an independent residence 
status.
However, the E.C.H.R., as interpreted up to now by the Commission and Court of 
Human Rights o f Strasbourg, seems to offer little or no help to divorcees who have no 
relatives in the country - relatives with whom they could claim to have family life.* 342 34The 
only possibility for persons in this situation appears to rest in Article 3 o f the E.C.H.R. 
Yet, it would be very difficult for them to make a case on these grounds before the 
Commission and the Court of Human Rights.343 Nevertheless, the consequences o f the 
expulsion should be considered carefully. This should include the examination o f the 
situation o f the person concerned in the country to which she should be sent, in order to 
assess the risk o f  inhuman treatment there.344
34® Or. to be more accurate, to the detriment of the parent who is not the (main) guardian of the children. 
34 * Not to mention the latter,
342 See, however, my argument in chapter 1, section B, that the right to private life (protected by Article 8 
of the E.C.H.R.) may be at stake in cases of expulsion of aliens who do not have relatives in the country of 
residence.
343 See supra Chapter 1, section B.
344 According to this criterion, the case of Cancan, K., a 24 years old Turlish woman, should be carefully 
examined. At the age of 14 her father gave her in marriage to a man chosen by him. The marriage 
eventually broke down. Then, her father gave her to a compatriot immigrant in Germany, who took her 
there. This second husband seems to have treated her very badly, beating and raping her, as well as 
keeping her in chains for long periods. While she was with him, she suffered two miscarriages and was 
hospitalised several times. One day she finally found the courage to run away from her husband and then 
applied to remain in Germany. The relevant German law, however, required a period of three years of 
common residence (of the couple) before autonomous residence could be granted to her. She left her 
husband only two months before this three years limit. Thus, she faced the likely prospect of having to 
return to Turkey. Back to her father, again. See L’Unità of 12/8/1993.
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b) the worker's partner (unmarried couple)345 
(i) Community Law perspective
What rights do unmarried couples have according to Community Law regarding 
the free movement of persons? The following remarks concern the situation of unmarried 
heterosexual couples. However, to a certain extent they are also applicable to gay and 
lesbian couples. These couples face basically the same type of problems as unmarried 
heterosexual couples, as far as the right of residence of the third country national partner 
is concerned.346
345 See the way in which Member States protect the rights of unmarried couples in "National Family 
Policies in EC Countries in 1991”, European Observatory of National Family Policies, Dumon.W. (Ed.), 
Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1992, at p.149. For developments on the same 
subject in 1992 see the report on that year, by Dumon, W. and Nuelant.T. (ed.), 1994, at pp.69-73. See 
also the issue of Europe Sociale on "The European Union and the Family", Brussels, Directorate General 
for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, No.l, 1994.
346 However, the position of homosexuals has a number of peculiarities also. For an overview of the legal 
issues concerned with the gay and lesbian situation regarding the E.C.H.R. and EC Law see, generally, 
Jessurun D’OIiveira, H.U. "Lesbian and Gays and the Freedom of Movement of Persons”, in 
Homosexuality: A European Community Issue, Essays on Lesbian an Gay Rights in European Law and 
Policy, Waaldijk, K. & Clapham, A. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp.289-316. See also 
Bovey, Mungo, "Out and out: UK immigration law and the homosexual", ¡NLP, Vol.8, 1994, No.2, pp.6I- 
63; Clapham, A. & Weiler, J. "Lesbian and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order" in 
Homosexuality: A European Community Issue.... op.cit., pp.7-69; Heinze, Eric , Sexual Orientation: A 
Human Right, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, in particular at pp. 175-8 and pp. 196-208 (on 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on Privacy and Liberty, respectively), p. 286 (on 
immigration) and pp.291-303 (on a model declaration of rights against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual discrimination); and Tanca, Antonio "European Citizenship and the Rights of Lesbian and Gay 
Men", in Homosexuality: A European Community Issue..., op.cit., pp.267-288, particularly at 281-3. For a 
quick but updated overview of the situation of gay and lesbians in Europe, as far as marriages and legal 
recognition of unions is concerned, see Lind, Craig, “Time for lesbian and gay marriages". New Law 
Journal, Vol.145,20 October 1995, pp. 1553-4. Following what was argued supra, in section B of chapter 
I, the right to respect for private life, protected under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, should be considered to protect the relations of an homosexual couple, even in the context of 
migration cases. The Commission of Human Rights has considered that the relations between an 
homosexual couple do not give rise to the issue of family life, but of private life. Thus, it decided that the 
expulsion of an homosexual couple may constitute an interference with the right for respect of private life, 
if it is established that the couple cannot live elsewhere and that the connection with the expelling State is 
a fundamental element of the relationship. See Commission decision in Application No.9369/81, D&R, 
Vol.32, p.220. As far as Community Law on free movement of workers is concerned, the ruling of the 
Court on the Reed case (case 59/85, Netherlands v. Ann Florence Reed [1986] 1283) seems to apply to 
homosexual couples also. There the Court ruled on the definition of spouse included in Article 10 of 
Regulation 1612/68. The European Court considered that: ”[i]n the absence of any indication of a general 
social development which would justify a broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary in the regulation, it must be held that the term spouse in Article 10 of the Regulation refers to a 
marital relationship only." See paragraph 15 of the case. This ruling is analysed by D'Olivcira, op.cit., 
pp.299-301. See also the Roth report of 1994 on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbian in the EC, made 
on behalf of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, doc.ref. PE 
206.256/fin, A3-28/94.
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The situation of unmarried couples was addressed by Court of Justice of the 
European Communities in the Reed case.3^7 This case concerned an unmarried British 
national, Ann Reed, who moved with her companion to the Netherlands so he could work 
there. She looked for work in that country, but without success. Miss Reed asked for a 
residence permit as a companion of a British worker. Mrs. Reed and her companion had a 
stable relationship of five years standing and the stability of their relationship was not 
questioned. However, her request for a residence permit was refused by the Dutch 
authorities. According to the relevant Dutch law, her situation lacked one of the legal 
requirements to grant her right of residence. This was the condition that the person 
residing in the Netherlands, with whom she had a de facto relationship, enjoyed a 
permanent right of residence there, i.e. an "unrestricted right of residence".* 348 However, 
Mrs. Reed's companion was considered to have no such right of residence, since he held a 
residence permit restricted to five years, the minimum period required by Community Law 
for such a permit.349
She then invoked a Community right to live in the Netherlands, based on Articles 7 
(prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality350 *) and 48 of the Treaty of 
Rome, as well as on Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68.351 In a preliminary ruling on the 
case, the European Court considered that:
"In the absence of any indication of a general social development which would 
justify a broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in
34? Case 59/85, Reed, quoted supra.
348 These persons would even include refugees. See the opinion of the Advocate General idem, case 
quoted supra, at pp. 1284-5.
349 In fact, the relevant EC provision, Article 6 of Council Directive 68/360/EEC, quoted supra, 
establishes that the residence permit is to be issued for at least five years from the date of issue. This 
permit is also automatically renewable on the production of evidence of identity and of documentary proof 
that employment will remain available to the worker in the state in question - see Article 4(3)(a) and (b) 
of the same Directive. Finally, it may be noted that, according to the Court of Justice, the source of the 
right to reside is not the residence permit itself, but the relevant EC Treaty provisions. As mentioned 
supra, the Court has ruled that secondary instruments of Community Law implementing Treaty provisions 
on free movement of persons do not create new rights for the persons protected by EC Law. They merely 
gives closer articulation to the Treaty provisions, by determining the scope and detailed rules for the 
exercise of the rights directly conferred by the Treaty. See case 48/75, Procureur du Roi v. Royer [1976] 
ECR 497, paragraphs 23 and 28. This is one more reason to sustain that the Court was right in not 
accepting the argument of the Netherlands government that Dutch legislation did not discriminate on the 
grounds of nationality, and only issued a differential treatment on the basis of the restricted or unrestricted 
period of residence allowed by the residence permit. See also the Advocate General Lenz's opinion on the 
case, who suggests that the relevant Dutch Law could, in itself, be considered by the national court as 
applicable to the case of Mrs. Reed. However, he sustained that the reference made in Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68 to the enjoyment of the same social advantages "as national workers" could apply only 
to the delimitation of the rights of workers entitled to be admitted, but not to the delimitation of the 
category of persons entitled to be admitted with the worker. The Court did not follow him in its decision 
on the case. See case 59/85, Reed, quoted supra, at p.1292.
350 preSently prohibited by Article 6 of the EC Treaty, after its renumbering by the Treaty on European 
Union.
351 See her arguments as recalled by the Advocate General Lenz, idem, at p.1293. Note also that the 
quoted supra Article 10 (2) of Regulation 1612/68 establishes that Member States shall "facilitate the 
admission of any member of the family" not included in paragraph 1 of the same document. This could be 
construed to include a partner of a worker, when both live together in a marital-like status.
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the regulation, it must be held that the term spouse in Article 10 of the Regulation 
refers to a marital relationship only.”352
Then the Court referred to Article 7(2) of the same Regulation, which provides that in the 
host State a worker who is a national of another member State must ’’enjoy the same 
social and tax advantages of nationals." If Reed’s partner had been Dutch, she could have 
obtained a residence permit. The Court considered this to be a social advantage within the 
meaning of that provision, as it "can assist [the foreign worker’s] integration in the host 
State and thus contribute to the achievement of the freedom of movement of workers."353
However, maybe one could perhaps go a bit further. Another sense of equality in 
the context of free movement of persons should be considered. It should not only be 
assessed whether there is a discriminatory treatment against the migrant worker (national 
of a Member State) compared to nationals of his or her host country. We should also 
examine his or her situation in relation to the position he had in his or her country of 
origin, or to the position of his or her compatriots who move within their country of 
origin.354 In this respect, he or she is discriminated against in relation to that position, in 
particular if his or her country of origin gives his or her partner the right to residence 
based on their relationship.
One possible solution could be to give the third country national partner of a 
migrant worker, who is a national of a Member State, the right of residence in the new 
host EC country, provided he or she had such a right in the worker's country of origin. 
The European Parliament, in its opinion on the proposal of the Commission to amend 
Regulation 1612/68, proposed a broader rule than the current one, also adding the ruling 
of the Court in the Reed case. A new paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Regulation would 
extend the right to residence in the new country to:
"(...) the person with whom the worker lives in a de facto union recognised as such 
for administrative and legal purposes, whether in the Member State of origin or 
the host Member State, and their dependent offspring."355 
This official recognition could make an important contribution to protect rights of the 
concerned persons, while avoiding that liberal EC rules became a tool to easily circumvent 
migration laws. However, this proposal was not adopted by the Council.356
352 Case 59/85, paragraph 15.
353 Idem, paragraph 28. Note that, as recalled by Advocate General Lenz, Mrs. Reed was already in 
England when reference to the Court of Justice was made, although her deportation order had been 
suspended. Mrs. Reed and her companion had gone back to the United Kingdom and had no intention to 
return to the Netherlands.
354 This is mentioned by the Court in the Surinder Singh case, when determining whether or not the 
result of the application of British Law would be that a "national of a Member State might be deterred 
from leaving his country of origin in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person 
as envisaged by the Treaty in the territory of another Member State.” See the Surinder Singh case, quoted 
supra, paragraph 19.
355 Amendment 67 proposed by the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1990, 
OJ C 68/87 of 19/3/1990. As recalled supra, the European Parliament proposed to extend the Commission 
draft amendment, according to which the dissolution of marriage of the worker would not affect the right 
of the worker’s ex-spouse to reside and work in the territory of the host Member State, to "the de facto 
separation of the couple". Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1990, OJ C 
68/87 of 19/3/1990, amendments Nos. 11 and 64, and 68. See also Commission Proposal for a regulation 
amending Council Regulation 1612/68, COM (88) 815 final, SYN 185, OJ C 100/6 of 21/4/1989.
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(¡i) E.C.H.R. perspective
The Commission and Court of Human Rights have consistently held that family life 
is protected by Article 8 whether or not it results from a marriage. The important factor is 
that family life really exists.356 57 This means» for instance» that a child bom out of wedlock is 
entitled to as much protection as the child bom within marriage. Moreover, the 
Commission of Human Rights of Strasbourg has already recognised that extra-marital 
relationships of a couple may also constitute family life within the meaning of Article 8.358 *
From a legal point of view, it may be more difficult to prove the existence of the 
family life of an unmarried couple than that of a married one. However, the criteria usually 
applied to establish the existence of family life 5^9 can also ^  expected to apply to 
informal families.^^ Here it will be assumed that the existence of family life has been 
proved.
Therefore in this context there are two issues that remain to be analysed as far as 
the treatment of informal families is concerned. The first issue specifically concerns the
E.C.H.R.: would the Commission and Court of Human Rights apply to informal families 
their case-law on Article 8 in a migration context? The second issue concerns the 
immigration mies under the Community instruments dealing with the free movement of 
persons. When they differentiate between married and unmarried couples, is this 
discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the E.C.H.R.?
1. The answer to the first question seems more straightforward than that of the 
second. The Commission and Court of Human Rights have on a number of occasions 
protected relationships outside marriage, even if usually with regard to relationships 
between parents and their children.361 On the relationship between the two members of
356 A similar proposal was presented by the Parliament, on 13 December 1989, on the three new 
Directives of 1990 on the right to residence, OJ CIS, p.70,74 and 78. It was also unsuccessful.
357 For the Commission and the Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg it is not enough to demonstrate 
that there is de iure family life. This has been considered as a limit to the relevance, under the Article 8, 
of relations outside the nuclear family (that of a couple and their children).
358 Applications No.7289/75 and No.7349/76, X and Y v. Switzerland, Yearbook E.C.H.R., Vol.20, 
1977, p.372, at 408. There, it is stated that the "Commission does not deny that extra-marital relationships 
may constitute 'family life* within the meaning of {Article 8 of the Convention], In the present case, 
however, there is no common household of the applicants and they do not permanently live together, the 
first applicant being married and normally staying with his family [elsewhere]."
35^  Namely the sentimental and economic ties, besides the biological ties between parents and their 
children. See section B of chapter 1.Q/A r
jou I will use this expression to define the (family) relationship in a couple who is not married, but live 
together, or have a stable relationship in the way married couples have. The "informal family” includes, of 
course, the children of such a couple. The lack of attention paid to them is due to the fact that it is usually 
easier to recognise, before the law, the relationship between those children and their parents (considered 
individually) than between the parents themselves .
361 See the judgment of the Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg in case Marckx v. Belgium, Series A, 
No.31,1979, paragraph 31 (on the mother); the one of the case Rasmussen v. Denmark, Series A, No.87, 
1985 (on the father) and in case Johnston v. Ireland, Series A, No. 112, 1987 (as far as both parents are 
concerned, but particularly on the position of the father). See also the judgment of the Keegan case, on the 
rights of the biological father not living with the mother, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26/5/1994, series 
A, Vol.290. Likewise, see the decision of the Commission of Human Rights of Strasbourg on the 
admissibility of Application No.20769/92, G.F. v. Germany, D&R, No.78-A, p.l 11, in which is declared
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the couple themselves, apart from one decision of the Commission,362 *there is no other 
case-law in a migration context. However, both the Commission and the Court have 
repeatedly held that family life has to be protected independently of the existence of a 
marriage.
This idea was implicitly taken up again in the statements of the Court and of the 
Commission in the Johnston case.363 |n this caSe, a couple composed of a married man 
(separated from his wife) and a (single) woman, lived together with their common child. 
They claimed that their status under Irish law, which did not give them the same benefits 
as married couples, violated Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. Despite denying violation of that 
provision, the Commission and Court of Human Rights accepted that family life could 
exist between them. The Commission was satisfied that: "there exists no legal impediment 
under Irish law preventing the applicants from living together [and] supporting each 
other".364 Qn this point, the Court declared that it was important that:
"Ireland has done nothing to impede or prevent them from living together and 
continuing to do so and, indeed, they have been able to regularise their situation as 
best they could".
However disputable the conclusion reached in this case may be, it nevertheless remains 
that both the Commission and the Court of Human Rights recognised implicitly the 
importance of non interference with the life of informal families. More recently, in the 
Kroon case, the European Court of Human Rights declared that:
"as a rule, living together may be a requirement for 'family life’, but exceptionally 
other factors may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship had sufficient 
constancy to create de facto family ties' - such is the case here, as four children 
have been bom to Mrs.Kroon and Zerrock".365
Hence, it may be assumed that the relationship of an unmarried couple, living together as a 
family, could be protected under the E.C.H.R., by the Commission and Court of Human 
Rights.
2. As far as the second question is concerned, it might be recalled that Article 14 
of the E.C.H.R. provides that:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status."
Community rules provide that a married national of a Member State may take his or her 
spouse with him or her when moving to another Member State. A non-married person, 
however, in a family relationship with a partner, may not take the latter with him. Do these 
EC rules conform to Article 14 of the E.C.H.R.?
that Article 8 makes no distinction between "legitimateN and "illegitimate” family. See also case Kroon v. 
the Netherlands, judgment of 27 October 1994, series A, No.297-C.
362 This, in the end, considered that the relationship in question did not constitute family life. See 
Applications No.7289/75 and No.7349/76, quoted supra.
Johnston v. Ireland, quoted supra.
Idem, paragraph 116 of the Commission's decision.
365 See case Kroon, quoted supra.
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According to the case-law of the Commission and Court of Human Rights,366 to 
assess the existence of inadmissible discrimination in a certain case, 4 elements have to be 
found: (1) a differential treatment, (2) of analogous s i t u a t i o n s ,367 (3 ) with no objective 
not reasonable justification for that difference (with regard to the aim and effects of the 
measures concerned), and (4) no reasonable proportion between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised. Each element will be examined separately.
1) Clearly Community rules with regard to freedom of movement treat spouses 
and partners of Community nationals differently. The practical result established by the 
Court of Justice in the Reed case is an exception to the functioning of EC rules on free 
movement of persons.
2) However, are the situations of these persons analogous? Are the important 
elements of their situations similar enough to consider them analogous?
Two aspects must be considered. One is that both kinds of couples, married and 
unmarried, have family life relevant for the purposes of Article 8 of the E.C.H.R..368 in 
this respect they are in a similar situation.
The other point is that the married couple has an official relationship, instituted by 
a formal act and with precise legal consequences. The unmarried couple may or may not 
be recognised by law and thus may or may not have precise rights and duties. This 
depends on the law of their country of residence.369 jn some countries, however, the 
unmarried couple is in this respect in a fairly similar position to the married one.
Meanwhile, it would seem that the situation of an unmarried couple, living in a 
relationship of a marital kind, is essentially analogous to that of a married couple, 
assuming that the essential point is the relationship of the two persons with each other, not 
before the law. Provided that the existence of such a relationship is proved, there seems to 
be no reason not to protect it as family life. This is even more evident if they have 
common children, or if the law of their Member State of origin^ O^ recognises the 
existence of their relationship for identical purposes of those of a married couple.
In any event, the Johnston case may be considered. In that case, it was stated that: 
"the Court does not consider possible to derive from Article 8 an obligation [of the 
Government] to establish for unmarried couples a status analogous to that of married 
couples". The point is that what is asked for here is not a general status of equality with 
the married couples. I am only claiming that even if a couple is not married, that couple 36789
366 Velu, J. & Ergec, R., La Convention Européenne des Droits de L'Homme, Brussels, Bniylant, 1990, 
p.l 17. Here the issue will be analysed with the method used by the Commission and the Court of Human 
Rights of Strasbourg, although the scrutiny of Community rules would be made by the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities. On the principle of non-discrimination in Community Law see Schermers & 
Waelbroeck, op.cit., p.69.
367 As it is pointed out by van Dijk & van Hoof, op.cit., p. 540, in most cases, unfortunately, the 
Commission and the Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg give less or no relevance at all to the 
examination of comparability between the various situations at stake, concentrating instead on the analysis 
of the government's justification.
368 Again, I assumed this was proved in relation to the unmarried couples.
369 Or, to be more precise, the law regulating their relationship - according to the rules of Private 
International Law.
3?01.e., where they previously resided.
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should not be prevented (in any circumstances whatsoever) from continuing to live 
together if they decide to move to another Member State. It is the very existence of the 
family life of the couple that is in question, not the way in which they may organise a 
negligible part of their lives.
3 ) Next, it has to be discovered whether or not the justification for the different 
treatment of the two kinds of couples is objective and reasonable. Here, the issue in 
question is not whether the rules under examination are discriminatory, but whether that 
discrimination achieves "a fair balance between the protection of the interests of the 
community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention".37 1
One argument against equality in this context could be the danger of affecting the 
classical model of the family, resulting from an official marriage, which may be seen as a 
sustainable interest of the society. However, it is unlikely that this would receive much 
consideration from the Court. The most likely argument to be considered by the Court 
could relate to the possibility of fraud control in immigration. It could be sustained that if 
unmarried couples were given the same immigration rights as married ones, a danger 
would exist of fake couples invoking their status as family to circumvent migration laws. 
However, this argument may not be sufficiently objective and reasonable to justify the 
Community rules as they stand. To avoid such a fraud, the control of the existence of the 
family life of unmarried couples could be made in a similar way to that of the married 
ones,* 372 or, if duly justified, even in a stringent manner.
In any case, it seems clear that some possibility should be given for the persons 
concerned to prove that they really are engaged in a relationship where family life exists. 
Otherwise, it could not be said that, with regard to the effects of the measures concerned, 
there was an objective and reasonable justification for the differential treatment in 
question. Neither could it be said that a fair balance between the protection of the interests 
of the community and the respect for the rights of the individual is achieved.
4) In any case, even if the justification was considered to be objective and 
reasonable, it seems clear that the means employed are completely disproportional with 
the aim pursued. On one hand, (in the prevention of fraud hypothesis) there is the mere 
possibility that two persons agree to get married in order for one of them to acquire the 
right of residence in a Member State, while for all practical purposes they are not really 
married. On the other hand, the unmarried couple, under Community Law has no chance 
whatsoever of acquiring the right to reside together in a new Member State, even if, for 
example, they prove beyond doubt that they have been living together for years and have 
several children. It seems clear that here there is not a reasonable proportion between the 
means employed and the aim to be realised.
To the extent that this assessment is true, the Community Law rules on the matter 
do not conform to the standards of the E.C.H.R.
371 "Belgian Linguistic" case, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A, No.6, 1968, p.44. For criticism of this 
reasoning as a way of procedure, see van Dijk & van Hoof, op.cit., pp.542-3.
372 Such a control is often very stringent, as demonstrates, i.e, the "primary purpose" rule in British 
Immigration Law and the attempts by the French authorities to strictly control the existence of real family 
life in immigration cases.
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C - THE RIGH TS O F TH IRD  COUNTRY NATIONALS IN O T H E R  
AREAS OF EC  LAW  - A U SEFUL COMPARISON ?
Conventional wisdom says that the Community does not have competence to act 
with regard to third country nationals, except in a few cases regarding relatives of 
nationals of a Member State who are migrants in another Member State and in situations 
envisaged in external agreements.
This supposed lack of Community competence was already questioned in chapters 
2 and 3. However, the worst aspect of this superficial idea - that the Community can only 
exceptionally act with regard to third country nationals - is that this is often confused with 
the idea that Community Law in general does not apply to third country nationals. The 
objective of this section is to assess whether and to what extent certain areas of 
Community legislation include third country nationals in their personal scope [hereinafter: 
have a general or narrow personal scope, respectively].
It is not the purpose of this section to make a comprehensive inquiry into the 
personal scope of Community Law, as a whole. First, the legislation relating to free 
movement within the Community has already been dealt with in sections A and B. 
Secondly, it is rather obvious that most of the economic law of the Community applies to 
nationals of a Member State and to third country nationals alike, the latter being either 
natural or legal persons. Provided third country nationals have the right to operate in or 
with the Union, they are, in principle, within the personal scope of Community Law 
regarding, e.g., commercial policy, competition policy, industrial policy, taxation and 
undertakings. However, for the purposes of this thesis what is important is the situation of 
natural persons living in the Union and who are nationals of a third country. Therefore, the 
analysis of this section will concentrate on some areas of special relevance for such natural 
persons. This section will not deal with areas the main relevance of which is for legal 
persons, notably for enterprises from third countries.
Two areas in particular will be examined in this section: social policy and 
education. Community social policy seems to be of particular importance for the everyday 
life of nationals of third countries living in the Union. This is due to the fact that, in one 
way or another, a considerable proportion of EC social policy measures relate to the 
protection of persons with an inferior socio-economic status, which is usually the one held 
by third country nationals. In the meantime, the importance of education also lies in the 
strategical relevance that it has for the personal and collective integration of third country 
nationals in the Member States. Finally, this section will make a short reference to other 
rules of Community Law applicable to third country nationals, as far as procedural rights 
and also officials of the European Union institutions are concerned.
The analysis in this section is meant to contribute to determining whether the 
application to third country nationals of EC legal instruments is the rule or the exception 
within Community Law. In the end some conclusions will be submitted.
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1- SOCIAL PO LIC Y, BESID ES FREE M OVEM ENT OF PERSONS 
a) Treaty Provisions
Except as far as the free movement of persons is concerned, the social provisions 
of the EC Treaty373 seem to be drafted in such a manner as to have a clear general 
personal scope - i.e. to include third country nationals in their personal scope. Those 
provisions usually refer to " workers",374"labour",375 and "men and women"376 in such a 
generic way that it is legitimate to presume that they refer to all workers, regardless of 
their nationality.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation has already examined the possibility of using the EC 
Treaty provisions on social policy as a legal basis for the pursuit of Community activities 
in relation to third country nationals, including the enactment of legal measures concerning 
them. That chapter analysed, for instance, the case of Article 118, which establishes that 
the Commission shall promote close cooperation between Member States in the social 
field. In the Germany et al. v. Commission cases,377 the Court ruled that Article 118 
authorised the Commission to promote consultation on policy on immigration and 
immigrants from third countries, except as far as the cultural integration of such workers 
was concerned.
Within the social provisions of the EC Treaty, only Article 121 seems to 
potentially exclude third country nationals. It regards the assignment by the Council to the 
Commission of "tasks in connection with the implementation of common measures, 
particularly as regards social security for migrant workers referred to in Articles 48 and 
51". This last reference relates mainly to nationals of Member States, because, as 
mentioned in section A of this chapter, only such nationals are considered to have an 
independent right to freedom of movement as workers.
In all other respects, the social provisions of the EC Treaty seem to apply to all 
workers in the European Union, irrespective of nationality.
As regards the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community and that of the 
European Atomic Energy Community they establish clearly that free movement of 
workers in their domain is reserved to nationals of Member States.378 However, other 
provisions of the same treaties also make general reference to "workers" - for instance as 
far as wages or health and safety are concerned.379 As pointed out above, this contrasts 
with Article 48 of the EC Treaty, which mentions "workers" and "workers of the Member
373 Chapter 1 and 2 (on Social Provisions and The European Social Fund, respectively) of Title VIII (on 
"Social Policy, education, vocational training and youth") of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on 
European Union, correspondent to Chapter 1 and 2 of Title III of the EEC Treaty (on Social Policy) of the 
version of the Treaty of Rome in force before the Treaty on European Union.
374 Articles 117, 118,118A and 123 (on the European Social Fund).
373 Article 118B, on "dialogue between management and labour at European level".
376 Article 119, on "the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work".
377 Joined cases 281,283-285,287/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203.
378 Article 69(1) and Article 96, respectively.
379 See Articles 46, 48, 56,68 and Article 69(4) of the ECSC Treaty and Articles 2 and 30, as well as 97, 
148 and 196 of the EAEC Treaty.
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States". This reference has been interpreted by the Court of Justice in the Meade case,380 
and implemented by secondary Community Law on free movement of workers, as if it 
would only concerned workers who are nationals of Member States.
b) The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers was adopted at 
the European Council of Strasbourg in December 1989.381 It was approved by all of the 
then Member States of the European Community, except the United Kingdom. It was 
meant to reflect their "attachment to a model of social relations based on common 
traditions and practices" and to "serve them as a reference point for taking fuller account 
in future of the social dimension in the development of the Community".382 The Charter 
has often been referred to in the Preamble of Community instruments on social matters. 
Thus, it may be relevant to examine whether or not the Charter was intended to cover 
workers who are nationals of third countries.383
First, the title of the Charter refers to "workers", and, as Bercusson recalls, 
"workers" may "include persons who are not Member States citizens, but are working in 
the Community."384 As he adds, the question may even arise "as to whether workers who 
are not Community nationals may be lawfully resident."385
Secondly, in the Preamble of the Charter, a recital states that:
"(...) the completion of the internal market must offer improvements in the social 
field for workers of the European Community, especially in terms of freedom of 
movement, living and working conditions, health and safety at work, social 
protection, education and training^ ...)".
As explained above, freedom of movement of workers is considered to be limited to 
nationals of a Member State, thus the reference to "workers of the European Community" 
must relate here to "workers who are nationals of a Member State". This would indicate 
that the Charter does not apply to third country nationals. This seems to be somewhat 
confirmed in a later recital stating that:
"(...) it is for Member States to guarantee that workers from non-member 
countries and members of their families who are legally resident in a Member 
State of the European Community are able to enjoy, as regards their living and
380 Case 238/83, quoted supra.
38* Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted in the European Council of 
Strasbourg in December 1989, published e.g., in Social Europe, No.1,1990, Commission of the European 
Communities, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, Brussels, 
1990, pp.46-50.
382 Conclusions of the French Presidency, Bull. EC, 12/1989, pg. 11, point 1.1.10.
383 Even beyond the determination of the precise legal value of the Charter. For an analysis of the legal 
status of the Charter in the Community legal order see Hepple, Bob "The Implementation of the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights", MLR, Vol.53,1990, No.5, pp.643-654, at 644-646.
384 Bercusson, Brian "The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Charter of Workers", 
MLR, Vol.53, 1990, No. 5, pp.624-642, at 627. Bercusson also highlights the differences between the 
drafts and the final version of (he Social Charter, in that the latter mentions workers and the former refers 
to citizens, idem, pp. 626-627.
385 Idem.
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working conditions, treatment comparable to that enjoyed by workers who are 
nationals of the Member State.”
This recital appears to exclude third country nationals from the personal scope of the 
Charter, at least as far as Community Law is concerned.386
In any case, it is worth noting that this exclusion contrasts with the previous 
versions of the Social Charter. In the first version proposed by the Commission, the 
relevant recital made a general declaration, stating:
"Whereas workers from third countries who are legally resident in a member state 
of the Community should benefit from treatment comparable to that of workers of 
the member state concerned."38^
The second Commission proposal makes a slight change, stating that:
"Whereas workers from non-member countries who are legally resident in a 
member state of the Community should be able to enjoy treatment comparable to 
that enjoyed by workers who are nationals of the member state concerned."-*88 
The expression "should benefit" from comparable treatment, in the first version, becomes 
"should be able to enjoy" comparable treatment, in the second version. "Comparable 
treatment" is already an imprecise and weak expression if it is compared with the 
expression "equality of treatment" - which we could legitimately expect to find in a 
document of this type. Yet, the Charter becomes even weaker on its way to the final 
version, because the latter declares that "it is for Member States to guarantee" such 
comparable treatment. In this manner, no doubt is left as to the divisions of competence 
between Member States and the Community, at least as far as the intentions of the drafters 
of the Charter are concerned.389
Nevertheless, a third important element remains to be analysed: the main text of 
the Social Charter. This text contains words and expressions with a general meaning. On 
employment and remuneration, for example, the Charter refers to "every individual" or "all 
employment". It also states that equal treatment "for men and women must be assured". 
Moreover, it provides for protection or assistance to "all disabled persons", or to "any 
person who [has] reached retirement age but who is not entitled to a pension" or to 
"persons who have been unable to enter or re-enter the labour market", or to "young 
people".
These expressions, in themselves, could also include third country nationals. 
However, the matter becomes more complicated when the same type of expression seems
386 Although, arguably, the principle of comparable treatment could be seen as a principle of Community 
value to be enforced by the Member States.
38^  See the draft of the Commission published in EIRRev, No. 186, July 1989, pp.27-29.
388 See the draft of the Commission published in EIRRev, No. 190, November 1989, pp.26-28.
389 That careful wording may be important should there be an eventual judicial use of the Charter. The 
Court of Justice could be called on to rule on a case in which the equality of treatment between a worker 
national of a Member State, on the one hand, and someone who is a national from a third country, on the 
other, is at stake. The careful wording of the Charter, declaring it to be for the Member States to guarantee 
comparable treatment between both types of workers, does not help the Court to draw inspiration from the 
Charter, or in any other way to use the Charter as a basis to declare discrimination in this context to be 
incompatible with Community Law. The fact that the Charter was not approved by the United Kingdom 
does not help either, except, perhaps, in the case that the rules at stake would not apply to the United 
Kingdom because they were enacted under the Maastricht Social Agreement - annexed to the Protocol on 
Social Policy to the Treaty on European Union.
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to be used with different meanings. For instance, the term "worker of the European 
Community" is an expression that is repeated in the Charter. Point 1, providing that 
"Every worker of the European Community shall have the right to the freedom of 
movement throughout the territory of the Community", seems clearly to indicate that the 
intention of the European Council was not to extend that right to third country nationals. 
Again, the expression as used in that context is equivalent to "every worker who is a 
national of a Member State". However, what about in other cases? Doubts may be raised, 
for example, when the Charter provides that "every worker of the European Community 
shall have a right to a weekly rest period and to annual paid leave" or that "the conditions 
of employment of every worker of the European Community shall be stipulated in laws, a 
collective agreement or a contract of employment". Would these rules apply only to 
nationals of a Member State and not to third country nationals? It seems difficult to justify 
such a restrictive interpretation.
It is submitted that the Community Social Charter was not meant to change in any 
way whatsoever the legal status quo regarding, first, the competence of the Member 
States and of the Community vis-à-vis third country nationals and, secondly, the personal 
scope of Community social legislation. In this manner, the reference made in the recital to 
the competence the Member States vis-à-vis workers from third countries should be 
understood as a precaution of the EC governments against any extension of Community 
competence through the Charter. On the other hand, the Social Charter should not be 
interpreted as precluding the application of Community Social Law to third country 
nationals.
In the meantime, the fact that different elements of the Charter seem to point in 
contradictory directions (by apparently limiting its scope to nationals of a Member State in 
the Preamble and then often using expressions with a generic sense in the main text) 
demonstrates, perhaps, how difficult it can be in most cases to exclude third country 
nationals from the personal scope of Community social legislation. It is therefore 
necessary to examine that legislation.
c) Secondary legislation
As explained in section A of the present chapter, the Community rules on the free 
movement of workers (employed or self-employed persons) apply almost exclusively to 
nationals of Member States. Third country nationals have, at most, only a derived right to 
follow their relatives who are migrant nationals of a Member State. As regards social 
security matters related to movement within the European Union, the rights of third 
country nationals are also very limited. Therefore, following such basic guidelines, the 
personal scope of all EC social legislation relating to freedom of movement of workers is 
usually restricted to nationals of the Member S t a t e s .390
However, this appears to be in contrast to the rest of Community social legislation, 
which seems to have a general personal scope (it is also applicable to third country 
nationals), or, at least, its personal scope is not explicitly limited to nationals of Member 
States. For the purposes of this section, EC Social legislation (not related to free 390
390 Note also the Communication from the Commission on living and working conditions of residents in 
frontier regions (specially frontier workers) which, in its own title, declares that is only concerned with 
"Community citizens", COM (90) 561 final, of 27/11/1990.
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movement of workers) will be roughly divided into five groups, according to their subject 
matter. These groups include legislation related, first to workers in general and their rights 
in particular; secondly to health and safety at work; thirdly to specific groups of persons, 
fourthly to the European Social Fund and the fifthly to some other remaining matters.
(i) Rights of workers
The social legislation relating to the position and rights of workers391 does not 
differentiate between workers who are and who are not nationals of a Member State. 
Sometimes, EC legislation appears to indicate clearly that it also applies to third country 
nationals when it uses expressions such as "every paid employee".392 However, the legal 
expressions or concepts most used by EC social legislation (on workers and their rights) 
are of a less precise character. Often such legislation uses quite generic expressions such 
as "workers" (or "individual workers"393, or "shift worker”394) and "employees"395 (or 
"employed persons”396) or "employer”,397 with no further delimitation - at least as far as 
their nationality is concerned.398
391 Workers as such and not as nationals entitled to rights of free movement within the Community.
392 Article 1 of the Council Directive 91/533 of 14/10/1991 on an employer's obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship, OJ L 228/32 of 
18/10/91.
393 Article l(l)(a) of the Council Directive 75/129/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 48/29 of 22/2/75.
394 Council Directive 93/104/EC, of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time, OJ L 307/18 of 13/12/93.
395 See Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses, OJ L 61/26 of 05/03/77; and Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 
20/10/1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees 
in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 283/23 of 28/10/80. Article 1 of the latter Directive 
applies to "employees claims arising from contracts of employment or employment relationships and 
existing against employers" in a state of insolvency. The Directive establishes that "Member States may, 
by way of exception, exclude claims by certain categories of employee from the scope of this Directive, by 
virtue of the special type of the employee's contract of employment or employment relationship or of the 
existence of other forms of guarantee offering the employee protection equivalent to that resulting from 
this Directive" - Article 1(2). Such categories are listed in the annex to the Directive and do not refer to a 
nationality criterion. See also the Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's 
obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship, OJ 
L 288/32 of 18/10/91; the Council Directive 93/104/EC on working time, quoted supra; and the Council 
Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254/64, of 30/09/94. As mentioned supra in 
section A, it may be argued that this Directive constitutes a basis to hold that a third country national, who 
is a representative in a European Works Council, has a Community right to travel to another Member 
State when that Works Council meets there.
396 See the Council Recommendation 92/443/EEC of 27 July 1992 concerning the promotion of
participation by employed persons in profits and enterprises results (including equity participation), OJ L
245/53 of 26/8/92. This expression was also used by the Commission's proposal for a Council Directive on 
certain employment relationships with regard to working conditions, and by the Commission's proposal 
for a Council Directive on certain employment relationships with regard to distortions of competition - 
both contained in COM (90) 228 final of 13/8/1990. However, these two proposals are to be withdrawn by
2 3 7
As far as the wording of the provisions is concerned, it may certainly be pointed 
out that in the Mikkelsen case399 the Court of Justice considered that the meaning of the 
term "employee" to be protected by Directive No.77/187400 was equivalent to that of the 
persons protected as employees under national employment law. In this manner, the Court 
referred to national law to define the precise meaning of a Community rule. Nevertheless, 
this does not seem to raise problems for the analysis engaged in this section, even if the 
concepts used by Community Law were to be defined exclusively according to national 
laws. Usually, national labour laws do not discriminate between workers who are nationals 
of a Member State and those who are not - at least not in the matters covered by the EC 
Law in question.
Besides the mere wording of the provisions, or the context in which they are used 
does not indicate that they are meant to have a narrow personal scope - i.e. to cover 
nationals of a Member State only. On the contrary, the wording, as well as the context of 
the provisions, seem to indicate that the legislation applies to nationals of Member States 
and third country nationals alike.
This derives, inter alia, from the fact that EC legislation in this area pursues a 
general objective of workers protection. This objective could not be truly achieved if it 
excluded nationals of third countries who are workers in the European Union. 
Furthermore, another clear objective of the EC legislator in the adoption of these 
instruments was to make an approximation of national labour legislation. Again, it could 
be said that there is a common tradition of national labour laws, in the matters covered by 
the discussed EC Law, according to which they usually apply without discrimination to 
national and foreigner workers alike.401 Thus, it would be impossible to achieve a real 
harmonisation of national rules if the relevant EC Law excluded third country nationals 
from its personal scope.
the Commission according to the Medium Term Social Action Programme 1995-1997, COM (95) 134 
final, of 12/4/1995, p.36.
Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport, OJ L 370/8 of 31/12/85.
39^  See also the case of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport, OJ L 370/1 of 31/12/85, which 
Article 1(3) establishes that for the purposes of the Directive " 'driver* means any person who drives the 
vehicle...". Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport (OJ L 370/8 of 
31/12/85), which establishes that for its purposes the same definitions of Regulation 3820 is applied. 
Regulation 3821/85 refers also to "employer" and "driver", in generic terms.
399 See case 105/84, quoted supra, paragraphs 26-8.
400 Quoted supra, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.
401 National legislation on social security often differentiates between workers (and their relatives) who 
are nationals of a Member State and those who are not. However, if we exclude EC legislation on social 
security for beneficiaries of free movement and that on non-discrimination on the basis of sex, we have to 
conclude that binding EC instruments on social security are rather perfunctory or even non existent.
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(ii) Health and Safety at work (or closely related to workers)
Here it is seems to be particularly clear that there is no substantive reason to 
exclude workers who are third country nationals from the personal scope of EC measures. 
Furthermore there seem to be important reasons to include them. This conclusion may be 
drawn in light of the wording, the context, and the objective foreseen by the relevant EC 
legislation in this area.
As far as the wording is concerned, in none of the legal instruments is there an 
explicit or implicit distinction between workers who are nationals of a Member State and 
workers who are not. Whenever there is a mention of "workers", it is a general one.402 
Sometimes expressions of a less undetermined character are used. The Directive on 
medical treatment on board vessels, for example, defines the worker to whom it applies as 
being "any person carrying out an occupation on board of a vessel".403 Some other 
Directives refer only to any natural or (sometimes) legal person who carries out a certain 
activity or has a certain responsibility - again with no distinction based on nationality.404 
In all cases it seems that the Directives include third country nationals in their personal 
scope.
As far as the context of the provisions on health and safety is concerned, there 
seems to be no reason to conclude that they apply to nationals of a Member State only. *4
4°2 See, e.g., the Commission Recommendation of 22 May 1990 to the Member States concerning the 
adoption of a European schedule of occupational diseases OJ L 160/39, 26/6/1990; Council Directive 
91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health at work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary employment 
relationship, OJ L 206/19 of 29/07/91; Council Directive of 25 June 1991 amending Directive 83/477/ 
EEC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work, OJ L 206/16 of 
29/7/91; Council Directive on minimum requirements for the provision of safety and/or health signs at 
work, OJ L 245/23 of 26/8/92; and Council Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992 on the implementation 
of minimum safety and health requirements at mobile constructions sites, OJ L 245/6 of 26/8/92. The 
Directives referred to often detail the duties that each Member State is expected to impose on the 
employers. These duties include actions related to the working place and material or to the workers - even 
if the latter appear some times under other words, like "persons". See also, e.g., Council Directive 
92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety 
and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breast feeding 
(tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391 /EEC), OJ L 348/1 of 
28/11/92; and Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum requirements 
for improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting industries through 
drilling (eleventh individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ 
L 348/9 of 28/11/92. Note, finally, that Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Council Directive 93/104, quoted supra, 
refer to "every worker". This Directive was adopted under Article 118A of the EC Treaty - on 
improvement of health and safety of workers, especially in the working environment.
4°3 Article 1(b) of Council Directive 92/29/EEC on the minimum safety and health requirements for 
improved medical treatment on board vessels, OJ L 113/19 of 30/4/92. Moreover, for the purposes of the 
Directive, the vessels to be covered are all vessels flying the flag of a Member State or registered under its 
jurisdiction. Thus any worker in such vessel is protected by the Directive.
404 Council Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992 on the implementation of minimum safety and health 
requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites (eighth individual Directive within the meaning of 
Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 245/6 of 26/8/92; Council Directive 92/58/EEC of 24 June 
1992 on the minimum requirements for the provision of safety and/or health signs at work (ninth 
individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 245/23 of 
26/08/92.
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Furthermore, the very objective of EC legislation on health and safety at work is an 
important reason to consider that such legislation also applies to third country nationals. In 
most of the cases it is fairly obvious that the very aim of the initiatives cannot be attained if 
distinction is made between workers, based on their nationality, or on any other criterion 
not related to the conditions regarding health and safety. Usually, ensuring certain 
conditions of health and safety requires the effort of every person involved. It could be 
pointless, for instance, to require a French worker to take some action or care to protect 
health and safety, if his or her Algerian colleague is allowed to pay no attention to it and 
puts the former (and himself) in danger.
Furthermore, the objectives of the legislation on safety and health at work are as 
much in the interest of the workers themselves,405 as they are in the interests of society as 
a whole. It is in the interest of society, for instance, to reduce medical expenses and social 
security allowances caused by accidents at work. This interest could not be fully achieved 
if third country nationals were excluded from the personal scope of the Directives and 
were thus exposed to risks to their health.
A further argument to sustain a general personal scope for the legislation in 
question is the fact that it has its legal basis in Article 118a(l) of the EC Treaty. This 
article states that:
"Member States shall have particular attention to encouraging improvements, 
especially in the working environment, as regards health and safety of 
workers“.40^
Such a generic reference seems to confirm the idea that in this area Community 
instruments apply to workers who are nationals of third countries.
(iii) Action on specific groups of persons, besides workers
An important group of Community social instruments relates to action on specific 
groups of persons, besides workers. They share with most EC social legislation the 
characteristic of having a general undetermined personal scope. That is the case of 
instruments making generic reference to "disabled people",407 "elderly",408 "young 
people",409 "men and women",410 or "poor people".411
405 Or of directly concerned persons, like employers, clients and other persons directly and individually 
affected by safety and health conditions.
400 Emphasis added. See also Article 118a(3), making a generic mention to "the protection of working 
conditions".
407 See, e.g., the Council Decision 93/136/EEC of 25 February 1993 establishing a third Community 
action programme to assist disabled people (Helios n 1993 to 1996), OJ L 56/30 of 09/03/93. Its Article 1 
defines it as an action programme to promote equality of opportunities for and the integration of disabled 
people and Article 2 defines disabled people without making any reference to a nationality criterion. Note, 
finally, that Article 2 of the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum requirements to 
improve the mobility and the safe transport to work of workers with reduced mobility ("with motor 
disabilities"), defines the latter workers as "any worker who has special difficulty in using public 
transport", OJ C 68/7 of 16/3/91, as modified (OJ C 15/18 of 21/1/92).
408 See, e.g., the Council Decision 91/49/EEC of 26 November 1990 on Community actions for the 
elderly, OJ L 28/29 of 2/2/91; and the Proposal for a Council decision on Community support for actions 
in favour of older people, COM (95) 53 of 1/3/95.
409 Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ L 216/12
of 20/8/94. According to the Directive, Member States shall take the "necessary measures to prohibit work
by children" and that work by young people is performed under conditions suitable to their age, e.g. that
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In the light of the lack of other relevant elements of legal interpretation indicating 
that third country nationals are excluded from their personal scope, it is submitted that 
such persons are covered by these types of EC legal instruments. It would be inconsistent, 
for example, to promote the equality of opportunities for men and women, or, even more 
so, the social integration of marginal groups of persons, but to exclude third country 
nationals from the scope of the relevant Community measures. Such differential treatment 
could also amount to a violation of the principle of equality, which is part, inter alia, of 
Public International Law.
(iv) The European Social Fund
The European Social Fund was established by Article 123 of the EEC Treaty,
"In order to improve employment opportunities for workers in the common market 
and to contribute thereby to raising the standard of Iiving(...)."
The task of the Fund is said to be that of *410
the work does not harm their health. The very purpose of this Directive indicates that it has to apply also 
to third country nationals. Article 2 thereof refers to "any person under 18 years of age having an 
employment contract or relationship". Article 3 defines "young person" as being "any person under 18 
years of age", “child" as "any young person of less than 15 years of age", and "adolescent" as "any young 
person of at least 15 years of age but less than 18 years". Arguably the Directive applies also to illegal 
workers. Note that this Directive was adopted under Article 118A.
410 See, e.g., Council Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating 
to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, OJ L 39/40, of 14/8/86; Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ L 39/40 of 14/2/1976; Council Directive 79/7/EEC, of 19 December 1978, on the 
progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social 
security, OJ L 6/24 of 10/1/79; Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on equal treatment for men 
and women in occupational social security schemes, OJ L 225/40 of 12/8/86; and the Council resolution of 
29 May on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work, OJ C 157/3 of 27/6/90.
4*1 Council Decision 85/8/EEC of 19 December 1984 on specific Community action to combat poverty, 
OJ L 2/24 of 3/1/85. Article 1(2) thereof establishes that poor shall mean "persons, families and groups of 
persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the 
minimum acceptable way of life in the Member States where they live". This undoubtedly includes third 
country nationals, who, actually, are one of the most important groups to be dealt with in this initiative. 
Later the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 3730/87 of 10 December 1987 laying down the general 
rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks to designated organisations for distribution to the 
most deprived persons in the Community, OJ L 352/1 of 15/12/87. The Preamble of this Regulation 
speaks of most deprived persons and most deprived citizens, but in its actual provisions the Regulation 
mentions only most deprived persons. See also the Resolution of the Council and of the ministers for 
social affairs meeting within the Council of 29 September 1989 on combating social exclusion, OJ C 
277/1 of 31/10/89. It refers to "economically and socially disadvantageous groups of people". It is 
noteworthy that in this Resolution the Council requests Member States to take measures "to enable 
everyone to have access to education, training employment housing community services and medical 
care". Finally there are also Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3149/92 of 29 October 15192 laying down 
detailed rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks for the benefit of the most deprived persons 
in the Community, OJ L 313/50 of 30/10/92; and the Commission Decision 94/617/EC of 8 September 
1994 adopting the plan allocating to the Member States resources to be charged to the 1995 budget year 
for the supply of food from intervention stocks for the benefit of the most deprived persons in the 
Community, OJ L 245/23 of 20/9/94. These two latter instruments make no exclusion of their personal 
scope based on a nationality criterion. See, finally, the draft decision of the Council on a medium-term 
action programme to combat exclusion and promote solidarity, COM (93) 435 of 22/9/93.
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"rendering the employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical 
and occupational mobility within the Community, and to facilitate their adaptation 
to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through 
vocational training and retraining."412
The generic references of Article 123 have allowed the European Social Fund to finance 
programmes promoting the integration of nationals from third countries and also the 
training of social workers and teachers involved with third country nationals residing in the 
Union.413
However, it may be interesting to note that while specific legislation provides for 
the use of the European Social Fund for certain other groups of persons,414 there is no 
legal instrument regarding the specific use of the Fund for third country nationals.
(v) O ther instrum ents
Community measures in some other areas also seem to have a general personal 
scope. In some cases this is rather clear, although the instruments in question do not have
2 Emphasis added. This is the original text of the EEC Treaty. Article G (34) of the Treaty on European 
Union made minor changes to the drafting of this article, including the change of the reference to the 
"workers in the common market" to "workers in the internal market". This does not challenge, and 
perhaps even reinforces the assessment that third country nationals workers in Member States may benefit 
from the Fund actions.
413 See Jacobs, A. T. J. M. & Zeijen, H. in European Labour Law and Social Policy, Tilburg, Tilburg 
University Press, 1993, at p.44; and the reference to this topic in chapter 2. See also, inter alia. Article 1 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No.2950/83 of 17 October 1983, on the implementation of Decision 
83/516/EEC on the tasks of the European Social Fund, OJ L 289/1, of 22/10/1983; and the very Council 
Decision 83/516/EEC on the tasks of the European Social Fund, OJ L 289/38 of 22/10/1983. Article 
4(2)(d) of this decision states that fund assistance may be granted to promote employment to persons, over 
the age of 25, who are "migrant workers or have moved within the Community or become residents in the 
Community to take up work, together with the members of their families". An annex to the decision 
contains statements to be entered in the minutes. One of such statements relates to Article 4 and goes as 
follows: "[n]oting that the number of nationals of third countries benefiting from the Fund's assistance is 
relatively small, the Commission points out that countries receiving migrant workers should make a 
significant effort to integrate them". Note also the old Council Decision 74/327, of 27 June 1974, on 
action by the European Social Fund for migrant workers, OJ L 185/20, of 9/7/74. This decision, although 
not expressly mentioning third country nationals was worded in such a way as not to exclude them. This 
was particularly clear in its Articles 2 and 3, which defined the activities eligible to receive assistance 
from the Fund. In its Article 1, the Decision referred only to persons moving "from one Community 
country to another”. These referred to nationals of Member States and their families, since only these were 
seen as having a right to free movement in the Community. However, Article 2 included under the 
activities to be funded those "intended to facilitate the reception and integration into their social and 
working environment of persons, other than frontier workers, who have left their country of origin to take 
up employment in a Community country, and of members of their families". Moreover, Article 3 allowed 
for funding of "operations to facilitate the basic and advanced training of welfare workers and teachers 
responsible for integration courses for migrant workers or their children".
414 See the Council Resolution of 22 June 1994 on the promotion of equal opportunities for men and 
women through action by the European Structural Funds, OJ C 231/1 of 20/08/94. For other specific 
groups of persons, see, e.g.. Council Regulation (EEC) No 3039/78 of 18 December 1978 on the creation 
of two new types of aid for young people from the European Social Fund, OJ L 361/3 of 23/12/78; and the 
Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs, meeting within the 
Council, of 18 December 1984 on greater recourse to the European Social Fund in respect of cultural 
workers, OJ C 2/2 of 4/1/85.
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a legally binding force. That is the case of a Council resolution of 1992 on the fight against 
unemployment, which declares that attention should be given to the "breaking down of 
outdated stereotypes concerning women, disadvantageous groups and older workers".415 
A Council recommendation of June 1992, on common criteria concerning sufficient 
resources and social assistance in social protection systems,416 points in the same 
direction. It suggests that the Member States recognise "the basic right of a person to 
sufficient resources and social assistance to live in a maimer compatible with human 
dignity". One of the basic principles to be followed in order to recognise that right is that 
the scope of the latter:
"be defined vis-à-vis individuals, having regard to legal residence and nationality, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions on residence, with the aim of 
progressively covering all exclusion situations in that connection as broad as 
possible".
While this would seem to leave room for restrictions based on nationality, the 
recommendation declares that "every person" is to have access to that right, provided 
some criteria of effective need are met. The recommendation further adds that this right is 
to be "auxiliary in relation to other social rights" and that an "effort should be made in 
parallel to reintegrate the poorest people into the systems of general rights"417
It is also worthy to note a Council recommendation of July 1992 on the general 
policy principles in the area of social protection.418 It recommends that "under conditions 
determined by each Member State", social protection attempts, inter alia:
"to give any person residing legally, within its territory, regardless of his or her 
resources, the chance to benefit from the system for the protection of human 
health existing in the Member State"
Social protection should also:
"help further the social integration of all persons legally resident within the 
territory of the Member State."
Furthermore, the Council recommendation states that social benefits should be granted in 
accordance with principles such as
"equal treatment in such a way as to avoid any discrimination based on 
nationality, race, sex, religion, customs or political opinion, provided the 
applicants fulfil the conditions regarding length of membership and/or residence 
required to be eligible for benefits".
In addition, the Council recommends that the different forms of social protection should 
be available to employed (or elderly) persons who are legally resident in a Member State, 
or to "all women legally resident" (for maternity benefits), or to "disabled persons legally 
resident" (for incapacity for work).
415 Council resolution of 21 December 1992 on the need to tackle the serious and deteriorating situation 
concerning unemployment in the Community, OJ C 49/3 of 19/02/93.
416 Council recommendation 92/441/EEC of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient 
resources and social assistance in social protection systems, OJ L 245/46 of 26/08/92.
417 Note, in any case, that an interestingly prudent recital states that this recommendation "does not 
affect national and Community provisions on the right of residence".
418 Council recommendation 92/442/EEC of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of social protection
objectives and policies, OJ L 245/49 of 26/08/92.
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The above mentioned resolutions and recommendations seem to have a clear 
general personal scope, although they are not legally binding.419
2  - E D U C A T IO N , A N D  V O C A T IO N A L  T R A IN IN G
The EC Treaty provisions dealing specifically with education and vocational 
training do not exclude third country nationals from their personal scope.420
However, EC legislation related to the educational aspects of free movement of 
persons has a clear narrow scope, i.e., it is not applicable to third country nationals. The 
legislation on mutual recognition of diplomas (certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications), for example, provides only for the recognition of diplomas awarded to 
nationals of a Member State.421 This is the case of the Directives on general recognition of 
diplomas422 and on their recognition in specific areas.423 Furthermore, the Council 
decisions on the recognition by Member States of diplomas conferred in third countries 
also have a narrow personal scope424 By comparison, the Council Decision on the 
comparability of vocational training qualifications between Member States425 has a more 
general character, at least potentially. It establishes measures related to the uniformity of
419 Note, however, that the Court of Justice has recognised the possibility that Commission 
recommendations have indirect effect. See case C- 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionels 
[1989] ECR 4407, mentioned in chapter 3.
420 See Articles 126 and 127 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union.
421 In any case, note my argument, explained above in this chapter, that in certain circumstances third 
country nationals residing in the Union should have a Community right to have their diplomas recognised 
in a Member State.
422See Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second general system for the recognition of 
professional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC, OJ L 209/25 of 24/07/92, later 
amended - OJ L 217/8 of 23/08/94; and Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general 
system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education 
and training of at least three years' duration, OJ L 19/16 of 24/01/89. Article 2 of both Directives state that 
they apply to the recognition of diplomas conferred to "any national of a Member State".
423 Artie le 2 of Directive 77/452/EEC of 27 June 1977 (nurses responsible for general care), OJ L 176/1 
of 15/7/77; Article 3(2) of Council Directive 77/796/EEC of 12 December 1977 (goods haulage operators 
and road passenger transport operators), OJ L 334/37 of 24/12/77; and Articles 2 of Directive 78/686/EEC 
of 25 July 1978 (practitioners of dentistry), OJ L 233/1 of 24/08/78; Directive 78/1026/EEC of 18 
December 1978 (veterinary medicine), OJ L 362/1 of 23/12/78; Directive 80/154/EEC of 21 January 1980 
(midwifery), OJ L 33/1 of 11/2/80; Directive 85/384/EEC of 10 June 1985 (architecture), OJ L 223/15 of 
21/8/85; Directive 85/433/EEC of 16 September 1985 (pharmacy), OJ L 253/37 of 24/9/85. Note that this 
type of Directives often includes "measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment 
and freedom to provide services". This helps to explain that they only apply to nationals of a Member 
State. However, this, in itself, does not make it impossible to envisage a system of recognition of 
diplomas conferred to third country nationals. The latter could, for example, benefit from such recognition 
only insofar as they were under the scope of Community Law on free movement, or as far as national legal 
orders allowed them to enter, reside and work in a Member State.
424See Council recommendation 89/49/EEC of 21 December 1988 concerning nationals of Member 
States who hold a diploma conferred in a third State, OJ L 19/24 of 24/1/89; Council resolution of 18 June 
1992 concerning nationals of Member States who hold a diploma or certificate awarded in a third country, 
OJC 187/1 of 24/7/92.
425Council Decision 85/368/EEC of 16 July 1985 on the comparability of vocational training 
qualifications between the Member States of the European Community, OJ L 199/56 of 31/7/85.
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descriptions of jobs at a European level to facilitate the circulation of workers in the 
Union. It makes generic references to "workers" and "skilled workers", although it creates 
no rights of free movement for third country nationals.
The area of vocational training has further interest in general terms. A part of the 
Community programmes in the area of vocational training clearly has a general personal 
scope. The Petra programme, for instance, provides for the possibility of receiving 
vocational training for "all young people in the Community who so wish".426 Furthermore, 
according to the Council decision that established that programme, consideration should 
be given to the promotion of equal opportunities between sexes and particular attention 
devoted to "young people most at risk, including disabled and disadvantaged young 
people".427 All these references appear to be compatible with the view that third country 
nationals are included in the personal scope of the programme. Moreover, considering the 
objective of the programme, to a certain extent the mentioned references only make lull 
sense if that inclusive view is followed. In the meantime, the Council recommendation on 
access to continuing vocational training, based in Article 128, recommends that Member 
States "gear their vocational training policies to ensuring that every worker of the 
Community must be able to have access to continuing vocational training without any 
form of discrimination".428 Other instruments in the area of vocational training do not 
seem to have a narrow personal scope, either 429
Another important area is that of special programmes in the area of education. This 
area is particularly relevant for the application of Community Law to third country 
nationals. Some programmes use expressions which are generic enough to leave room for 
their application to third country nationals. The 'Youth for Europe' programme, for 
example, has the objective of promoting youth exchanges and mobility within the 
European Union, and states that its measures are directed at "young people”.430 Likewise, 
the Cornett programme does not make nationality-based restrictions on its personal
426 Article 1 of Council Decision 87/569/EEC of I December 1987 concerning an action programme for 
the vocational training of young people and their preparation for adult and working life, OJ L 346/31 of 
10/12/87.
427 Article 2(4) of the decision quoted in the previous note, as amended - OJ L 214/69 of 2/8/91.
428 Point I of Council recommendation 93/404/EEC of 30 June 1993 on access to continuing vocational 
training, OJL 181/37 of 23/7/93.
42  ^See, e.g., the Commission Recommendation 87/567/EEC of 24 November 1987 on vocational training 
for women, OJ L 342/35 of 4/12/87, which refers to "young and adult women"; the Council conclusions of 
26 May 1987 on vocational training for women, OJ C 178/3 of 7/7/87, which does not use a criterion of 
nationality to define its beneficiaries; the Council conclusions of 15 June 1987 on the development of 
continuing vocational training for adult employees in undertakings, OJ C 178/5 of 7/7/87; and the Council 
Decision 89/657/EEC of 18 December 1989 establishing an action programme to promote innovation in 
the field of vocational training resulting from technological change in the European Community 
(Eurotecnet), OJ L 393/29 of 30/12/89. The latter makes no exclusion of natural persons as beneficiaries 
on the basis of their nationality. Moreover, it is worth noting that Article 4 includes in the aims of the 
programme the promotion of equality of opportunities for men and women.
43 A^rticle 3 of Council Decision 91/395/EEC of 29 July 1991 adopting the 'Youth for Europe' 
programme (second phase), OJ L 217/25 of 6/8/91.
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scope.431 *By the same token, a very important programme, Erasmus, refers to university 
students in generic terms.437 The Council decision that establishes the programme states 
in generic terms that
"Students registered in [university] establishments, regardless of their field of 
study, are eligible for support within the Erasmus programme(...)\433 
While one of the aims of the programme is said to be to "strengthen the interaction 
between citizens in different Member States with a view to consolidating the concept of a 
People's Europe",434 *the other aims of the programme do not seem to exclude third 
country nationals, in any manner whatsoever.
A similar situation can be found in the Lingua programme, on the promotion of 
competence in foreign languages. One of the explicit aims of the programme is related to 
Member States policies aimed at "encouraging all citizens to acquire a working knowledge 
of foreign languages". In the meantime, other aims mentioned do not apply only to citizens 
(of the Member States), but make references of a generic nature, such as the one to "work 
force".433 In this respect, it may be recalled here that the Socrates programme states that 
one of its aims is "to strengthen the spirit of European citizenship",436 while one of the 
priority fields of action envisaged by the programme also clearly concerns third country 
nationals.437 Thus, the references to Union citizens and citizenship do not exclude, per se, 
the application of these programmes to third country nationals.
Finally, at least one education programme undoubtedly applies to third country 
nationals. This is the Community programme on human capital and mobility.438 * The 
programme provides for scholarships at a post-doctoral level for people referred to as 
"young researchers", "young scientists", and "researchers". The Council decision that 
establishes the programme, states that
"The individual fellowship recipients (...) must be nationals of the Community 
Member States or natural persons resident in the European Community."43^
431 Council Decision 89/27/EEC of 16 December 1988 adopting the second phase of the programme on 
cooperation between universities and industry regarding training in the field of technology (Cornett II) 
(1990 to 1994), OJ L 13/28 of 17/1/89.
437 Article 1 of Decision 87/327/EEC of 15 June 1987 adopting the European Community Action Scheme 
for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS), OJ L 166/20 of 25/6/1987.
433 According to the addition introduced by Council decision 89/663/EEC amending the previously
auoted decision, OJ L 395/23 of 30/12/1989.
3^4 Article 2 of the Decision 87/327/EEC, quoted supra.
433 Council Decision 89/489/EEC of 28 July 1989 establishing an action programme to promote foreign 
language competence in the European Community (Lingua), OJ L 239/24 of 16/8/89.
43° Article 3 (a) of the Programme, adopted by the Decision 819/95/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 14 March 1995, OJ L 87/10 of 20/4/95.
437 See Action 2 of chapter II of the annex to the Programme (quoted in the preceding footnote), which 
concerns education of the children of migrant workers, of occupational travellers, travellers and gypsies, 
as well as inter cultural education.
438 Council Decision 92/217/EEC of 16 March 1992 on a specific research and technological 
development programme in the field of human capital and mobility (1990 to 1994), OJ L 107/1 of
24/4/92.
43  ^Idem, Point I (1 ) of Annex HI.
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As far as children's education is concerned, the most important Community 
instrument is the Council Directive of 1977 on the education of children of migrant 
workers.440 This Directive provides for free tuition to facilitate the initial reception of 
children, including the teaching of the host country's language.441 Moreover, it envisages 
the teaching of the children's mother tongue and of the culture of their country of 
origin.442 However, this Directive only applies to children dependent on nationals of 
Member States.443 On 25 July 1977, on the occasion of the adoption of the Directive, a 
declaration was added to the minutes of the Council, in which Member States expressed 
the political will to ensure that the measures to be taken by all Member States in 
compliance with this Directive would equally meet the needs of children of nationals of 
other Member States, of children from third country backgrounds and, in general terms, of 
children not covered by this Directive.4"44
The Commission has recognised the great importance of the education of children 
of third country nationals. It has stated that:
"(...) a massive investment in the education and training of all young people, 
foreigners [third country nationals] and EC nationals alike, is clearly in the 
interest of the Member States themselves and of the Union as a whole."443 45
Accordingly, since 1976, the Commission has been promoting, in cooperation with 
Member States, pilot projects on the education of migrant children, including children 
from third countries.446 These projects have given priority to the teaching of the language 
of the host country, as well as to the teaching of the immigrants' mother tongue. These are 
the main objectives of the above mentioned Directive on the education of children of 
migrant workers, which applies only to children of the families of migrant nationals of a 
Member State. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that, in this manner, the 
Commission is applying the Directive to children of families of third country nationals. In 
fact, the Directive establishes certain objectives, for the achievement of which Member 
States have the duty to act. As far as third country nationals are concerned, such 
objectives cannot be implemented by the Commission acting alone. The Commission can
440 Council Directive 77/486/EEC of 25 July 1977 on the education of the children of migrant workers. 
OJ L 199/32 of 6/8/77. The Council has also adopted two resolutions on school provision for children of 
occupational travellers, and of gypsy and traveller children, which were adopted jointly with the Ministers 
of Education meeting within the Council: Resolutions of 22 May 1989, OJ L 153/1 of 21/06/89; and of 22 
May 1989, OJ C 153/3 of 21/6/89, respectively. For an overview of the Community activities on education 
of children of migrant workers see the Commission’s Report on the education of migrants' children in the 
European Union, COM (94) 80 final, of 25/3/1994.
441 Article 2 of Council Directive 77/486/EEC.
442 Idem, Article 3. This Article states that "Member States shall, in accordance with their national 
circumstances and legal systems, and in cooperation with States of origin, take appropriate measures to 
promote, in coordination with normal education, teaching of the mother tongue and culture of the country 
of origin" of those children.
443 Ibidem. Article 1.
444 SEC (90) 1813 final, pg. 24. In the words of the Commission Communication on Immigration 
adopted in 23 October 1991, this declaration to the minutes is surprisingly turned into a "Resolution 
attached to the Council Directive [mentioned supra], which has already outlawed any discrimination based 
on the pupil's nationality”. See SEC (91) 1855 final, pg.26.
445 COM (94) 80 final, of 25/3/1994, paragraph 16.
446 Commission communication on immigration and asylum policies, of 23 February 1994, presented to 
the Council and the European Parliament, COM (94) 23 final, at p. 37.
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only cooperate with the Member State programmes in this area. Thus the Commission 
presented a proposal for reinforcing and extending this cooperation, in the framework of 
the above mentioned Socrates action programme.
The adopted version of the programme turn out to be slightly less far reaching than 
the Commission’s draft.447 One of the three types of action of the programme relates to 
the promotion of inter cultural education and the improvement of the quality of schooling 
for children of migrant workers, of gypsies and of occupational travellers. Financial 
assistance may be allocated to projects aiming, inter alia, to promote equal opportunities 
for those children.448 *In the meantime, contrary to the Directive of 1977 on the education 
of children of migrant workers, the Socrates programme does not exclude children of third 
country nationals from the beneficiaries of the programme. Therefore, in view of its 
Preamble, its explicit aims and the actions it envisages, it may be concluded that the 
programme is clearly intended to cover children of third country nationals.
3 - O T H E R  P R O V IS IO N S  O F  E C  L A W
a) E C  officials
Among the other provisions of EC Law that also apply to third country nationals, 
there is article 12 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European 
Communities. This article states that the Protocol applies to all Community officials 
"whatever their nationality". Thus, in this respect, officials of the Institutions of the 
European Union who are third country nationals have the same rights as their colleagues 
who are nationals of a Member State.
b) Access to  Ju s tic e
Nationals of third countries have the possibility of defending their legal position 
under Community Law. They are entitled to do so either by replying to Commission 
letters,449 or by presenting their case to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. The rules on the latter establish that:
"Any natural or legal person may (...) institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which (...) is of direct and individual 
concern to [him or her]."450
and that:
"Member States, Institutions of the Community and any other natural or legal 
person may (...) institute proceedings to contest a j u d g m e n t . . . " . 4 ^ I
447 Parliament and Council decision No. 819/95/EC of 14 March 1995, OJ L 87/10. Cf. the 
Commission's draft COM (94) 180 final, of 16/5/1994.
448 Action 2 of chapter II of the annex to the Programme, adopted by the Parliament and Council 
decision quoted in the preceding footnote. Cf. with the Preamble of the Commission's proposal; and 
Article 3(ii) of that proposal, referring to "citizens who live in the Community" (Commission's emphasis), 
COM (94) 180 final.
^A s provided, for instance in several competition, anti-dumping and Common Customs Union 
regulations. But, as explained above, these fields are not the main concern of this dissertation.
4 0^ Article 173 (4) of the EC Treaty.
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Other provisions on judicial action do not exclude third country nationals from their 
personal scope. Therefore, provided third country nationals are protected by Community 
Law, they have the procedural right to defend their legal position and interests.
As will be refened to in chapter 7, after the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union, third country nationals residing in a Member State have been formally 
granted the right to address petitions to the European Parliament and the right to make 
complaints to the European Ombudsman.* 452
C o n c lu d in g  R e m a rk s  - S e c tio n  C
The fundamental conclusion of this section is that a considerable part of 
Community legislation on social and educational matters is applicable to nationals of third 
countries living in the European Union. The application to third country nationals of 
Community rules in these matters seems to constitute further grounds to argue for the 
extension of EC Law on free movement of persons to third country nationals permanently 
residing in the Union, as suggested before. Besides the substantial reasons, a greater 
coherence of Community Law would be achieved in this manner.453
In some cases, EC legislation on social matters (except on free movement) and on 
education explicitly states that it also applies to third country nationals. However, most of 
that legislation states that it applies to categories of persons defined or referred to only in 
generic terms, with no reference being made to their nationality. Usually such legislation 
does not seem to have any contextual elements that work against its application to third 
country nationals. Moreover, its purposes are often coherent with (or not, at least, 
contradicted by) that application. It, thus, seems reasonable to consider that such 
legislation also applies to permanently resident third country nationals. There does not 
seem to be a need to invoke an extensive interpretation of that legislation to reach such a 
conclusion on its personal scope.
Therefore, it is submitted that there should be a presumption of a general personal 
scope of Community legislation, as long as no clear textual, contextual, or teleological 
elements contradict such a possibility. This seems to be particularly justified when the 
objectives of the social or educational legislation relate to the society as a whole, and to 
socially disadvantaged groups in particular - as in the case of the fight against poverty and 
exclusion. Furthermore, it would frequently be awkward to make artificial distinctions in 
order to apply that legislation in a different manner to nationals of Member States and to 
third country nationals.
In addition, it is also important to note that the application of Community 
legislation to third country nationals is not exclusive to the areas examined above. Most
4 1^ Article 39 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Article 
40 of the same instrument also uses a generic expression by referring to "any party".
452 Articles 138 D and 138 E of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Treaty on European Union.
453 Naturally, it may be argued that there are policy reasons to differentiate between the application of EC 
social, education and labour legislation, on one part, and EC rules on free movement of persons, on the 
other. However, I believe that, in the current process of European integration and given the present 
situation of third country nationals resident in the Union, the reasons to harmonise the personal scope of 
both areas of legislation should take precedence.
2 4 9
EC legislation on health or consumer protection, for example, is applicable to nationals of 
Member States and third country nationals alike.
These conclusions highlight the difference between the personal scope of 
Community rules on free movement of persons and on other matters. Arguably, this 
difference constitutes a contradiction. The fact that most Community legislation applies to 
nationals of Member States and third country nationals residing there alike, means that 
both groups of persons are part of the European society.454 Third country nationals 
require attention at a European level in the area of the relevant Community legislation. 
They are thus included under its personal scope. They come under that scope not in the 
capacity of third country nationals but as workers, disabled, young or poor people, social 
assistance beneficiaries, students, researchers, or Community officials. In other words, as 
persons living in the European Union.455
On the other hand, third country nationals are basically excluded from the scope of 
the Community rules on free movement of persons. This seems to contradict the fact that 
third country nationals residing in the European Union are part of the European society.
C O N C L U S IO N S  O F  T H E  C H A P T E R
The main concern of this chapter was to highlight the imperfections of Community 
Law on free movement as far as third country nationals are concerned. The main negative 
aspect of Community Law in this regard seems to be the fact that it is not fully applicable 
to resident third country nationals, namely as far as free movement of workers is 
concerned. While sections A and B of this chapter dealt with Community Law on free 
movement, section C examined the personal scope of EC legislation in other areas, notably 
in relation to social matters and education.
Section A examined the rights assigned to third country nationals by Community 
Law on free movement, irrespective of any family relationship with a national of a 
Member State.
As far as free movement of goods and capital is concerned, third country nationals 
are in a similar position as that of nationals of a Member State. However, the most 
questionable aspect of the system relates to the absolute use of the nationality criteria to 
define the personal scope of EC rules on free movement of persons. This reinforces the 
underlying idea that third country nationals are under the scope of Community Law only in 
exceptional (although important) circumstances. The absolute use of the nationality
454 An official support for this idea seems to come from the Declaration Against Racism and Xenophobia, 
adopted by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, together with the representatives 
of the Member States within the Council, OJ C 158/1 of 25/6/86. That declaration affirms their resolve to 
protect, and declare that they are determined to pursue the endeavours already made to "protect the 
individuality and dignity of every member of society and to reject any form of segregation of foreigners" - 
points 2 and 4 of the mentioned declaration. Note that the declaration refers explicitly to third country 
nationals.
455 In the Member States, under the European Union (and thus also Community) legal order.
250
criteria may be found in relation to several rules of Community Law, either in their own 
wording or in the interpretations of them. It sometimes entails singular interpretations and 
even peculiar consequences.
One of these interpretations corresponds to the established view on the personal 
scope of Article 48, according to which "workers of the Member States" means workers 
who are nationals of the Member States. An explanation was given as to why this 
interpretation was not, to say the least, based on a more sound legal basis than is an 
interpretation that would include third country nationals in the personal scope of that 
Article. It was suggested that, instead, Article 48 could be interpreted as being also 
applicable to all third country nationals with permanent residence in the Community. For 
these purposes, it could be considered that a third country national is a permanent resident 
in the Community in two cases. One is that, under positive national law, he or she has an 
unlimited right of residence in one Member State. The other is that he or she has resided in 
one or more Member States, for more than a total of 10 continuous years, or for fifteen 
non-continuous years. Moreover, the application of EC Law on free movement of persons 
seems to be particularly justified in the case of refugees. I suggested that after three years 
of legal residence in the Community they be granted EC rights in this respect, on equal 
terms to nationals of a Member State.
Another legal interpretation open to criticism relates to the so-called principle of 
"Community preference" in access to the labour market of Member States. The precise 
limits of this principle were examined and it was concluded that, in binding legal terms, the 
legal regime in force amounts to not much more than a general principle of non­
discrimination among nationals of Member States. This does not necessarily go against the 
position of third country nationals, contrary to what is usually presumed.
In relation to the peculiar consequences of the exclusion of third country nationals 
from the personal scope of the EC Law, several examples concerning EC rules on free 
movement were reviewed. Reference was made, inter alia, to the definition of the personal 
scope of Reg. 1408/71, on coordination of social security schemes for persons who have 
worked in several Member States;456 to the difference of treatment of natural persons 
who are nationals of a third country and legal persons founded and controlled by third 
country nationals; and to the fact that third country nationals residing in a Member State 
are not entitled to provide services in another Member State, except if they are workers of 
an enterprise of a Member State.
Section B examined the rights granted under the Community rules on free 
movement to third country nationals due to their family relationship with a national of a 
Member State. An important contribution has been made by the Court of Justice in this 
area, in particular as regards the definition of the legal status of relatives of migrant 
nationals of a Member State, when such relatives come within the scope of Community 
Law. However, there are several points that remain to be improved. One of those relates 
to reverse discrimination, the grounds of which were challenged. However, this section 
analysed in particular the situations of divorced spouses and partners of a national of a 
Member State. It was argued that failure to grant them a right of residence in the host
456 Article 2 of the Regulation.
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Member State could be, not only contrary to a correct interpretation of the relevant 
Community rules, but also contrary to the best interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
Finally, in section C it was shown how Community legislation is in most occasions 
applicable to nationals of third countries who are residents in the European Union, notably 
in what relates to social matters and education. In some cases, this application to third 
country nationals is quite clear and even explicit. In other cases, it derives from a correct 
interpretation of the wording, context and objective of the relevant EC legislation. The 
fact that most Community legislation includes in its personal scope resident third country 
nationals and nationals of Member States alike, is a further reason to support the idea that 
both groups of persons are part of European society. This sort of de facto social 
membership of third country nationals living in the European Union seems to 
contradictory to the fact that they are basically excluded from the scope of the Community 
rules on free movement of persons. It could perhaps be said that such rules constitute the 
fundamental exception in the application of Community Law to third country nationals. 
Insofar as there is no particular justification for such an exception, the latter manifests an 
inconsistency in the Community legal system.
It is of the utmost importance to emphasise that it would be in the interest of the 
European Union as a whole to extend to third country nationals the Community rules on 
free movement of persons. It does not seem very coherent, for instance, to bar third 
country nationals from a powerful instrument of social integration - free movement for 
labour - and then to establish programmes that can be used to promote their social 
integration. The social exclusion of third country nationals should be better considered 
before it happens, not only afterwards. Action against the social exclusion of third country 
nationals living in the Union is particularly relevant considering the fact that they are a 
very large number of people. It would be negative for Europe to let them stay in or go to 
the margins of society.
Besides, resident third country nationals contribute substantially to the economic 
well-being of the Community and, generally, to its very objectives, namely as defined in 
Article 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty. Moreover, as members of the European society, third 
country nationals suffer all the direct and indirect disadvantages of European economic 
integration.457 Therefore, they should also be entitled to benefit from all of its advantages.
The progressive harmonisation of national immigration policies at the level of the 
European Union reinforces the idea that those allowed by the Union to enter and reside in 
a Member State should be allowed to become full members of the Union - at least as far as 
free movement of persons is concerned. If third country nationals enter the Union under 
rules commonly agreed by the Member States, they should be entitled to participate fully 
in the economic and social entity that these Member States constitute.
457 por example: a third country national living in the Community is more likely to be unemployed than 
the average national of a Member State.
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A general legal argument can also be used in this respect. The Community is a 
Community based on the rule of Law.458 A general principle of Law, which is 
fundamental in any society based on the rule of Law, is the principle of equality - i.e. that 
equal situations should be equally treated. For the purposes of enjoying the right of free 
movement, the situation of nationals of a Member State should be seen as equal to the 
situation of third country nationals permanently residing in the Union. This conception is 
also based on the idea that the right of free movement should be seen more as a social and 
an economic right than as a political right pertaining to nationality and citizenship. To the 
extent that this perspective is justified, it seems that a differential treatment between long 
resident third country nationals and nationals of Member States, in this respect, amounts 
to discrimination. Arguably, the differential treatment is not justifiable by, or proportional 
to the fact of holding or not the nationality of a Member State.
A final word has to recall that social and economic difficulties are likely to arise 
from the granting of free movement rights to several millions of third country nationals 
currently living in the Union. These predictable practical problems should be addressed by 
a policy response. The extension of free movement rights to third country nationals could 
be done in a progressive manner to diminish practical problems. However, the policy 
response to such practical problems cannot be to prolong the present exclusion of third 
country nationals.
The basic exclusion of third country nationals from the EC rights on free 
movement of persons is reprovable both from a legal and from a practical, social point of 
view. In the present state of European integration, and taking into consideration the value 
of material justice, the absolute use of the criteria of nationality should be rejected. In 
defining the beneficiaries of freedom of movement among Member States, the nationality 
criteria should be mixed with the criteria of permanent residence in the Community.
458 gee case 294/83 Les Verts v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23; and Opinion 
1/91 on the EEA Agreement, [1991] ECR 1-6079, paragraph 21.
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PART I - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
C hapter 5
T h e L egal Status o f T h ird  Country Nationals under
COMMUNITY AGREEMENTS 
W ITH THIRD COUNTRIES
i l i
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses agreements concluded by the Community and its Member 
States with third countries, which contain rules on the legal status of nationals of the latter 
countries in the European Union.1
These agreements are a fundamental part of Community Law concerning third 
country nationals resident in the Union. First, they were concluded with the countries 
whose nationals form about half of the population of third country nationals living in the 
European Union.2 Secondly, the agreements contain important rules on the rights of 
nationals of the relevant third countries. Such rules regard important matters, like the 
rights of workers and their families, and, in some cases, the right of establishment and the 
right to work as self-employed persons in the Member States. Moreover, the Court of 
Justice has, in some cases, recognised direct effect to provisions of the agreements and to 
rules of Decisions of the Association Councils set up in their framework.3 Thirdly, the 
rules of such agreements are important as guidelines of what could be a Community policy 
on all third country nationals.
In chapter 2 it was recalled that, although the agreements are considered to be 
mixed agreements because governments of the Member States considered that the legal 
status of third country workers is outside the Community competence, the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities declares itself to have jurisdiction to interpret the 
agreements.4 In this respect, the rulings of the Court have been quite daring, contrasting 
with the positions expressed by the Member States. The Court has, for instance, already 
considered that the Community has powers under Article 238 of the EC Treaty to 
conclude association agreements with third countries, which contain provisions on free
1 However, this chapter does not deal with the new rules introduced by GATS. On the Agreements 
analysed in this chapter see Akandji-Kombé, J.-F., "Les Droits des Étrangers et Leur Sauvegarde dans 
l'Ordre Juridique Communautaire", CDE, Vol.31, 1995, Nos.3-4, pp.351-381; GISTI, La Circulation des 
étrangers dans L ’Espace Européen, Paris, June 1994, pp.23-35; Johnson, Esther & O'Keeffe, David 
"From discrimination to obstacles to free movement: Recent developments concerning the free movement 
of workers 1989-1994", CMLRev, Vol.31, December 1994, No.6 , pp. 1313-1346, at 1342-1344; 
Maresceau, Marc "Nationals of third countries in agreements concluded by the European Community", 
Actualités du Droit, 1994, No.2, pp.249-263; the good article by Peers, Steve "Toward Equality: Actual 
and Potential Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, CMLRev, forthcoming; Raux, 
Jean "La mobilité des personnes et des entreprises dans le cadre des accords externes de la C.E.E.", 
RTDE, Year 15th, 1979, No.3, pp.466-479; Stangos, Petros N. "Les ressortissants d'états tiers au sein de 
l'ordre juridique communautaire", CDEt Vol.28, 1992, No.3-4, pp.306-347.
2 In 1992, there were in the present 15 Member States around 5 million persons with the nationality of 
one of the following countries: Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. By then, the total population of third country nationals was 10 million persons (for this purpose 
Austria, Sweden and Finland were here considered as if in 1992 they were already Member States). See 
Eurostat Rapid Reports on Population and Social Conditions, 1994, No.7, pp.6-7.
3 For the Agreements under analysis in this chapter see case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 
14, in which was at stake the Association Agreement with Turkey; and for the decisions of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council see, e.g., case 192/89, S. Z. Sevince V. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1990) ECR 3461, 
paragraph 15, and case C-18/90, Office National de l'Emploi V. Bahia Kziber, [19911 ECR 1-199, 
paragraph 15. See infra, section B, for more details. See also case 87/75 Bresciani [1976J ECR 129; case 
17/81, Pabst & Richarz [1982] ECR 1331; and case 104/78 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641.
4 See chapter 2 for discussion on this topic.
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rmovement of workers from those third countries.5 However, the issue of competence 
having been dealt with in chapter 2, this chapter concentrates in the substantive content of 
the agreements and on the precise legal effects of their rules.
Section A of this chapter makes a general overview of the several agreements 
containing rules on the legal status of third country nationals in the European Union. The 
review to be made comprises the Association Agreement with Turkey (and its Additional 
Protocol, as well as and decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council), the 
Cooperation Agreements with the Maghreb countries and Yugoslavia, the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area, the "Europe Agreements" establishing an Association with 
Central and Eastern European Countries, and the Agreements on Partnership and 
Cooperation with some countries of the ex-Soviet Union. Reference will also be made to 
some declarations annexed to the Lomé Convention and to the Joint Declaration with the 
Mashreq Countries. Section B of this chapter examines specific issues in the content of 
such agreements and refers to some legal problems regarding the interpretation of their 
rules. First, the rights of workers and their families will receive particular attention. 
Analysis will be made, namely, of rules concerning the right of the workers to ... work and 
reside in a Member State, the prohibition of discrimination of the workers on the grounds 
of nationality, the rights of the family members of the workers, and social security. 
Secondly, reference will be made to rules on freedom of establishment and provision of 
services. Thirdly, common and final rules of the agreements will be dealt with - including 
limitations to the rights and cooperation envisaged with the Community.
A) THE A G REEM EN TS - AN O VERVIEW
1 - Association Agreement with Turkey
The Association Agreement with Turkey6 was concluded on 12 September 1963, 
when the Community only had the six original Member States.7 It was then made in view 
of the future accession of Turkey to the EEC, and, in the Preamble, it was even stated that 
both parties were determined to establish "an ever closer union" between the Turkish 
people and the peoples of the Member States of the European Communities. With this 
idea in mind, the Treaty envisaged the steps of a transition for accession. Article 12 of the
5 Demirel, case quoted, at paragraph 9, in which the Association Agreement with Turkey was at stake.
6  OJ 217/3687, of 29/12/1964. Tilts agreement entered in force on 1/12/1964. For an analysis of this 
Agreement, or some aspects of it, see Burrows, Noreen "The rights of Turkish workers in the Member 
States", ELR, Vol.19, June 1994, No.3, pp.305-308; Cicekli, Bulent "Turkish immigrants in Europe: a 
literature and case review", INLP, Vol. 9, 1995, No.2, pp.67-69; Guedalla, Vicky "Turkish workers, 
residence rights and family unity: some aspects of the Ankara Agreement", ¡NLP, Vol.7, 1993, No.4, 
pp. 119-122; Lichtenberg, H., "The Rights of Turkish Workers in Community Law-Kazim Kus v. 
Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden; Hayriye Eroglu v. Land Baden-Württemberg", Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 
24, March 1995, No.l, pp.90-97; Huber, Bertold "Das Sevince-Urteil des EuGH: Ein neus EG- 
Aufenthaltsrecht für türkische Arbeitnehmer", Vol.lO, NVWZ, 1991, No.2, pp.242-243; and Womham, 
Trevor The Immigration Lawyer’s Guide to the Turkey-EC Association Agreement, London, ILPA, March 
1994. See also the interesting article by Grœnendijk, C.A. "Betekenis Associate EEG-Turkije voor 
Turkse werknemers in Nederland: Hoe soft law hard wordt gemaakt?”, Migrantenrecht, 1994, No. 10,
pp. 199-208.
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Agreement, for instance, provided that the parties would inspire themselves in articles 48, 
49 and 50 of the EC Treaty for the purpose of "progressively securing freedom of 
movement for workers between them". Accordingly, an Additional Protocol to the 
Agreement,8 signed in 23 November 1970, established that this freedom would be 
gradually realised between 1 December 1976 and 1 December 1986.9 This was never 
actually implemented.
Meanwhile, the Association Council adopted three decisions relevant to the status 
of Turkish nationals in the Member States. Decision 2/76, adopted in 1976, grants to 
workers the right of access to the labour market, under certain conditions, and to their 
children, legally residing with them, the right to general education. On 19 September 
1980, the Association Council adopted Decision 1/80 and Decision 3/80.10 Decision 1/80, 
inter alia, develops further the rules on access to the labour market of Turkish workers, 
grants to members of their family (legally resident) the right of access to the labour 
market, and to their children the right of access to courses of general education, 
apprenticeship and vocational training, in conditions equal to the children of Member 
States. Decision 3/80 deals with the application of social security schemes of the Member 
States to Turkish workers and members of their families - extending to them most of the 
Community Law rules on the matter.
The rules of the Agreement with Turkey and of the Protocol to it, together with 
the provisions adopted by the Association Council, constitute the most elaborated set of 
rules on the status of third country national workers (and members of their families) in 
force under any agreement between the Community and a third country - with the 
exception of the EE A Agreement. Nevertheless, the initial aim of accession of Turkey to 
the Union does not seem to be within reach in the near future.11 During 1994 and 1995 
negotiations were held to conclude a customs union between the Community and 
Turkey.12 The assent of the European Parliament to the customs union was finally given 
on 13 December 1995.13
8 OJ L 293/3 of 29/12/1972. This Protocol entered in force on 1/1/1973.
9  Article 36 of the Additional Protocol.
Note that work for the implementation of Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 has already been developed. See, 
e.g., Press Release CEE-TR 119/92, Brussels, of 9/11/1992, point 1. c).
* * See the Commission's opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the Community, SEC (89) 2290, of 
18/12/1989; and Kramer, Heinz "EC-Turkish relations: Unfinished forever?" in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, London, Brasseys/ Macmillan, 1994, pp. 190-249.
*2  The 36th meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council, held on 6/3/1995, achieved Agreement in 
principle on the implementation of the final phase of the customs union with Turkey. See Week in Europe, 
9/3/1995, and the Press Release of that meeting (PRES/95/78). The latter states that, in a Resolution 
adopted by that meeting on the development of the Association, cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs 
is envisaged. As far as social cooperation is concerned, the resolution planned a regular dialogue on the 
situation of Turkish workers legally employed in the Community and declared that both Parties will 
explore every possibility for a better integration of these workers. See also the draft decision of the Council 
on a common position by the Community in the EC-Turkey Association Council for the adoption by the 
latter of a decision on the implementation of the final phase of the customs union between the Community 
and Turkey - doc.ref. 7092/95, Limite, NT 11, of 9 June 1995, Council of the European Union, 
Interinstitutional file No. 95/0101 (ACC).
13 However, this approval by the European Parliament of the customs union with Turkey was uncertain 
for a long time, mostly due to the deplorable situation in that country as far as human rights are 
concerned. The approval of the Parliament is required for agreements based in Article 238 of the EC
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In April 1976, the Community and its Member States signed Cooperation 
Agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. *4 A Cooperation Agreement with 
Yugoslavia was only signed four years later, in April I980.* 145 Following the war in that 
country this agreement was suspended on 11 November 1991.16
All four agreements have the same content, as far as workers and their families are 
concerned. They establish the principle of non discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
what regards working conditions, remuneration and social security. Furthermore, they 
provide for the addition of periods of insurance, employment or residence for the purpose 
of pensions, annuities and medical care, and provide also for free transfer of pensions and 
annuities. The exact same rules of these agreements were also proposed by the 
Commission in 1991 in the draft customs union and cooperation agreement with San 
Marino.17
The agreements with the Maghreb countries and Yugoslavia [hereinafter Maghreb 
Agreements] introduced important rules in the legal status of the nationals of the third 
countries concerned. However, when the agreements were concluded, to a certain extent 
their content proved deceptive for the Maghreb countries. Lead by Algeria, those 
countries had asked for the right of free movement within the Community for their 
nationals working there. They also asked for a general right to equal treatment with 
workers who are nationals of a Member State. Finally, they asked for the right of their
2 - Cooperation Agreements with the Maghreb countries and Yugoslavia
Treaty, as was the Association Agreement of 1963 and the additional protocols to it. The European 
Parliament expressed the fear that the Commission and the Council intended to adopt the customs union 
agreements on a different basis in order to avoid the need for the Parliament's consent, see the oral 
question of the European Parliament No. H - 0212 and 0213/95 for question time at the party session in 
April 1995. However, in the draft decision of the Council, quoted by the end of the preceding note, it is 
envisaged the consultation of the European Parliament, "with a view to obtain the Assent necessary for the 
adoption" of the decision of the EC-Turkey Association Council on the implementation of the final phase 
of the customs union with Turkey. Such assent was, in the end, requested and finally obtained on 13 
December 1995.
14 Agreement with Algeria: OJ L 263/2; with Morocco: OJ L 264/2 and with Tunisia: OJ L 265/2, all of 
27/9/1978. For an examination of these Agreements see Guild, Elspeth Protecting Migrants Rights: 
Application o f EC Agreement with Third Countries, Brussels, CCME, Briefing Paper No. 10, 1992, and 
her "Protecting Migrants Rights and Community Law: The Cooperation Agreements with Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia", INLP, Vol.7, 1993, No.l, pp.15-18; Mezdour, Salah "L* Émigration maghrébine 
en Europe", RMCUE, March 1993, No.366, pp.237-241; and Nadifi, A., "Le Statut Juridique des 
Travailleurs Maghrébins Résidant Dans la CEE", RMC, 1989, No.327, pp.289-295.
1 5  OJL41/2 of 14/2/1983.
Decision 91/586/EEC of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council, OJ L 315/47 of 15/11/91. See, however, Council Regulation (EC) 
984/95 of 28 April 1995, OJ L 99/1 of 29/4/1995. For the record, the relevant provisions of the Agreement 
with Yugoslavia will be mentioned in the footnotes, along with the provisions of the Cooperation 
Agreements with the Maghreb countries; however in the main text the Cooperation Agreements with 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Yugoslavia will be referred to only as "Maghreb Agreements".
17  See Articles 20 to 22 of that draft Agreement, in OJ C 302/12 of 22/11/91.
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workers to receive vocational training. This training was meant to be organised so that it 
would be useful when the workers returned to their countries of origin.18
In the beginning, the Member States of the Community did not envisage the 
inclusion in the agreements of any rules on workers. One of the arguments invoked was 
that the Community had no competence here. Only after more than 3 years of negotiation 
was it possible to agree on these provisions. The important novelty in these agreements 
was the possibility of adding up, for social security purposes, periods of work carried out 
in different Member States.19 *For the rest, it may be said that most provisions of the 
agreements in this area simply restate certain rights already acquired, when they mention 
them at all. This is particularly true in relation to Member States where the workers of the 
Maghreb countries are mostly concentrated in the Community.
At the same time as these agreements were being made with the Maghreb 
countries, the Community also concluded, in 1978, Cooperation Agreements with Israel 
and the Mashreq countries (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt). None of the latter 
agreements contained provisions in the social field.
Recently, on 12 April 1995, the Community concluded with Tunisia an Agreement 
of economic association, which may be the first step for a future free-trade agreement with 
that country. The agreement with Tunisia is the first of similar agreements to be concluded 
with Mediterranean countries with the aim of strengthening relations between them and 
the Community. In the following month, the Commission presented a draft Euro- 
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association with Tunisia.2° This latter draft 
agreement is meant to be a further step in the relations between the Community with 
Tunisia. It does not develop much further the rights of workers and their families,21 but 
provides for a more extensive cooperation between the Community and Tunisia.22
A similar agreement is now being negotiated with Morocco.
18  More daring proposals did not disappear, meanwhile. Note, e.g. that in June 1993 the Tunisian 
president made a speech, in the European Parliament, proposing the elaboration of a Euro-Maghreb 
Charter which would define the rights and duties of immigrants of the Maghreb countries in the EC. See 
Agence Europe, No. 6006 (n.s.), of 23/6/1993.
1 9  Like in other Agreements it is not possible to take into account periods performed in the country of 
origin. Not even proportionally, according to the amounts paid in each country (of the Community and in 
the country of origin).
Draft Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, on the other part, COM (95) 235 
final, of 31/5/1995.
21 The only significant difference is that the non discriminatory treatment of workers would extend also to 
temporary workers who had been "allowed to take paid employment" - Article 64 (2).
2 2  See Articles 69 and 71.
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. Relations between the European Community and member countries of the 
European Free Trade Association* 24 are not a new phenomenon. Bilateral free trade 
agreements with individual Member States of that organisation were established by the 
Community as early as 1972.25 The need for a different relationship became clear after the 
launch and progressive implementation of the internal market project. The idea of a new 
partnership gained a new impetus when, in 1989, Jacques Delors made a proposal for 
different relations, including common decision making and administrative institutions.
Negotiations started in July 1990 between the European Community (and its 
Member States) and Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. An agreement was reached with those countries in October 1991. However, 
the negative opinion of the EC Court of Justice on the provisions on the judicial control, 
obliged the Agreement to be negotiated again and a second draft was signed in Oporto, in 
Portugal, on May 1992. A second factor delayed the entry into force of the Agreement 
when, on 6 December 1992, a referendum in Switzerland refused its ratification. A new 
protocol had to be signed in March 1993. The EE A Agreement entered into force on 1 
January 1994. Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded to the European Union on 1 January 
1995.26 Thus, at present, besides the Community and its Member States, only Iceland, 
Norway, and Liechtenstein are party to the EEA Agreement.27
3 - The Agreement on the European Economic Area23
For an analysis of the EEA Agreement see e.g. Evans, Andrew The Law o f  the European Community, 
including the EEA Agreement, Deventer, Kluwer, 1994; Gladstone, Robert C. "The EEA Umbrella: 
Incorporating Aspects of the EC Legal Order", UEI, 1994, No.l, pp.39-71; Jacot-Guillarmod, O. (ed.) 
EEA Agreement ~ Comments and reflexions, Collection de Droit Européen, Vol.9, Zurich, Schulthess 
Polygraphischer Verlag; 1992; Norberg, Sven et al. EEA Law - A Commentary o f  the EEA Agreement, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1993. See also Cremona, Marise "The 'Dynamic and Homogeneous' EEA: Byzantine 
Structures and Variable Geometry", ELR, Vol.19, October 1994, No.5, pp.508-526; O'Keeffe, D. "The 
Agreement on the European Economic Area", UEI, 1992, No. 1, pp.1-27.
2 4  While the European Economic Community was created in 1957, the European Free Trade Association 
was established in 1960 between countries who did not accept the integration objectives of the 
Community. The initial members were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. By a Protocol appended to the founding Convention, the latter applies to 
Liechtenstein, to be represented by Switzerland. Meanwhile, Finland associated with EFTA in 1961, 
entering into full accession only in 1986. Iceland acceded in March 1970. An Agreement with Spain 
entered in force in 1980. It was denounced in 1985, to have effect by the end of the year, due to the entry 
of Spain (as Portugal ) to the European Communities.
2  ^In that year, two Member States of EFTA, the United Kingdom and Denmark, left the Association and 
acceded to the European Communities. Agreements were then concluded with Austria, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Iceland.
Austria (on July 1989), Sweden (July 1991), Finland (March 1992), Switzerland (May 1992) and 
Norway (November 1992) had asked for accession to the Communities. A referendum in Norway refused 
accession to the European Union, A Referendum in Switzerland refused accession to the EEA and , 
namely, in view of this referendum, Swiss accession to the European Union seems highly unlikely for 
some years now. Note that Malta and Cyprus requested also accession to the Community, in 16 and 4 July 
1990, respectively.
2 7  Liechtenstein after 1 May 1995, following the decision of the EEA Council of 10/3/1995, see OJ L 
86/58-9. Liechtenstein decided to accede to the EEA Agreement by referendum held in that country on 9 
April 1995, with 55.9 % yes votes and 82% turnout.
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The EEA Agreement may be considered less far reaching than the initial project. 
Nevertheless, it is the most ambitious and comprehensive agreement already concluded by 
the European Communities with EFTA countries.28 It is also the first multilateral global 
agreement with those countries. The aim of the Agreement was the creation of an 
homogeneous economic area to the scale of western Europe. It applies to the EFTA 
countries most of the Community Law in force when it was concluded. It also provides for 
an extension to those countries of future legal instruments adopted by the Community 
institutions.29 In practice, this treaty constitutes a kind of half accession of the EFTA 
countries to the European Communities. These had to incorporate somewhat more than 
half of the existing Community rules. Yet, they will have far less than half the rights of a 
full member in the Community decision making process.30 With the accession of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden the practical importance of the EEA Agreement was considerably 
reduced. However, the Agreement maintains its value as an example of what can be an 
intermediate step for accession to the European Union.
a) Substantive content of the EEA Agreement
The EEA Agreement repeats most of the substantive rules of the Treaty of 
Rome.31 The provisions related to the legal status of nationals of one country, which is 
party to the Agreement, in another country also party to the Agreement are no exception 
to this rule. The EEA Agreement basically extends to nationals of Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein32 the rules of the EC Treaty and Community secondary legislation on free 
movement of persons and on the social field in general terms. Therefore, the relevant rules 
of the EEA Agreement will only be dealt with in this section, not in section B, which 
analyses specific issues arising within external agreements on the legal status of third 
country nationals in the Union.
Within the chapters of the EEA Agreement on free movement of workers and the 
right of establishment, Articles 28 to 35 are based on the substantive rales of Articles 48 
to 58 of the EC Treaty. Annexes V, VI and VII detail the specific modalities of application 
of rules on free movement of workers, social security, mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications and right of establishment, respectively.33 In similar terms to the Treaty of 
Rome, free movement of workers will entail the abolition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality between workers of Community Member States and workers of the EFTA
2 8  The expression "EFTA countries" is used to refer to the countries that are party of the EEA Agreement 
without being members of the European Union, as those countries were members of EFTA. Switzerland is 
also member of EFTA, but the EEA Agreement does not apply to it. Thus it is not included in the 
reference to the EFTA countries.
2 9  In what concerns the existing rules of Community Law, several restrictions and delays of 
implementation are authorised. In relation to legal instruments to be approved in the future by the 
Community, special procedures are envisaged allowing the EFTA Member States to be exempted from 
them. However, the system is established in such a way as to make substantial exemptions very difficult 
and application of new Community instruments a rule.
3 0  In the same sense see Krafft, Mathias Charles, "Le système institutionel de I'EEE - Aspects généraux", 
EJÎL% Vol.3, 1992, No.3, pp. 285-299, at 299.
3 1  With the necessary adaptations and some exceptions, but most of the times ipsis verbis.
3 2  At the present moment.
3 3  As provided by Article 119 of the Agreement, annexes to it (and the acts referred to therein, as 
adapted), as well as the Protocols, are an integral part of the Agreement.
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countries. This, presumably, refers to workers who are nationals of the latter countries. 
The possibility of it referring to persons working in such countries, whatever their 
nationality, was not felt as needing to be discarded - in view of the institutional practice in 
the Community and of the case law of the Court of Justice on the correspondent 
Community rules, already analysed in chapter 4. Therefore, the relevance of the EE A 
Agreement for the legal position of third country nationals in the European Union is 
presently restricted to citizens of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.34 Therefore, we 
have to agree with Guild when she states that the discriminatory treatment, that different 
categories of third country nationals will have is a matter of concern.35 Nationals of 
Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein are granted free movement rights even if they have no 
connection with the European Union. Other third country nationals, already living in the 
Union for a considerable time, or even since they were bom, will remain without those 
rights. This constitutes a material discrimination of the latter third country nationals. It 
confirms the character of "half-accession" of the EEA Agreement.
Free movement of persons was a central topic in the negotiations between the 
Community and some EFTA countries, notably Switzerland. In the campaign of the 
ratification referendum in Switzerland the supporters of the "No" insisted on the danger of 
the country being invaded by workers of the Community, even though complete free 
movement was provided to be delayed until 1 January 1998 for that country.36 It should 
be recalled that Switzerland has a considerable proportion of foreigners among its 
population: 18%.37 In any case, it is still envisaged that the development of future closer 
relations with Switzerland will also include free movement of persons among the issues in 
discussion.38 Meanwhile, somehow envisaging the same type of problems, several EFTA 
countries39 made Declarations warning that, if need may arise, they could impose 
safeguard measures in respect of free movement. Those measures would be based on 
Article 112 of the Agreement, which allows for safeguard measures in the case of "serious 
economic, societal or environment difficulties of a sectoral or regional nature liable to
3 4  And to their families, whatever their nationality, as provided by the relevant Community Law.
3 5  Elspeth Guild, Protecting Migrants' Rights: Application o f EC Agreements with Third Countries, 
op.cit., at pg.25.
3 6  Protocol 15 to the EEA Agreement allowed Switzerland and Liechtenstein to have a special 
transitional period for the free movement of persons (not only workers). Its rules are now only valid for 
Liechtenstein, who had already obtained slightly more protective conditions than Switzerland. Protocol 16 
to the EEA Agreement allowed the two countries to derogate from the provisions in the field of social 
security, as a consequence of the transitional periods of the former Protocol. A minor exception to the free 
movement derives also from the fact that the Agreement, in principle, will not apply to the Aland Islands, 
in Finland. Even if the Finnish government will declare that it applies, exemptions are already provided in 
the text of the EEA Treaty in what concerns acquisition of real property in those islands, as well as the 
right of establishment and the right to provide services there. See Article 126 of the Agreement.
3 7  In the 1990 census 1.246.000 foreigners were counted as residents - of whom there were 81.000 Turks, 
171.000 Yugoslavian, 383.000 Italians, 124.000 Spanish and 110.000 Portuguese. On the consequences 
for Switzerland of the roles on the free movement of persons see Haymann, Michael, "Approaching 
Europe : Swiss Prospectives and Dilemmas”, in UEI, 1992, No.2, p.71 at 82. On Austria see Seid- 
Hohenveldem, H.C.I., "Austria and the EEA", idem, p.29, at 43.
3 8  See Press Release PRES/94/219, of 31/10/1994.
3 9  Liechtenstein, Austria, Iceland (all of which also referred to eventual perturbations in the real estate 
market) and Switzerland.
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persist”. The response of the Community came in ‘’replying" declarations:40 it considered 
such statements would not make "prejudice to the rights and obligations of the 
Contracting Parties under the Agreement." That is to say: the problems are to be solved 
only under the rules and procedures included in the EEA Treaty.
Finally, in the context of the movement of persons, a Declaration was made by the 
governments of the Member States of the Community and of the EFTA countries on the 
facilitation of border controls. It states that those countries will
"cooperate with a view to the facilitation o f  controls for each other’s citizens and 
the member of their families at borders between their territories".
This is said to be "subject to the practical modalities to be defined in the appropriate fora". 
One may wonder what this allusion refers to. It seems it does not refer to any entity or 
working group within the Council of Europe.41 Presumably it refers to the 
intergovernmental cooperation then developed between Community Member States. Or 
even to cooperation provided for under Title VI of the by then already signed Treaty on 
European Union. The fact is that States that were parties to the Schengen agreements put 
pressure on the EFTA countries, who asked to join the European Union, to accede also to 
the Schengen agreements.
In relation to social provisions, Articles 66 to 71 of the Agreement are again a 
repetition of Community rules. They contain principles identical to those of Articles 117 to 
119 of the Treaty of Rome. These provide for the respect of principles on the 
improvement of working conditions, health and safety of workers and equal pay for both 
sexes. Annex XVIII of the EEA Agreement determines to what extent secondary legal 
instruments implementing such Community rules will be applied in EFTA countries. 
Cooperation in the field of Social Policy, in general, is also envisaged.42 Accordingly, the 
EFTA governments issued a Declaration endorsing the principles and basic rights laid 
down in the EC Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.43
b) Specific Legal Issues
One of the most important legal issues regarding the EEA Agreement is whether 
its provisions, and provisions of EEA Law in general, may or may not have direct effect.
4 0  No Community reply was made on the Declarations of Liechtenstein and Iceland, presumably because 
of its small size and more vulnerable situation.
4 1 All countries of both the European Communities and EFTA are members of the Council of Europe. See 
the European Agreement on Regulations Governing the Movement of Persons Between Member States of 
the Council of Europe, of December 1957, UNTS, vol.315, p.139; ETS 25. It provides for the facilitation 
of passage of frontiers for parties’ nationals. In some circumstances even an identity card or an overdue 
passport is enough. The present parties to the Convention include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
4 2  Article 78 and Protocol 31 to the Agreement, and Article 5 of the Agreement.
4 3  This is no surprise for those who are familiar with the EC Social Charter and have at least a superficial 
idea of the social and labour relations in the EFTA countries. On the reverse side of the issue, on whether 
the EEA Agreement and accession to the EEC may harm the Swedish Welfare State, see Joahansson, 
Sten, "L'Accord sur L'Espace Économique Est Suffisant * in RM CUE, June 1992, No.359, pp.494-500. 
See also Aubert, Gabriel "Le Droit suisse du travail au regard de l'acquis communautaire" in EEA 
Agreement - Comments and Reflections, Jacot-Guillarmod, Olivier (ed.). Collection de Droit Européen, 
vol.9, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag AG, Zurich, 1992, p.435.
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In this regard two provisions are particularly important. Article 6 of the Agreement 
establishes that
"(...) the provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance 
to corresponding rules of the [EC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty] and to acts 
adopted in application of these two Treaties, shall, in their implementation and 
application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of signature of this 
Agreement."
This could indicate that the provisions of the EEA Agreement which are similar to those 
of the Treaties of the European Communities could have direct effect if the necessary 
conditions were fulfilled. However, account has to be taken also of Protocol 35 to the 
EEA Agreement. It provides that
"For cases of possible conflicts between implemented EEA rules and other 
statutory provisions , the EFTA States undertake to introduce, if necessary, a 
statutory provision to the effect that EEA rules prevail in such case."
Therefore, it seems that Van Gerven is right when he sustains that
"The principles of primacy and direct effect of, at the date of signature of the EEA 
Agreement, existing identical legal rules are, by virtue of Article 6 EEA, an 
integral part of EEA law. Only to the extent that Protocol 35 deviates from the 
principle of primacy, and thus only for a period of time during which a 
Contracting Party has not (and should reasonably, not yet have) complied with the 
obligation assumed under that Protocol, can it be accepted that the principle of 
primacy, and in so far as it is linked thereto, the principle of direct effect, of EEA 
law is temporary inoperative."44
One other important legal problem that may arise is the conformity of rules of the 
EEA Agreement, of EEA law, and of acts of the EEA institutions with the European 
Convention of Human Rights.45 The problem has already been discussed in the European 
Community. We shall see whether, on this issue, future case-law of the EFTA Court, of 
national courts of EFTA countries and of the Commission and Court of Human Rights of 
Strasbourg will repeat the doctrine used on the relations between Community Law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
4 4  See the conclusions of van Gerven, Walter "The Genesis of EEA Law and the Principles of Primacy 
and Direct Effect", Fordham Inti L J . t Vol. 16, 1992-3, No. 4, pp.955-989. See also Norberg, Sven et a l., 
op. cit., at p.202-208, and Evans, op.cit., at p. 106-108.
4 5  See KSlin, Walter, "The EEA Agreement and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights" in EJIL , Vol.3, 1992, No.3, p.341.
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4 - "Europe Agreements" with Central and Eastern European 
Countries46
The concrete and political fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent 
démocratisation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe [hereinafter Eastern 
European countries] was one of the most important events in recent times. It soon became 
clear that new relations had to be organised between the Community and those countries. 
They could no longer be treated as strangers. At some stage those countries will join the 
Community and fully participate in the construction of Europe.47 Thus, in the meantime, 
their relations with the Community have to be pursued within a different framework - 
whilst that attractive, or "fearful", perspective does not materialise.
With the aim of preparing them for accession,48 the Commission proposed the so 
called "Europe Agreements". These are association agreements covering a wide range of 
areas. They include provisions on political dialogue; on trade; on workers, establishment 
and services; on payments and movement of capital; on competition; on approximation of 
laws and on cooperation in selected areas - including the social area. They are also seen as 
mixed agreements, they were concluded by both the Community and its Member States, as 
some areas covered by them are seen as being outside of the Community competence. 
While the agreements were not ratified by the national Parliaments of the Community 
Member States, interim agreements entered into force between the Community alone and
4 6  See the European Agreements in force with Hungary, OJ L 347/2; and Poland, OJ L 348/2, both of 
31/12/1993; Romania. OJ L 357/2; Bulgaria, OJ L 358/2; the Slovak Republic, OJ L 359/2 and the Czech 
Republic, OJ L 360/2, all of 31/12/1994. The Agreements signed with the Baltic countries were proposed 
by the Commission in COM (95) 207 final, of 2/6/1995. For the Agreement which is being negotiated 
with Slovenia, see COM (95) 341 final, of 12/7/1995. On the Europe Agreements see, inter alia, Benyon, 
F. S. "Les accords européens avec la Hongrie, la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie", RMCUE, 1992, No.2, 
Pp.25-50; Maresceau, Marc "Les accords européens: analyse générale", RMCUE, 1993, No.369, pp.507- 
515; and Toledano Laredo, Armando "L'Union Européenne, L’Ex-Union Soviétique et les Pays de 
L’Europe Centrale et Orientale: Un Aperçu de Leurs Accords", CDE, 30th Year, 1994, No.5-6, pp.543- 
562. See also David, Richard "The Central European Dimension”, in The Dynamics o f  European 
Integration, by Wallace, William (ed.), London, Pinter Publishers - The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1990; Kennedy, D. and Webb, D.E. "The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European 
Communities", CMLRev, Vol.30, 1993, No.6 , p. 1095-1118; Peers, Steve "An Ever Closer Waiting 
Room? : The Case for Eastern European Accession to the European Economic Area", CMLRev, Vol.32,
1995, No.l, pp. 187-213; Redmond, John "The Wider Europe: Extending the Membership of the EC", in 
The State o f  the European Community, Vol. 2: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, by Cafruny, Alan W. 
and Rosenthal, Glenda G. (ed.), Harlow, Lynne Rienner Publishers - Longman, 1993; and the Roth & 
Turner report of 30/3/1994 on immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and on the harmonisation of 
family reunion policy, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Interna! Affairs of the 
European Parliament, doc.ref. A3-204/94.
4 7  On the preparation of those countries to accession to the European Union see "The Europe Agreements 
and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession", COM 
(94) 320 final of 13/7/1994; the follow-up of the latter communication in COM (94) 361 final, of 
27/7/1994; and the "White Paper” on "Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union", COM (95) 163 final of 3/5/1995.
4 8  By the end of 1995, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, had applied 
to accession to the European Union. It is planned that the Czech Republic applies formally in January
1996.
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the Eastern European countries. They cover areas on which the Community, as such, 
undoubtedly has competence to conclude external agreements. Hence, the interim 
agreements deal mainly with commercial issues and do not cover, e.g., the legal status of 
foreign workers.
Initially, Member States were not willing to grant many rights to workers who are 
nationals of Eastern European countries thereinafter Eastern European nationals49]. The 
governments of the Member States were only prepared to make a general statement, 
declaring that due attention would be given to the rights of such workers living in the 
Community. At the most, Member States were prepared to subscribe something similar to 
the general declarations annexed to the Lomé Convention. However, during the 
negotiations with the Eastern European countries, it became clear that this would be not 
enough. Those countries, invoking their European character, were not prepared to accept 
less than what had been granted to Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Maghreb countries. 
Therefore, the Commission had to ask permission, to the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting in the Council, to go further in this field.50
The first Europe Agreements were signed on 16 December 1991 with the 
"Visegrad" countries: Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.51 In December 1992, the 
Commission presented to the European Council, in Edinburgh, a report on the future of 
relations between the Community and Eastern European countries. In that document, the 
Commission stated that Member States
"should be encouraged to apply the provisions of the Europe Agreements 
concerning access to employment as soon as possible, notably through the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements on quotas."
According to the Commission, the possibility should also be explored of accelerating the 
entry into force of the agreements' second stage, envisaging the improvement of 
conditions for access to employment.52 It was already clear that, to a certain extent, the 
provisions of the agreements were insufficient.
Meanwhile, the agreement with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had to be 
negotiated again, due to the division of the country. Signature of separate agreements with 
the two new countries was delayed because of the division of commercial quotas of the 
old country. In any case, the rules on the legal status of Czechs and Slovaks in the 
Member States remained identical to the previous draft agreement. The agreements with 
the two separate countries were signed in June 1993. Meanwhile, a similar "Europe 
Agreement" was concluded with Romania, on 2 February 1993 and with Bulgaria, on 8 
March 1993. On 1 February 1994, more than two years after being signed, the European
4 9  Or Eastern European workers to refer to workers who are nationals of countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.
5 0  As in others, see Bull. EC, 4-1991, point 1. 3. 5.. A good analysis of the relations between countries of 
Eastern Europe and the EC is made by Lavigne, Marie in "La Cee est-elle l'avenir de l'Est ? - Une 
coopération économique limitée", Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1993, p. 13,
51 Note that, some days later, as part of their preparation to the market economy and to the Community 
Internal Market, these four countries concluded the "Central European Free Trade Agreement" in 21 
December 1992 - in ILM, Vol. 34,1995, No.l, p.3. That agreement entered into force in 1 March 1993. It 
is trade oriented and contains no provisions on workers of one contracting State working in the territory of 
another.
5 2  Commission Background Report No. ISEC/B6/93, 17/2/93, point 2. c.
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Association Agreements with Poland and Hungary entered into force. Precisely one year 
later, on 1 February 1995, the Association Agreements with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovakia entered into force. On 12 April 1995, Association Agreements 
were signed with the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Negotiations have 
also been initiated with Slovenia on the conclusion of a Europe Agreement.
5 - Partnership and Cooperation Agreements53
In 1994 and 1995 the Commission proposed the conclusion of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements [hereinafter Partnership Agreements] with several countries of 
the ex-Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan54 and the Kyrzyk 
Republic. Partnership Agreements are also planned with the three transcaucasian republics 
of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.55 The agreements already drafted establish a 
framework for a political dialogue with the European Communities and contain provisions 
on trade, the status of workers, establishment of companies, cross border supply of 
services, payments and movement of capital, competition, approximation of laws and 
economic cooperation - including cooperation in the social area and, in some agreements, 
cooperation against illegal immigration. As in the Europe Agreements, while the 
Partnership Agreements do not enter into force, interim agreements with the Community, 
acting alone, regulate the relations with those countries.
The rules of the Partnership Agreements on workers were inspired by those of the 
Europe Agreements, but are less generous than in the latter and there are slight variations 
within the several Partnership Agreements: for instance the agreements with Kazakhstan 
and the Kyrzyk Republic do not contain rules on social security and only the agreement 
with Russia includes the members of the family of the workers among the beneficiaries of 
provisions on social security coordination in the Member States.
6 - Declarations
a) Declarations annexed to the Lome Convention
In IV Lomé Convention, signed on 1989, the Declarations of annexes V and VI 
deal with the situation of workers who are nationals of ACP countries and live in the 
European Union. The first provides for the respect of the fundamental freedoms of "ACP 
migrant workers" in the Community and declares that ACP States will take the necessary 
measures to discourage the irregular immigration of their nationals to the Community. The 
second provides for the absence of discrimination regarding working conditions and 
remuneration for workers of ACP States legally employed in a Member State of the EC, 
as well as regarding social security contributions connected with their work (for them and
5 3  See the draft Agreements with Ukraine - COM (94) 226 final of 1/6/1994; Russia - COM (94) 257 final 
of 15/6/1994; Kazakhstan - COM (94) 411 final of 5/10/1994; the Kyrzyk Republic - COM (94) 412 final 
of 5/10/1994; Moldova - COM (94) 477 final of 3/11/1994; and Belarus - COM (95) 44 final of 
22/2/1995.
5 4  In June 1995 the ratification of the Partnership Agreement with Kazakhstan was stalled because of the 
suspension of the parliament of that country. See Week in Europe, 15/6/1995.
5 5  Meanwhile, in the view of the Commission, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are unlikely to meet the 
political conditions for negotiating Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in the short term. See Week 
in Europe, 15/6/1995.
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members of their family residing with them). ACP States undertake the same obligations 
towards nationals of Member States. It is unlikely that these general Declarations have any 
binding legal effect,56 as Article 368 of the Convention mentions only the Protocols to the 
Convention to provide that they "shall form an integral part thereof.57
b) Joint Declaration with the Mashreq Countries
The concern of these countries for their workers in the Community, especially in 
times of economic crisis, lead to the "Joint Declaration Related to the principles 
Regulating Working and Living Conditions of Migrant Workers on the Two Regions".58 
This Declaration was made by the General Commission of the Euro-Arab dialogue when 
meeting on 9 to 11 of December 1978 in Damask. It is said to be a "reaffirmation of the 
principles which inspire their policies in this field". It is made in an interesting way. 
Certainly due to the fact that it is only a declaration, it concedes the migrant workers 
broad rights: the principle of non-discrimination is recognised in respect to working and 
living conditions, wages, economic and union rights, professional taxes, contributions and 
lodging facilities. It also provides a number of rights for the members of his or her family 
that reside in the country where he or she works and makes many general references for 
the national laws of the countries involved.
5 6  Arguing in favour of their direct effect see Guild, Elspeth in Protecting Migrants' Rights: Application 
of EC Agreements with Third Countries, op.cit., at p.24. A case discussed under the first Lomé 
Convention was that of Razanatsimba. Case 65/77,1977 [ECR] 2229. There the Court of Justice ruled on 
the interpretation of Article 62 of that Convention. This rule established that ”[a]s regards the 
arrangements that may be applied in matters of establishment and provisions of services, the ACP States 
on the one hand and the Member States on the other shall treat nationals and companies or firms of the 
Member States and nationals and companies or firms of the ACP States respectively on a non- 
discriminatory basis." The Court of Justice considered that Mr. Razanatsimba, a national of Madagascar, 
was not discriminated against when France denied him the right to be admitted to pupillage at the Lille 
Bar, while it would grant such right to nationals of other ACP States, under provisions of bilateral 
Agreements. The Court considered that "it is not contrary to the rule as non-discrimination laid down in 
Article 62 for a Member State to reserve more favourable treatment to the nationals of one ACP-State, 
provided that such treatment results from the provisions of an international agreement comprising 
reciprocal rights and advantages.” See paragraph 19 of the judgment. This case is interesting, notably 
because the non-discriminatory rule of Article 62 of the then Lomé Convention is not unique. Article 53 
of the Agreement with Tunisia, for example, provides that, in fields covered by that Agreement, there 
shall be no discrimination between Tunisian national, companies or firms; or between Member States, 
their national, companies or firms.
5 7  The analysis made on the declarations annexed to the European Single Act can be recalled here, with 
the exception that the declarations annexed to the Lomé Convention cannot exactly be seen as meaning to 
interpret provisions of the Convention.
5 8  Bull. EC 6-1988, point 2.4.5. See also the 23th General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities, pg. 389.
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C) SP E C IFIC  ISSUES IN AGREEMENTS* RULES 
1 - W orkers and their family members 
a) Right to work and reside 
(i) Turkey
As mentioned above, the Association Agreement with Turkey was made in view of 
the future accession of Turkey to the EEC. Article 12, for instance, provides that:
"The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the 
Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing 
freedom of movement for workers between them".
Accordingly, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol of 1970 provided that this freedom 
would be "secured by progressive stages’* between 1/12/1976 and 1/12/1986. This was 
never fully implemented.
In Demirel,59 the Court of Justice was asked to recognise the direct effect of the 
above mentioned Article 12 of the Association Agreement with Turkey and Article 36 of 
the Additional Protocol to it, when read in conjunction with Article 7 of the Agreement. 
The latter was drafted in a similar manner to Article 5 of the EC Treaty and provides that: 
"The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from this Agreement.
They shall refrain from any measures liable to jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Agreement."
The Court repeated its ruling in Haegeman,60 according to which the Court of Justice has 
competence to interpret the provisions of an agreement concluded by the Council 
according to Article 228 and 238, because the Agreement is, as far as the Community is 
concerned, an act of the institutions of the Community within the meaning of Article 
177(1) (b) of the EC Treaty. Such provisions, after the entry into force of the agreement, 
form an integral part of the Community legal system, and within the framework of that 
system the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation 
of the Agreement.61 The Court considered also that it was not excluded ab initio that the 
provisions of the Association Agreement with Turkey, and the Additional Protocol to it, 
had direct effect. In this context, the Court stated that
"A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member 
countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to 
its wording and the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision 
contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation 
or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure.”62 
After having examined Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of its Protocol, the 
Court concluded that these provisions
5 9  Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECR 3719. See on the direct effect of the provisions at stake in the 
Demirel case, the annotation to that case by Nolte, Georg, "Freedom of movement for workers and EEC- 
Turkey association agreement", CMLRev, Vol. 25. 1988, No.2, pp.403-415, at 410-414.
6 0  Case 181/73, Haegeman, [1974] ECR 449.
6 1  Demirel, case quoted, paragraph 7.
6 2  Idem, paragraph 14.
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"(...)essentially serve to set out a programme and are not sufficiently precise and 
unconditional to be capable of governing directly the movement of workers".63 
Below, I will come back to ¿is case, to analyse the issue of the scope within which the 
Court of Justice could or should control the respect of fundamental human rights.
- workers
The rights of Turkish nationals to work and reside in the Member States are 
further regulated by two decisions of the Association Council, which grant them some 
rights of access to the labour market or of continuing participation in it. The first decision 
was adopted in 1976 and the other was adopted in 1980.
Decision 7/16
This decision was meant to provide the rules for a first stage of four years, towards 
full freedom of movement of workers. Its Article 7 establishes a standstill clause for 
restrictions on the access to the employment market of Turkish citizens legally resident 
and employed in a Member State. Furthermore, Article 5 establishes that when an offer of 
employment cannot be met by the employment market of the Member States, and when 
the Member States decide to authorise a call on workers who are third country nationals, 
they "shall endeavour in so doing to accord priority to Turkish workers".
Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the decision grants concrete rights to Turkish workers. 
It provides that after three years of legal employment in a Member State, a Turkish 
worker shall be entitled to "respond to an offer of employment made (...) for the same 
occupation, branch of activity and region." This possibility is subject "to the priority to be 
given to workers of Member States of the Community" and it is required that the offer of 
employment has been "made under normal conditions and registered with the employment 
services" of the relevant State. After five years of legal employment in a Member State, "a 
Turkish worker shall enjoy free access in that country to any paid employment of his 
choice".64 In the meantime, it is provided that:
"Annual holidays and short absences for reasons of sickness, maternity or an 
accident at work shall be treated as periods of legal employment. Periods of 
involuntary employment duly certified by the relevant authorities and long 
absences on account of sickness shall not be treated as periods of legal 
employment, but shall not affect rights acquired as the result of the preceding 
period of employment."
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 establishes that the procedures for applying the provisions of 
paragraph 1 "shall be those established under national rules".65
Decision 1/80
On 19 September 1980, the EC-Turkey Association Council adopted Decision 
1/80 and Decision 3/80. The latter concerns social security and will be dealt with below. 
Decision 1/80 concerns the access of Turkish workers and members of their families to the 
labour market of the Community Member States, and grants some educational rights to
6 3  Ibidem, paragraph 23.
6 4  Article 2 (l)(b).
6 5  Article 2 (2). This seems to echo the formula of the Europe Agreements, according to which the rights 
accorded to workers and their families are "subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in each 
Member State" (and "laws, conditions and modalities" in the Partnership Agreements).
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Turkish children. To the extent that Decision 1/80 grants more rights or more extensive 
rights to Turkish nationals than does Decision 2/76, the former substitutes the latter.
The rule contained in Article 5 of decision 2/76, on priority to Turkish workers, 
when there is not "labour available in the employment market of the Member States", is 
elaborated further in Article 8 of Decision 1/80. Its first paragraph provides that, in certain 
circumstances, Member States "shall endeavour(...) to accord priority to Turkish 
workers". This priority will be accorded when a Member State authorises a call on third 
country national workers, in case it is not possible to meet an offer of employment in the 
Community "by calling on the labour available on the employment market of the Member 
States". This seems to constitute a priority in the recruitment of labour force residing in 
third countries, which contrasts with Article 8(2) apparently referring to priority within the 
workers residing within the Community". This Article provides that, when the "duly 
registered Community labour force" has not been able to fill vacant positions registered in 
the employment services of the Member State, these services "shall endeavour to fill" them 
"with Turkish workers who are registered as unemployed and legally resident in the 
territory of that Member State."66
The wording of this Article, requiring that Member States "endeavour to is 
drafted in such a way that arguably it may not necessarily be incompatible with the 
Commission proposal that third country nationals residing in a Member State be given 
access to jobs in another Member State, when the authorities of the latter are not able to 
find nationals of a Member State or residents in the very host Member State ready to take 
them.67
Article 6 of Decision 1/80 opens further the access to the labour market of a 
Member State of Turkish workers "duly registered as belonging to the labour force of 
[that] Member State".68 In this respect, Article 6 of Decision 1/80 replaces Article 2 of 
Decision 2/76. First, Article 6 of Decision 1/80 provides that the worker is entitled, "after 
one year's legal employment, to the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, 
if a job is available".69 Secondly, it is provided that, after three years of legal employment, 
the worker can "respond to another offer of employment, with an employer of his choice, 
(...) for the same occupation." As in Article 2(l)g(a) of Decision 2/76, this right is subject 
to "the priority to be given to workers of Member States of the Community" and it is 
required that the offer of employment has been "made under normal conditions and 
registered with the employment services" of the relevant State.70 Finally, the requirement
6 6  Note the third recital of decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council: "(w]hereast in the social 
field, and within the framework of the international commitments of each of the Parties, the above 
considerations make it necessary to improve the treatment accorded to workers and members of their 
families(...)’\ A Council statement concerning this recital and Article 8  of the decision, declares that "(...) 
the 1954 Nordic Labour Market Agreement is an international commitment such as is mentioned in the 
3rd recital to the Association Council Decision. The Council notes that Article 8  of the Decision does not 
affect Denmark's obligations under the Nordic Labour Agreement'’.
6 7  See point 3.3.5. of the Commission communication on a "Medium Term Social Action Programme 
1995-1997", COM (95) 134, of 12/4/1995. See also chapter 4, section A.
6 8  Or "appartenant au marché régulier de l'emploi", in the French version.
6 9  Article 6(1), first indent.
7 0  Article 6(1), second indent.
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set in Decision 2/76 of five years of legal employment to have access to "any paid 
employment of his choice" is reduced to four years in Decision 1/80.71
Article 6 of Decision 1/80 provides also that 
"Annual holidays and absences for reasons of maternity or an accident at work or 
short periods of sickness shall be treated as periods of legal employment. Periods 
of involuntary employment duly certified by the relevant authorities and long 
absences on account of sickness shall not be treated as periods of legal 
employment, but shall not affect rights acquired as the result of the preceding 
period of employment."72
Here, the novelty of Article 6 of Decision 1/80 is that the qualification of "short" applies 
only to absences due to periods of sickness, not also due to maternity or an accident at 
work, as established in Decision 2/76.
To ensure the effectiveness of the provided rights of access to the labour market, 
Article 10(2) of Decision 1/80 establishes that, when they are entitled to such rights, 
Turkish workers (duly registered as belonging to Member States labour forces) and 
members of their families "shall be entitled, on the same footing of Community workers, to 
assistance from the employment services in their search for employment"
- workers family members - Decision 1/80
In the framework of the Agreement with Turkey members of the family of Turkish 
workers benefit also of rights to work in a Member State. Article 13 of Decision 1/80 
extends to such relatives of Turkish workers the standstill provision on access to the 
labour market of the Member States contained in Article 7 of Decision 2/76. Article 13 
requires also that those workers and family members "be legally resident and employed" in 
the Member States.
Article 7 of Decision 1/80 grants specific rights of access to the labour market to 
"members of the family of a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour 
force of a Member State, who have been authorised to join him". First, and subject to the 
priority to be given to workers of Member States, they are entitled "to respond to any 
offer of employment after they have been legally resident for at least three years in that 
Member State". Secondly, "provided they have been legally resident there for at least five 
years", they "shall enjoy free access to any paid employment of their choice". Thirdly, it 
provides that "[c]hildren of Turkish workers who have completed a course of vocational 
training in the host country", and "irrespective of the length of time they have been 
resident in that Member State", "may respond to any offer of employment there(...) 
provided one of their parents has been legally employed in the Member State concerned 
for at least three years".73
- ECJ's jurisprudence on Decisions 2/76 and 1/80
A number of cases have dealt with the above mentioned decisions of the EC- 
Turkey Association Council. The Court of Justice has repeatedly considered that such 
decisions are capable of having a direct effect, provided that they fulfil the general
71 Article 6(1), third indent.
7 2  Article 6(2). Article 6(3) provides (as did Article 2(2) of Decision 2/76) that the "procedures for 
applying paragraphs 1 and 2  shall be those established under national rules."
7 3  Second paragraph of Article 7.
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conditions required for the provisions of the Agreement to have that effect.74 Moreover, it 
considered that several provisions of the decisions do actually have direct effect. In the 
Sevince case, for example, the Court of Justice considered, against the opinion of 
Germany, that Articles 2(1) (b) and 7 of Decision 2/76, and Articles 6 (1) and 13 of 
Decision 1/80 have direct effect in the Member States.7^  This was confirmed in the latter 
case-law of the Court.76
In the Eroglu case,77 the Court interpreted the first indent of Article 6(1) of 
Decision 1/80, which provided that, "after one year's legal employment", the worker is 
entitled "to the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, if a job is available". 
The Court ruled that such provision did not give
"the right to the renewal of his permit to work for his first employer to a Turkish 
national who is a university graduate and who worked for more than one year for 
his first employer and for some ten months to another employer, having been 
issued with a two-year conditional residence authorisation and corresponding 
work permits in order to allow him to deepen his knowledge by pursuing an 
occupational activity or specialised practical training."78 
The Court considered that the objective of that provision is merely to ensure continuity of 
employment and thus gives only the right to continue to work for the same employer after 
one year’s legal employment.79 Moreover, a different interpretation of that provision could 
also put at risk the priority enjoyed by nationals of Member States in access to work; 
which (according to the third indent of Article 6(1)) limits the rights of Turkish workers to 
access the labour market until they accomplish four years of legal employment.80
Meanwhile, in Sevince, the Court interpreted the concept of "legal employment" 
mentioned in Article 2(1) (b) in Decision 2/76 and in the third indent of Article 6 (1) in 
Decision 1/80. The Court considered that the legality of employment within the meaning 
of those provisions, does not necessarily require that the person holds a residence permit, 
but requires a stable and secure situation.81 Consequently, such concept of "legal 
employment" does not cover the situation of a Turkish worker who was legally able to 
continue in employment "only by reason of the suspensive effect deriving from his appeal" 
on a decision refusing him the right of residence, pending a final decision by the national 
court thereon, and "provided always, however, that that court dismisses his appeal".82
7 4  See, e.g., case 192/89, S. Z. Sevince V, Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR 3461, paragraph 15.
7  ^Sevince, case quoted, paragraph 26.
7 6  See, e.g., that in Kus the first and third indents of Article 6(1) were considered to have direct effect to 
obtain the renewal of a work permit and of a residence permit (Case C-237/91, Kus v. Landeshauptstadt
Wiesbaden [1992] ECR I - 6781, paragraph 36) and that in Eroglu the Court reaffirmed that Article 7 of 
Decision 1/80 has direct effect (Case C-355/93, Eroglu v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1994) ECR 1-5113,
7 8  Idem, paragraph 15.
7 9  Ibidem, paragraph 13.
8 0  Ibidem, paragraph 14.
81 Sevince, case quoted, paragraph 30.
8 2  Sevince, case quoted, paragraphs 32 and 33.
Similarly, in case Kus83 the Court considered that the notion of legal employment used in 
the third indent of Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 (legal employment during four years) was 
not fulfilled if the worker exercised an employment benefiting from a provisional right of 
residence, which had been granted to him while he was waiting for a definitive decision on 
his definitive right of residence.84
On the other hand, the Court considered, also in Kus, that the requirement of one 
year of legal employment inscribed in the first indent of Article 6(1) was fulfilled by a 
Turkish national who worked for one year under a residence permit which was not issued 
for him to work in a Member State. In the case, Mr. Kus, a Turkish national, had obtained 
a residence permit to live in Germany with his German wife, and the divorce of the couple 
had already been decreed when a decision on request for the renew of his work permit was 
taken.85 The Court ruled that the right to renew a work permit, after the period required 
by the said provision, does not imply that the worker in question has to have 
simultaneously an independent right to reside in the Member State concerned. The 
important fact is that the worker was residing legally in the Member State for a long 
enough time to renew his work permit. From there on, the first indent of Article 6(1) 
entitles him to reside in the country to enjoy his right to work.
This connection between the right to work and the right to reside was addressed 
by the Court of Justice in a number of cases, starting with the Sevince. There, the Court 
recognised that employment and residence are two closely linked aspects of the personal 
situation of a Turkish worker. Thus, to grant a worker a right to have access to any kind 
of job of his choice (after a certain period) implies necessarily the right of the worker to 
have recognised a right of residence, otherwise the right to work recognised to him, or 
her, would be deprived of practical effect.86 The governments of Germany and 
Netherlands, had argued, on the contrary, that a legal employment and the right of access 
to work, in the sense of the decisions, could only exists if previously a right of residence 
had been granted.
Reaffirming the necessary relation between the right to work and the right of 
residence, the Court decided in Kus that the first and third indents of Article 6(1) of 
Decision 1/80 have direct effect for the purposes of renewing the work permit gad the 
residence permit of the same Turkish worker.87 Likewise, in the Hroglu case, the Court 
ruled that a Turkish national who fulfils the conditions of Article 7 of Decision 1/80 can
8 3  Kus, case quoted. See also case Re a Turkish Drugs Peddler (Administrative Court of Appeal, North 
Rhine-Westphalia) CMLR% Vol.6 8 , 1993, No.3, pp.276-280, and the case now pending before the Court, 
case C-285/95 Suat Kol v. Land Berlin, in which the Court of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling 
on the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the decision, as far as the notion of regular employment is 
concerned, in a case of an expulsion related to a residence permit obtained on the base of knowingly 
made false statements constituting an infringement of German Law - see Proceedings of the Court of 
Justice, No.24/95, p.26.
8 4  Idem, paragraph 18.
85  Kus, case quoted, paragraphs 23 and 26.
8 6  Sevince, case quoted, paragraph 29. This was repeated in case Kus as far as the first indent of that 
provision is concerned, paragraphs 29 and 30. See also paragraph 18 of case Eroglu, quoted supra, which 
repeats paragraph 29 of the ruling in Sevince on the link between the right to work and the right of 
residence. That repetition is also made in paragraph 28 of the judgment of the Court in case Bozkurt, 
quoted infra.
8 7  Kus, case quoted, paragraph 36.
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rely on that provision not only to respond to any offer of employment, but also to obtain 
the extension of his residence permit to be able to work.88
-ECJ’s jurisprudence on rights of residence, protection of human rights and scope of 
EC Law
The following remarks deal with cases Demirel89 and Bozkurt.90 These cases 
regard rules on Turkish nationals included or adopted in the framework of the Association 
Agreement with Turkey. They are both concerned with the right of residence of Turkish 
nationals in a Member State. More importantly, they both raise the issue of the control of 
respect of fundamental human rights by the Court of Justice and the scope of Community 
Law for that purpose.91
-DEMIREL
Facts
In case Demirel the facts92 were the following. Mrs. Demirel contested the legality 
of an expulsion order from Germany, where she had gone to live with her husband, a 
Turkish worker legally residing there. Mr. Demirel, her husband, went to live legally in 
that country in September 1979. By then, the German legislation, which dated from July 
1966 and January 1975, provided that, in the event of his marriage, he would have to 
complete three years of residence in Germany for his wife to be able to join him there. He 
actually married in August 1981, in Turkey, and the couple had a son. According to the 
German law in force at the time of the marriage, and when their son was conceived, all the 
family could be reunited in Germany in September 1982. However, on 30 March 1982, the 
German law was changed,93 raising from three to eight years the waiting period necessary 
for a Turkish worker to be able to be rejoined by his family.
In March 1984, Mrs. Demirel and the couple's son entered Germany to visit 
Mr.Demirel, under a visitors visa only, not valid for family reunification. The visa expired 
in June 1984, without Mrs.Demirel having left the country, contrary to what she had 
promised to the authorities. By that time, she was pregnant again and later gave birth to 
the second child of the couple. On the grounds that she had violated her visa, in May 1985
8 8  Case Eroglu, paragraph 23. As referred to supra, in paragraph 18 the Court recalled its ruling in 
Sevince on the close link between the right to work and the right of residence.
8 9  Demirel, case quoted supra.
9 0  Case C-434/93, Ahmet Bozkurt v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1995] ECR I- 1475.
91 On the Court of Justice's review of protection of human rights in the Demirel case see Weiler, Joseph 
"Thou Shalt Not Opress a Stranger (EX.23:9): On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC 
Nationals - A Critique", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, 
T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.). 
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, pp.248-271, at 255*267. See also, on human rights and Community 
Law, the bibliography quoted in footnote 304 of chapter 4.
9 2  The "rather horrible facts", as Weiler & Lockhart call them, see Weiler, J. & Lockhart, N. "Taking 
rights seriously' seriously: the European Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence - part II", 
CMLRevt Vol.32, No.2., 1995, pp.579-627, at 619.
9 3  It is interesting to note that, as the report of the hearing refers, the rules were changed by two 
consecutive ministerial circulars, which "do not have the force of law but are internal administrative 
instructions", point 14 of that report, case quoted, at pp.3722-3.
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the authorities issued an order for her to leave the country, threatening her with expulsion 
if she did not leave the country of her own volition. Mrs. Demirel had pleaded that she 
would have difficulties to establish herself in Turkey and that she was pregnant, but the 
authorities stated that the public interest inherent in the expulsion took precedent. An 
appeal made by Mrs. Demirel to a regional administrative authority was also rejected.
Ruling on positive EC rules
As referred above,94 Mrs. Demirel tried to argue that Article 12 of the Agreement 
with Turkey and Article 36 of its Protocol, read in conjunction with Article 7 of the 
Agreement, had direct effect. The objective was to conclude that Member States were 
obliged by a standstill provision in respect of family reunification of Turkish workers 
resident in the Community, as part of freedom of movement of workers between Member 
States and Turkey.95 The Court ruled that those provisions could not have direct effect.96
It cannot be said that, in this respect, the Court's ruling was particularly forceful or 
strange. However, it has been argued that the Court could have followed another path. 
Guedalla97 presents ideas in favour of an alternative decision, using arguments also based 
on the positive rules applicable on Turkish workers in a Member State. He recalls the 
above mentioned Article 37 of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement with 
Turkey. This provision establishes the principle of non discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, as far as working conditions and remuneration are concerned, between Turkish 
workers employed in the Community and workers of other Member States of the 
Community.98 In Kziber the Court found the equivalent provision of the Cooperation 
Agreement with Morocco (Article 40) to be of direct effect.99 Thus, it could be assumed 
that Article 37 of that Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey does have direct effect too. 
Guedalla proposes that family unity be considered relevant for "conditions of work and 
remuneration" of a Turkish worker employed and resident in a Member State. He argues 
that a "Turkish worker who is denied family unity necessarily has worse conditions of 
work, as one might construe the expression, than an EC national who has the option of 
family unity". Moreover, "equal remuneration is nevertheless of unequal value to a Turkish
9 4  See this section B, point 1- a) (i).
9 5  It is noteworthy that the government of Germany sustained that such a standstill provision did not 
exist, invoking the very provisions of the EC Treaty.
9 6  Paragraph 23.
9 7  Guedalla, Vicky, op.cit., at p. 122.
9 8  This principle of non-discrimination is reaffirmed in Article 10(1) of Decision 1/80 of the EC-Tbrkey 
Association Council. The beneficiaries of the latter provision are 'Turkish workers duly registered as 
belonging to [Member State's] labour forces." It may also be relevant to note that Article 7 of Decision 
2/76 establishes a standstill clause for restrictions on the access to the employment market of Turkish 
citizens legally resident and employed in a Member State. Article 13 of Decision 1/80 extends that 
standstill provision to relatives of Turkish workers, when those workers and their family members are 
"legally resident and employed" in the Member States. Furthermore, in Sevince, for example, the Court of 
Justice considered that Article 7 of Decision 2/76, and Article 13 of Decision 1/80 have direct effect in the 
Member States (see Sevince, case quoted, paragraph 26). Therefore, if restrictions on family reunification 
were considered indirect restrictions on access to employment, such restrictions would be incompatible 
with the mentioned supra provisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council, and thus prohibited under 
Community Law.
"  See C-18/90, Office National de l’Emploi V. Bahia Kziber [1991] EC R1-199, paragraph 22.
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worker denied family unity who must therefore maintain two households."100 Arguably, if 
family unity was considered to be a part of, or to be relevant for "conditions of work and 
remuneration” of Mr.Demirel, then, his family could join him under equal conditions to 
those of other nationals of a Member State living in Germany - i.e. benefiting in practice 
from the provisions of Regulation 1216/68 mentioned in chapter 4.
Guedalla's reasoning is not at all absurd. It has the merit of trying to solve this 
problem within the positive rules of Community Law, instead of raising difficult political 
problems for the Court of Justice to face - like the review of national legislation as far as 
respect of fundamental human rights is concerned. In any case, I do not think that the 
Court of Justice would be prepared to treat Turkish workers as migrant nationals of a 
Member State, for the purposes of their family reunification. That seems highly unlikely to 
be accepted by the Court of Justice, both in the present context, and at the time when the 
Demirel case was decided. Admittedly, however, this too applies to the suggestions I will 
present below on review by the Court of Justice of fundamental human rights.
ECJ's review of human rights
At the end of its ruling, the Court of Justice addressed the issue of whether Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had "any 
bearing" on the decision of the case. The answer of the Court was negative. The Court 
considered that family reunification of Turkish workers legally resident in the Community 
was out of the scope of Community Law, because there was no Community provision on 
the matter. Accordingly, Member States were not implementing a provision of Community 
Law when they applied national legislation on family reunification.101 Therefore, the Court 
did Dût have
"jurisdiction to determine whether national rules such as those at issue are 
incompatible with the principles enshrined in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights"102
Critique of ECJ’s non-review
This denial of jurisdiction has already been sharply criticised by Weiler.103 It seems 
to me to be entirely justified to criticise the Court on this part of the judgment.
The Court seems to adopt here what I would call a formal definition of the scope 
of Community Law. I purpose, instead, the use of a substantial criterion of definition of
10 0  Guedalla, Vicky, op.cit., at p.122.
101 Until the present moment, there have been only two types of cases in which the Court of Justice has 
reviewed the respect of fundamental human rights by national legislation (or action). First, it makes such 
review when Member States act "for, or on behalf of the Community - as its "agent" or executive branch - 
or where the Member State measure is specifically required by a Community measure" - see Weiler, J. & 
Lockhart, N. "Taking rights seriously' seriously: the European Court and its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence - part I", CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.l, pp.51-94, at pp.63-4. Secondly, following its 
judgment in ERT, the Court also reviews the respect of human rights where a Member State relies on a 
derogation provided by EC Law in order to restrict a right protected by Community Law (namely one of 
the four fundamental free movement provisions). See Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE 
v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis et Sotirios Kouvelas, 11991] ECR1-2925.
102 Case Demirel, quoted supra, paragraph 28.
103 Weiler, "Thou Shalt Not Opress a Stranger...", op.cit.
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the scope of Community Law, that could be used for the purposes of review of human 
rights.
In Demirel, to justify its own denial of jurisdiction on the human rights problem, 
the Court considered sufficient the absence of a positive rule of Community Law on family 
reunification, which could be applied in the case. However, perhaps the question should 
not be limited to a determination of whether there is a positive rule of Community Law on 
the matter. That is certainly relevant, but not necessarily the only relevant factor in this 
respect. It may be that the Court of Justice, in certain circumstances, has the duty to 
review national legislation which has a bearing on human rights even on matters regarding 
which there is no positive rule of Community Law.
To assert the existence of a duty of the Court of Justice to review human rights 
protection, it also seems important to determine whether there is a relevant connection 
between the right regulated by national law (namely as far as respect of fundamental 
human rights is concerned) and the enjoyment of the right granted by Community Law. 
With this reasoning I try to find a substantial criterion to define the scope of Community 
Law.
In the case under analysis, it must be determined whether the respect of 
fundamental human rights related to the Demirel's family reunification has a relevant 
connection with the right of Mr.Demirel to work and to reside in a Member State, a right 
which is protected by Community Law.104
104  In this respect, Nolte seems to follow the same line of substantial reasoning, even if his conclusions 
are more limited than mine. He argues against the overriding importance of the criterion used by the 
Court to deny its jurisdiction: namely that there is no Community legislation on family reunion. He 
hypothesises a case in which Community Law would go beyond the present rules granting rights of access 
to the labour market, and would actually guarantee to Turkish workers the conditions of their residence 
status in the Member States. In such a case, he claims that a national rule regulating the modalities of 
family reunion would come ’within the framework* of the Community rule guaranteeing the residence 
status of Turkish workers. "To fall into [the framework of that Community rule] it is immaterial whether 
the national rule in question was expressly designed to implement a rule of Community law or whether it 
is simply presupposed by such rule.” Nolte gives one example of such a Community rule on the residence 
status of Turkish workers: a rule granting to the spouse of the worker the right to live together with the 
latter in a Member State. In such case, "the question would arise whether minors could claim to join their 
parents under Community Law". He seems to believe that the right of such minors would be a Community 
Law subject. He sustains that it "is very doubtful whether in that case the Community could leave it to the 
Member States to issue rules on that matter on the basis of their fundamental human rights". He explains 
that "by guaranteeing the reunion of the spouses the Community assumes responsibility for the matters 
which are, by virtue of the right to family respect, inextricably connected with that matter. Since this right 
not only guarantees a sphere free of restrictions but is also a source of certain positive obligations [Nolte 
refers to the European Court of Human Rights judgments in Johnston, of 18 Dec. 1986, Series A No.l 12, 
p.55; and Abdulaziz et al. of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 94, p.67] the addressee of these obligations 
seems to be the entity which is responsible for the legal status on the basis of which a person builds his 
day-to-day existence. Thus, at the moment that the Community, by virtue of a decision of the Council of 
Association, assumes the responsibility for residence status, it becomes the addressee of the right to 
respect for family life." See the annotation to the Demirel case - Nolte, Georg "Freedom of movement for 
workers and EEC-Turkey association agreement", CMLRev, Vol. 25, 1988, No.2, pp.403-415, at 414-415. 
Note, however, that Nolte does not goes as far as to sustain that the Court of Justice should have reviewed 
the human rights aspect of the Demirel case. He only recalls the insufficiency of the criterion used by the 
Court to deny its jurisdiction on the matter. Nevertheless, Nolte remarks point out the importance for the 
very Community rules of national legislation "inextricably connected with” such rales.
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Naturally, it remains to be defined what the mentioned "relevant connection" is. 
For now, I would prefer to stress the importance of this substantial criterion and its 
justification. Next, I will try to define it more precisely.
First, it can be recalled that rights and legal orders are mere conceptual 
constructions. They provide perceptions of reality, but do not always recreate the 
interaction between the many different aspects of people's lives. Nevertheless, rights and 
legal orders are meant to serve persons in real life, not persons as legal concepts. In this 
respect, it may be highlighted, for example, that only a substantial criterion of definition of 
EC Law scope can fully take into account the obvious interaction between Community 
legislation and national legislation, and can take into account the results of that interaction 
for the enjoyment of Community rights.105
Secondly, this type of substantial criterion and substantial reasoning has already 
been used by the Court of Justice itself. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Sevince can be 
recalled again. In this case the Court recognised the necessary relation between, on one 
hand, the right to work granted by Community Law to Turkish workers and, on the other 
hand, their right of residence regulated by national legislation. The Court declared that 
employment and residence are two closely linked aspects of the personal situation of a 
Turkish worker. Thus, the EC right to work of a Turkish national necessarily implied his 
right of residence. Otherwise, in the words of the Court, his Community right to work 
"would be deprived of practical effect".106 The fact that there was no positive rule of 
Community Law on such right of residence was no obstacle to the Court’s ruling.
This is obviously not the only ruling of the Court of this kind. In other cases the 
Court of Justice used also a substantial reasoning to define its jurisdiction on a right 
regulated by national legislation and related with the enjoyment of a Community right.107 
In fact, the protection of the practical effect of a Community right is often a determinant 
factor in the Court’s rulings, e.g. regarding judicial remedies available to beneficiaries of a 
EC right.
Another example is the case Konstantinidis,108 in which was at stake the 
application of German rules on transliteration of Greek names for the Roman alphabet. 
The German rules were applied to Mr. Konstantinidis, a Greek migrant who was a self- 
employed professional. In the concrete case the German legislation entailed that the name 
of Mr. Konstantinidis be entered in a register of civil status, against his wishes, in a 
transliteration which seriously misrepresented the correct pronunciation of his name.
In a manner similar to what the Court stated in Demirei on family reunification, in 
Konstantinidis the Court recalled that the transliteration of Greek names was an area
105 It can be recalled that "the potential for Community legislative reach into Member State domains is 
not only dynamic but may, perhaps be limitless." Weiler & Lockhart, op.cit., Part I, at p. 64.
1 0 6  Sevince, case quoted, paragraph 29. As mentioned supra, this consideration was later repeated in 
cases Kus, Eroglu and Bozkurt.
107 Although the Court has also used formal criteria on several occasions. For a critic of a formal 
reasoning of the Court in paragraph 26 of the Bostock case (case 2/92, The Queen v. Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Dennis Clifford Bostock, [1994] ECR 1-955) see Weiler & 
Lockhart, op.cit., Part II, at pp. 615-7.
10 8  Case C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis [1993] ECR 1-1191.
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which was for each Member State to regulate.109 However, unlike what the Court did in 
Demirel, in Konstantmidis the Court went beyond this assertion and decided that German 
rules on the matter could be considered incompatible with Article 52 of the EC Treaty, 
"dans la mesure où leur application crée pour un ressortissant hellénique une gêne 
telle qu'elle porte, en fait, atteinte au libre exercise du droit d'établissement que cet 
article lui garanti.110
The Court considered that such would be the case,
"(...) si la législation de l'État d'établissement oblige un ressortissant hellénique à 
utiliser, dans l'exercise de sa profession, une graphie de son nom résultant de la 
translitération dans les registres de l'état civil, si cette déformation l'expose au 
risque d'une confusion de personnes auprès de sa clientelle potentielle."111
In this way the Court used a substantial reasoning to define the scope of 
Community Law. If the national legislation undermines ("porte atteinte") the exercise of a 
profession, that exercise being protected by a Community right, then the national 
legislation is incompatible with Community Law. Thus, implicitly but clearly, that national 
legislation is within the scope of Community Law. Admittedly, the Court did not mention 
the issue of human rights, and, actually referred to the possible existence of indirect 
discrimination.112 13However, the point here is that the Court was prepared to review 
national legislation in a matter on which there was no positive rule of Community Law. In 
my view the Court was also committed to a substantial reasoning and rightly so.
In any case, the substantial criterion of the Court in the cases referred to is a 
substantial criterion of a narrow character. The Court of Justice considers that it has 
jurisdiction to review national legislation when the latter deprives of effect or undermines 
the very Community right.
A substantial criterion of a wider scope was proposed by the Advocate General
F.G. Jacobs in the same case. He proposed that the application of the German legislation 
to the case of Mr. Konstantmidis be considered incompatible with Articles 7 and 52 of EC 
Treaty. However, according to A.G. Jacobs, the determination of violation of the EC 
Treaty in the case did not necessarily depend on the existence of indirect discrimination112 
on grounds of nationality, which resulted in actual damage of a tangible nature,114 *which
109  Idem, paragraph 14 of the judgment.
1 1 0  Ibidem, paragraph 15.
111 Ibidem, paragraph 16.
112  Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment.
11 3  It is noteworthy the example given by Advocate General F.G. Jacobs of a Member State that
introduces a "draconian penal code under which theft is punishable by amputation of the right hand." This 
would be a national measure of a non-discriminatory nature. However, according to Jacobs, if it was 
applied to a migrant national of another Member State (or, in my view, also if it was applied to a third 
country migrant worker whose right of residence is protected by Community Law) it would be contrary to 
Community Law, because it would be incompatible to Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights - paragraph 45 of his opinion in the case. Would it make sense to apply to this hypothetical case 
the criteria of the Court in Konstantinidis and consider the national measure only contrary to Community 
Law if the migrant worker was, for example, a typist, but not if he did not need his or her right hand to 
work?
114  Paragraphs 22 and 24 of A.G. Jacobs’s opinion.
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would be a criterion similar to that of the Court. In the view of A.G. Jacobs, the German 
legislation violated the EC Treaty simply because it violated Mr.Konstantinidis' human 
rights.
Jacobs recalls that Community Law does not regard the migrant worker purely as 
an economic agent and a factor of production but as a human being.115 He sustains that 
" (...) a Community national who goes to another Member State as a worker or 
self-employed person under [the EC Treaty provisions] is entitled not just to 
pursue his trade or profession and to enjoy the same living and working conditions 
as nationals of the host State; he is in addition entitled to assume that, wherever he 
goes to earn his living in the European Community, he will be treated in 
accordance with a common code of fundamental values, in particular those laid 
down in the European Convention of Human Rights." 116
Weiler sustained an idea similar to this one, in relation to Turkish nationals 
benefiting from rights granted in framework of the Association Agreement with Turkey. 
He argued that
"whatever protection [the Association Agreements with Turkey] gave migrant 
workers under specific disposition, there is an implicit prohibition on the parties to 
violate the fundamental human rights of migrant workers covered by the 
Agreement,117 
Therefore,
" (...) even in the absence of positive Community law defining with precision 
many of the conditions of sojourn of migrants from Turkey, (...) the European 
Court of Justice retains jurisdiction (and a duty) to ensure that the fundamental 
rights of such migrants, in relation to their rights of residence, should not be 
violated either by the Community or by its Member States.“118
I agree completely with Weiler's assertion. I am certainly aware that this extension 
of revision of fundamental human rights by the Court of Justice can create some 
practical119 and political problems.120 Moreover, the issue of review of human rights in
1 ^  Idem, paragraph 24.
1 Ibidem, paragraph 46. See also his article "European Community Law and the European Convention 
of Human Rights", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration - Essays in Honour o f  Henry C. 
Schermers, by Curtin, Deirdre & Heukles, Ton (eds.), Vol. II, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 561- 
571, at pp. 564-565.
117 Weiler, "Thou Shalt Not Opress a Stranger...", op.cit., at p.265.
11 8  Idem, at p.262. See also Weiler & Lockhart, who sustain that "the migrant worker may expect human 
rights protection from the Court in all that concerns his or her actual right to be in the host Member State 
since that right, in and of itself, is a matter of Community law. (...) But it might be excessive to expect the 
canopy of Community human rights protection to extend to them where they are not acting as, or treated 
as, migrant workers." See Weiler & Lockhart, op.cit., Part I, at pp.66-67.
11 9  For a dismissal of the relevance of one these problems - an eventual overlap of jurisdiction between 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights - see 
paragraph 50 of A.G. Jacobs opinion in Konstantinidis.
120  It may be feared, e.g., the materialisation of a development similar to that of the United States, where 
"the federal bill of rights originally was understood to apply only to measures of the federal government", 
while, "[ojver the years the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment, has construed it to apply, 
by and large, to all state measures as well" - Weiler & Lockhart, op.cit.. Part I, at p.62. See also Clapham,
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Community Law is related with issues of a more structural and problematic nature which 
are still to be completely and clearly defined - like the precise relation between national 
legal orders, the Community legal order and the E.C.H.R., as well as the relation between 
their respective jurisdictions.
However, the point remains that the Court of Justice should not refuse jurisdiction 
on the respect of human rights of Turkish workers whose right of residence in a Member 
State is protected by Community Law. Arguably, it is a normal consequence of the right of 
residence of those workers (which is entailed by the right to work) that their fundamental 
human rights are protected. It can be sustained that the free exercise by a Turkish worker 
of his or her Community right to work and reside in a Member State is undermined by the 
violation in that State of his or her fundamental human rights. Moreover, it does not seem 
reasonable that EC Law grants a right of work and residence, but that the same EC Law 
allows that the enjoyment of these rights may entail the violation of the fundamental 
human rights of those same beneficiaries of Community rights. This violation deprives 
such workers of the normal conditions for enjoyment of Community rights. Arguably, 
Community Law cannot be indifferent to such deprivation. This seems to be even more 
clear and justified if the violation of fundamental human rights is made in relation to such a 
consensual and low threshold as the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights [hereinafter E.C.H.R.].
Were Demirel's human rights violated?
The above remarks concentrated on arguing that the Court should review the 
protection of fundamental human rights in the Demirel case. Now, I would like to argue 
that Demirel's fundamental human rights were actually violated in the case.
It could perhaps be sustained that the application to Mr.Demirel and his family of 
the German rules on family reunification violated their right to family life, protected by the 
E.C.H.R..
As referred to in the last chapter, according to a well established case-law of the 
Court of Justice "fundamental human rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of Community Law, the observance of which is ensured by the European Court of 
Justice". 121 Moreover, the Court has already considered that:
"International treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community Law" * 22 
The European Convention of Human Rights being one of such treaties, the Court has 
often used the Convention as a standard to review the legality of acts under the scope of 
Community L a w .  123 *123
A., European Union - The Human Rights Challenge, vol. I - Human Rights and the 
European Community: A Critical Overview, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991, pp.33-55, at p.45. However, a 
similar development does not seem to be likely in the present phase of European integration.
1 2 1  See, for instance, Case 29/69, Stauder [1969] ECR 419; Case 4/73, Nold(II) [1974] ECR 491; Case 
44/79, Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 and Case 136/79, National Panasonic [1980] ECR 2033.
12 2  Second Nold case, quoted infra, paragraph 13, at p.507.
1 2 3  See, e.g., Case 36/75. Rutili [1975] ECR 1232 and Case 63/83, Kirk, [1984] ECR 2718.
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As referred to before, it has been considered by the Commission and the Court of 
Human Rights of Strasbourg that the right to reside or to enter a Contracting Party, as 
well as the right of asylum and the freedom of expulsion, are not, as such, protected by the 
Convention.124 However, it has also been considered that migration measures adopted by 
a Contracting State may put at stake certain rights protected by the Convention. I believe 
that to be precisely the case here.125
The change of the German law on family reunification applied to Mr. Demirel five 
months before the date in which, according to the old law, he could bring his family to live 
with him. He had been waiting for that occasion, he had married and had a son. It is 
imaginable that the couple contracted marriage and that they had the child, hoping to be 
able to live all three together in Germany. It could be argued that the Demirel's right of 
family life was violated, in so much as they had the right to organise their family life 
according to the law. They had legitimate expectations126 that the organisation of their 
life,127 especially in such a fundamental matter, would not be put in jeopardy by a new law 
which so drastically increased the time necessary for them to live together in Germany - 
three to eight years.128 In material terms I would sustain that this is a case of retroactive 
application of the law.129 One that should not be allowed to exist in this situation.130
12 4  See, e.g., Commission decision of 24/4/1965, in Application No. 1855/63, Yearbook of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Vol. VIII, p.203, and judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Abdulaziz et at., of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 94, p.67. See also the observations of the French 
government on this point in the report for the hearing of the Demirel case, ECR, quoted supra, p.3728. 
See also section B of chapter 1.
125 For the analysis of violation of their right to family life I do not propose to overlook that the Demirets 
are foreigners in a Member State. I certainly take that fact into consideration. I simply sustain that they 
are entitled to the protection by EC Law of fundamental human rights in the way ensured by the E.C.H.R. 
to foreign persons.
1 26  On the principle of legitimate expectations (and legal certainty) in Community Law see Hartley, T.C., 
The Foundations o f  European Community Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, at pp. 149-155; 
Schwarze, J . , European Administrative Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, at pp.942-953; and Wyatt,
D. & Dash wood, A. European Community Law, 3rd.ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, at pp.91-5.
12 7  Note for example that Article 2 of the Grundgesetz (the German Basic Law) provides that everyone 
has the right to develop his personality in so far as he does not infringe the rights of others and does not 
act in breach of the constitutional order or of public morality.
128  The violation of the right to family life in this manner - right to organise their family life within the 
limits of the law for the purposes of family reunification - would be more clearly violated, for example, if 
the old law required 15 years of residence of the worker, if 14 years and nine months had already passed 
and if a new law would extend the required period of residence, e.g. to 30 years. However, the violation of 
the right to family life as violation of legitimate expectations, arguably, exists also in the concrete case of 
the Demirels.
1 2 9  In legal technical terms, this type of application of the law in time - when a new rule of law is applied 
to an act which is in process of completion - is a case of false retroactivity or quasi-retroactivity. See 
Hartley, op.cit., at p.149,
130  Note that the Court of Justice held in Kirk that non-retroactivity in penal rules (in relation to 
Regulation 170/83) is part of the general principles of law which observance the Court of Justice ensures - 
case 63/83, Kirk [1984] ECR 2718, paragraph 22. The principle of non-retroactivity is often applied in the 
constitutional orders of the Member States as a limit to legislation restricting human rights. The idea 
underlying in this principle should forbid a retroactive change in law on family reunification of the kind 
occurred in the Demirel case.
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This line of reasoning has not been adopted, and to my knowledge not even 
considered by the Commission or Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg. However, there 
is certainly room to argue that the material retroactivity of national legislation on family 
reunification of foreigners can violate their right to family life, in the manner construed
above.
- ROZKURT
Facts and ruling of the Court
In the Bozkurt case the Court was asked to interpret certain provisions of 
decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. However, this case can also be seen in 
the perspective of the protection of human rights.
The case concerned a Turkish worker, Mr. Bozkurt, who was employed in a 
Dutch company, and had suffered an accident at work. The Dutch Ministry of Justice had 
refused to grant him a residence permit unrestricted in time. Mr. Bozkurt had worked 
from 1979 to 1988 as a lorry driver on routes to the Middle East. His contract of 
employment was concluded under Netherlands law with a company incorporated under 
Netherlands Law, which had its head office also in that country. When Mr. Bozkurt was 
not working, he lived in the Netherlands. He did not have a residence permit there, 
because, due to the particular situation of his job, the Dutch aliens law did not require him 
to have one. Instead, he had the required visa valid for multiple journeys, which enable 
him to stay in the Netherlands when he was not working.
In 1988, Mr. Bozkurt, had an accident at work, the degree of his incapacity having 
been determined at between 80 and 100%. Therefore, he received invalidity benefits under 
the relevant Dutch legislation. When he asked for a residence permit unrestricted in time, 
the Dutch authorities rejected the request. Mr.Bozkurt introduced an appeal to the 
Council of State of the Netherlands, which asked the Court for a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 2 of Decision 2/76 and Article 6 of Decision 1/80 of the EC- 
Turkey Association Council. As mentioned above, these provisions grant to Turkish 
workers certain rights of access to the labour market of the Member States, while 
conditioning such rights to the fulfilment of some requirements.
The first question addressed by the Court was the meaning of one of the conditions 
of Article 6 of Decision 1/80: that the Turkish nationals belonged to the legitimate labour 
force of the Member States. In this respect the Court decided against the opinion 
sustained by the governments of Germany, Greece, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
The Court ruled that the criterion of the Lopes da Veiga Judgment131 should be adopted 
in the case of Bozkurt. Accordingly, it was for the national court to decide whether an 
international lorry-driver like Mr.Bozkurt belongs to the said legitimate labour force of a 
Member State. To determine this, the national court should
"determine whether the applicant's employment relationship retains a sufficiently 
close link to the territory of the Member State, and, in so doing, to take account in 
particular of the place where he was hired, the territory on which the paid 
employment was based and the applicable national legislation in the field of 
employment and social security."
131 Case 9/88 Lopes da Veiga v. Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 2989, paragraph 17.
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As mentioned above, the concrete facts of these aspects of Mr.Bozkurt's situation seem to 
indicate that he was part of the labour force of the Netherlands. In any case, the Court of 
Justice stated that it was for the national court to determine so.
Secondly, the Court ruled on whether a Turkish worker like Mr. Bozkurt, who 
was not required to have a work permit or residence permit to carry out his work, could 
be considered to be legally employed in the Netherlands. If he could be considered so, the 
question was then whether he was entitled to have a right of residence while he had a legal 
employment. The answer of the Court was affirmative in both respects. The Court 
declared that the rights to work and to reside while working, which are conferred to 
Turkish nationals duly integrated in the labour force of a Member State, are accorded to 
such nationals
"(...) irrespective of whether or not the competent authorities have issued 
administrative documents which, in this context, can only be declaratory of the 
existence of those rights and cannot constitute a condition for their existence."132
Thirdly, the Court addressed what, for the purposes of respect of human rights by 
Community Law, seems to be the most important issue in the case. The Court was asked 
to interpret again Article 6 of Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council. The 
question now was whether, under that provision, a Turkish worker belonging to the 
legitimate labour force of a Member State and having had an accident at work which 
rendered him permanently incapacitated for work, was entitled to remain in the territory of 
that Member State. If the answer to this question was positive, then for Mr.Bozkurt to 
have such a right to remain in the Netherlands, he needed only to be considered by the 
Dutch court as belonging to the legitimate Dutch labour force.
In the case, Bozkurt and the Commission invoked the second paragraph of Article 
6 of Decision 1/80.133 Mr.Bozkurt claimed that the right for him to remain in the 
Netherlands could be derived from the second sentence of that provision, as it refers to 
long absences on account of sickness, which "shall not affect rights acquired as the result 
of the preceding period of employment".134 The Commission presented what seems to be 
a more convincing argument. It argued that his right to remain could be derived from the 
first sentence of the provision, because, according to the Commission, this sentence 
provides that
"a period of permanent incapacity for work resulting from an accident at work 
must be treated in the same way as permanent legal employment, which implies 
the existence of a right of residence for the person concerned".135
On the other hand, the governments of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and 
United Kingdom sustained that, in the absence of an express provision on the subject,
132 Case Bozkurt, quoted supra, paragraph 30.
133 Which provides that "(ajnnual holidays and absences for reasons of maternity or an accident at work 
or short periods of sickness shall be treated as periods of legal employment. Periods of involuntary 
employment duly certified by the relevant authorities and long absences on account of sickness shall not 
be treated as periods of legal employment, but shall not affect rights acquired as the result of the preceding 
period of employment."
134  Bozkurt, case quoted, paragraph 33.
135 Idem, paragraph 34.
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"Turkish workers must be regarded as not entitled to claim the right to remain." 
According to those governments, the consequences for the right of residence of a person 
with a permanent incapacity to work would be "governed exclusively by the national law 
of the Member State concerned".136
Germany and the United Kingdom added that the objective of Decision 1/80 was 
only to consolidate the situation of Turkish workers already employed. In their view, the 
right of residence "must remain" only a corollary of the worker's employment, "so that, 
where there is a break in employment, the right of residence can subsist only if that break 
is of limited duration."137 This interpretation would, in the view of those Member States, 
be in conformity with Article 6 of the Decision, as this would refer "only to temporary 
absences, which would not as a rule affect the workers subsequent participation in 
working life". On the contrary,
"in the case of long-lasting incapacity for work, the worker is no longer available 
as a member of the labour force at all and there is no objectively justified reason  
f o r  guaranteeing him the right o f  access to the labou r fo rce  an d  an ancillary  
right o f  residence."138
The conclusion of the governments was that to maintain a right of residence when the 
Turkish national had a permanent incapacity for work would "amount to conferring on it 
an independent character, contrary to the purpose of Decision 1/80."139
The Court accepted the arguments of the German and United Kingdom 
governments, taking into account how the provisions of the Decisions of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council and Article 12 of the Agreement stood.140 The Court considered that 
Article 6(2) of Decision 1/80 "is intended only to regulate the consequences, for the 
application of Article 6(1), of certain breaks in employment."141 First, annual holidays, 
absences for reason of maternity or an accident at work or short periods of sickness are 
treated as periods of legal employment. This was so "particularly" to calculate the length 
of the period of legal employment required in order to acquire the right to free access to 
any paid employment. Secondly, in the case of periods of unemployment and long 
absences on account of sickness, they are not treated as periods of legal employment, and 
are "taken into account only in order to ensure that rights acquired by the worker as the 
result of preceding periods of employment are preserved." Therefore, in this respect, the 
Court considered that:
n[T]he provisions of Article 6(2) ensure only the continuation of the right to 
employment and necessarily presuppose fitness to continue working, even if only 
after a temporary interruption."142
The conclusion of the Court was that Article 6 of Decision 1/80
"covers the situation of Turkish workers who are working or are temporarily 
incapacitated for work. It does not, on the other hand, cover the situation of a 
Turkish worker who has definitively ceased to belong to the labour force of a
1 3 6  Ibidem, paragraph 35.
13 7  Ibidem, paragraph 36.
138 Ibidem, paragraph 36. Emphasis added.
1 3 9  Ibidem.
14 0  Ibidem, paragraph 37.
141 Ibidem, paragraph 38.
14 2  Ibidem.
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Member State because he has, for example, reached retirement age or, as in the 
present case, become totally and permanently incapacitated for work.143 
The Court added that:
"(...) in the absence of any specific provision conferring on Turkish workers a 
right to remain in the territory of a Member State after working there, a Turkish 
national's right of residence, as implicitly but necessarily guaranteed by Article 6 
of Decision No 1/80 as a corollary of legal employment, ceases to exist if the 
person concerned becomes totally and permanently incapacitated for work."144
Comments on the case
The Bozkurt case is quite interesting in several regards. However, the analysis to 
be made here will concentrate on the problems raised by the last issue addressed by the 
Court. In other words: the following remarks will try to determine whether or not, under 
Community Law, a Turkish worker belonging to the legitimate labour force of a Member 
State, having worked and resided in a Member State under a Community right, but having 
had an accident at work which rendered him permanently incapacitated for work, is 
entitled to remain in the territory of that Member State after such an accident.
Let me make clear from the outset that I consider that the decision of the Court 
regarding the right of Mr.Bozkurt to remain in the Netherlands is a decision open to 
criticism. However, the following analysis will not concentrate solely on the personal 
aspects of this case (on Mr.Bozkurt himself), but rather focus on the general way in which 
the decision was formulated. This generality might lead to subsequent cases being decided 
using the Bozkurt case as authority. The case is thus considered principally interesting as 
an example of the general situation of a Turkish worker who has worked in a Member 
State under a Community Law right and whose right of residence is questioned when he 
can work no more. It is in this respect that I believe that the ruling can entail very serious 
repercussions and is specially worrying, namely as far as the control of respect of human 
rights is concerned.
The issue will be here examined under two perspectives. First, it will be analysed 
from the point of view of the positive rules of Community Law on the matter, namely the 
decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. Secondly, the issue will be analysed in 
the light of the control by the Court of Justice of respect for human rights within the scope 
of Community Law.
- Positive rules of Community Law
As far as positive rules of Community Law on the matter are concerned, the main 
criticism that can be made to the ruling of the Court is that the restrictive interpretation 
made of Article 6 of Decision 1/80 does not seem to be the only one possible. This is 
striking if one recalls the facility with which the Court adopted a ruling such as this one. 
The effect of such ruling is that Community Law may authorise a person to work in a 
Member State for an undetermined number of years, protecting his or her right to work 
and reside there. Then, if the person can work no more, Community Law allows that he or
143 Ibidem, paragraph 39.
14 4  Ibidem, paragraph 40.
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she be expelled to his or her country of origin, without any consideration whatsoever for 
their personal circumstances.145
As previous case-law of the Court of Justice exemplifies, one of the main problems 
at stake in this respect is that Article 6 of Decision 1/80 is not always clear and 
comprehensive, leaving some loopholes in the legal regime on Turkish workers in the 
Member States.146 Besides the issues dealt with in this case, there remain to be interpreted 
expressions like, e.g., "short" and "long absences on account of sickness", used in 
paragraph 2 of Article 6.
The Court decided to make a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 of Decision 
1/80 in relation to the right of residence of a Turkish worker, given his or her absences 
from work due to an accident at work. The alternative would have been to make a broad 
and arguably more appropriate teleological interpretation of that rule. It could be done in 
one of the two following ways, roughly equivalent to the suggestions of the Commission 
and Mr.Bozkurt, respectively. First, the fact that Mr.Bozkurt could not work could be 
considered as an absence for reasons of an accident at work and then be considered as a 
period of legal employment, according to the first phrase of Article 6(2). As the 
Commission pointed out,147 if an absence for an accident at work was considered as a 
period of legal employment, the latter would entail the recognition of the implied right of 
residence. Secondly, in alternative, his incapacity to work could be considered as a period 
of involuntary unemployment, which would not "affect the rights acquired as the result of 
the preceding period of employment", in accordance with the second phrase of Article 
6(2). Since previously he had already acquired the right to reside, he would continue to 
have such right after his accident.
There seem to be good reasons to make a teleological and broad interpretation of 
the provisions of the second paragraph and of the whole Article 6 of Decision 1/80. In this 
respect it may be noted that, contrary to what the governments of the intervening Member 
States repeated (explicitly and implicitly), and the Court accepted,148 Article 6 does not 
seem to always require that an interruption of work be of limited duration. In fact, the first 
phrase of its paragraph 2 provides that:
"Annual holidays and absences for reasons of maternity or an accident at work or 
short periods of sickness shall be treated as periods of legal employment."
"Short" is here mentioned only in relation to periods of sickness. In this respect, it is 
interesting to recall again that Article 6(2) is based on Article 2(1 )(c) of the former 
Decision 2/76 on the same matter. The latter provision stated:
"Annual holidays and short absences for reasons of sickness, maternity or an 
accident at work shall be treated as periods of legal employment."
As may be seen, while in Decision 1/80, quoted above, the qualification of "short" applies 
only to absences due to periods of sickness, in Decision 2/76, the last one quoted, it 
applies also to absences due to maternity or an accident at work. There is, thus, a
1 45  To be optimistic, perhaps the decision of the Court was influenced by what could have been seen as 
the dubious character of the connection of Mr.Bozkurt with the Netherlands. However, that does not 
diminish the far-reaching consequences of the very wide formulation of the Court's ruling. Nor does it 
mean that Mr.Bozkurt was not entitled to more protection by the Court than the one he was given.
1 4 6  See also Peers, Steve, "Toward Equality...", op.cit.
147 Idem, paragraph 34.
148 See paragraphs 36,38 and 39, for example.
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difference between the versions of the same basic rule, the more recent version (Article 6, 
paragraph 2 of Decision 1/80) being less restrictive. This may give food for thought. It 
could, perhaps, be argued that this change corresponds to an intention of the Association 
Council to be more "human" when it considered the legal effect of the workers’ absences 
due to maternity or an accident at work. After the adoption of Decision 1/80, for absences 
due to maternity or an accident at work to be treated as periods of legal employment, they 
do not have to be "short absences" as before. It is certainly true that the Association 
Council did not go so far as to inscribe in Decision 1/80 a right of residence to persons 
who due, to an accident at work, could work no more. However, it does not seem either 
that the wording of Article 6(2) clearly precludes that possibility. Besides, as the case-law 
of the Court shows, the provisions of Article 6 of Decision 1/80 are not clear in many 
other aspects either, like in such a fundamental point as the right of residence while 
working.
Furthermore, there is perhaps an aspect of more general relevance in the change 
made by the Association Council regarding the legal effect of absences of workers due to 
maternity or an accident at work. If this change is a sign that a legislator such as that 
Council has a certain "humanity" in dealing with workers, then the strict economic view of 
the purpose of the legal regime of Turkish workers in the Community may be questioned. 
Maybe it is not necessarily correct to reason that the provisions of the Decision 1/80 only 
protect Turkish nationals who are working or who, although not working, will be able to 
work again.149
This can reinforce another observation, which goes as follows. If the Community 
legal regime protects workers in periods of temporary impossibility for work, as Article 
6(2) of Decision 1/80 does, a fortiori that regime should be interpreted as protecting them 
if their problems are of a more serious nature - like when they have an accident at work 
which definitively impedes them working. This should be considered to be so at least in 
the lack of positive and clear rules to the contrary. Therefore, Article 6(2) should be 
interpreted in a broad manner, authorising a Turkish worker who suffered an accident like 
Mr.Bozkurt to stay in the Member State where he worked.150
149  In any case, it could even be said that an accident at work is still directly connected with the workers' 
work. In the case of Mr.Bozkurt the connection between his impossibility to work and his work was 
crystal-clear. That would not be the case of a Turkish worker who suffered a car accident with similar 
consequences while in holidays. The latter worker would nevertheless be entitled to protection by the 
Court of Justice of his or her fundamental human rights.
150  In this respect, the Court could have used as a source of inspiration Article 2 (1) (a) of Regulation 
1251/70 (OJ L 142/24 of 1/7/1970, Special Edition). Such rule provides "the right to remain permanently 
in the territory of a Member State [for] a worker who, having resided continuously in the territory of that 
State for more than two years, ceases to work there as an employed person as a result of permanent 
incapacity for work. If such incapacity is the result of an accident at work or an occupational disease 
entitling him to a pension for which an institution of that State is entirely or partially responsible, [which 
was the case of Mr.Bozkurt] no condition shall be imposed as to the length of residence". The Court 
referred that this provision "cannot simply be transposed to Turkish workers", without elaborating much 
on why it could not be done - see paragraph 41). In any case, what was at stake was not necessarily to 
transpose simply that provision, but, for example, to use it as a source of legal inspiration for a ruling 
which would use a broad interpretation of Article 6  of Decision 1/80, as suggested in the main text.
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A final argument for such broad interpretation comes from ILO Convention No.97 
concerning migrant workers,151 which Netherlands ratified as early as 20 May 1952. 
Paragraph (1) of Article 8 thereof provides that:
"(1) A migrant for employment who has been admitted on a permanent basis and 
the members of his family who have been authorised to accompany or join him 
shall not be returned to their country of origin or the territory from which they 
emigrated because the migrant is unable to follow his occupation by reason of 
illness contracted or injury sustained subsequem to entry, unless the person 
concerned so desires or an international agreement to which the Member is a party 
so provides.”
Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that, if a worker is admitted on a permanent 
basis to one country, the authorities of the latter can demand a minimum period for the 
application of the first paragraph. However, that period cannot exceed five years from the 
date of admission of the worker. As Article 234 of the EC Treaty states that rights and 
obligations derived from agreements concluded between Member States and third 
countries shall not be affected by the provisions of the EC Treaty, the above mentioned 
provisions of the Convention are not abrogated by the EC Agreement with Turkey.
In relation to the excluding clause referred to at the end of the quoted Article 8(1) 
of the Convention - that an international agreement to which the Member is a party 
provides for the return of the worker to his country of origin - it is submitted, again, that 
the relevant provisions of decision 1/80 do not actually provide for the possibility that a 
worker in the situation of Mr.Bozkurt be expelled.152 In any event, Article 8(1) of the ILO 
Convention seems to be an additional basis to sustain that the relevant provisions of 
decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council should be interpreted in a broad 
manner, thus protecting a Turkish worker such as MnBozkurt.
Admittedly, it may not be a matter of Community Law, as such, that the mentioned 
ILO Convention has to be respected by the Netherlands. However, it is important to stress 
that, in the light of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, Community Law does not go against 
respect of the Convention. Arguably, in the specific case at stake, the respect by the
151 ILO Convention of 1 July 1949, UNTS, Vol. 120, p.7l. It was ratified by 40 countries, including the 
following Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.
152 Arguably, this is further confirmed by the simple fact that there is a reasonable doubt on whether the 
rules of the decision allow for such expulsion. Perhaps the best interpretation of the excluding clause of 
Article 8(1), in fin e, of the Convention would be a narrow interpretation. This interpretation would 
require the existence of an explicit rule providing for the return of the worker to his country of origin, and 
would not be satisfied by the mere fact that such return is implicitly allowed for, after a careful judicial 
interpretation of the rule and the framework in which it is contained. The objective of Article 8(1) of the 
Convention seems to be to protect workers against unexpected events. Arguably, for the workers to be 
protected in that respect they should, at least, have the clear possibility to know in advance that their 
return to the country of origin is possible under an international agreement - in the case where the worker 
"is unable to follow his occupation by reason of illness contracted or injury sustained subsequent to entry”. 
Such clear possibility does not seem to exist if the rule of such an international agreement is not explicit 
and unequivocal enough for them to apprehend it in advance.
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Netherlands of the standards of the ILO Convention No. 97 would not be compatible with 
the expulsion of a worker such as Mr.Bozkurt.153
- Protection of human rights
The ruling of the Court in Bozkurt can also be analysed from the point of view of 
control of respect for human rights. To start with, it may be useful to highlight the 
consequences that the ruling of the Court in Bozkurt could have for the violation or lack 
of protection of human rights. The ruling of the Court, considers that, from the point of 
view of Community Law it is permissible to expel from a Member State a Turkish worker 
when he or she can work no more, "because he has, for example, reached retirement age 
or (...) become totally and permanently incapacitated for work",154 due to an accident at 
work.
It would be possible to wonder if the Court would apply the same justification and 
concrete results to some other similar situations - situations in which Turkish workers, 
until then protected by Community Law, would suddenly become definitively 
incapacitated to work. It would be interesting to know how the Court would decide a case 
in which such a person would be definitively unable to work because he or she had been a 
victim of a car accident (in which the fault was entirely of someone else) and become 
quadriplegic; or because she had serious medical problems after or on the occasion of 
giving birth to a child; or because he or she had been the victim of a criminal attack, for 
example a racist attack. All these cases seem to be covered by the general formulation of 
paragraph 40 of the judgment.155 In all these cases such ruling of that paragraph would 
entail that their expulsion would be valid under Community Law. However, the analysis to 
be made here will not go that far. Perhaps cases like those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph would not need to reach the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
Perhaps the governments of the Member States would be more compassionate regarding 
the situation of those persons. The question would remain on how Community Law would 
protect such persons, if they did need such protection. However, the Court made specific 
reference only to the cases of retired persons and persons incapacitated to work following 
an accident at work. Therefore, the following analysis will concentrate on those two cases.
153 Note also that Article 8(1) of ILO Convention No. 143, of June 1975, establishes that, if a migrant 
worker is legally resident in the territory of a Contracting Party for the purposes of employment, he "shall 
not be considered as in an illegal situation by the mere fact that he lost his employment, which shall not in 
itself imply the withdrawal of his authorisation of residence". Cf. also with point 18 of Recommendation 
No. 8 6  concerning migration for employment (revised) of 1949. Finally, note Article 3(3) of the 
European Convention on Establishment, of 1955 (ETS, No. 19), to which both Turkey and Netherlands are 
Parties. Such provision establishes that "nationals of any Contracting Party lawfully residing for more 
than ten years in the territory of any other Party may only be expelled for reasons of national security", or 
due to reasons related to their offence against ordre public or morality, if those reasons "are of a 
particularly serious nature".
154 Bozkurt, case quoted, paragraph 39.
155 It states that Article 6  of Decision 1/80 "covers the situation of Turkish workers who are working or 
are temporarily incapacitated for work. It does not, on the other hand, cover the situation of a Turkish 
worker who has definitively ceased to belong to the labour force of a Member State because he has, for 
example, reached retirement age or, as in the present case, become totally and permanently incapacitated 
for work.
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wThe main criticism that can be made of the Court's ruling in this respect is that it 
allows for the expulsion of persons without any consideration whatsoever of their personal 
situation.
There is already something not ethical about protecting a person while he or she 
can work, while leaving that person without protection when he or she can work no more. 
That is precisely when that person needs more protection. Moreover, in the case of 
Mr.Bozkurt he is not protected anymore, he can work no more, because while he was 
working he had a serious accident. However, what seems worst from a moral point of 
view is that no consideration was given to the personal situation of Mr.Bozkurt. He simply 
cannot work and that is all that is important in deciding that he can be expelled. To this 
extent he was only considered as a factor of production and not as a human being with 
fundamental human rights.
The lack of consideration of his personal situation has not only moral relevance. It 
can also have some concrete legal relevance. In fact, his expulsion could violate an ethical 
minimum standard which was translated into a positive legal regime: the E.C.H.R..
It is very easy to imagine a situation in which an expulsion of a Turkish worker 
would actually violate the E.C.H.R., if we consider its Article 8, on respect for family life. 
For the sake of the discussion of this case, such an hypothetical situation would be, as far 
as the legal facts relevant for Community Law are concerned, similar to the one regarding 
which the Court of Justice cleared the expulsion.
Let us imagine that Mr.Bozkurt had been residing in the Netherlands for a 
considerable number of years - for instance from 1976, the date of the first Decision of the 
EC-Turkey Association Council granting Turkish workers with rights to continue to work 
and reside. In the meantime, he could have constituted a family there, having married and 
having had several children. Some of his children could already be working, thus being 
protected by Community Law. Moreover, Mr.Bozkurt could be a Kurd, his family could 
have been killed in the war between the Turkish army and Kurdish separatists. It could 
happen that he had no more relatives in Turkey, at least close ones. In this hypothetical 
situation it would seem plausible to consider that the expulsion of Mr.Bozkurt from the 
Netherlands would clearly infringe Article 8 of the E.C.H.R.. Nevertheless, the ruling of 
the Court denies that he would be protected by Community Law against such expulsion.
In my opinion this means that, in this respect, Community Law would be 
incompatible with the E.C.H.R.. This assessment is based on the assumption that matters 
regarding the expulsion of Mr.Bozkurt are within the scope of Community Law - in the 
mentioned hypothetical situation as in the real one dealt with by the Court. In fact, I would 
like to put forward the idea that, from a material and formal legal point of view, it cannot 
be said that it is simply a matter of national law that Mr.Bozkurt loses his right to reside in 
a Member State. It seems strange to say that the expulsion of Mr. Bozkurt is outside the 
scope of Community Law, simply because the relevant positive rules of Community Law 
do not give him the right to stay in a Member State. The relevant fact here seems to be 
that Community Law ensured his right to reside in a Member State and that Community
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Law withdraws him that right.156 It is Community Law that, according to the ruling of the 
Court, denies him such right because he can work no more.
In other words: it seems to me that it is a matter of Community Law that the 
Community entitles a person to reside, but under certain conditions - namely (according to 
the ruling of the Court) that he or she works, or is able to work after a temporary period 
of inactivity. The right of residence was created or protected by Community Law. It is a 
Community right. It is an intrinsic limit of the Community right of residence that it only 
exists in order that a person may work, regardless of whatever happens to him or her. If it 
is a limit of a Community right of residence, it is a Community Law matter.
Therefore, it is paradoxical to consider that to allow a person to work and reside is 
a matter of Community Law, and that, instead, to expel such person when he or she does 
not have that Community right any more is simply a matter of national law. It seems to me 
that, instead, it is a Community Law matter.
By way of conclusion, it has been argued that fundamental human rights could be 
violated in a case where a Turkish worker is expelled from a Member State because he or 
she can work no more, while before he or she had a Community right of residence there. 
Furthermore, that expulsion is an issue within the scope of Community Law, because it 
regards the withdrawal of a right of residence that Community Law granted to that 
worker. If there is a case in which fundamental human rights can be violated and which is 
within the scope of Community Law, then the Court of Justice should review the respect 
of fundamental human rights in that case. Unfortunately the Court of Justice failed again 
to do that in the Bozkurt case. Moreover, the Court adopted a ruling that gives room for 
such absence of review to be repeated in future similar cases. On the other hand, the Court 
still has some room for manoeuvre to make in the future such review of human rights, as it 
can always claim that the issue was not raised in the Bozkurt case.
(H) Other Agreements 
- general
The Agreements with the Maghreb countries and with Yugoslavia were clearly 
inspired by the provisions of the agreement concluded with Turkey, but are less 
comprehensive. For example: they make no reference to a future free movement of 
workers between the contracting parties.157 They only provide for non discriminatory
15 6  The Bozkurt case seems to be particularly clear-cut compared with Demi rei, regarding the 
justification of the judicial review of respect for human rights by the Court of Justice. In fact, in Bozkurt 
there is not a problem of a right regulated by national legislation only, which is connected with a 
Community right. There is a problem of the very right (of residence) granted by Community Law. Weiler 
& Lockhart make what, to a certain extent, seems to be a similar remark when they compare, as far as the 
issues of EC Law scope and protection of human rights are concerned, cases Bostock and Konstantinidis, 
both quoted supra. See Weiler & Lockhart, op.cit., part II. at p. 609, footnote 35.
157 Articles 38 to 41 of the Agreement with Algeria, Articles 40 to 43 of the Agreement with Morocco, 
Article 39 to 42 of the Agreement with Tunisia and Article 44 to 47 of the Agreement with Yugoslavia. 
The references to the provisions of the various Agreements, made supra as "Article X of the Agreement 
with ..." will from now onwards be substituted by "on" followed by the name of the relevant third country 
with which the Community concluded an Agreement.
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treatment of Maghreb158 *workers on the basis of nationality, and for coordination of social 
security systems of the Member States. They contain no provision on the right of access of 
Maghreb nationals (or of their families) to the labour market of the Member States.
All Europe Agreements have exactly the same provisions as regards workers, *59 
with the exception of Poland. In spite of the chapter title "Movement of Workers", the 
Europe Agreements grant to Eastern European nationals no autonomous right of access to 
the Member States as workers. The main result of these agreements, as far as workers are 
concerned, is to improve the situation of Eastern European workers and their family 
members already living in a Member State.
In the Partnership Agreements the chapter on workers is more accurately entitled 
"labour conditions".160 The Partnership Agreements provide only for non discriminatory 
treatment of workers and for the coordination of social security systems.161 They also plan 
cooperation against illegal immigration.162
In both the Europe Agreements and the Partnership Agreements the beneficiaries 
will only be workers who are legally employed in the territory of a Member State and 
members of their family legally resident there.163
- workers family members
Under the Europe Agreements, while Eastern European workers are legally 
working in a Member State, their spouses and children have access to the labour market of 
that Member State. This possibility applies only if the members of their family are legally 
resident in the same Member State, and is again "subject to the conditions and modalities 
applicable in each Member State". The members of the family of seasonal workers and of 
workers coming under bilateral agreements cannot benefit from access to the labour 
market, unless otherwise provided by these agreements.164 In respect of this group of 
rights, a reciprocity clause exists for working nationals of a Member State living in a 
Eastern European country. It functions under the same conditions as those for Eastern 
European workers.165
Maghreb Agreements and Partnership Agreements do not grant to family members 
of workers the right of access to the Community labour market.
158 And Yugoslavian workers, although, due to the fact that the Agreement with Yugoslavia was 
suspended, from now onwards, only Maghreb workers will be explicitly referred to.
15* Article 36 to 42 on the agreement with Estonia, Articles 37 to 43 on the agreements with Hungary, 
Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; Articles 38 to 44 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia.
160  Articles 23 to 27 on Russia, Articles 19 to 22 on Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk 
Republic, and Article 18 to 21 on Belarus.
161 With the exception on Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic.
162  Except in the case of the Agreement with Russia, see infra.
163  Partnership Agreements do not refer to family members of workers, except the one with Russia.
16 4  Article 36(1) second indent on Estonia; Article 37(1) second indent on Hungary and Poland, Latvia 
and Lithuania; and Article 38(1) second indent on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia.
165 Article 36(2) on Estonia, Article 37(2) on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 38(2) 
on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
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definition of family members
Joint declarations made in relation to all Europe Agreements and the Partnership 
Agreement with Russia166 state that the notion of children and of member of the family of 
the worker is defined according to the national legislation of the host country concerned. 
It seems that, not only may they have different definitions in different Community Member 
States, but they may even have a different definition when comparing that of the EC 
Member States to that of an Eastern European country.
Such joint declarations, or provisions with similar content, are absent in the 
Maghreb Agreements and in the Agreements with Turkey, or in the relevant Decisions of 
the EC-Turkey Association Council.167
b) Non discriminatory treatment
In the Association Agreement with Turkey, Article 9 provides that, within the 
scope of the Agreement and without prejudice to any special provisions which may be laid 
down by the Association Council "any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 7” of the EEC Treaty - 
presently Article 6.1 of the EC Treaty. Article 9 of the Agreement with Turkey seems to 
be a good basis to sustain that, within the scope of that Agreement, rules on Turkish 
nationals should be interpreted in a similar manner to the interpretation of the 
corresponding rules of Community Law, at least if there are no other provisions clearly 
ruling against this idea. Later on, Article 37 of the Additional Protocol to the Association 
Agreement with Turkey established the principle of non discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, as far as working conditions and remuneration are concerned, when comparing 
Turkish workers employed in the Community to workers of other Member States of the 
Community.168 This principle is reaffirmed in Article 10(1) of Decision 1/80 of the EC- 
Turkey Association Council. The beneficiaries of the latter provision are "Turkish workers 
duly registered as belonging to [Member States] labour forces."
The Maghreb Agreements establish also the principle that workers of the 
contracting parties must "be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as regards 
working conditions or remuneration", when compared with nationals of Member 
States.169 Contrary to the Protocol with Turkey, the Maghreb Agreements have a 
reciprocity clause in favour of nationals of Member States working in Maghreb 
countries.170
The Europe Agreements provide that Eastern European workers, legally employed 
in the territory of a Member State, will be free from discrimination based on nationality, as 
compared to the nationals of the Member States where they are employed. The non­
166  The only Partnership Agreement to refer explicitly to family members of the workers.
167 Note, in any case, that Article 1 of Decision 3/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement refers 
provides the definition of family members is that made in Article 1 of Council Regulation 1408/71. The 
latter provision basically refers, in turn, to national legislation.
168 Article 37.
1 6 9  Articles 38 on Algeria, Article 40 on Morocco, Article 39 on Tunisia and Article 44 on Yugoslavia.
170  Second phrase of Article 38 on Algeria, Article 40 on Morocco, Article 39 on Tunisia and Article 44 
on Yugoslavia.
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discrimination principle relates to working conditions, remuneration and dismissal. 
Dismissal is not mentioned in the Protocol with Turkey, nor in the Maghreb Agreements.
The objective of the equivalent provision of the Partnership Agreements is the 
same as that of the Europe Agreements, but under the Partnership Agreements it is only 
mentioned that the Member States "shall endeavour to ensure" such egalitarian treatment. 
The only exception is the agreement with Russia, in which the Member States pledge to 
"ensure" that treatment. The Association Council in the Partnership Agreements is meant 
to make recommendations in relation to the implementation of the non-discriminatory 
treatment of workers.171
Both the Europe Agreements and the Partnership Agreements state that the non- 
discriminatory treatment will be "subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in 
each Member State" ("laws, conditions and modalities" for Partnership Agreements). 
What this may precisely mean, and thus allow for, is not clear.
It could be argued that the non-discrimination principle on remuneration and 
working conditions (and also dismissal in the Europe Agreements and in the Partnership 
Agreement with Russia) is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to have direct 
effect. Arguably there is no significant difference between this principle (as established in 
the above mentioned rules) and the relevant Community internal rules on non 
discrimination.172 Moreover, it has a limited extent, which is one more reason for this 
principle to be capable of being invoked in court by individuals. Finally, the nature and 
objectives of the relevant Agreements do not seem to preclude such direct effect. In 
Kziber,173 the Court had the opportunity of ruling on the provision prohibiting 
discrimination on working conditions and remuneration in the Agreement with Morocco - 
Article 40 thereof. It found it to be of direct effect.174 Thus, it seems that direct effect 
should also be recognised for the equivalent provisions on non-discrimination of the other 
agreements - excluding the Partnership Agreements, although including that with Russia.
c) Educational rights
Turkey is the only country whose nationals residing in the Community may, within 
the framework of an association agreement with the Community,175 benefit of rights 
regarding education. Article 3 of decision 2/76 of the EC-Turkey Association Council
171 See Article 27 of the Agreement of the Community and its Member States with Russia, Article 22 on 
Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic; and Article 21 on Belarus.
1 7 2  For example: Article 48(2) of the EC Treaty (on employment, remuneration, and other conditions of 
work and employment), Article 3 of Regulation 1408/71 (on social security) and Article 6(1) of the EC 
Treaty (in general terms, **[w]ithin the scope of application of the EC Treaty**).
1 7 3  Case Kziber, quoted supra.
17 4  Idem, paragraph 22.
17 5  Note, however, that special programmes provide cooperation and exchange in education with third 
countries, inter alia, with Eastern European countries. Cornett and Erasmus are among programmes 
providing for educational cooperation with third countries. It may also be interesting to note that, through 
an exchange of letters, annexed to the Agreement with Yugoslavia it was agreed to exchange views on 
joint action "to promote the teaching of the language and culture of the country of origin and safeguard 
the maintenance of links with that culture."
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provides that Turkish children "residing legally with their parents in a Member State of the 
Community shall be granted access in that country to courses of general education." In 
that Article it was established that they "may also be entitled to enjoy in that country the 
advantages provided for in this connection under national laws". Furthermore, Article 9 of 
Decision 1/80 of the same Council establishes that
"Turkish children residing legally with their parents, who are or have been legally 
employed in a Member State of the Community, will be admitted to courses of 
general education, apprenticeship and vocational training under the same 
educational entry qualifications as the children of nationals of the Member States.
They may in that Member State be eligible to benefit from the advantages 
provided for under the national legislation in this area.”
Peers sees the wording of this last phrase as drafted to avoid that those children ask for 
scholarships in their host country, because it contrasts with the corresponding Article 12 
of Regulation 1612/68, which provides that children of workers nationals of a Member 
State shall be admitted in those courses "under the same conditions as the nationals of [the 
host] Member State." Instead, Article 9 of the Decision 1/80 provides only that the 
children "may” be eligible to advantages provided by national legislation.176
d) Provisions for development of workers rights and safeguarding of more 
favourable rules
As already mentioned, the EC-Turkey Association Council is empowered to adopt 
rules on the progressive free movement of workers between Member States and 
Turkey.177 Moreover, the Association Council may also make recommendations for 
encouraging the exchange of workers.178 Meanwhile, Article 8 of Decision 2/76 and 
Article 14(2) of Decision 1/80 contain a limitation clause safeguarding national legislation 
and bilateral agreements providing more favourable treatment to Turkish nationals, as far 
as rights of access to the labour market are concerned.
One of the final provisions of the Maghreb Agreements provides that the 
Association Council can formulate resolutions, recommendations or opinions, which it 
sees as desirable to attain common objectives and the smooth functioning of the 
agreements.179 Moreover, through an exchange of letters, on the occasion of the 
conclusion of all Maghreb Agreements, Member States and each Maghreb country agreed 
to exchange views on Maghreb labour employed in the Community, including the 
examination of "the possibilities of making progress towards the attainment of equality of 
treatment for Community and non-Community workers and the members of their families 
in respect of living and working conditions, having regard to the Community provisions on 
force."
In the Europe Agreements, it is provided that, after a certain period, each of the 
Association Councils "shall examine further ways of improving the movement of
176  See Peers, "Toward Equality...", op.rit.
177 Article 36 of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey. See also Article 38 of the same 
Protocol.
178 Article 40 of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey and Article 18 of Decision 1/80.
179 See, e.g., Article 44 of the agreement with Morocco.
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workers".180 For that purpose» that Council is supposed to take into account the economic 
and social situation in Eastern European countries,181 as well as the employment situation 
in the Community, However, the Association Council can only make recommendations 
with that aim. It does not have power to adopt decisions itself. This contrasts with the 
Agreement with Turkey, that gives such competence to its Association Council. In the 
Europe Agreements it is also envisaged that the Association Council shall "examine 
granting other improvements including facilities of access for professional training". This 
will be made also "taking into account the labour market situation in the Member States 
and in the Community" and "in conformity with rules and procedures in force in the 
Member States".182 Finally, in the Europe Agreements with Poland it is provided that:
"The Member States will examine the possibility of granting work permits to 
Polish nationals already having residence permits in the Member State concerned, 
with the exception of those Polish nationals who have been admitted as tourists or 
visitors."183
This provision exists only in the agreement with Poland and seems to be related to Polish 
students living in Member States.
In the Europe Agreements provision is also made concerning bilateral agreements 
between Community Member State and Eastern European countries. First, it is provided 
that the existing facilities for access to employment for Eastern European workers 
established in those agreements "ought to be preserved and if possible improved". 
Secondly, it is provided that Member States not having, in this field, bilateral agreements 
with Eastern European countries "shall consider favourably" the possibility of concluding 
agreements similar to the referred.!84 A limitation clause applies to both of these rules: 
account has to be taken of "the labour market situation in the Member State" and the rules 
are "subject to its legislation and to the respect of the rules in force in that Member State 
in the area of mobility of workers".185
Provisions on "further ways of improving the movement of workers" do not exist 
in the Partnership Agreements. In the Maghreb Agreements and in the Partnership 
Agreements there is neither a provision safeguarding other more favourable rules (for 
instance included in national legislation or bilateral agreements); except, in respect of 
bilateral agreements, as far as coordination of social security is concerned.
1 8 0  Article 41 of the Agreement with Estonia, Article 42 of the Agreement with Poland, Hungary, Latvia 
and Lithuania; and Article 43 of the Agreements with Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia.
181 And, as far as the Agreement with Poland is concerned, also the needs of that country.
1 8 2  Ibidem, paragraph 2.
1 8 3  Article 41(3) of the Agreement with Poland.
1 8 4  See Article 40 on Estonia; Article 41 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 42 on 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
185  Idem, paragraph 1.
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e) Social Security
(ï) Turkey
Among external agreements of the Community, again with the exception of the 
EEA Agreement, those rules on social security regarding Turkish workers are the most 
elaborated and those which grant most rights.
The Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement with Turkey, of 23 
November 1970,186 prescribed that by the end of the first year after the entry into force of 
the Protocol, the Association Council would have adopted measures on social security 
"for workers of Turkish nationality moving within the Community and for their families 
residing in the Community."187 These measures would include arrangements to add 
together periods of insurance and employment completed in individual Member States in 
respect of "old-age pensions, death benefits and invalidity pensions, and also as regards 
the provision of health services for workers and their families residing in the 
Community."188 It was established that the measures to be taken by the Association 
Council in this domain "must ensure that family allowances are paid if a worker's family 
resides in the Community".189 This is better than if the requirement was that they lived in 
the same Member State. Nevertheless, it still may be considered discriminatory when 
compared with the situation of worker nationals of a Member State moving in the 
Community, whose families remain in their country of origin. Naturally, the requirement 
that the relatives be resident in the Community encourages the arrival of more relatives, 
because it is worthwhile to bring the family to receive more money. Some years ago, when 
the German government decided to reduce family allowances given to children of Turkish 
workers if those children were not living in Germany, a considerable number of Turkish 
children left Turkey and came to live with their parents in Germany.
The Protocol provides also explicitly that the addition for social security purposes 
of such periods of insurance and employment completed in individual Member States,
"shall create no obligation of the Member States to take into account periods 
completed in Turkey."190
Finally, the Protocol envisaged the authorisation of transfer to Turkey of old-age pensions, 
death benefits, and invalidity pensions obtained under the measures mentioned regarding 
coordination of social security adopted by the Association Council,191 Furthermore, a 
limitation clause provided that rules in bilateral agreements would prevail if they provided 
more favourable arrangements for Turkish nationals.192
The rules of the Protocol were developed by the Association Council when, on 19 
September 1990, it adopted Decision 3/80 on the application of social security of the 
Member States to Turkish workers and members of their families. This decision extended
Article 39.
187 Article 39(1).
188  Article 39(2).
189  Article 39 (3).
190  Article 39 (2), in fine.
191 Article 39 (4) .
19 2  Article 39(5). See, however, Article 5 of Decision 3/80, to be analysed infra.
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to Turkish workers in the Community most of the rules of Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, on 
application of social security schemes to employed persons and members of their families 
moving within the Community.193 Article 3 of the decision provides for a general principle 
of non-discrimination in relation to nationals of the host State, including the right to elect 
members to organs of social security institutions or to participate in their nomination. 
Meanwhile, several rules of Decision 3/80 provided for consideration of all children and 
relatives residing in the Community, and, in some cases, even of those residing in 
Turkey.194
There is now before the Court of Justice a case in which this decision falls to be 
interpreted, as far as its direct effect is concerned, namely in regard of its Articles 12 and 
13 - on invalidity, and old age and death pensions, respectively. The Court will also have 
to decide whether or not the reference made in Article 13 of Decision 3/80 to several 
provisions of Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, includes reference to the amendments made to 
these provisions after the adoption of the Decision.195
(ii) Maghreb Agreements
The Maghreb Agreements establish a general principle of non-discrimination, 
stating that:
"the workers [of Maghreb countries] and members of their family living with them 
shall enjoy, in the field of social security, treatment free from any discrimination 
based on nationality in relation to nationals of the Member States in which they 
are employed."19**
This principle is less extensive than that regarding Turkey, as it does not include the 
election of members to organs of social security institutions.
Furthermore, the Maghreb Agreements also allow for the addition of all 
“(...) periods of insurance, employment or residence completed (...) in the various 
Member States (...) for the purpose of pensions and annuities in respect of old 
age, death and invalidity, and also for the medical care for the workers and for the 
members of their families resident in the Community.”19^
193 As mentioned in chapter 4, when this Regulation was enacted it applied only to employed persons and 
only later was amended to apply also to self-employed persons, following Court of Justice rulings to that 
effect. See also chapter 4 on Regulation 1408/71.
194 See e.g. Articles 12,13,27 of the decision, and also its Article 6 .
195 Case C-277/94, Z Taflan-Met et al v. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, OJ C 370/1 of 
24/12/1994. This is a problem of a similar type of that the Court had to face as far as the material scope of 
the principle of non-discrimination in social security of the Maghreb Agreements is concerned. See infra 
in the main text.
19*> Article 39(1) on Algeria, Article 41(1) on Morocco, Article 40(1) on Tunisia and Article 45(1) on 
Yugoslavia.
19'Articles 39(2) on Algeria, Article 41(2) on Morocco, Article 40(2) on Tunisia and Article 45(2) on 
Yugoslavia. This rule includes the addition of periods of residence, unlike Article 39(2) of the Additional 
Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey, but note that Decision 3/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council 
refers to the rules of Regulation 1408/71, which includes periods of residence in the addition of periods for 
social security purposes.
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Maghreb workers will also receive family allowances for members of their families, 
if the latter "are resident in the Community."198
Moreover, the Maghreb Agreements gave to Maghreb workers the right 
"to transfer freely to [their country of origin], at the rates applied by virtue of the 
laws of the debtor Member State or States, any pensions or annuities in respect of 
old age, death, industrial accident or occupational disease, or of invalidity 
resulting from industrial accident or occupational disease."199
It was also provided that, before the end of the first year following the entry into 
force of the agreements, the Cooperation Council would adopt measures to implement 
principles on coordination of social security provisions.200
The Maghreb Agreements all include a reciprocity clause for treatment as a 
national citizen of nationals of a Member State working in the relevant Maghreb 
country.201 Furthermore, as in the Additional Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey,202 
it is provided that the rules of the Maghreb Agreements on coordination of social security 
do not affect more favourable rules of bilateral agreements.203
■ ECJ jurisprudence
The provisions of the Maghreb Agreements on non-discrimination on social 
security were the object of a number of rulings by the Court of Justice.
In Kziber204 the Court ruled that, contrary to the opinion of the Commission,205 
Articles 40 and 41 of the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco were capable of having 
direct effect - account being taken of their wording and of the objective and nature of the 
Agreement in which they are inscribed.206 The fact that the Agreement with Morocco did 
not envisage accession of that country to the Community was not considered by the Court 
to be an obstacle to such direct effect.207 In Krid208 the Court recognised also direct effect 
to Article 39(1) of the Agreements with Algeria, providing non-discrimination on social
198 Articles 39(3) on Algeria, Article 41(3) on Morocco, Article 40(3) on Tunisia and Article 45(3) on
Yugoslavia.
199 Articles 39(4) on Algeria, Article 41(4) on Morocco, Article 40(4) on Tunisia and Article 45(4) on
Yugoslavia.
2 0 0  Articles 40 on Algeria, Article 42 on Morocco, Article 41 on Tunisia and Article 46 on Yugoslavia.
201 Articles 39(5) on Algeria, Article 41(5) on Morocco, Article 40(5) on Tunisia and Article 45(5) on
Yugoslavia.
2 0 2  Article 39(5) of the Protocol. However, see also Article 5 of Decision 3/80 of the EC-Turkey
Association Council.
2 0 3  Articles 41 on Algeria, Article 43 on Morocco, Article 42 on Tunisia and Article 47 on Yugoslavia.
2 0 4  See C-l 8/90, Office National de I’Emploi V. Bahia Kziber [1991] ECR1-199.
2 0 5  See, incidentally, the written answer of Commissioner M.Marin, given on 17/6/1987, to a member of 
the European Parliament, in which direct effect of such provisions was implicitly, although clearly, 
excluded - OJ C 261/49, of 30/9/1987.
2 0 6  Idem, paragraphs 22 and 23. This was confirmed in Yousfi in relation to Article 41 - Case C-58/93, 
Yousfi v. Belgium, [1994] ECR I - 1352, paragraph 18.
207  Ibidem, paragraph 21.
2 0 8  Case C-l03/94, Zoulida Krid v. CNAVTS, [1995] ECR 1-719.
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security, because it was drafted in the same manner as Article 41(1) of the Agreement with 
Morocco and both agreements pursued the same objective.209
The personal scope of the principle of non-discrimination in social security was 
defined by the Court in the Kziber, Yousfi and Krid cases.
In Kziber the Court ruled, against the opinion of Germany, that the notion of 
worker, used in Article 41(1) of the Agreement with Morocco, is not limited to active 
workers. It includes also workers who have left the labour market after reaching the age 
required for receipt of an old-age pension, or after becoming victims of the materialisation 
of one of the risks conferring entitlement to allowances under other social security 
branches.210 To justify its ruling the Court recalled that Article 41(2) and (4) make explicit 
reference, as far as addition and transfer of allocations to Morocco is concerned, to old 
age, death and invalidity regimes benefiting retired workers.211 The Court ruled also that 
the principle of non-discrimination applies equally to the case of a family member of a 
Moroccan worker, who is living with him, and who satisfies all the conditions that are laid 
down by the legislation of a Member State (except that of nationality) to be entitled to an 
unemployment allowance awarded to young persons in search of employment ("allocation 
d'attente"). Such allowance cannot be refused to that person solely on the grounds that he 
or she is a national of Morocco.212
In Yousfi213 the issue at stake was the situation of a Moroccan youngster who had 
been the victim of an accident at work and was dependent on his Moroccan father with 
whom he lived. Yousfi claimed a disability allowance for handicapped persons provided in 
Belgium only for Belgians, refugees, stateless persons or persons of undetermined 
nationality, who had been continuously resident in Belgium for five years. His request was 
rejected because he was Moroccan. The Court ruled confirmed its ruling in Kziber. It 
considered that Article 41(1) of the Agreements with Morocco covers also a Moroccan 
national who was incapable of working following an industrial accident suffered by him in 
the Member State where he has been living for more than five years and who applies for a 
disability allowance.214
Finally, in Krid, the Court interpreted the personal scope of Article 39(1), to 
confirm its rulings in Kziber and Yousfi; that workers, in the meaning of that Article, may 
include workers retired due to old-age or invalidity. Furthermore, the Court considered 
that the personal scope of the non-discrimination principle could also cover members of 
those workers' families, as paragraphs (1),(2) and (4) refer to the workers families, namely 
regarding the receipt of pensions in respect of death. Thus, the Court ruled that the non­
discrimination principle of Article 39(1) covers also members of the family of an Algerian 
worker who continue after the worker's death to live in the Member State in which he is 
employed.215
2 0 9  Idem, paragraphs 23 and 24.
2 1 0  Case Kziber, quoted supra, paragraph 27.
21 1  Idem.
2 1 2  Ibidem, paragraphs 28 and 29.
2 1 3  Case C-58/93, Yousfi, quoted supra.
2 1 4  Idem, paragraph 23.
2 1 5  Case Krid, quoted supra, paragraphs 27 to 30.
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The material scope of the principle of non-discrimination was also defined by the 
Court of Justice. In Kziber, the Court decided that the notion of social security of Article 
41(1) of the Agreement with Morocco should be interpreted by analogy to the identical 
notion contained in Regulation 1408/71, on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and members of their families moving within the Community. Since 
Article 4 of that Regulation includes unemployment benefits in its scope, they are 
therefore also included in the material scope of the principle of non-discrimination on 
social security.216 In this case the Court declared that Belgium could not refuse an 
unemployment allowance provided for the benefit of young persons in search of 
employment ("allocation d'attente") to a Morocco woman, only on the ground of her 
nationality.
In Yousfl, the Court developed its interpretation of Article 41(1) of the Agreement 
with Morocco. It declared that benefits for handicapped persons were included in the 
material scope of the principle of non-discrimination inscribed in that provision. The Court 
justified this once more by reference to the fact that such benefits were included in the 
field of Regulation 1408/71. The Court recalled its case-law217 in which it had considered 
such benefits to be included in the Regulation, due to the fact that Article 4( 1 )(b) of that 
Regulation refers to "invalidity benefits".218 Therefore, the Court considered that Article 
41(1) of the Agreement with Morocco
"precludes a Member State from refusing to grant a disability allowance provided 
for under its national legislation in favour of nationals residing in that State for at 
least five years to a Moroccan national suffering permanent incapacity for work 
following an industrial accident occurring in that State and who has resided on 
that state territory for more than five years on the ground that the person 
concerned is of Moroccan nationality" 2 1 9
In Krid the Court had to consider whether the principle of non-discrimination on 
social security, established in Article 39(1) of the Agreement with Algeria, included a 
supplementary allowance provided in France by the Fonds Nationale de Solidarité to 
recipients of old-age or invalidity benefits under legislative provisions or regulations. 
According to French Law, this supplementary allowance is granted persons who have 
insufficient means of their own. The beneficiaries were only French nationals resident in 
France, and foreigners "where an international convention based on reciprocity has been 
signed".220 Once again the Court recalled that the notion of social security must be 
deemed to have the same meaning as the identical term used in Regulation 1408/71. The 
problem was that, prior to its amendment by Regulation 1247/92, Regulation 1408/71 did 
not specifically mention non-contributory benefits, of a similar kind to the supplementary 
allowance from the FNS, amongst the social security benefits to which it applies. 
However, even before Regulation 1247/92, the Court had already considered that benefits
2 1 6  Case Kziber, quoted supra, paragraphs 25 and 26.
2 1 7  See, e.g. Case 187/83 Callemeyn [1974] ECR 553, paragraph 15.
2 1 8  Case Yousfi, quoted supra, paragraphs 25 and 28.
2 1 9  Idem, paragraph 29.
2 2 0  Articles L.815-2 to L.815-6 of Title I, Section 5, Book VIII of the French Social Security Code.
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such as that allowance fell within the matters covered by Regulation 1408/71 by virtue of 
its Article 4(1).221 The Court based its decision on the fact that such type of allowance 
provides additional income for the recipients of social security benefits, without any 
assessment of individual needs or circumstances. Thus it could not be considered part of 
social assistance, but rather of social security. Consequently, the Court concluded that 
France was precluded from, on mere grounds of nationality, refusing to grant a 
supplementary allowance from the "Fonds Nationale de Solidarité" to Mrs. Krid, the 
widow of an Algerian worker, who was resident in France and was recipient of a 
survivor’s pension from her Algerian husband who had worked in France.
(iii) Europe Agreements and Partnership Agreements
In the Europe Agreements and Partnership Agreements, as far as social security is 
concerned, there is not a general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. This 
is in contrast to the case of Turkey and to the Maghreb Agreements.222
Nevertheless, in the Europe Agreements and in the Partnership Agreements 
(except those regarding Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic) there are also rules 
providing for coordination of social security systems of the Member States, in respect of 
workers who are nationals of the relevant third countries.223 While the wording of the 
provisions of the Europe Agreements is not conditional, the Partnership Agreements 
merely establish that the "Parties shall conclude agreements" in order to adopt "the 
provisions necessary" for social security coordination. In both type of agreement the 
objective is the addition of all periods of insurance, employment or residence completed by 
workers in the various Member States. The addition is made to determine the right to 
receive pensions and annuities in respect of old age, invalidity and death, and for the 
purpose of medical care for such workers and their family members. Furthermore, any 
"pensions and annuities in respect of old age, death, industrial accident or occupational 
disease, or of invalidity resulting therefrom"224 will be freely transferable. There is no limit 
regarding the country into which the transfer can be made, but it can only be made "at the 
rate applied by virtue of the law of the debtor Member State or States". Non-contributory 
benefits225 are an exception to these rights of free transfer.
Meanwhile, in the Europe Agreements it is provided that the workers "shall 
receive family allowance for members of their families".226 However, that will happen only 
if these relatives are legally resident in the same Member State. The condition that 
members of the workers family be legally resident in the Member State where the worker
221 See, e.g., Case 236/88 Commission v. France [1990] ECR1-3163. See also joined cases 379 to 381/85 
and 93/86 Giletti [1987] ECR 955; and case 147/87 Zaoui v. Caisse régionale d'Assurance maladie de Hie 
de France [1987] ECR 5511, paragraphs 8-9.
2 2 2  See, again. Article 3 of Decision 3/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council and Articles 39 of the 
Agreement with Algeria; Article 41 on Morocco; Article 39 on Tunisia; and also Article 45 of the 
Agreement with Yugoslavia (not in force any more).
2 2 3  Article 37 on Estonia, Article 38 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 39 on the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. See Article 19 bis on Ukraine, Moldova, 
Article 18 bis on Belarus, and Article 24 on Russia, as far as the Partnership Agreements are concerned.
2 2 4  The last type of invalidity is not included in the draft Agreement with Ukraine.
2 2 5  In the Partnership Agreements the reference is made to "special non-contributory benefits".
2 2 6  Partnership Agreements do not refer explicitly to family members of workers, except for that with 
Russia.
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is employed, contrasts with the Protocol with Turkey227 and the Maghreb Agreements,228 
which require only that they be resident in the Community.
In the Europe Agreements and Partnership Agreements, the rules on social security 
are also "subject to conditions and modalities applicable in each Member State" and apply 
only to workers legally employed there and for members of their family legally resident 
there. However, the Partnership Agreements, except for that with Russia, do not refer 
explicitly to family members of workers.
In the Europe Agreements, the Association Council has powers to adopt 
implementing measures on the rules of the agreements on coordination of social 
security 229 It is provided that those instruments may not affect more favourable treatment 
established in bilateral agreements concluded between individual Community Member 
States and Eastern European countries.230 In the Partnership Agreements it is not even 
provided explicitly that the Association Council can make recommendations for that 
purpose.231 In any case, in the Partnership Agreements, it is also provided that the 
agreements to be concluded between the Parties on coordination of social security may 
not affect more favourable treatment established in bilateral agreements.232
Finally, it is noteworthy that a reciprocity clause is imposed on the third countries 
which are Parties to Europe Agreements and the relevant Partnership Agreements. It 
prescribes a similar treatment to workers who are nationals of a Member State and 
members of their families. As in relation to previous agreements, this reciprocity rule does 
not include the possibility of taking adding together, for social security purposes, periods 
of work carried out in several third countries.
2 - Establishment (and entry to work as "key personnel" o f companies)
Article 13 of the Association Agreement with Turkey establishes that the Parties 
will be guided by the EC Treaty provisions on the right of establishment "for the purposes 
of abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment between them." This provision is 
similar to the one related to freedom of movement of workers.233 Both are framework
2 2 7  See Article 39. Note again that several rules of Decision 3/80 of the HC-Turkey Association Council 
provided for consideration of all children and relatives residing in the Community, and. in some cases, 
even of those residing in Turkey - see e.g. Articles 6 ,12, 13,27.
2 2 8  See Articles 39 of the Agreement with Algeria; Article 41 of the Agreement with Morocco; Article 39 
of the Agreement with Tunisia; and also Article 45 of the Agreement with Yugoslavia (not in force any 
more).
2 2 9  Article 38 on Estonia, Article 39 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 40 on the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
2 3 0  Article 39 on Estonia, Article 40 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 41 on the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
231 Cf., however, (limited to coordination of social security, and on working conditions for businessmen) 
Article 27 on Russia, Article 22 on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Kyrzyk Republic and Moldova; and Article 
21 on Belarus. See also Article 3 bis on Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; and Article 3 on Russia.
2 3 2  Concluded between individual Member States and third countries party to the Partnership 
Agreements. See Article 25 on Russia; Article 19 ter on Ukraine and Moldova, and Article 18 ter on 
Belarus.
2 3 3  Article 12 of the Association Agreement with Turkey.
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provisions and do not have direct effect. To be more precise, those Articles do not 
necessarily entail that the provisions of the Association Agreement with Turkey have to be 
interpreted as having direct effect, even if equivalent similar provisions of the EC Treaty 
have direct effect. Meanwhile, Article 41 of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement 
with Turkey contains a standstill provision on restrictions on establishment and services. 
The Association Council has powers to determine the timetable and rules for progressive 
liberalisation of the right of establishment and provision of services.234
The Cooperation Agreements with the Maghreb countries do not even refer to the 
right of establishment. As far as Tunisia is concerned, in the recent draft Association 
agreement with that country235 the Commission proposes that the existing agreement be 
widened so as to cover the right of establishment; but, as in the Partnership Agreements, 
only to "one Party's firms on the territory of the other".236 The Association Council would 
make recommendations to achieve this objective.
The Europe Agreements provide that the establishment of companies and natural 
persons (who are nationals of a Eastern European country) in Member States, as well as 
their operation or work therein, will be carried out with treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to the companies and nationals of the host Member State.237 Both the areas 
within which the right of establishment may be exercised, as well as the date after which 
such right may be enjoyed, differ between the various agreements and, often, even in the 
very same agreement, according to the sectors at stake. Yet, most of the rules on the right 
of establishment are common to all the agreements - notably those referring to the 
definition of establishment. As far as establishment of natural persons is concerned, it is 
defined as being
"the right to take up and pursue economic activities as self employed persons and 
to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies, which they 
effectively control".238
According to the agreements, "economic activities" include
"activities of an industrial character, activities of a commercial character, 
activities of craftsmen and activities of the professions".23^
In any case, self employment and business undertaking are not to be confused with access 
to the labour market. It will not be possible to seek or to take employment in a Member 
State under the provisions on establishment. Neither do the latter apply to persons who 
are not exclusively self employed.240
2 3 4  Article 41(2) of the Protocol.
2 3 5  COM (95) 235 final, of 31/5/1995.
2 3 6  Idem, Article 31(1).
2 3 7  Articles 43 to 50 on Estonia; Articles 44 to 51 on Latvia and Lithuania; Article 44 to 54 on Hungary 
and Poland; Articles 45 to 55 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; and Articles 45 to 
52 on Slovenia. In the draft Agreement with Slovenia reference is added to the treatment of companies 
and nationals of any third country, in relation to which companies of the Contracting Parties should be no
less favourably treated: Article 45(1) and (2) of the draft Treaty with Slovenia.
2 3 8  Article 45(5) on Hungary and 45(4) on Poland; Article 45(4) on the Czech Republic, and 45(5) on 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Article 45 on Estonia, Article 46 on Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 
47. d) and f) on Slovenia.
239 idem,
2 4 0  Ibidem.
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Doubts may arise as to the legal effect and precise content of the provisions of the 
agreements on the right of establishment. Given its wording and the agreements 
objectives, it seems reasonable to admit that the core of such provisions is capable of 
having direct effect.241 However, the precise personal scope of the provisions on the right 
of establishment seems to be less clear.242 Do the agreements allow for a person who is an 
Eastern European national, residing in his or her country of origin, to come to reside in a 
Member State in order to work there as a self-employed person? Or do the provisions 
granting a right of establishment apply only to Eastern European nationals who are already 
living in the relevant Member State, or in some Member State?
Peers243 favours the first interpretation, recalling that, in cases Kaefer and 
Procacci the Court considered "obvious" that the right of establishment and provisions of 
services "must require a right of entry and residence” for the persons entitled to the former 
rights.244 However, what seems to be doubtful here is precisely who are the Eastern 
European nationals that have such right of establishment. If it was defined that Eastern 
European nationals living in their countries of origin do have the right of establishment in 
the Community, then it seems clear that they would have the right to enter and reside in a 
Member State. However, previously, it has to be determined that they are entitled to the 
right of establishment. For that specific purpose, the previously mentioned part of the 
Court's ruling in cases Kaefer and Procacci does not seem to help much.
Nevertheless, some other arguments can be adduced in favour of a broad 
interpretation. In the wording of the agreements there is no element clearly indicating that 
only Eastern European nationals already living in a Member State can benefit from the 
right of establishment. Furthermore, this right has several specific limits - both in the areas 
of activity in which the right can be enjoyed and in the time limits for it to be granted. 
Besides, there is a both underlying and express concern that the right will not be used to 
gain access to the employment market of a Member State. These limits and concern are 
very important, and are repeatedly expressed. Thus, it would seem odd that the drafters of 
the Treaties had forgotten to make clear the existence of a restrictive personal scope of the 
right, had they such scope in mind. Moreover, it may be recalled that, to facilitate the 
taking up and pursuance of regulated professional activities, the Europe Agreements even 
provide that the Association Councils will examine and take all necessary measures "to 
provide for the mutual recognition of qualifications."245 This, certainly, is not a decisive 
argument, but it seems to indicate that a broad interpretation is possible, one that justifies 
the effort to be made for "mutual recognition of qualifications". A broad interpretation 
would appear also to make sense with regard to the generic formulation of the rule on 
establishment of the Europe Agreements - each Member State shall grant "a treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals for the establishment of [Eastern 
European] companies and nationals. Finally, a broad interpretation seems to make sense in
241 In favour Peers, Toward Equality...", op.cit.
2 4 2  This situation, to a certain extent, is similar to the one in the provisions on services. See infra.
2 4 3  Peers, "Toward Equality...", op.cit.
2 4 4  Joined cases C-100/89 and C-101/89, Kaefer and Procacci [1990] ECR1-467, paragraph 15. This case 
related to Article 176 of Council Decision 86/283 of 30 June 1986 on the association of overseas countries 
and territories with the European Economic Community, OJ L 175/1 of 1/7/86.
2 4 5  Article 46 on Hungary and Poland; Article 47 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; Article 49 on Estonia, Article 50 on Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 51 on Slovenia.
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terms of the objective of the agreements of preparing progressively the Eastern European 
countries for accession to the European Union.246
Given a broad interpretation of the personal scope of the rules on establishment, it 
might be said that this would eventually entail the immigration into Member States of a 
considerable number of persons, most of whom would only pretend to be self-employed, 
without this actually being the case. However, in the final general provisions of Title IV of 
the Europe Agreements it is provided that nothing in the agreements can "prevent the 
parties from applying their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, work, labour 
conditions, establishment of natural persons, and supply of services". Therefore, Member 
States could still use their usual instruments to avoid fraud in relation to immigration.247
Another possibility for the entry of Eastern European nationals to work in a 
Member State is as "key personnel" of companies of their countries of origin. When, under 
the Europe Agreements, Eastern European companies are allowed to benefit from 
establishment facilities, they are authorised to employ in a Member State persons who are 
nationals of their country.248 However, employment of these persons is only permitted 
under specific conditions. Such persons have to be qualified as "key personnel", according 
to a strict definition made in the agreements. This, in brief, requires them to be employees 
with managerial functions, or to possess qualifications or knowledge which are high, 
uncommon or specific to the organisation in which they are employed. Moreover, such 
employees must have been employed by the company "for at least one year preceding the 
detachment". In the relevant host Member State, they can only be employed by that 
company and their residence and work permits cover only the period of their employment.
The Partnership Agreements do not provide for the right of establishment of 
natural persons, but only of companies.249 Furthermore, some of their rules are less 
generous than those of the Europe Agreements: e.g., they some-times use the Most 
Favoured Nation clause, instead of the national treatment clause of the Europe 
Agreements. The Partnership Agreements also authorise the employment of key personnel 
of companies benefiting from the right of establishment, under conditions equal to the 
Europe Agreements.250 However, the Partnership Agreements add to the definition of
2 4 6  Note, by the way, that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements do not grant rights of 
establishment to natural persons, but only to companies, see below.
2 4 7  The draft Europe Agreement with Slovenia and the Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
contain a joint declaration according to which "the Parties agree that no provision under the Agreement 
can be interpreted as denying the right of the Parties to control and regulate in order to ensure that natural 
persons benefiting from the right of establishment effectively pursue an activity as self-employed persons."
2 4 8  Article 51 on Estonia; Article 52 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; Article 53 on the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; and Article 46 on Slovenia. The notion of "key personnel” of 
companies is also used to define the persons who can enter into a Member State to provide services. See 
infra in the main text.
2 4 9  See Article 28 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 23 on Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrzyk Republic, and Article 22 on Belarus. Accordingly, the Partnership Agreements do not refer to 
mutual recognition of qualifications.
250 Sgg Article 32 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 28 on Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrzyk Republic and Article 27 on Belarus.
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"key personnel" made by the Europe Agreements» the category of "intra-corporate 
transferee".251
It may be noteworthy to recall here the Community internal regime on movement 
of third country nationals under the framework of the freedom of establishment. A 
national of a third country, which has concluded a Europe Agreement or a Partnership 
Agreement with the Community, can reside and work in a Member State, as "key 
personnel" of companies of their country of origin. In contrast, as already mentioned in 
chapter 4, if a worker of the same nationality is already residing in a Member State, no 
explicit Community rule grants an analogous right in a similar situation. Such third country 
national resident in a Member State, in the event that the enterprise for which he or she 
was working in that Member State decided to established itself in another Member State, 
cannot go to the latter and work there for the same enterprise. If this situation is 
considered compatible with the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment,252 then 
the relevant third country nationals residing in their country of origin would have, under 
the Europe Agreements, an advantageous position compared to their compatriots residing 
in a Community Member State.253
3 - Provision of services254
Article 14 of the Association Agreement with Turkey provides that the 
Contracting Parties will be guided by the EC Treaty provisions on services "for the 
purposes of abolishing restrictions on freedom to provide services between them." Like 
the similar rules on free movement of workers and freedom of establishment, this 
provision does not have direct effect. As already mentioned, the standstill rule of Article 
41 of the Additional Protocol with Turkey applies also to restrictions on freedom to 
provide services, and the Association Council also has powers to determine the timetable 
and provisions for progressive liberalisation of the provision of services between the 
Contracting Parties.255
251 This is defined as being "a natural person working within an organisation in the territory of a Party, 
and being temporarily transferred in the context of pursuit of economic activities in the territory of the 
other Party; the organisation concerned must have its principal place of business in the territory of a Party 
and the transfer be to an establishment (branch, subsidiary) of that organisation, effectively pursuing like 
economic activities in the territory of the other Party." See the provisions quoted in the preceding footnote.
2 5 2  See supra, chapter 4. It was argued that, in certain circumstances, such right should be understood as 
contained in Article 54(2)(D of the EC Treaty. This Article requires the "progressive abolition of 
restrictions on freedom of establishment", namely in what relates to "the conditions governing the entry of 
personnel belonging to the main establishment into managerial or supervisory post in such agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries...". However, no secondary legislation or ruling of the Court of Justice recognised 
the existence of such right.
2 5 3  See also, infra, the corresponding situation regarding services and the comments of Peers on it - Peers, 
"Toward Equality...", op. cit.
2 5 4  See also infra, chapter 8  and my comments on the Council Resolution relating to the limitations on 
the admission of third country nationals to the territory of the Member States for the purpose of pursuing 
activities as self-employed persons, adopted by the Council meeting of 30 November/ 1 December 1994 - 
Press Release: PRES/94/252 (1.12.94).
2 5 5  Article 41(2) of the Protocol to the Agreement with Turkey.
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While the Maghreb Agreements make no reference to services* the recently 
proposed Association Agreement with Tunisia256 provides that the Association Council 
would make recommendations for "liberalisation of the provision of services by one 
Party's firms to consumers in the other".257 At the out-set, each of the Parties would 
reaffirm its obligations under the GATS, including granting treatment according to the 
Most Favoured Nation clause.258
All Europe Agreements provide for progressive liberalisation of the "supply" of 
services.259 The final objective is to allow the supply of services by companies or natural 
persons of Eastern European countries or of the Community Member States, who are 
"established in a Party other than that of the person for whom the services are intended". 
The movement of services is, thus, envisaged only in relation to the provider of services, 
not in relation to the recipient person.260 However, this does not seem to be enough to 
define with accuracy the precise personal scope of the services provisions, in so far as 
natural persons are concerned. There is a somewhat similar problem to that mentioned in 
relation to the provisions of the Europe Agreements on the right of establishment. In the 
case of the provisions on services, the issue is whether the requirement that a beneficiary 
be "established" in another Party, means that a Eastern European national has to be 
residing in his or her country of origin, or can also be resident in a Community Member 
State. As Peers points out,261 unless that expression is interpreted as including also a 
resident in a Member State, the Eastern European nationals living outside the Community 
may end up having more rights than their compatriots residing in the European Union.
While the agreement with Russia contains a general Most Favoured Nation clause 
for the treatment of companies supplying services, the other Partnership Agreements 
provide also for the progressive liberalisation of cross-border supply of services, as do the 
Europe Agreements. In the meantime, all Partnership Agreements envisage that the 
Association Council makes recommendations for that liberalisation.262
Under the Europe Agreements, the Association Council has power to adopt the 
necessary measures to implement progressively the objective of ... progressive 
liberalisation of supply of services.263 Only after the adoption of such measures will the
2 5 6  COM (95) 235 final, of 31/5/1995.
2 5 7  Idem, Article 31.
2 5 8  Ibidem, Article 32 (1).
2 5 9  Article 55 on Hungary and on Poland; Article 56 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; Article 51 on Estonia, Article 52 on Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 53 on Slovenia.
2 6 0  Probably that helps to explain why the chapter is not called free movement of services, but only 
"supply of services". It is noteworthy that here the drafters were more modest than in the chapter related to 
workers. There the title name is "movement of workers", although no major new rights to free movement 
are established.
261 Peers, "Toward Equality...", op. cit.
2 6 2  Article 31 on Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic, and Article 28 on Belarus.
263 5 ^  Article 55(1) and (3) on Hungary and on Poland; Article 56(1) and (3) on the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Article 51(1) and (3) on Estonia, Article 52 (1) and (3) on Latvia and 
Lithuania; and Article 53 (1) and (3) on Slovenia.
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provisions of the agreement be of any use.264 An exception to this is the provision of 
services for State entities, or on behalf of them - given the content of the rules of the 
Europe Agreements that grant, "as of the entry into force" of the agreements, Community 
treatment to companies of Eastern European countries in the award of public contracts.265 
This exception is not valid for the Partnership Agreements.
In step with the liberalisation process, some "temporary" movement of natural 
persons is allowed for by the Europe Agreements. It is limited to natural persons 
providing a service and to persons employed as "key personnel" by a company providing a 
service. The definition of "key personnel" is the one provided for by the right of 
establishment. The movement of natural persons may also include the movement of 
representatives of the company provider of services, when they seek temporary entry into 
a Member State to negotiate the sale of services, or to sell services for the company. 
However, such representatives may not make direct sales to the general public or supply 
the services themselves.266
Among the Partnership Agreements, only those with Russia and Belarus provide 
for the movement of natural persons for the purposes of provision of services. Such 
movement is only allowed for representatives of companies, under the same conditions as 
the Europe Agreements. Contrary to the latter, the movement of natural persons is not 
permitted for direct provision of services or for "key personnel" of relevant companies.267 
Furthermore, a Community declaration on the agreement with Russia and a joint 
declaration on the agreement with Belarus refer to the fact that the cross border supply of 
services envisaged by the agreement does not imply a right to movement of the service 
supplier or recipient into another country.
It is worthwhile comparing the rules of Europe Agreements and Partnership 
Agreements on movement of natural persons (nationals of third countries) to provide 
services, with the internal Community regime in this field, already dealt with in chapter 4. 
As mentioned there, in the case Rush Portuguesa,268 France and the Commission 
sustained unsuccessfully, that, for the purposes of Community Law, only part of the 
enterprises employees could be considered providers of services. Two groups could be 
authorised entry into another Member State to provide services. The first group would 
comprise "Le personnel de confiance de la societé", the workers carrying on a task typical 
of company managers, able of undertaking the society vis-à-vis the other parties. The
264 with a different opinion see Guild, E., Protecting Migrants' Rights: Application o f  EC Agreements 
with Third Countries, op.cit., at pg.21.
26 5  Article 6 6  on Hungary; Article 6 8  on the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; 
Article 67, in particular paragraph (2), on Poland and Estonia, Article 6 8 , in particular paragraph (2), on 
Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 69, in particular paragraph (2), on Slovenia.
2 6 6  Article 55(2) on Hungary and on Poland; Article 56(2) on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; Article 51(2) on Estonia, and Article 52(2) on Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 53(2) on 
Slovenia.
267  See Article 37 of the Agreement with Russia and Article 29 on Belarus.
2 6 8  Case C-l 13/89, Rush Portuguesa Lda. v. Office National d'immigration, (1990J ECR 1-1417; 
discussed above in chapter 4.
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second group would be comprised of workers who performed high skilled activities.269 
These two groups of employees correspond roughly to the type of employees mentioned 
in the definition of "key personnel" of a company allowed entry into a Member State, 
under the Europe Agreements and Partnership Agreements.270
4 - Common and final rules
The various agreements that have been analysed in this chapter share, in some 
cases, a number of rules which limit the extension or effect of the rights granted by them, 
or that simply provide for cooperation between the Community and its Member States and 
the relevant third country. The following remarks deal with some of those common rules.
a) Implementation and restriction clauses
(i) National procedures, conditions, or modalities
The decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council, containing provisions on 
rights of access to the labour market, include clauses providing that procedures for 
applying such provisions "shall be those established under national rules."271 In Kus,272 
the Court ruled that the direct effect of Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council was not put in question by a clause of that type,273 because the latter 
only requires that Member States adopt administrative measures for the implementation of 
Article 6(1), without qualifying or restricting the application of a precise and unconditional 
right inscribed in it.274
The provisions of the Europe Agreements on non discriminatory treatment of 
workers, social security coordination, and rights of residence to family members state that 
such rights will be "subject to the conditions and modalities applicable in each Member 
State". Partnership Agreements refer likewise to "laws, conditions and modalities". 
Meanwhile, a joint declaration to all the Europe Agreements, except to the draft 
agreement with Slovenia, state that "the concept of 'conditions and modalities applicable in 
each Member State' includes Community rules where appropriate". Partnership 
Agreements do not have a similar declaration.
2 6 9  As already recalled in chapter 4, this group recalls the old version of Article 16 of Regulation 
1612/68, which allowed for a derogation of the principle of Community preference in the recruitment of 
workers. Before being amended in 1992, it provided that a worker from a third country could be hired 
through public employment services, provided the offer of employment was made to a "named worker and 
[was] of a special nature in view of: (...) the requirement of specialist qualifications" - Article 16(3)(a)(i) 
of the previous version of Regulation 1612/68, quoted supra. In the Annex of that Regulation (in the 
version of the latter previous to its amendment in 1992) it was specified that "[t]he expression 'specialist' 
indicates a high or uncommon qualification referring to a type of work or a trade requiring specific 
technical knowledge(...)."
2 7 0  With the exception of "intra-corporate transferee", included in the Partnership Agreements, but not in 
the Europe Agreements , or to the version of EEC Regulation 1612/68, in the version previous to 1992. 
See chapter 4.
271  See Article 2(2) of Decision 2/76 and Article 6(3) of Decision 1/80.
2 7 2  Case C-237/9I, Kus v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden [1992] ECRI - 6781.
2 7 3  That is: by Article 6(3) of Decision 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council.
2 7 4  Idem, paragraph 31.
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(il) Restrictions on public grounds
As far as Turkey is concerned, there is the reference in Article 12 of the 
Association Agreement to the guidance of Articles 48, 49, 50 of the EC Treaty, on free 
movement of workers, for the interpretation of the EC-Turkey Agreement. Such reference 
of the Association Agreement includes also the reference to the rules of the EC Treaty, 
fust, on restriction of rights on grounds of public policy, public security and public health, 
and secondly, on exclusion of employment on the public service. The first type of 
restriction is also valid for the reference made in Articles 13 and 14 of that Agreement to 
EC Treaty provisions on establishment and provision of services. In addition, these two 
Articles refer also to EC Treaty provisions that exclude the right of establishment and the 
free provisions of services from activities "connected, even occasionally, with the exercise 
of official authority."275 Finally, restrictions on grounds of public policy, public security 
and public health are also allowed for in decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council 
on the right of access to the labour market.276
The Maghreb Agreements do not have any of such restriction clauses.
In most of the Europe Agreements, two types of restrictions are established on the 
rights granted by the chapter on establishment. First, grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health may be invoked to limit the mentioned rights. Secondly, the 
provisions of the chapter do not apply to "activities which in the territory of each Party are 
connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority".277 Restrictions on 
the grounds of public policy, public security or public health may also be made on the 
rights to supply services under the Europe Agreements.278
The Partnership Agreements contain also those two types of restrictions included 
in the Europe Agreements.279 Still, in the Partnership Agreements, both types of 
restrictions apply to all rules on establishment, services and workers and "labour 
conditions", while that is not the case in the Europe Agreements - except for Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia.280
As far as restrictions on public policy, public security and public health are 
concerned, there seems to be grounds to sustain that they should be interpreted by analogy 
to the interpretation made by the Court of the equivalent provisions of the EC Treaty. This 
seems to be particularly justified when the rules of the external agreements at stake, 
granting rights to third country nationals, are considered to have direct effect.281
2 7 5  Article 55 of the EC Treaty, applied also to services due to Article 6 6  of the EC Treaty.
2 7 6  Article 9 of Decision 2/76 and Article 14(1) of Decision 1/80.
2 7 7  Article 53 on Hungary and on Poland; Article 54 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Estonia; Article 55 on Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 56 on Slovenia.
2 7 8  Article 57 on Hungary and on Poland; Article 58 on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; Article 53 on Estonia.
2 7 9  See Article 46 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 34 on Ukraine and Moldova, Article 35 on 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic; and Article 31 on Belarus.
2 8 0  Article 55 on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and Article 56 on Slovenia.
281 Moreover, as Peers, ("Toward Equality...’\op.cit.) recalls, when interpreting Article 36 of the EC 
Treaty the Court of Justice has not applied its Polydor principle, according to which the fact that the 
provisions of an external agreement of the Community have the same wording as the equivalent 
provisions of the EC Treaty does not mean necessarily that they have to be interpreted in the same 
manner. It may be added that, as far as Turkey is concerned, a further argument comes from the fact that.
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(ni) National laws and regulations
Finally, in both Europe Agreements and Partnership Agreements there is a 
provision common to the chapters on workers, establishment and services. It states that 
nothing in the agreements can prevent the parties from applying national laws and 
regulations regarding entry and stay, work, labour conditions, establishment of natural 
persons, and supply of services. However, when applying such laws and regulations, the 
Contracting Parties may not "nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the 
terms of a specific provision of the Agreement".282 The reference to "any Party” is seen by 
Peers as apparently precluding "direct reliance by individuals upon the clauses”.283 
Meanwhile, in the Partnership Agreements, this limitation clause is further elaborated and, 
thus, reinforced in another provision.284
In the Europe Agreements with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, an interesting declaration was made by the Community unilaterally. It states that 
”(...) nothing in the provisions of Chapter I, 'Movement of workers’, shall be 
construed as impairing any competence of the Member States as to the entry into 
and stay on their territories of workers and their family members."
Given the existence in the actual text of the Agreements of the above mentioned provision 
with an analogous content, it may be wondered whether these declarations served not 
external purposes, but internal purposes regarding the clarification of the division of 
competences between the Member States and the Community. It could be that the 
Community institutions wanted to leave clear that competences "on entry into and stay on 
their territories of workers and their family members" belonged to the Member States and 
not to the Community.
(iv) Em ployment market disturbances
Another type of restriction is allowed for in Article 6 of Decision 2/76 and Article 
13 of Decision 1/80, as far as rights of access to the labour market285 are concerned, when 
"a Member State of the Community or Turkey experiences or is threatened with 
disturbances on its employment market(...).M This safeguard clause seems to be related to 
the fact that the Association Agreement with Turkey is the only one to envisage the 
adoption of measures on full freedom of movement of Turkish workers in the Community.
as mentioned in the main text, Article 12 of the Association Agreement with Turkey declares that the 
contracting parties are to be guided by the corresponding provisions of the EC Treaty "for the purpose of 
progressively securing freedom of movement for workers between them." See, in the same sense, 
paragraph 2 0  of the case Bozkurt, quoted supra.
2 8 2  Regarding the Europe Agreements see Article 58(1) on Hungary and on Poland; Article 59(1) on the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Article 55 on Estonia; Article 56 on Latvia and 
Lithuania; and Article 57(1) on Slovenia. As far as the Partnership Agreements are concerned, see Article 
48 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 35 on Ukraine and Moldova, Article 36 on Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrzyk Republic; and Article 32 on Belarus.
2 8 3  See Peers, "Toward Equality...", op.cit.
2 8 4  See Article 50 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 36d on Ukraine and Moldova, Article 41 on 
Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic, and Article 32e on Belarus.
2 8 5  Established in Article 2(1) (a) and (b) of Decision 2/76 and Articles 6  and 7 of Decision 1/80.
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b) C oop eration
(i) On legislation and social affairs
Through an exchange of letters, on the conclusion of all Maghreb Agreements the 
Member States of the Community and each Maghreb country agreed to exchange views 
on "social and cultural questions".
The Europe Agreements go further providing for approximation of ("existing and 
future") legislation of Eastern European countries to that of the Community.286 Specific 
provision is made for social cooperation - including in the fields of social security, health 
and safety of workers, and the upgrading of job-finding, vocational training and careers- 
advice services.287 In the Europe Agreements, at the end of the chapter on workers, it is 
established that the Community will provide for technical assistance by the Community for 
the establishment of "a suitable social security system 288
Partnership Agreements also envisage approximation of legislation with that of the 
Community. Moreover, social cooperation is also planned.289 The rules on social 
cooperation are slightly more comprehensive and detailed than rules on social cooperation 
in the Europe Agreements.
(ii) Against illegal immigration
Finally, the Partnership Agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan envisage the 
cooperation between the Contracting parties on prevention of illegal activities - namely of 
"illegal immigration and illegal presence of physical persons of their nationality on their 
respective territories, taking into account the principle and practice of readmission".290 
Such cooperation includes mutual consultations and close coordination, covering 
assistance in drafting legislation for prevention of illegal activities.
Similar provisions cannot be found in the Europe Agreements, with the exception 
of the agreements with Slovenia,291 Estonia,292 Latvia,293 and Lithuania.294 Moreover, the 
agreement with Estonia is the only external agreement of the Community to make explicit 
reference to cooperation against "trafficking of human beings and crime related to activity 
of illegal immigration networks".
2 8 6  Article 67 on Hungary and Article 68 on Poland, Article 69 on the Czech Republic, Latvia and 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Article 6 8  on Estonia; and Article 70 on Slovenia.
2 8 7  Article 87 on Poland, Article 8 8  on Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Article 89 on Bulgaria 
and Romania; Article 91 on Estonia, Article 92 on Latvia and Article 93 on Lithuania; and Article 89 on 
Slovenia.
2 8 8  Article 42 on Estonia, Articles 43 on Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania; Articles 44 on the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. The Agreement with Hungary adds the 
reference to technical assistance for the establishment of "labour services system", contrary to all other 
Europe Agreements. In any case, when it comes to the provisions on social cooperation, the Agreement 
with Hungary are similar to all other Europe Agreements.
2 8 9  See Article 74 of the Agreement with Russia, Article 63 on Ukraine; Article 57 on Moldova, Article 
62 on Kazakhstan; Article 61 on the Kyrzyk Republic; and Article 52 on Belarus.
2 90  See Article 84 of the Agreement with Russia and Article 71 on Kazakhstan.
291 Article 98.
2 9 2  Article 100.
2 9 3  Article 101.
2 9 4  Article 102.
3 1 5
Meanwhile, in the chapter on labour conditions of all Partnership Agreements, 
except the one with Russia, it is envisaged that the Cooperation Council will "examine 
which joint efforts can be made to control illegal immigration taking into account the 
principle and practice of readmission"295 and shall make recommendations to that end.296
These are, after all, just a few concrete examples of a more general situation. As it 
will be explained in section C of chapter 8, the fight against illegal immigration has 
assumed an increasing explicit and important role within the definition of the Union 
external policy.
CO NCLUSIO N
The agreements examined in this chapter constitute one of the most important 
areas of Community Law relevant to the legal status of third country nationals living in the 
European Union. The Court's rulings on these agreements have been, in most cases, rather 
protective of the relevant third country nationals - often going against the opinions and 
positions of the Member States and even of the Commission. The protection by the Court 
of Justice of third country nationals has been achieved, for example, through the 
recognition of direct effect of certain provisions of the agreements or of decisions taken 
under their framework. The Court has also given an appropriate interpretation of the 
relevant rules when it sought to defend the practical effect of the rights granted by them. 
Nevertheless, in other cases, the Court has not granted much protection to third country 
nationals - as has been pointed out in the remarks on cases Demirel and Bozkurt. It can 
also be said that these cases challenged the structural limitations of the Community legal 
order, as far as the protection of human rights is concerned. In this respect, such cases did 
not represent the best that Community Law can offer.
In any case, it must be emphasised that, in order to protect third country nationals 
in the Community, the Court could never go beyond the limits of the agreements. It seems 
that the ideal solution for this problem would be the adoption of a general principle of 
equality in the social area between resident third country nationals and nationals of 
Member States. It seems clear that, at least in certain domains, it is desirable to extend the 
rules of the agreements to all third country nationals resident in the Union. Why should, 
for example, a Russian national working in a Member State be able to enjoy non- 
discriminatory treatment in working conditions, remuneration, or contributory allowances;
295 See Article 20 on Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic, and Article 19 on Belarus. 
The Agreement with Russia does not contain a like provision in the chapter on labour conditions, 
although, as previously mentioned, illegal immigration is included in its Article 84 as the fields in which 
cooperation will be developed, as mentioned in the main text. Furthermore, there is also an interesting 
joint declaration on Articles 26, 32 and 37 of the Agreement with* Russia. It starts by declaring that the 
Parties to the Agreement shall ensure the issue of visas and resident permits to businessmen, key 
personnel of companies benefiting from the right of establishment, and to sellers of cross border services; 
and that they shall ensure that "administrative procedures do not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to 
any Party" under those Articles of the Agreement. However, the declaration proceeds by stating that the 
Parties agree that "an important element in this context is the timely conclusion of re-admission 
agreements between the Member States and Russia."
296  See Article 22 on Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the Kyrzyk Republic, and Article 21 on Belarus. 
In the declaration to the Agreement with Russia, mentioned in the preceding note, it is envisaged that the 
Cooperation Council "shall regularly review the evolution of the situation in these areas” - the areas 
referred to in the declaration,
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but not his Chinese or Chilean colleagues? It is normal that the European Union grants 
especial rights to nationals of countries with which it keeps close relations. However, this 
should not exclude nationals of other third countries from enjoying a minimum threshold 
of rights. These latter rights could be considered to be more part of the category of 
fundamental human rights, universally recognisable, rather than being considered to be in 
the category of special social rights, which are granted only to nationals, or to foreigners 
but in the framework of special agreements with their countries of origin.
For a long time this type of proposal did seem quite daring. However, in its 
meeting of 23/11/1995, the Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed in principle to a 
resolution that points in this direction.297 It provides for a special status for third country 
nationals who have at least ten years of legal residence in a Member State.298 They will 
enjoy precisely
"no less favourable treatment than is enjoyed, in accordance with the legislation of 
the Member State concerned, by nationals of that Member State with regard to 
working conditions, membership of trade unions, public policy in the sector of 
housing, social security, emergency health care and compulsory schooling".299 
Moreover, subject to public policy and national security reasons to the contrary, those 
third country nationals are to be granted au unlimited residence permit or one valid for at 
least ten years.
At the moment of writing, the resolution was not yet formally adopted. It full text 
is not available and its legal nature is not certain. However, it seems to constitute a 
potential novelty in the approach of the European Union to the protection of basic rights 
of third country nationals. The rights of each of them may be seen as deserving protection 
due to their personal circumstances, and not only because they are nationals of a country 
with which the Union concluded an agreement.
Furthermore, and depending on its precise content and legal value, it may even 
lead to the revision of some equality rules of the external agreements studied in this 
chapter.
2 9 7  Press Release of the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 23/11/1995, PRES/95/332.
2 9 8  This resolution states that it will not be applicable to persons regarding which in principle there are 
more favourable legal regimes: like relatives of migrant nationals of Member States, migrant nationals of 
other EE A countries and their relatives, third county nationals admitted to a Member State to study or 
research, and nationals of third countries with which the Community has concluded Agreements that 
provide for more favourable rules.
2 9 9  Press Release PRES/95/332, quoted infra.
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PART II - THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
Chapter 6
EARLY
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
(before the Treaty on European Union)

INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the Intergovernmental Cooperation developed before the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.
Part I of this dissertation examined legal issues in Community Law regarding third 
country nationals. However, an important fact must be appreciated with regard to the 
harmonisation of Member States national laws, the preparation of common measures on 
immigration and the status of third country nationals. Most developments in these areas 
have occurred outside the Community framework. They have come about through what is 
usual referred to as "Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Cooperation", or simply 
"Intergovernmental Cooperation". These expressions refer to the cooperation developed 
by the governments of the Member States completely outside the rules and procedures of 
the decision-making process of the European Communities.
This chapter will first outline some legal issues concerning the work of 
Intergovernmental Cooperation groups, which may be classified into two general 
categories: those concerning the relations between the activities of the latter and EC 
competence, and those concerning the relations between EC Law and the rules enacted in 
the ad hoc intergovernmental framework. Secondly, a general overview will be made of 
the structure and work of the several fora of Intergovernmental Cooperation among 
governments of the Member States. Particular attention will be given to the most 
important intergovernmental groups, like the Trevi group, the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Immigration and the Schengen Group. The work of these groups will also be assessed, 
both from the point of view of their efficiency, and from the perspective of the particular 
character of their working methods in order to determine the extent to which they can be 
considered democratic. The intergovernmental groups’ work that is relevant for this 
dissertation, notably that of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, will be analysed in more 
detail in Chapter 8, together with the work already developed in the same areas under 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
The cooperation to be examined in this chapter is that dealing with security, 
immigration and more generally with the creation of conditions for the abolition of internal 
border controls within Member States. Therefore, to a certain extent, the scope of this 
chapter may be wider than the scope of the overall dissertation. However, this broader 
analysis is intended to place the cooperation on matters related to immigration and 
immigrants from third countries in context. It is very important to emphasise how the 
concern of the Member States on third country nationals is intimately connected to their 
concern for the control of immigration and how both are integrated into an overall 
concern for general security problems. Furthermore, Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
whether dealing with matters concerning third country nationals (and immigration from 
third countries) or not, will often display similar characteristics and encounter similar 
problems. Relations with EC Law and EC competence, problems on working methods and 
the perceived lack of parliamentary or judicial control are issues which continuously arise.
The "Intergovernmental Cooperation" was developed as a way of addressing 
problems in which the European Communities had no competence (for example terrorism
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and issues dealt with by the Trevi Group),1 or that could not be adequately dealt with 
within the Community framework. This lack of adequacy could have been due to the 
desire of EC governments to establish co-operative structures outside the parliamentary 
and judicial controls of the EC. Furthermore, since unanimity was (and still is) required for 
action at the Community level, countries willing to cooperate had to act outside the EC 
framework to surmount opposition from other Member States. This was the case, for 
example, in the opposition of the United Kingdom to the abolition of internal border 
controls and the cooperation of the Schengen Group which had precisely this aim. 
Therefore, to some extent, this chapter gives an account of what could have been done in 
the framework of the European Community if there had been unanimity, or if the EC rules 
of decision-making were different.
The development of the Intergovernmental Cooperation may be roughly divided 
into four periods, discussed in section B below. The first lasted from 1976 to 1986. 
During this phase, the most important group was Trevi and the issues at stake were mainly 
related to internal security in a narrow sense. There was a broad consensus that such 
issues were not within EC competence and should not be dealt with by the Community.
The second period lasted from 1986 to the end of 1988. In 1986 the European 
Single Act entered into force and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration was 
created. The Single European Act established in Article 7A of the EC Treaty that:
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing 
the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992 (...) The internal 
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty. "
However, most EC governments resisted the idea that matters related to internal security, 
immigration and immigrants from third countries, and controls on persons at borders be 
treated by the Community institutions. The governments of the Member States considered 
that such areas were to be preserved as part of national sovereignty. They took the view 
that since these matters were a part of public policy and public security they could not be 
dealt with by EC institutions, but were more appropriately tackled within a framework of 
intergovernmental cooperation.2
As mentioned earlier, in the Final Act of the European Single Act, the EC 
governments made a "political declaration" on the free movement of persons stating that: 
"In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall 
cooperate, without prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as 
regards the entry, movement and residence of nationals of third countries. They 
shall also cooperate in the combating of terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and 
illicit trading in works of art and antiques."
In chapter 3 the legal value of this declaration was examined and it was concluded that it 
had no binding force in Community Law. However, this declaration expressed the will of
1 At least not in an obvious manner, when the cooperation began in the seventies.
2 See the submissions of the French and United Kingdom governments in cases 281. 283-5 & 287/85, 
Germany et al. v. Commission, and Lanfranchi, M.-P., Droit Communautaire et Travailleurs Migrants 
des États Tiers-Entrée et Circulation dans la Communauté Européenne, Paris, Economîca, 1994, pp.58-9.
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the Member States to cooperate outside the Community framework and this should not be 
overlooked.
Also in 1986, in order to address the problems created by the new objective of 
abolishing internal border controls, the EC governments created the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Immigration, which undertook or was deeply involved in the preparation of 
most common measures and documents relating to the harmonisation of laws in the field 
of immigration and asylum.
The third period of Intergovernmental Cooperation began in 1988-1989, these 
years marking the beginning of a kind of transitional phase from complete "ad hoc" 
cooperation to the integration of this cooperation into the European Union institutions. In 
December 1988 the Coordinators Group was created and in the first half of 1989 the 
"Palma Document" was approved by the European Council. This transition ended formally 
with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, in November 1993.
The fourth period refers, therefore, to the Intergovernmental Cooperation 
developed under the framework of the Treaty on European Union, when all the practical 
structures be set up and functioning. The legal and institutional framework introduced by 
the Treaty on European Union will be examined in the next chapter.
A) LEGAL ISSUES
1 - E C  Competence and Intergovernmental Cooperation Activities
The Community competence on matters relating to third country nationals was 
examined in chapter 2. Chapter 3 analysed the extent to which Article 7A of the EC 
Treaty required the Community to adopt measures on third country nationals, with 
particular emphasis on the area of abolition of border controls on persons. In chapter 2, it 
was recalled how Article 100 and particularly Article 235 have been used to enact 
legislation in a wide range of fields, supposedly relevant to the common market. It was 
submitted that measures concerning third country nationals had a similar or even greater 
relevance for the establishment, functioning, and operation of the common market, and for 
the attainment of Community objectives. In chapter 3, this idea was emphasised in the 
light of the new objective of the establishment of a market "without internal frontiers", as 
set out in Article 7A of the EC Treaty. It was submitted that Article 7A established a duty 
for Community institutions to act for the attainment of that new objective.3 It was 
explained how the attainment of that objective required the adoption of measures 
regarding third country nationals. Consequently, this duty to act would include the 
obligation to adopt measures regarding third country nationals. However, in chapter 3 it 
was also stressed that the Council could not act without proposals from the Commission 
and that no such proposals had been presented.4
3 Whether or not that provision is considered capable of having (partial) direct effect, as suggested in 
chapter 3.
4 This was the result of a a "realistic" approach”, adopted as early as 7/12/1988 in COM (88) 640 final. 
Conscious of the difficulties of securing the required unanimity in the Council to approve measures in this 
area, the Commission decided to wait for the results of the Intergovernmental Cooperation. Recently, in 
July 1995 the Commission presented some proposals for Community instruments on the right to travel of
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Thus the behaviour of the Commission is a key point in the appreciation of the 
relationship between Intergovernmental Cooperation activities and the issue of the limits 
of Community competence. In as much as the Commission does not make proposals to the 
Council, it seems rather fruitless to determine whether, and to what extent 
Intergovernmental Cooperation questions Community competence. Since Community 
competence can only be exercised by the Council on a proposal from the Commission,* 6 
then, the fundamental and prior legal issue in this context is the possibility of judicial 
action against the Commission for its failure to act. This was also examined in chapter 3. 
Moreover, that chapter referred to the case initiated by the European Parliament against 
the Commission on this matter.6
The European Parliament has in several occasions criticised the Member States for 
acting through Intergovernmental Cooperation in the field of the abolition of border 
controls and free movement of persons. It considered that such cooperation contravened 
the Treaties because that field was within Community competence. Accordingly, the 
Parliament called on the Commission to stop collaborating with Intergovernmental 
Cooperation and to present draft Community measures in that field. It asked it to be 
mindful of its role as guardian of the Treaties7 and even invoked the possibility of the 
Commission using Article 169 against Member States. It also called on the Council and 
the governments of the Member States to conduct their intergovernmental work on the 
free movement of persons and internal security in a Community context.8
third country nationals and announced that it will present proposals for a limited right of freedom of 
movement (see above, chapter 4). Besides, subsequent to the Treaty on European Union, the Commission 
has been developing other activities related to third country nationals, but mainly under the framework of 
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
6 Article 152 of the EC Treaty provides that the Council "may request the Commission to undertake any 
studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it 
any proposals." However, the problem is not that the Council wants to adopt measures on third country 
nationals and the Commission does not present it with adequate proposals. On the contrary, the problem is 
that the Commission does not present proposals to the Council on third country nationals because the 
latter does not want to adopt them.
6 Case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission, abstract of the Parliament’s petition in OJ C 1/12 of 
4/1/1994.
7 Note that the first indent of Article 155 states that "the Commission - shall ensure that the provisions of 
this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied”.
8 For all these assertions and suggestions see, e.g., the following European Parliament resolutions: 
resolution on the right of asylum, of 12 March 1987, DOC. A2-227/86; resolution on the signing of the 
Supplementary Schengen Agreement, of 23 November 1989, doc.ref. B3-583/89, OJ C 323/98 of 
27/12/1989; resolution on the free movement of persons in the internal market, of 15 March 1990, doc.ref. 
B3-291, 300 & 310/90, OJ C 96/274 of 17/4/1990; resolution on migrant workers from third countries, of 
14 June 1990, OJ C 175/180 of 16/7/1990; the resolution on the Schengen Agreement and the Convention 
on the right of asylum and the status of refugees as defined by the ad hoc Group on Immigration, of 14 
June 1990, OJ C 175/170 of 16/7/1990; the resolution on relations between the European Parliament and 
the Council, of 10 October 1990, document B3-1734/90; resolution on the harmonisation of polices on 
entry to the territories of the EC Member States, with a view to free movement of persons, and the 
drawing up of an inter-governmental Convention among the 12 Member States of the EC, of 22 February 
1991, OJ C 72/213 of 18/3/1991. See also the draft report on the freedom of circulation of persons and 
security in the European Communities, adopted on 1 March 1991 by the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens Rights, Document PE 143.354/B/rev.
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The position of the European Parliament in these matters seems to be basically 
correct. In the field of the abolition of border controls and free movement of persons, and 
particularly in the field of immigration and immigrants from third countries, it can be 
argued that most of the work of the Intergovernmental Cooperation could have been done 
within the Community framework.
In any case, the Parliament’s requests to the Commission did not make the latter 
change its position. The Commission continued to collaborate with the intergovernmental 
groups and did not present any proposals to the Council in the areas mentioned above. 
Thus it appears that little can be done against the wishes of the governments of the 
Member States and the Council itself. According to the system of the Treaties, judicial 
action against Intergovernmental Cooperation must begin by questioning the 
Commission’s failure to act. As mentioned in chapter 3, this was already done by the 
European Parliament when it initiated the proceedings against the Commission.
In this context, it is also worthwhile to note Timmermans remarks on Community 
competence and Intergovernmental Cooperation. He maintains that:
"(...) there can scarcely be any doubt that, the abolition of internal border controls 
of persons, which is part of the completion of the internal market, depends in part 
on the creation of a common regime on a number of issues related to immigration 
and national rules and policies relating to aliens; and that to that extent the 
Community is competent to enact such a regime by way of harmonisation 
directives under Article 100 EEC®
Furthermore:
"where all Member States agree on the necessity of a common action on the level 
of the Twelve and the Community holds the necessary powers to act, the 
Community as such should act, not its Member States by negotiating agreements 
in an intergovernmental framework."1®
However, as Timmermans admits,
"The situation becomes complicated where all Member States do agree on the 
necessity of a common regime for the twelve but disagree on the existence or the 
extent of Community powers to enact such regime". * 1 
To deal with this, he suggests that the Commission should start infringement procedures 
against Member States for breach of Community competence, under Article 169, or that it 
starts action under Article 175 against the Council for failure to act (if the latter did not 
act on Commission proposals). Alternatively, or in addition, the Commission could ask 
(under the second paragraph of Article 228(1)) for the opinion of the Court of Justice on 
the compatibility with EC Law of agreements concluded by the Member States.12
® Timmermans, C.W.A., "Free Movement of Persons and the Divisions of Powers Between the 
Community and its Member States - Why do it the intergovernmental way?", in Free Movement of 
Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European 
Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, pp.352-368, at 
361.
Idem, at 362. This is the result of what Timmermans calls "a classical example of construing a 
Community competence", namely in that such competence is implied by a "fairly general phenomena": 
"the external dimension of the internal market". He recalls that the legal basis of the latter dates back to 
such well known cases as Case 22/70, ERTA [1971J ECR 263.
11 Timmermans, op. cit., at p.363.
12 That provision being used by analogy or with an expansive interpretation.
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As far as Schengen is concerned, it may be recalled that the Community 
competence in relation to issues concerning the free movement of persons (as far as 
abolition of internal border controls and third country nationals are concerned) is not an 
exclusive competence, as it is mainly based in Articles 100 and 235. Thus, according to 
Timmermans, that competence does not exclude action by the Member States "as long as 
the Community powers remain unused". Agreements by some Member States, of 
transitional character, "allowing for a final solution on Community level" and also 
otherwise respecting Community Law, "do not seem to pose any difficulty from a 
Community point of view".13
Finally, it should be mentioned that Article 5 may also be of relevance to relations 
between Community competence and Intergovernmental Cooperation.14 That Article 
states that:
"Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty."
This provision15 could help to clarify why and to what extent Member States should nfit 
engage in Intergovernmental Cooperation in order to respect Community competence. 
Clearly, Article 5 would be particularly pertinent if the Commission wanted the 
Community to exercise its competence in this field.
The Court of Justice has already used Article 5 to define limits and duties for 
Member State action in matters in which the Council does not exercise Community 
competence. Most of these cases concerned areas in which the Community had exclusive 
competence, like the common market on agriculture. However, Kapteyn & Verloren van 
Themaat have already wondered,
"whether the Court, in the face of further stagnation in the decision-making 
process, would not draw positive or negative legal consequences on the basis of
13 Timmermans, "Free Movement of Persons...", op.cit., p.362. Before the entry into force of the Treaty 
on European Union, the matter had to be addressed in this manner because in the EC Treaty there is no 
provision such as Article 233 of the latter (allowing for more close regional integration between Benelux 
countries) which could be applied to any cooperation between EC Member States, such as that of 
Schengen. After the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, its Article K.7 of the latter clears 
the Schengen cooperation, as will be referred to below in the main text and in the next chapter. On the 
relations between Schengen and the European Community see also Philip, C. & Boutayeb, C. "Schengen 
(Accords de - )" in Dictionnaire Juridique des Communautés Européennes, Barav, Ami & Philip, 
Christian (eds.), Paris, P.U.F., 1993, pp.981-991, at pp.989-991.
14 On Article 5 of the EC Treaty, see Constantinesco, Vlad, "L'article 5 CEE de la bonne foi à la loyauté 
communautaire", in Capotorti et ai. (eds.) Du Droit International au droit de l’intégration: Liber 
Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, p.97; Lang, John Temple "Community 
Constitutional Law: Article 5 of the EEC Treaty", CMLRev, Vol.27, 1990, No.4, pp.645-681; and 
Kapteyn, P.J.G. & Themaat, P. Verloren Van Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 2nd. 
ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989, pp.86-91.
15 Eventually together with other EC Treaty provisions, as is common in the Court of Justice's doctrine on 
Article 5.
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Article 5 for the actions of the Member States in other areas in which the Council 
or the Member States were obliged to act in solidarity but had to do so."16 
Admittedly, Kapteyn & Verloren van Themaat did not have in mind the area discussed in 
this chapter. However their idea could be one way for the Court of Justice to positively 
influence the issue of the division of competence between Member States and the 
Community, and to stress the Community powers in this area.17
Timmermans suggestions and the possible use of Article 5 suggested by Kapteyn 
& Verloren van Themaat may be read as reinforcing the basic position of the 
European Parliament: i.e. that most of the fields in which the Intergovernmental 
Cooperation acts are fields in which the Community could or should also act. However, 
they also indicate that everything initially depends on the Commission's position, and on 
the Court of Justice’s appreciation of it.
2 - The Relationship between substantive rules of EC Law and binding 
rules enacted in the Intergovernmental framework18
From the point of view of Community Law, if any binding rule enacted as a result 
of the work of Intergovernmental Cooperation conflicts with a positive and substantive 
rule of Community Law, then the latter has primacy. This follows, for example, from 
Article 5 of the EC Treaty.
In principle, conflict should not arise. The only binding instruments adopted within 
the Intergovernmental Cooperation framework were the Dublin Convention - which is not 
yet in force - and the Schengen Agreements.19 Besides, intergovernmental rules or 
decisions usually contain express clauses according priority to EC Law. This is important 
from the point of view of International Public Law, because Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law on Treaties20 states that:
Op.cit., p.89, referring also to Zuleeg in Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Von Der Groeben et al., 3rd 
ed., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983, Vol.l, p.168. Both Zuleeg and Kapteyn & Verloren van Themaat stress, 
however, that the Court does not have the power to determine Community policy. Yet, this accurate 
consideration does not seem to exclude the use of Article 5 in connection with other provisions of the EC 
Treaty, e.g. Article 7A and 175.
17 See also Lang, CMLRev, op.cit. supra. He refers in detail to the various duties that Article 5 imposes 
on Member States, namely their duty to implement Community objectives (pp.657-659), to take collective 
action and to cooperate with other Member States (p.671). Furthermore, he also makes an interesting 
analysis of the repercussions of Article 5 for competence rules and conflict rules (pp.673-677).
18 See, O'Keeffe, David "The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?", YEL, 
1991, pp. 185-219, at pp.209-211 and, in a more general manner, Philip & Boutayeb, "Schengen (Accords 
de-)'\ op.cit., at pp.989-991.
19 The initial Schengen Agreement, the Schengen Implementing Agreement and the readmission 
agreement between the Schengen Contracting Parties and Poland.
20 Concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980, UN Doc A/Conf. 39/27, 1969, or 
International Legal Materials (ILM), Vol.8, 1969, p.679. The Convention was not ratified by all Member 
States (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom are not parties to it) but is 
generally regarded as being the expression of the rules of customary international law on the subject. See 
Bemhardt, Rudolf "Interpretation in International Law", in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
Bernhardt, Rudolf (ed.), Amsterdam, North Holland, 1984, Vol.7, p.318 at 321. Also pointing in that 
direction see Schermers, "The effect of the date 31 December 1992", CMLRev, Vol.28, 1991, No.2,
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"When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as 
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty 
prevail".
One such reservation clause is Article 134 of the Agreement Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement [hereinafter the Schengen Implementing Agreement]. It states that: 
"The provisions of this Convention shall apply only insofar as they are compatible 
with Community law".21
As O’Keeffe recalls, there are a number of possible areas of conflict between Community 
Law and the Schengen Implementing Agreement, namely because both have rules on the 
same subject matters. Among such areas of conflict there are those related to firearms, 
checks on hand baggage when taking (Community) internal flights, data protection, the 
position of third country nationals protected by Community Law, and border controls 
between Schengen States and other Community Member States that are not parties to 
Schengen.* 212 However, the principle established in Article 134 of the Schengen 
Implementing Agreement should be sufficient to justify the predominance of Community 
Law.23 *
The Dublin Convention is less straightforward than the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement in this regard. The Dublin Convention provides only in generic terms for the 
possibility of its own revision or amendment, if that is necessary:
"pursuant to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8A of the [EC 
Treaty], such achievement being linked in particular to the establishment of a 
harmonised asylum and a common visa policy”.2*
In this situation, the rules of the Vienna Convention do not seem to favour the priority of 
Community Law, as Article 30 (3) of that Convention establishes that:
pp.275-289, at p.276, and him with Waelbroeck, Denis in "Judicial Protection in the European 
Communities", 5th ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1992, p.102, note 463.
21 Therefore Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention (on the relations between a later Treaty and an 
earlier Treaty when the latter is concluded between only some of the Contracting Parties of the former) 
does not apply in this case. Note also the existence of Article 142 of the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement, providing for the possibility of replacing or amending the Agreement itself "When 
Conventions are concluded between the Member States of the European Communities with a view to the 
completion of an area without internal frontiers...". It is also interesting to note that Article 1 of the same 
Agreement defines alien as "any person other than a national of a Member State of the European 
Communities".
22 See O’Keeffe, "The Schengen Convention..."op.cit., at pp.209-210. O’Keeffe also recalls that 
Community law is incompatible with lack of respect of human rights, as established e.g. in the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. An eventual incompatibility between these 
human rights rules and the Schengen Agreements would seem to give rise to conflicts with Community 
Law only insofar as the scope of the latter is concerned.
23 In the meantime, as will be recalled in the next chapter, Article K.7 of Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union provides that "The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent the establishment or 
development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States in so far as such cooperation does 
not conflict with, or impede, that provided for in this Title". This rule does not seem to allow a disregard 
for Community Law, because it refers only to the relations between other Intergovernmental Cooperation 
and Title VI itself, and not to the relations between other Intergovernmental Cooperation and Community 
Law.
2* Article 16 of the Dublin Convention. Note that this provision did not exist in an earlier version of the 
Dublin Convention, see "Nieuws - Convention on the right of asylum", NJB, 65th Year, 27 January 1990, 
No.4, pp. 165-170.
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"When all parties to the earlier treaty arc parties also to the latter treaty but the 
earlier treaty is not terminated (...) the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that 
its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty."25 
However, from the perspective of Community Law, if and when the Community adopts 
rules on matters of asylum which are dealt with by the Dublin Convention, those 
Community rules should be considered as having priority over the Dublin Convention. 
Furthermore, another element of the Dublin Convention may throw a different light on an 
eventual conflict between the provisions of the Convention and Community Law. A recital 
of the Preamble of the Convention states that the Heads of State concluded it,
"Considering the joint objective of an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of persons shall, in particular, be ensured, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, as 
amended by the European Single Act (...)"26
It may be argued that this statement demonstrates that the Contracting parties to the 
Dublin Convention did not wish to contravene their obligations under Community Law, in 
particular those derived from current (or later) EC rules on the free movement of persons.
Other decisions of the Intergovernmental Cooperation usually contain reserve 
clauses safeguarding Community Law. This is the case for the resolutions on the 
admission of third country nationals into the Union Member States.27 It is also the case, 
for example, for the ministerial agreement on the establishment of the Europol Drugs Unit, 
signed in Copenhagen on 2 June 1993.28
This again reinforces the assertion that Community rules should prevail over rules 
enacted in the framework of the Intergovernmental Cooperation. The repeated statements 
to this effect included in legal instruments and official documents of that cooperation seem 
to indicate that the EC governments do not question that assertion. Furthermore, 
according to Article 219 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities is the sole judicial organ with jurisdiction in Community Law.29 Presumably, 
in a conflict situation, the Court of Justice would uphold the substantive rules of 
Community Law against rules produced by the Intergovernmental Cooperation.5®
25 See also Article 39 of the Vienna Convention.
2^  In an earlier version of the Convention this recital consisted simply of the following text: "Resolved to 
achieve their joint objective of a land space without borders, in accordance with the Single European Act". 
See again "Nieuws - Convention on the right of asylum", op.cit., p,166.
27 See section B of chapter 8.
26 It stated that "The activities of the Unit will be without prejudice to other forms of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in relation to combating illicit drug trafficking and other related activities, nor to 
the competences of the European Community." See the full text of that agreement in part 3 of 
STATEWATCH Eurofile No.l, London, Statewatch, 1994.
29 Or, more precisely, to appreciate a "dispute concerning the interpretation and the application" of the 
EC Treaty.
5® Note also that Article N of the Treaty on European Union (which roughly substituted the old Article 
236 of the Treaty of Rome) provides for the amendment of the Union treaties according to a specific 
procedure. Admittedly, that provision could be implicitly over-ruled by a new Treaty between all Member 
States, but it shows that the intentions of the Member States is that of ensuring that the Union treaties are 
only revised in the agreed manner. Indirectly this would ensure the supremacy of Community Law: in 
order to be changed the latter would have to be modified in the manner envisaged by the Union treaties, 
not by making new treaties on the same subject matters.
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B ) IN TERGO VERN M EN TA L STRU CTU RES AND A C T IV IT IE S31 
1 - Cooperation Between the 12 Member States 
a) The TREVI Group32
The origins of the Trevi Group date back to the 70's and its initial objective was to 
improve cooperation in combating of terrorism in the Community. However, its role was 
later extended to deal with police cooperation in general, including cooperation against 
drugs trafficking, against international organised crime, on police technical matters, and, 
to a certain extent, even on the combating of illegal immigration (in one of its sub-groups).
The creation of TREVI was preceded by several intergovernmental meetings on 
terrorism held in 1971 and 1972. In December 1975, in Rome, the Council of Ministers 
approved British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan's proposal to set up a special working 
group to combat terrorism in the EC.33 The proposal was formalised in the next meeting 
of the EC Interior Ministers on 29 June 1976. From then onwards, when they held their 
meetings, the Interior Ministers were accompanied by senior police and security service 
officials.
The members of the Trevi group were the then Member States of the EEC. Other 
countries attended the meetings as observers or were briefed by the "troika" officials after
The most important works on this issue, in general, are: Benyon, J. et al.. Police Co-operation in 
Europe : An Investigation, Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, November 1993; 
Bunyan, T. (ed.). Statewatching the New Europe - a Handbook on the European State, London, 
Statewatch, 1993; Cruz, A., Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group and other European 
Intergovernmental Bodies - in view of a Europe without internal borders, CCME Briefing Paper No. 12. 
Brussels, CCME, June 1993. These are the main sources of the facts referred in this chapter and have 
further details. See also Bonnefoi, S. A., Europe et sécurité intérieure: Trevi, Union Européenne. 
Schengen, Paris, Delmas, 1995; Bunyan, T. & Webber, F., Intergovernmental Co-operation on 
Immigration and Asylum, CCME Briefing Paper No. 19, Brussels, CCME, April 1995; Carlier, J.Y., 
"L'Europe et les ressortissants des Etats tiers: de la coopération intergouvemementale vers le droit 
communautaire ", Actualités du Droit (Revue de la Faculté de Droit de Liège), 1993, No.2, 1993, p.207; 
Cruz, A., An insight into Schengen, Trevi and other European Intergovernmental bodies, CCME Briefing 
Paper No.l, Brussels, CCME, April 1990; École Nationale d'Administration, Mise en oeuvre du traité de 
Maastricht et construction européenne, Vol.I., Paris, ENA - La Documentation Française, 1994, pp.176- 
246; and the "Appendix 1- Glossary of Groups", in the quoted supra Statewatching..., p.173. Specifically 
on police cooperation see Fijnaut, Cyrille "International Policing in Europe: Present and Future", ELR, 
Vol.19. December 1994, No.6, pp.599-619.
32 See Bunyan, T., "Trevi, Europol and the New European State", in State watching..., op.cit., p.15 and 
Benyon, John (& others) in "The Trevi Group" in Police Co-operation... quoted supra, p. 152.
33 The origins of the name are uncertain. Some say that it is an acronym for "Terrorism, Radicalisation, 
Extremism and Violence International". Others, perhaps with a more romantic perspective, assure that the 
acronym is an invention, the name being inspired by the Fontana di Trevi (which was close to the place in 
Rome where the meeting that decided its creation was held), and by the Dutch initiator of the group, Mr. 
Fonteijn (the then Director General for Police and Alien Affairs at the Netherlands Ministry of Justice). 
See Bunyan, T., article quoted in the preceding footnote, (his) p.34, footnote 3 (expressing doubts on the 
exact explanation of the acronym) and Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group and other... ", quoted 
supra, at pp.18-9 (saying the acronym is an invention of journalists and that in fact it refers to the Dutch 
initiator).
328
the meetings. These countries were called the "Friends of Trevi" and were: Argentina 
(briefed by Spain), Austria, Canada, Finland (briefed by Denmark), Hungary (briefed by 
Germany), Morocco, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S.A.34
As far as third country nationals were concerned, the work of Trevi increased in 
the period of the establishment of the single internal market. The Trevi Group became one 
of the main "fora" responsible for the creation of the so called "compensatory measures", 
supposed to be necessary for the lifting of the Community's internal frontiers. In the 
meantime, the Ad hoc Working Group on Immigration, created in 1986, took over the 
work on immigration matters which were less, or not at all related to security concerns.
Later on, the Maastricht Treaty brought most of the fields of activity of the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation under the "Third Pillar" of the European Union. This was 
reflected in the Trevi Group also. Presently all the work of Trevi proceeds under the 
framework of Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty, with the exception of terrorism.35
The "Trevi Group" operated with a three level structure.
First, there was the ministerial level: the ministers with responsibility for policing 
and internal security affairs. They met usually every six months (in June and December) in 
the country holding the European Presidency. They had overall political responsibility for 
Trevi.
Secondly, there was the Trevi group of senior officials. It was formed by senior 
officials and civil servants from each member state and, sometimes, also by senior police 
officers. It received reports from the working groups and was responsible for the 
coordination of their work. It was also responsible for giving policy advice to the 
ministers. Thus it met at least every May and November, before the ministerial meetings. It 
made reports on the progress of the Trevi work to the Ministers’ meetings and also to the 
meetings of the Coordinators Group.
Although the Commission had previously unsuccessfully requested access to this 
group, only from the beginning of 1992 onwards were the representatives of the 
Commission allowed to attend the meetings of the senior officials group as observers.36
On a third level, were the working groups into which the TREVI Group was sub­
divided. They were formed by civil servants, police officers, immigration and customs 
officials and representatives from relevant organisations, such as security services.
The Trevi working groups were the following.37
34 In some occasions, Trevi meetings were even attended by US Attorney Generals and the chief of the 
US Drug enforcement Administration, according to Associated Press, 3/6/88 and 12/5/89, quoted by 
Bunyan. T. in "Trevi, Europol and the New European State“, op.cit., p.15 at p.34, footnote 6.
35 Agreement was reached that cooperation against terrorism will be part of Europol activities no later 
than two years after it has begun to function. This will be possible only after ratification of the Europol 
Convention. See Article 2(2), second paragraph, of the Europol Convention concluded on 26 July 1995, 
OJ C 316/2, of 27/11/1995. Therefore, it will still take some time before Trevi I and the Police Working 
Group on Terrorism (and the TSFN - Trevi Secure Fax Network) cease their activities completely .
36 See Bunyan, T. in "Trevi, Europol and the New European State", p.15 at 34, footnote 5.
37 In the beginning (1976), three other sub-groups were also created: Trevi IH would deal with security 
procedures for civilian air travel (this field was later attributed to Trevi I), Trevi IV would work on safety 
and security at nuclear installations and transport, and Trevi V on contingency measures to deal with
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Trevi I was the sub-group on terrorism: it had the objective of facilitating 
concerted action at a European level against terrorists. It was created by the Trevi 
Ministers meeting on 31st May 1977 and was the only one to have an operational role, as 
opposed to one of mere coordination. Apparently, this was the group in which the Trevi 
work was most successful. Trevi I was also charged with security procedures for civilian 
air travel, a subject initially attributed to the planned, but never installed, sub-group Trevi
III. The Trevi Ministers in Copenhagen, on 1-2 June 1993, gave the Trevi I working 
group, which dealt with terrorism, the additional task of investigating the extent to which 
racist attacks were carried out by organised groups, namely extreme-right groups.* 38
Trevi II was the technical sub-group. It was established by the same meeting that 
created Trevi I. In the beginning, its activities were mainly concerned with cooperation 
and exchange of information as well as experience in technical matters, such as police 
equipment, police training and forensic science. Later, the work of the group extended to 
cooperation and exchange of information on the maintenance of public order, on action 
against football hooliganism and on policing of road traffic. It also did work on "police 
communications on an EC-wide level, with agreement needed between Schengen and non- 
Schengen countries".39
Trevi III was the sub-group on organised international crime. Its role was re­
defined by the Trevi Ministers meeting in Rome on 21 June 1985, as the initially planned 
Trevi III group was never implemented. Subsequently, it worked on serious organised 
international crime at a strategic, tactical, and technical level.40 It concentrated on drug 
trafficking41 and its work was at the origin of the creation of the European Drugs Unit 
and of Europol. In April 1987, the group decided to post Drug Liaison Officers in drug 
producing and transit countries.42 It was agreed that those officers would work closely 
together and share information. Furthermore, each Member State undertook to establish a 
national drugs intelligence unit. When all these became functional, it was possible to 
envisage the creation of a European Drugs Intelligence Unit to coordinate their activities. 
The E.D.U. is now functioning and constituted the first step towards the creation of 
Europol, the Convention for which was recently concluded.43
An important part of the work of Trevi in was on immigration controls at borders. 
This sub-group was responsible for such work until the Trevi 1992 working group was
emergencies (disasters, fire prevention and fire fighting). None of these groups ever met. Trevi HI was 
given a new role in 1985, as noted in the main text.
38 See Financial Times, 3/6/1993, p.22; and Statewatch, Vol.3, May-June 1993, No.3. Apparently Trevi I 
is still functioning now, but there are no reports on whether it actually worked on racist activities and with 
what results.
39 According to the report on Trevi II, presented to the Trevi Ministers at their meeting on 1 December 
1992. See Bunyan, T. in "Trevi, Europol and the New European State", p.15 at 19.
40 Another working group was created in a meeting on 19 September 1992 also to deal with organised 
crime. However, while Trevi III is only composed of police authorities, this is a mixed group in which 
judicial authorities participate too. See Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group and other... , quoted 
supra, at p.19.
41 Trevi HI dealt also with armed robbery, the protection of witnesses, stolen vehicles, environmental 
crime, money-laundering and illicit traffic in works of art. Furthermore, it worked on crime analysis, on 
developing a common police terminology and on the harmonisation of techniques of investigation.
42 Initially in the USA, India, Finland, Canada, Norway and Sweden.
43 See infra, on Europol.
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created. When Trevi 1992 was abolished, Trevi III recovered the responsibility for the 
detailed work on immigration controls.
Trevi 1992 was set up on 9 December 1988 and was given its name at a meeting in 
Madrid in April 1989. It was created to study the "policing and security implications of the 
European Single Market", for example in relation to the lifting of Community internal 
frontiers. It aimed at improving cooperation to "compensate for the consequent losses to 
security and law enforcement".44 The main work of Trevi 1992 was drafting the 'Trevi 
Programme of Action", for the whole Trevi Group, which was adopted at the ministerial 
meeting in Dublin in June 1990. However, the Trevi 1992 Group also worked with the 
customs group MAG 92 and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration to give: "early 
attention to the study of a possible computerised information system for law enforcement 
purposes which would operate for the benefit of all Member States".45 This refers to the 
European Information System. Trevi 1992 was dismantled by the Ministers meeting in 
London on 30 November 1992, as the ministers considered it had fundamentally attained 
its original objectives. The Trevi Senior Officials group was given general coordination 
responsibilities on immigration controls and Trevi III got back responsibility for the 
remainder of work on the same subject matter.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Europol was also part of the Trevi structure. It 
was set up after a meeting in Luxembourg in June 1992, following the report on "The 
Development of Europol" agreed in Maastricht in December 1991. Later, this ad hoc 
working group took over part of Trevi 92 and Trevi III’s work. It was responsible for the 
preparation of the Europol Drugs Unit (E.D.U.) and of Europol. It drafted the ministerial 
agreement creating E.D.U.46 Furthermore, until the entry into force of the Treaty on 
European Union, it was preparing the Convention on the establishment of Europol. The 
Project Group on Europol was set up to help the Working Group on Europol. According 
to the agreement signed by Trevi ministers in June 1993, the Project Group was to 
investigate the most efficient means for exchanging intelligence on traffic of drugs and 
associated money laundering activities.
Finally, it may be recalled that, as far as Trevi is concerned, the senior officials 
group and the working groups had frequent meetings 47 more than the ministerial group. 
The working groups made a report before each ministerial meeting, which was channelled 
through the senior officials group. In addition, and similarly to the EC and EU, there was 
the Trevi "troika". It was formed by three senior officials, one from the current presidency, 
one from the previous and a third from the next one. They were responsible for the
44 Briefing note on Trevi prepared by MS 18 (the European Unit in the Metropolitan Police of the United 
Kingdom) on 26/2/90, Home Affairs Select Committee, 363-1, p.xxi, quoted by Bunyan, T. "Trevi, 
Europol and the New European State", in State watching..., op. cit., p. 15 at 34, footnote 9.
45 Idem, at p.31.
46 See Statewatch, Vol.3, May-June 1993, No.3.
47 Sixty four meetings in the framework of the Trevi Group were counted for 1991 and 1992 (41) and 
1993 (23). For details see "Appendix 3 - Secret Europe: List of Meetings", in Statewatching... quoted 
supra, pg.185 and Statewatch bulletin, vol.4, No.l, January-March 1994, pg.9. See also "EU: list of secret 
meetings, 1991-1992, under the 'third pillar' (policing, immigration and judicial cooperation)" and "EU: 
list of secret meetings, 1993” in STATEWATCH Eurofile no 7, London, Statewatch, 1994. For 
adjournments see the Statewatch bulletin.
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administration of the Trevi group and assisted and briefed the current Presidency and its 
officials. The "troika" method was also used for individual working groups, like the one on 
terrorism. Finally, the Trevi secretariat was not permanent and was provided by the State 
which held the presidency. Therefore, every six months it moved from one EC capital to 
another.
b) The Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration
This group was created as a result of a British initiative, on 20 October 1986, in 
London, in a meeting of EC Ministers responsible for immigration, counter-terrorism and 
drugs, and a representative of the Commission. Its task was "to consider the coordination 
of visa policies, measures to eliminate abuse of the right of asylum and fraud in connection 
with passports, as well as ways of reconciling stricter surveillance at the Community’s 
external frontiers with the elimination of formalities at its internal frontiers"48
The creation of this group symbolises the beginning of the second phase of the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation. The European Single Act established the new objective of 
building up an internal market "without internal frontiers". The future abolition of internal 
border controls made a new approach on issues related to immigration necessary. The 
importance of controlling the movements of persons increased. From then onwards, 
immigration related matters were no longer merely one of the various fields in which 
security was at stake, that were treated by working groups concerned with security like 
Trevi. Immigration matters had to be addressed as a field in its own right, with a whole 
range of problems to be solved. At one point, it was envisaged that the responsibilities that 
were eventually accorded to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration, would be put 
under the framework of the Trevi Group to form a "Trevi IV". However, in the end it was 
decided to set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration to be coordinated by the 
Commission.49 The importance of the security aspects of the movement of persons 
increased with the prospect of total abolition of border controls. The need for common 
action was stronger than before. That need derived from a new factor: in the future 
Member States could no longer rely on national controls at internal borders. Security 
controls had to be performed at the external frontiers and reinforced within the territory of 
the Member States. Both types of security controls had to be harmonised to ensure their 
concrete and global efficiency.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration [hereinafter AHWGI] met for the 
first time on 26 November 198650 and set up the first two working sub-groups: on the 
Right of Asvlum and Forged Documents.51 Soon, three other sub-groups were created: on
48 20th General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, point 998. See also Bull.EC, 
10/1986, pp,75-77.
49 Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit., p. 16.
5® The full list of the meetings of the AHWGI (at a ministerial level) is the following: 26/11/86, 
28/4/1987 in Brussels, 9/12/1987 in Copenhagen, 3/6/1988 in Munich, 9/12/1988 in Athens, 12/5/1989 in 
Madrid, 15/12/1989 in Paris, 15/6/1990 in Dublin, 7/12/1990 in Rome, 13-14/6/1991 in Luxembourg, 2- 
3/12/1991 in The Hague, 11-12/6/1992 in Lisbon, 30-11&1/12/1992 in London and 1/6/1993 in 
Copenhagen. In May 1993, in Kolding, Denmark, there was also a meeting of the Interior and Justice 
Ministers which dealt with some issues related to immigration. See Bull.EC of the relevant months.
51 Bunyan, T. in "Trevi, Europol and the New European State", p.15 at 34, footnote 12.
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External Frontiers, on Expulsion and Admission and on Visas. Later a special sub-group 
on Refugees from ex-Yugoslavia was also created.
The Commission was a full member of the group and the secretariat was provided 
by the general secretariat of the Council. The group reported to the ministers of the 
Interior of the Member States, not to the Trevi ministerial group, as such.52
After its creation, the AHWGI became the Working Group responsible for almost 
all the work in the field of immigration from third countries, and in general, for most of the 
work on control of movements of persons coming from and going into the Member States. 
The most important binding instrument which it concluded was the so-called Dublin 
Convention: the Convention on the determination of the State responsible for examining 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European 
Communities.53 This Convention was concluded in June 1990. It was the only formally 
binding instrument agreed upon in the framework of Intergovernmental Cooperation. It 
was signed by all Member States54 but it has not yet entered into force because two 
Member States have not yet ratified it.55 Another Convention drafted by the AHWGI was 
the Convention on the Crossing of External Frontiers. It was supposed to be signed in 
June 1991, but until now this was not possible due to the disagreement between the 
United Kingdom and Spain on the status of Gibraltar. It is important to note that the 
External Frontiers Convention included several important measures envisaged by the 
"Palma Document"(discussed below in relation to the Coordinators Group), which to the 
present time have not been implemented. Recently, the Commission presented a new draft 
of this Convention in the framework of the Third Pillar of the European Union.56
Besides the drafting of these Conventions, the AHWGI has dealt with a wide range 
of matters relating to the harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies. However, no 
other legally binding instrument has been adopted. In the field of asylum, besides the 
Dublin Convention, the AHWGI adopted several resolutions and conclusions with the 
general aim of limiting the possibilities of presenting asylum applications 57 In April 1987, 
for example, the group proposed the application of sanctions on airlines transporting 
passengers without the required travel documents or with false documents. Such 
resolutions and conclusions do not have legal binding force, but in practice their standards 
have already begun to be applied by some Member States. The AHWGI has also approved 
several resolutions on the admission of immigrants from third countries, as well as on 
action against illegal immigration and on expulsion. These will be dealt in detail in chapter
8. Furthermore, the AHWGI worked on the approximation of visa policies and on the 
production of a manual of common instructions for consular posts. The AHWGI also 
proposed the creation and did some of the preparatory work for the installation of C1REA 
(Centre for Information, Research and exchange on Asylum),58 EURODAC (European 
Automated Fingerprint Recognition System, to control, e.g., the fingerprints of asylum
52 Benyon, John et al. Police Co-operation in Europe.... op.cit., p.162.
53 Published in BuIl.EC, 6/1990, pp. 155-162.
54 By 11 Member States in 15 June 1990 and later also by Denmark.
55 Ireland and the Netherlands did not yet ratify it.
56 COM (93) 684 of 10/12/1993, analysed in chapter 8, section A.
52 See Bunyan, T. & Webber, Frances Intergovernmental Co-operation..." op.cit., at pp.24-30.
58 The setting up of which was approved by the immigration ministers at the end of 1991.
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seekers) and CIREFI (Centre for Information, Research and Exchange on the crossing of 
Borders and Immigration).59 Finally, the AHWGI kept regular contacts with third 
countries in matters relating to its field of interest, including the conclusion of the so* 
called "parallel Conventions" to the Dublin and External Frontiers Convention, and the 
conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries.
c) Other Early Working Groups
There were some other working groups dealing with matters directly or indirectly 
related to the establishment of the internal market, and in particular with the consequence 
of the abolition of internal controls. The following are the most important of these groups.
The Working Group MAG (Mutual Assistance Group) was responsible for 
customs cooperation. It dates from 1972, when it was set up in the framework of the 1967 
Naples Convention, on mutual assistance in customs matters. At its highest level it 
brought together the directors of customs services of the Member States.60 It worked 
closely with the EC institutions: the Commission provided its co-presidency and 
secretariat. In addition, the Commission’s G.D. XXI (on customs union and indirect taxes) 
played an active role in it. There were two sub-groups of MAG: MAG and MAG 92, The 
objective of the first group was to combat the illegal traffic of sensitive goods, namely 
weapons and drugs. MAG 92 was created in 1989 and had the responsibility of studying 
and preparing for the consequences for customs arising from the internal market and free 
movement of persons. Sub-groups of MAG 92 dealt with the up-date of the Naples 
Convention, the reinforcement of controls at the external frontiers and the installation of a 
Customs Information System, which was similar to the European Information System. 
MAG 92 ceased to exist before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.61
The Ad Hoc Working Group on International Organised Crime was set up in 
September 1992, in a special ministerial meeting following the assassination by the Mafia 
of Italian judges, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. The group was established to 
pursue action against international organised crime. It undertook a survey of organised 
crime in the EC and compiled a report on that subject for the ministerial meeting of 
Kolding, in Denmark, in May 1993. The report explained the nature and structure of the 
Mafia and other organised criminal groups operating in the Community. It also made 
recommendations on cooperation between Member States to combat organised crime. 
Interestingly, the Commission and the Council secretariat were observers to the meetings 
of this group, although they had no formal role within it.
The Police Working Group on Terrorism was created in 1979, following the 
assassination of the UK ambassador to the Netherlands. It promoted cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism at a more operational level than that of Trevi. Along with the 12 
Member States, membership of this working group also included Austria, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden. It was this group that developed the fax system later used by Trevi for coded 
communication.62
59 The setting up of which was approved by a ministerial meeting in November 1992.
60 It also includes Turkey, as an observer.
61 Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit., p.20.
62 Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol and the European State", op.cit., at pp.20-21.
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VThe Judicial Cooperation Working Group on Criminal Matters was part of the 
European Political Cooperation Group.63 The group aimed to encourage judicial 
cooperation by preparing conventions and agreements to facilitate mutual legal assistance. 
It dealt with extradition, combating the funding of terrorism (on which its work was 
parallel to that of Trevi I), fraud vis-à-vis the EC budget (parallel to the Commission’s 
work in the Unité pour la Co-ordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude), and mutual legal 
assistance. The Group on Judicial Cooperation on Criminal Matters drafted a number of 
treaties in specific issues, but none of these were either signed by all the Member States, 
or entered in force. The drafted treaties were concerned, for example, with the transfer of 
condemned persons, the simplification of extradition procedures and the suppression of 
legalisation of acts. This group, for instance, began the work on what eventually became 
the Convention on Extradition with the consent of the person concern, which was signed 
by the representatives of the Member States in March 1995.
Within the framework of European political cooperation, there was also a group 
which dealt with the fight against terrorism (concentrating on the diplomatic aspects) and 
another dealing with narcotic drugs. These groups had working ties with Trevi and the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Immigration.64 Other groups working on the fight against drugs 
were the Pompidou Group and the working group CELAD. The Pompidou group was set 
up in 1971 and functions within the framework of the Council of Europe.65 CELAD 
{Comité Européen de Lutte Anti-Drogue) was formally approved by the Strasbourg 
European Council of December 1989 and aimed to co-ordinate several aspects of the fight 
against drugs, including prevention, health policy, repression and international aspects of 
that fight. CELAD was therefore responsible for the coordination of the drugs related 
work of Trevi III, of MAG and of the working group on drugs operating under the 
political cooperation framework.
Finally, reference has to be made to the GAFI ( Groupe d'Action Financière 
Internationale) which worked against the laundering of capital and to the Horizontal 
Group, which was set up for the purpose of preparing the technical aspects of the 
European Information System.
Other working groups did and do exist, but they function within the framework of 
other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe66 and thus, fall outside 
the scope of this thesis.67
63 The latter was set up in October 1970, following the approval of the Luxembourg (or Davignon) report, 
with the objective of concerting on and eventually harmonising the foreign policy of the Member States.
64 Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Croup..., op.cit., pp.20.
65 Apparently, there was a further working group on drug addiction, which was created in 1987. Initially 
it coordinated the Member States' ratification and implementation of international Conventions on the 
fight against narcotics traffic. Later this group reoriented its activities towards the Community framework 
and concentrated on the analysis of the health and prevention aspects of drugs consumption. See Mise en 
oeuvre du traité de Maastricht..., pp. 183-184.
66 For a review of other working groups in the field of international migration and asylum see Cruz, 
Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit., June 1993, pp.20-25.
67 For a detailed account of existing working groups in the field of internal security and immigration in 
Western Europe see "Appendix 1- Glossary of bodies and organisations" in Statewatching..., op.cit., at 
pp. 173-181.
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d) The Coordinators Group
The proliferation of intergovernmental working groups, with the duplication and 
overlapping of some of their activities, made the need for coordination more acute. Thus 
the Coordinators Group (also known as the Rhodes Group) was created by the 
European Council of Rhodes in December 1988. The objective of this group was to 
coordinate the work of the intergovernmental working groups so as to reinforce their 
global efficiency. It also aimed to identify and contribute to ways of overcoming problems 
that could delay the implementation of compensatory measures for the abolition of border 
controls.
In real and symbolic terms, the third phase of the Intergovernmental Cooperation 
began with the constitution of this group. In practical terms the need to improve efficiency 
stemmed from the fact that the deadline of 1992 was approaching and there was a delay in 
the adoption of the required measures. Furthermore, the constitution of this group marks 
the beginning of a slow transition towards the new institutional structure introduced by the 
Treaty on European Union.
The Coordinators Group was responsible for the coordination of almost all 
intergovernmental groups working close to the European Community in the areas of 
internal security and abolition of border controls on persons. It coordinated the work of 
Trevi(s), AHWGI, MAG, the European Political Cooperation Group and the Horizontal 
Group. The official name of the group is "Group of Coordinators of Free Movement of 
Persons". However, this may be misleading because this group coordinated activities that 
clearly go beyond the measures required for free movement of persons - such as those of 
Trevi, notably in relation to the fight against terrorism.
The Coordinators Group was formed by high level civil servants from the EC 
Interior Ministries and a representative of the Commission. It met monthly to analyse 
reports of the several working groups and to decide which matters should be forwarded to 
the Ministers' meetings. On the basis of the working groups reports, it prepared six- 
monthly reports to the European Council meetings at the end of each Presidency.
The first task assigned to the Coordinators Group to produce a report setting out 
the measures required for the abolition of border controls, specifying those which were 
indispensable and those which were only desirable. The group adopted this report in Las 
Palmas (thus it was called the "Palma Document") and it was approved by the 
European Council in Madrid in June 1989. This document will be examined in more detail 
below.
With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the work of the 
Coordinators Group was taken over by the K4 Committee, discussed in chapter 7.
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e) Overview of Activities Undertaken in Early Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Prior to the Treaty on European Union
(i) The "Palma Document", the declaration of Paris and the "Trevi Programme"
A sense of disorganisation prevailed in the activities of the Intergovernmental 
Cooperation groups before the Coordinators Group was created. The first work of this 
group was the elaboration of the "Palma Document".68 This is a report for the 
European Council with an inventory of the measures required for the abolition of internal 
border controls, in relation to persons. It distinguishes between indispensable measures 
and desirable measures and sets out an indicative timetable for their adoption or 
application. It refers to measures dealt with by several fora, both by Intergovernmental 
Cooperation groups and EC organs. It mentions the organ or body that should be 
responsible for preparing each measure.
The "Palma Document" envisaged action in a wide range of areas; at external and 
internal frontiers; as well as inside Community territory in relation to: combating drug 
trafficking, combating terrorism, admission to Community territory (visa policy), granting 
asylum and refugee status, expulsion ("removal"), judicial cooperation in criminal and civil 
matters and in matters concerning articles carried by travellers, including animals. The 
report did not deal with positive measures regarding the integration of third country 
nationals residing in the Union. In this regard, the only reference made was to a "study of 
the abolition of checks on third country nationals" at internal borders. A vague reference 
was also made to the desirability of "harmonisation where necessary of laws on aliens in 
general and immigration in particular". No reference was made to the possibility of 
extending Community rights of free movement between Member States to third country 
nationals.
The "Palma Document" was unanimously adopted by the Coordinators Group and 
unanimously approved by the European Council in Madrid in June 1989.
On 15 December 1989, the Trevi ministers meeting in Paris issued a declaration in 
which they expressed their determination to develop cooperation in law enforcement and 
security, whilst rejecting the idea that the Community should be closed to people from 
outside, and stressing the importance of the freedom of movement of persons. The need 
for further cooperation was held to derive from the fact that "[terrorists and professional 
criminals are increasingly adept at exploiting the limits of competence of national 
agencies".69 The development of cooperation was envisaged in four areas: communication 
and exchange of information (including the creation of a common information system); 
technical training; liaison officers and frontiers. As far as frontiers are concerned, the 
declaration envisaged the introduction, at external frontiers, of controls "which will 
safeguard the interests of all Member States", the allocation in the long term of a
68 The Palma Document also published in the report of the House of Lords, Select Committee for the 
European Communities, ¡992: Border Control of People, Session 1988-1989, 22nd report, pp.55-64. It 
circulated also in the European Parliament - see the annex 1 of Communication No.19/90 to the Members 
of the Committee for Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights, doc.ref. PE 143.470, DOC_PO/CM/93290.hcb, 
28/8/1990, confidential.
69 Bunyan, T. (ed.) Appendix 6 of State watching.,., op.cit., at p.196.
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European level radio frequency "common to all services of public safety", and the framing 
of bilateral agreements on hot pursuit.70
In 1990 the Trevi Group presented its Action Programme,71 which was a kind of 
developed version of the "Palma Document" for the security area. The Programme was 
divided into three chapters: Areas of Cooperation, Methods of Cooperation and 
Implementation of Cooperation. It envisaged cooperation between police and security 
services in a wide range of areas, for the Trevi Group on the whole. Those areas included: 
combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime; the technical and scientific 
police field and the training of personnel. With regard to combating illegal immigration, it 
was agreed that "co-operation between the relevant departments shall include in particular 
the exchange of information to assess the scope of the phenomena: the development of 
migratory flows, the discovery of clandestine immigration networks, the identification of 
aliens reported for the purposes of refusal of entry to a Member State and of aliens 
considered likely to compromise public order, [and] the techniques used in the 
manufacture of travel documents".72 Several methods of cooperation were conceived, 
such as exchanging experts and liaison officers, posting of liaison officers outside the EC, 
police cooperation in common frontier areas, trans-frontier observation and pursuit rights, 
and the study of a common information system - designed to collect data and descriptions 
of persons and objects. As far as control at external frontiers was concerned, the 
Programme envisaged that "Member States may, by means of special agreements, co­
ordinate the deployment of their personnel and facilities and develop the forms of co­
operation they consider appropriate. Such co-operation could involve, inter alia, the 
exchange of officers specialised in immigration problems."73 Finally, the possibility of 
extending cooperation to other subjects "concerning public order and internal security" 
was envisaged.
The Trevi Programme of Action was adopted by the Trevi ministers' meeting of 
Dublin in June 1990. For a long time, it was the main framework for police cooperation 
between Member States, although it was not fully implemented.74
(ü) Europol
Although the idea had been discussed for quite a while, it was in the European 
Council meeting of Luxembourg, in June 1991, that the creation of Europol was first 
proposed by Germany. Police cooperation and Europol were mentioned in the Treaty on 
European Union75 and a declaration was annexed to it confirming the agreement reached 
on the matter in June 1991.
70 Idem.
7  ^ Officially the Action Programme relating to the Reinforcement of police cooperation and of the 
endeavours to combat terrorism or other forms of organised crime, June 1990. This Programme 
circulated in the European Parliament - see Annex 3 of Communication No. 19/90 to the Members of the 
Committee for Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights, quoted supra.
72 Paragraph 5 of the Programme, op.cit., p.40.
73 Paragraph 11 of the Programme, op.cit, p.43.
74 Mise en oeuvre du traité de Maastricht..., p.192.
75 Article K.l(l)(9).
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As a first step to Europol, the Trevi ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, on 1-2 
June 1993, signed an agreement on the creation of the Europol Drugs Unit (E.D.U.). It 
was agreed that the Unit would "act as a non-operational team for the exchange and 
analysis of intelligence in relation to illicit drug trafficking, the criminal organisations 
involved and associated money laundering activities affecting two or more Member 
States/'76 Later, at the Essen Summit on 9-10 December 1994, the remit of the E.D.U. 
was extended to include nuclear crime, vehicle trafficking (car crime), "crimes involving 
clandestine immigration networks" and associated money-laundering operations.77
The Europol Convention78 was concluded on 26 July 1995. However, the issue of 
judicial control on Europol activities has not yet been definitively settled, since the United 
Kingdom persists in refusing to accord the EC Court of Justice jurisdiction on such 
activities. Meanwhile, it seems that the national parliaments of some Member States, 
particularly those of the Benelux are not willing to ratify the Convention without the 
guarantee that the EC Court of Justice will have jurisdiction on it, including as far as the 
United Kingdom is concerned.79
In a first phase, it is envisaged that Europol will have competence to act in order to 
prevent and combat, inter alia, "illegal immigrant smuggling" and "trade in human 
beings".80 The Council, acting by unanimity, may also instruct Europol to deal with "other 
serious forms of international crime". One of these types of crimes may be "crime against 
life, limb or personal freedom", like "racism and xenophobia".81
(iiï) EIS
The secrecy of the work of intergovernmental groups, like Trevi, required that the 
exchange of information and communication in general be surrounded by special 
guarantees of safety.82 In September 1986, Trevi I decided to created a secure, dedicated 
fax system to improve communications.8^  Also in 1986, the Police Working Group on 
Terrorism began installing its own coded fax system. This system was so successful that 
Trevi decided to install the same equipment throughout its network: the Trevi Secure Fax 
Network (TSFN). However, the TSFN soon became overloaded. In the mean time the 
AHWGI also called for a computerised list of "inadmissible aliens". It became clear that 
there was a general need for a safe system of exchanging information.84
76 See the text of the agreement in part 3 of STATEWATCH Euroftle, No.l, London, Statewatch, 1994. 
See also Statewatch, Vol.3, May-June 1993, No.3.
77 Article 2(2) of the Joint action 95/73/JHA concerning the Europol Drugs Unit, adopted by the Council 
on 10 March 1995, on the basis of Article K.3(2)(b) of the Treaty of European Union, OJ L 62/1-3 of 
20/3/1995. See also Statewatch, Vol.4, November-December 1994, No.6 and Bull.EC, 12/1994.
78 Convention of 26 July 1995 based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), OJ C 316/2, of 27/11/1995. On this 
Convention see Bunyan, Tony 77ie Europol Convention, London, Statewatch, 1995 (with bibliography).
79 See MNS, July 1995 and Statewatch, Vol.5, November - December 1995, No.6, p.5.
80 Article 2(2), first paragraph, of the Europol Convention, quoted supra.
81 Idem, Article 2(2), second paragraph, and Annex of the Convention.
82 For a detailed analysis of the work on police communications between Member States, including the 
work of the Trevi, the European Information System, the Europo! Drugs Unit and the systems of the 
Schengen Group, see Police Co-operation in Europe, op.cit., pp.219-248.
Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol and the European State", op.cit., at p. 18.
84 The European Political Cooperation Group has its own system of communications: COREU.
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Trevi II tried to address the problem. It worked in police communications on an 
EC-wide level and in the problems related to communications between Schengen and non- 
Schengen countries. However, this was not sufficient and a permanent solution for the 
communications problem was sought in a future European Information System (EIS), to 
be used for several law enforcement purposes.
The AHWGI, together with Trevi and MAG 92 tried to address the problem,85 
which was also considered by the Coordinators Group. Following this, in the second half 
of 1992, the technical work on the EIS passed to the Horizontal Group, at the request of 
the European Council of Lisbon, in June of that year. The Coordinators Group had the 
responsibility of drawing up a Convention on the use of the EIS.
The EIS has been drawn up using much of the experience of the Schengen 
Information System and is very similar to it in technical terms.86 A Convention on the EIS 
has been in preparation for some years and is now being negotiated under the framework 
of the Third Pillar of the Union.
Benyon, John et al. Police Co-operation in Europe..., op.cit., p.239 and Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol 
and the European State", op.cit., at p.3I.
86 For a comparison between the Schengen Information System and the European Information System, 
with reference to the rules on the exchange and use of information, see the paper of Magraner, Ana 
"Coexistence des différents systèmes informatiques SIS-SIE", presented at the EIPA colloquium "From 
Schengen to Maastricht", held in Maastricht, on 15-16/12/1994.
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2 - C o o p e ra t io n  be tw een  so m e  M e m b er S ta te s  only  - S ch en g en 87 
a) G en era l
The origins of the Schengen Group go back to the Saarbrücken Agreement, signed 
by France and Germany on 13 July 1984. This Agreement was a vague document, 
expressing the common will of both countries to abolish the obstacles to the free 
movement of persons between them. It was a response to a large movement of lorry 
drivers who, in the Spring of 1984, protested against the long queues of lorries at borders 
between Member States by blocking the crossing of numerous frontier posts.88
This was followed by the Schengen Agreement of June 1985, which involved 
France, Germany and the Benelux States. This was solely a programmatic agreement 
which envisaged some technical measures to facilitate the movement of persons and 
essentially it established a wide list of issues in which the authorities of the respective 
countries would cooperate. These issues included approximation of laws on visas, 
coordination of the fight against drug trafficking, irregular entry or residence of persons, 
smuggling, tax fraud, police cooperation, extradition, international judicial cooperation, 
harmonisation of laws on arms and explosives, registry of travellers at hotels and "certain 
aspects of the law on foreigners in relation to nationals of non-member states of the
European Communities".^
On 19 June 1990, a Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement90 was 
signed by the same parties to the Schengen Agreement itself. To date, ten Member States
87 There is an extensive bibliography on Schengen. See, e.g. Blanc, H. "Schengen: le chemin de la libre 
circulation en Europe" RMCUE, 1991, No.351, p.722; Chocheyras, Luc "Les Accords de Schengen", in 
Les Accords de Schengen - Quelle Politique Migratoire Pour la Communauté?, Luxembourg, Institut 
Universitaire International Luxembourg, 1992, pp. 101 -146, and "La Convention D'Application de 
L'Accord de Schengen", AFDI, Vol.XXXVII, 1991, pp.807-818; Donner, J.P.H. "Abolition of Border 
Controls" in Free Movement of Persons..., op. cit., p.5; Foblets, M-C, "Europe and its Aliens After 
Maastricht, The Painful Move to Substantive Harmonization of Member-States Policies Towards Third- 
Country Nationals", American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol.42, 1994, No.4, pp.783-805; GISTI, 
Conséquences de l'entrée en vigueur de la Convention de Schengen, GISTI/FTDA, 1995; Julien- 
Laferriére, F. "Que négocie-t-on à Schengen? Note sur les accords de Schengen" Plein Droit, 1989, No.8; 
Meijers, H. et al. (eds.) Schengen: Internationalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, 
Refugees, Security and the Police, 2nd.ed., Leiden, Stichting NJCM-Boekerij, 1992; Neel, B. "L’Accord 
de Schengen", L'Actualité Juridique-Droit Administratif, October 1991 Oct, No.20, p.32; O’Keeffe, "The 
Schengen Convention...", YEL, op.cit; O'Keeffe, David "Non-Accession to the Schengen Convention: The 
cases of the United Kingdom and Ireland" in Schengen en Panne, Pauly, Alexis (ed.) Maastricht, EIPA, 
1994, p. 145; Pauly, Alexis (ed.) Les accords de Schengen: Abolition des frontières intérieures ou menace 
pour les libertés publics?, Maastricht, EIPA, 1993; Pauly, Alexis (ed.) Schengen en Panne, op.cit.; Philip 
& Boutayeb "Schengen (Accords de - )" in Dictionnaire Juridique des Communautés Européennes, 
op.cit., pp.981-991; Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.). Free Movement of Persons in Europe..., op.cit.; Schutte, 
J. E. "Schengen, its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe” CMLRev, Vol.28, 1991, No.3, 
pp.549-570; and The Schengen Agreement: introduction, bibliography and full text, Statewatch Briefing 
Paper No.2, London, Statewatch, 1992. See also the Editorial Comments "Schengen: the pros and cons", 
CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.3, pp.673-678.
88 Cruz. Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit., p.3.
89 Article 19 of the Schengen Agreement.
90 See, e.g.. I.L.M., Vol.30,1991, No.l, p.73.
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of the European Union are party to the Schengen Implementing Agreement: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.91
The Schengen Implementing Agreement developed and materialised the agreement 
of 1985, providing for the total elimination of border checks between the contracting 
parties. This objective is to be achieved in two ways: by the reinforcement and 
harmonisation of controls at the external borders of the "Schengen Area" and by closer 
cooperation among national polices. The Implementing Agreement envisaged that the 
Schengen Information System would be the fundamental tool by which to ensure and 
facilitate these measures. The Schengen Information System is an electronic data-base 
which lists persons and objects wanted or inadmissible to the Schengen countries. The SIS 
is composed of a central data-base located in Strasbourg (the Central SIS or C-SIS), and 
the national data-bases of each member country (each country having its own National SIS 
or N-SIS). The National data-bases are connected on-line with the Central data base.92
The Schengen Implementing Agreement is quite a comprehensive document, 
covering a very wide range of areas. It includes a considerable number of measures which 
have been dealt with separately by the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups and even by 
the Community. For this reason it has been considered as a model for providing solutions 
which may, in the future, cover all Member States.93
The Agreement begins by making a number of relevant definitions in its Title I: e.g. 
that for the purposes of the Agreement an alien is "any person other than a national of a 
Member State of the European Communities".94 Title II relates to the abolition of checks 
at internal borders and movement of persons. Its provisions deal with crossing internal 
frontiers, external borders, visas, conditions governing the movement of aliens within the 
Schengen Contracting Parties, residence permits, reports concerning a person not to be 
permitted entry, measures relating to organised travel (responsibility of carriers for 
transporting passengers without the proper travel documents) and responsibility for 
processing applications for asylum. Title III relates to police and security. It deals with 
police cooperation, mutual assistance in criminal matters, application of the principle non 
bis in idemy extradition, transfer of the execution of criminal judgments, narcotic drugs, 
and with firearms and ammunition. Title IV relates to the Schengen Information System 
and deals with its establishment, its operation and utilisation, the protection of personal 
data and the security of data under the SIS, and, finally, apportioning the costs of 
establishing and utilising the SIS. Title V refers to the transport and movement of goods. 
Title VI establishes further rules on the protection of personal data, notably the obligation 
of all Member States, before the entry into force of the Agreement, to "adopt the national 
provisions required to achieve a level of protection of personal data at least equal to that 
resulting from the principles of the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for
91 See infra for a reference to the present situation of Austria and the Scandinavian countries as far as the 
Schengen Agreements are concerned.
92 For a detailed overview of the SIS's functioning see Benyon, John et al. Police Co-operation in 
Europe..., op.cit., pp.228-237.
93 See, O’Keeffe, "The Schengen Convention...", op.cit., in particular at pp.217-219.
94 Article 1.
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the protection of individuáis with regard to automatic processing of personal data.”95 Title 
VII refers to the Schengen ‘’Executive Committee” and Title VIII contains the final 
provisions of the Agreement, establishing, for example, that the Agreement is subject to 
Community Law and to the UN Conventions on Refugees.
Within the framework of the Schengen group, a readmission agreement of illegal 
immigrants was signed with Poland. In relation to some Schengen States, the Agreement 
was entered into force prior to the entering into force of the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement.96
b) S tru c tu re
At present, the structure of Schengen is quite complex. The highest level of 
responsibility lies with the Ministers and Secretaries of State of the Schengen countries, 
who make up the "Executive Committee", provided for by Title VII of the Schengen 
Implementing Agreement, and which is the highest Schengen authority. The Committee 
meets each six months. Below the Executive Committee, is the Central Negotiations 
Group, which has practical responsibility for all Schengen working groups and ad hoc 
committees.
There are four main Schengen working groups. Working Group I deals with police 
and security matters. It includes sub-groups on the harmonisation of national laws on 
controls on weapons (FIREARMS), on telecommunications in general (TELECOM), on 
radio frequencies for police use (FREQ) and a sub-group of legal experts (EX JUR), 
which was responsible for drafting the Schengen Implementing Agreement, Working 
Group II deals with problems more directly related to the movement of people and 
external border controls. It has four sub-groups. One developed a COMMON 
HANDBOOK for officials at external frontiers posts. Another deals with issues related to 
ASYLUM. A third sub-group works on VISAS and on issues related to documentation, 
forged documents and passports. A final sub-group prepares READMISSION agreements 
with non-Schengen countries. Working Group III deals with matters related to transport, 
which, by the way, are also addressed in the official Community framework. Finally, there 
is the Working Group IV which works on matters related to customs and movements of 
goods, including problems related to agricultural products and their transportation. It has 
four sub-groups: on PUBLIC HEALTH in general, on agricultural products 
(PHYTOS AN), on Environment and on customs affairs (COCOM).
A fundamental Working Group in Schengen is ORSIS. This group is responsible 
for the general ORientation of the Schengen Information System. It has several sub­
groups dealing with different parts of the SIS, or aspects of its use. These sub-groups are 
as follows. One is responsible for SIRENE (Supplementary Information Requested at 
National Entries). The purpose of this information system is to enable the exchange of 
information necessary for the preparation, or for following-up, of a certain action, which is 
to be requested or was already requested. It also allows for broader police
95 Article 126 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement. The Convention of the Council of Europe was 
published in ETS, No. 108. It was ratified by 16 countries, including Iceland, Norway, Slovenia and alt 
Member States, except Greece and Italy.
96 Published in Schengen: Internationalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens .... op.cit., at 
Pp.215-7.
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communications.97 Another sub-group works on VISION (the Visa Inquiry System in an 
Open-Border Network). This is the system for exchanging information on visa 
applications and visa issues. It allows for consultations between the Member States as 
provided for by Article 17(2) of the Schengen Implementing Agreement. Further sub­
groups are SINFONE (S IRENE Information Network) and CODEX (Conference on Data 
Experts). Under ORSIS there is also the sub-group PMT (the Project Management 
Team), and PWP (the Permanent Working Party).
Several other working groups operate in the Schengen framework and report to 
the Central Group. There is a "Permanent Administrative Committee" and other working 
groups dealing with specific subject matters. Among the latter is STUP (stupefacients), 
working on the handling of legal and illegal narcotic drugs; and there are the Working 
Groups dealing with TREATIES AND REGULATIONS (working on relations with the 
Dublin Convention and Community Law, preparation of readmission agreements, and new 
accessions), AIRPORTS and EXTERNAL FRONTIERS.
c) Schengen fu ture: en la rg em en t o r  absorp tion  by  the Union?
According to the Final Act of the Schengen Implementing Agreement, the practical 
implementation of the Agreement depended on the fulfilment of certain conditions: namely 
that "checks at external borders are effective". On several occasions, a date for initiating 
the implementation of the Agreement was set out. However, the required conditions were 
not met and the implementation was repeatedly postponed. Some technical problems with 
the Schengen Information System contributed to these delays, but there were also some 
political problems. Because of its reluctance to withdraw its border controls, the French 
government is generally regarded as having delayed the implementation of the Agreement. 
This is thought to have been due to perceived difficulties on the part of the French 
authorities in the control of illegal immigration as well as to the Dutch liberal policy on 
drugs.
Finally, in 26 March 1995, the Schengen Implementing Agreement began to be 
applied between Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal. Some 
technical and legal problems have already arisen from its application. However, for the 
time being they seem to be of secondary importance and do not seem likely to block the 
general implementation of the Agreement.
Italy and Greece, which are also parties to the Agreement, have not yet begun to 
apply it. In the case of Greece, this seems to be due to problems in the control of Greece's 
borders, namely in the Mediterranean. In Italy the problem seems to revolve around 
technical difficulties (there is a delay in setting up the Italian N-SIS) and the fact that Italy 
does not have a law on the protection of personal data. According to Pastore, this is due 
to the lobbying efforts of several Italian enterprises, that presently treat personal data 
without any limits regarding the privacy of the concerned persons, and have an interest in 
maintaining the present status quo - i.e. virtually a total absence of rules.98
97 Note that due to the rapid growth of demands for exchanging police and immigration information, at 
the meeting of the Schengen Committee in Brussels on 28 April 1995, a second communications network 
between the Schengen Countries was created. It is called SIRENE Phase II.
98 See Pastore, M., "Frontière aperte ma non per noi", ASPE, Year XIV, No.7, 13/4/1995, p. 12.
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France has also continued to raise problems.99 Following the explosion of bombs 
from the Summer of 1995 onwards, France has made recourse to Article 2(2) of the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement. This provision allows for the "temporary" replacing 
of controls at the national borders of a Member State, on the grounds of public order or 
national security. However, the temporary character of such controls has in practice been 
questioned by the high officials of the French government. They have made it clear that for 
now, controls at French borders will be made for an indefinite period.100
The Schengen Group is likely to expand in the future. For a long time it has had 
contacts with non-signatory countries. Apparently, the Schengen countries put pressure*01 
on Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden to join Schengen when they entered the Union. 
Switzerland has also indicated a willingness to have working ties with Schengen. As far as 
Austria is concerned, it formally joined the Implementing Agreement on 28 April 1995. 
However, it still has some work to do before being able to abolish border controls with 
other Schengen members. Moreover, the ratification of the Austria’s accession by the 
national Parliaments of other Member States is likely to take some time.
As far as Sweden, Finland and Denmark*02 are concerned, lately they have shown 
interest in joining the Schengen group. However, these three countries would prefer their 
participation in the Schengen system not to affect the Scandinavian passport-free zone - 
which also includes Norway and Iceland. Norway seems interested in participating too, 
but the Schengen Implementing Agreement is only open to Member States of the 
European Communities.103 Alternatives to the formal accession of Norway and Iceland to 
the Schengen Implementing Agreement, could be a parallel Convention to Schengen, 
special bilateral arrangements, or further developing the rules on free movement of 
persons within the European Economic Area.104 On 16 June 1995 an agreement was 
reached with the Nordic Union which will allow Norway and Iceland to become associate 
members. They will be allowed to join the Schengen "acquis", but will not be able to 
participate in Schengen itself. They will not participate, for example, in the Schengen 
Executive Committee.105 Later, in their meeting of 20 December 1995, the Schengen
99 For an account of some legal difficulties in France see he Monde, 8/4/1995. There are also some 
problems related to the reluctance of France in applying all Schengen rules, namely those regarding the 
right of hot pursuit by non-French police. See MNS, 5/1995.
*°° See The European, 21-27 December 1995.
*°* Or invitated them, depending on who tells the story.
102 On the criteria Denmark has to meet to join the Schengen Agreement, see "SCHENGEN Checklist 
given to Denmark" in Statewatch, Vol.5, January-February 1995, No.l.
103 Article 140 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement.
104 The European, No.259, 28/4-4/5/1995. See also Statewateh, Vol.5, March-April 1995, No.2, which 
quotes the Danish Presidency report agreed by the Prime Ministers of the Nordic Union meeting in 
Reykjavik on 27 February 1995. That report called for: "a Nordic arrangement with the Schengen 
Cooperation so as not to create new borders within or between the Nordic area and the rest of Europe". 
The report recalled that for a long time the Nordic Union cooperated against crime, drugs and illegal 
immigration and maintained that the checks carried out by Nordic countries at their external borders 
match those of the Schengen countries. Thus, the Prime Ministers agreed in that meeting that Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland would only apply for Schengen membership if Norway and Iceland were also 
admitted. See also the Information note on Nordic Passport Union, Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, 
15/5/91. SN 2245/91.
105 Statewateh, Vol.5, July-August 1995.
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ministers agreed in principle to allow Denmark, Finland and Sweden to join the Agreement 
and pledged to start negotiations as soon as possible. It was also decided to grant Finland, 
Sweden, Norway and Iceland, observer status from 1 May 1996. Denmark already had 
observer status.106
It is too soon to say whether all Member States, including the United Kingdom and 
(thus) Ireland, will one day be part of the Schengen group. What may also happen is that 
EU-wide structures, e.g. the European Information System and the External Frontiers 
Convention, will provide a framework which may come to resemble the provisions of 
Schengen. Thus, in practice, it may not make much of a difference whether the remaining 
Member States formally accede to the Schengen group, or simply accept EU-wide 
structures and solutions similar to those of Schengen.107
As explained in chapter 1, this dissertation will not make a very detailed analysis of 
the Schengen Agreements and of the legal issues they raise for third country nationals in 
the European Union. Nevertheless, given their considerable practical importance, 
Schengen rules and practices will often be mentioned when the corresponding rules and 
activities developed by all Member States are examined in the following chapters.
3 - A sse ssm e n t o f  in te rg o v e rn m e n ta l  c o o p e ra t io n  p r io r  to  th e  T r e a ty  o n  
E u ro p e a n  U n io n 108
a) Efficiency: the w ork a n d  th e  resu lts
The work of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups has not always lived up to 
the ambitious aims of their founders. One of the reasons usually given for the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation's lack of efficiency is the proliferation of working groups 
dealing with the same subjects, or with closely related aspects of the same subjects. 
Overlapping and loopholes were inevitable.109 This was also due to the fact that they
106 Idem.
107 An exception here is the possible insistence by the United Kingdom on retaining its border controls 
with other Member States, while applying Union measures and rules, e.g. as far as the reinforcement of 
external border controls is concerned.
1°8 See Benyon, John et al., Police Co-operation in Europe.... op.cit., pp.!46-151(on Schengen) and 
pp. 165-168 (on Trevi, cf. with pp. 131-133, which assesses Interpol); Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol and the 
European State", op.cit., p.23 (on Trevi) and pp.32-33 (in general); Bunyan, T. & Webber, Frances 
Intergovernmental Co-operation..., op.cit., pp.31-33; Cruz, An insight into Schengen, Trevi and .... 
op.cit., pp.5-6 (on Schengen) and 11-12 (on the Executive Committee of Schengen and the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice on Schengen); Curtin, D. & Meijers, H. "The principle of open government 
in Schengen and the European Union: Democratic retrogression?", CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.2, pp.39I- 
442, at 403-416 (on "Openness and Schengen"); the European Parliament's Piquer report on cooperation 
in the field of justice and internal affairs under the Treaty on European Union, of 1 July 1993, doc.ref. A3- 
215/93, at pp.l 1-12; O'Keeffe, "The Schengen Convention...", op. cit., pp.185-219; and Mise en oeuvre 
du traité de Maastricht.... p.197 (on the proliferation of ad hoc working groups). On police cooperation 
see Den Boer, Monica "European policing after 1992", JCMS, Vol.31, 1993, No.l, pp.3-28, and her 
"Europe and the Art of International Police Co-Operation: Free Fall or Measured Scenario?", in Legal 
Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, O'Keefe, David & Twomey, Patrick (eds.), London, Chancery, 1994, 
pPj279-291, in particular at 289.
109 See Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Croup.... op.cit., pp.l4 and 28, footnote 36, and p.14. See 
also the memorandum of evidence of the UK Immigration Law Practitioners' Association submitted to the
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lacked the coordination necessary to achieve global efficiency. The working groups that 
aimed to overcome this problem were not entirely capable of ensuring such coordination.
In any case, the results of the Intergovernmental Cooperation differ among its 
various working groups and even among sub-groups of the same group. For example; the 
results of Trevi I, on cooperation against terrorism, are usually regarded as being quite 
satisfactory. As to Schengen, it certainly managed to set up a rather sophisticated system 
of control of the movement of persons. However, it took a very long time to do so, even 
considering the important technical and political difficulties that it had to address. In 
relation to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration which existed for 7 years (from 
the end of 1986 to the end of 1993), none of the instruments adopted or drafted by it 
presently has binding legal force.
Nevertheless, even in this case it would be inaccurate to draw a completely 
negative picture of its work. First, the AHWGI has adopted decisions, which, although not 
having a binding legal force, have been implemented in practice by the EC governments. 
The United Kingdom, for instance, applied the concept of safe third country (country of 
first asylum) after it was agreed within the AHWGI - i.e. from 1990 onwards, three years 
before it was enshrined in national legislation.110 Secondly, the AHWGI prepared most of 
the work on common measures and the harmonisation of national laws in the field of free 
movement of persons within the Union and immigration from third countries. A 
considerable part of the work now being developed in this field under the Third Pillar of 
the Union is in fact a continuation of the work of the AHWGI. However, since the lack of 
efficiency of the Community decision-making process was one of the crucial reasons given 
for choosing the Intergovernmental Cooperation to deal with immigration related matters, 
the least that can be said is that the Intergovernmental Cooperation did not prove to be 
much better than the Community framework in ensuring agreement among all Member 
States on such sensitive issues.
Furthermore, as far as Schengen is concerned, it is important to note that the 
methods and legal solutions used by the Schengen group have frequently served as a 
model for non-participating countries. In the legal field, some solutions of the readmission 
agreement between the Schengen States and Poland have inspired the draft of readmission 
agreements among other countries. In the technical field, one example of Schengen 
influence is the fact that the new computer system of the British Police (PCN2) uses the 
same software as the Schengen Information System.111
b) F u n c tio n in g  m ethods and  dem ocracy
The working methods of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups lacked 
general transparency and democratic accountability.112
Home Affairs Committee in the framework of an inquiry into migration controls at the external borders of 
the European Community, INLP, Vol.6, April 1992, No.2, pp.48-52.
110 See Bunyan, T. & Webber, Frances Intergovernmental Co-operation.... op.cit., at p.31.
111 Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol and the European State", op.cit., at p.36, footnote 58. Note also that in 
April 1995 the British Prime Minister John Major announced that his government plans to introduce 
identification cards in Britain.
112 The past tense is used because almost all Intergovernmental Cooperation between Member States is 
now carried out under the framework of the Union, and thus will be examined in the next chapter.
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The intergovernmental groups developed their work in highly secretive ways. 
Usually the content of their decisions and draft decisions was only made public when they 
were adopted. This situation reached a somewhat unacceptable and ridiculous point when 
even the full content of the decisions taken was not made public. As Bunyan & Webber 
recall:
"There may be (...) measures and agreements discussed in ministerial meetings 
and implemented by police and immigration officials, of which we were unaware.
As it is, the measures we know about usually come to our attention when it is too 
late to change them."113
The lack of information may have derived from an understandable concern for 
security. However, while such concern may have been justifiable in fields like cooperation 
against terrorism, it hardly seems justifiable in most of the decisions on immigration and 
asylum matters. Most frequently it appears that the lack of information simply derived 
from the will to act without public discussion and consequent possible criticism. This is 
certainly hard to justify in a democratic society.
Nevertheless, as Cruz rightly points out in relation to Schengen, sometimes the 
problem was not that the relevant information was not available, but that there was not 
enough interest shown by the media or the relevant associations concerned with the work 
of the intergovernmental groups.114 Nevertheless, the most important point from a 
structural perspective is the way in which decisions are prepared and taken. The decision­
making procedure used by intergovernmental groups is open to severe criticism because of 
the lack of proper information made available to the public.
The decision-making procedure of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups may 
also be criticised for its lack of adequate democratic accountability. In this regard it may 
be recalled that the doctrine of the separation of powers was fundamental to the creation 
of the modem State in Europe. Executive, legislative and judicial powers are supposed to 
be separate, at least as a general rule. In the Community framework, the dominance of the 
Council (composed of representatives of EC governments) and the relative lack of powers 
of the European Parliament already goes against that principle. However, the functioning 
methods of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups depart still further from that 
principle. They lack the usual democratic characteristics of equivalent activities at the 
national level. In most cases, the work of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups gives 
civil servants a privileged access to decision-making without having adequate 
parliamentary accountability or judicial control.
Another important aspect to be stressed is that the European Parliament did not 
participate in the Intergovernmental Cooperation and was not properly informed of its 
activities.115 The same applies to national Parliaments, with a few exceptions.116 The
However, the situation described and analysed in the text still persists for Schengen and also for other 
remaining working groups in which all EC States participate (on terrorism, e.g.).
113 See Bunyan, T. & Webber, Frances Intergovernmental Co-operation..., at p.31.
114 As far as Schengen is concerned see on this point: Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., 
op.cit., pp.5-6.
115 Cruz recalls also that, following MEP's protests and several Parliament resolutions, the Ministers of
the Foreign Affairs of the Twelve decided on 7 May 1990 to initiate a procedure of contact with the 
European Parliament. This included a meeting every six months between the president-in-office of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Immigration and the chairpersons of the European Parliament committees
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participation of parliaments in the decision-making process is not only a guarantee of 
democracy in itself. It is also a way of ensuring that the draft measures will be made 
known to and discussed by the general public. This is a very important factor in favour of 
the participation of the European, or national parliaments in the preparatory phases of the 
adoption of decisions by the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups.117
Another important point is that the European Court of Justice had no jurisdiction 
in relation to the decisions of the Intergovernmental Cooperation groups.118 Neither was 
there a unique judicial authority with jurisdiction over the decisions or activities of the 
intergovernmental groups.
As far as Schengen is concerned, the powers of its "Executive Committee" 
established by the Schengen Implementing Agreement have been much criticised. 
According to Article 131 of that Agreement, the purpose of the Committee is to ensure 
that the Agreement "is implemented correctly" and for that purpose it takes the necessary 
measures, deciding by unanimity.119 Such wide powers were criticised by several official 
entities, notably by the Council of States of Netherlands and Belgium, the French and 
Italian Senates and the French Constitutional Council.120
The role of the European Commission in the work of intergovernmental groups 
may also be recalled here. That role differed according to the various groups. The 
Commission participated as a member in the ministerial meetings of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Immigration, which functioned under its coordination. In relation to Trevi, the
concerned. See Cruz, Schengen,Ad hoc Immigration Group.... op.cit., p.25, footnote 2. Nevertheless, the 
European Parliament was not satisfied with this and continued to approve resolutions criticising the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation.
1 ^  As far as Schengen is concerned, on the occasion of the ratification of the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement, the Dutch and Belgian parliaments obtained the right to be given all draft decisions of the 
Schengen Executive Committee, and to object to them within a period of two weeks. A similar right was 
proposed within the German Parliament, but was rejected. See Statewatch, Vol.5, July-August 1995, No.4. 
In more general terms, on the role of national parliaments in the Community and Union decision-making 
process, see, e.g., the short but instructive overview made in chapter 6  of Mise en oeuvre du traité de 
Maastricht..., at pp.401-468, in particular pp.412-414,418-420,431-432 and for a summary pp.461-466.
1 1 7  For Schengen see the interest account made by Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit.,
Ç'i*
1 1 0  Except if they overlapped with Community Law, but to the knowledge of this author there was no 
case submitted to the European Court of Justice in which the measures or activities of the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation groups were at stake. They are only indirectly at stake in case C-445/93, 
Parliament v. Commission, abstract of the Parliament's petition in OJ C 1/12 of 4/1/1994.
1 1 9  Article 132(2) of the Schengen Implementing Agreement. This Article adds that the Committee 
"shall draw up its own rules of procedure". The rules of procedure of the Executive Committee of 
Schengen were adopted on 18 October 1993 and later modified in Paris on 14 December 1993 and include 
15 Articles. They are contained in the Schengen document: SCH/Com-ex (93) 1, Rev. 2, Paris, 
14/12/1993. For a critical analysis of them see by the Standing Committee of Experts on international 
immigration, refugee and criminal law, "Schengen: Rules of Procedure of the 'Executive Committee' ", 
doc.ref.CM 193-207, published in the documents for the Seminar on judicial and parliamentary control o f  
European rules concerning refugee and immigration law, Brussels, 14 January 1994, pp.41-52.
1 2 0  Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group..., op.cit., p.l 1. See also p.12 for an eventual solution of 
the problem of the excessive powers of the Committee. See also the full text of the opinion of the Dutch 
Council of State on the Schengen Agreement in part 20 of STATEWATCH Eurofile No. 1 , London, 
Statewatch, 1994.
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European Commission took part in Trevi 92 from the beginning of 1991.121 A 
representative of the Commission was present for the first time in a Trevi ministerial 
meeting in June 1991, when the work of Trevi 1992 was discussed. Subsequently, until the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, a Commission representative was 
always present in the Trevi six-monthly ministerial meetings.122 As referred to above, 
from the beginning of 1992 onwards, representatives of the Commission attended, as 
observers, the meetings of the senior officials of the Trevi group, following a long 
insistence by the Commission that it should have the right to do so.123 As regards the 
Dublin Convention, Article 18(1) thereof provides for the participation of the Commission 
as an observer in the discussions of the Committee set up to coordinate its 
implementation. Likewise, the Commission can also participate in the working parties of 
the same Committee. Finally, the Commission was and still is an observer in the ministerial 
meetings of the Schengen Group,124 although its participation in the Schengen Executive 
Committee is not envisaged by the Implementing Agreement.125
In any case, the role of the Commission in the various intergovernmental groups 
was quite secondary. This was the case even in the AHWGI, because the major initiatives 
were usually taken by the Member States, particularly by those holding the group’s 
presidency. Not having the exclusive right of initiative, the Commission had little 
bargaining power. Thus, the Commission's participation in the work of the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, besides a purely informative interest, served mainly to 
provide technical assistance.
Finally, an important point must be recalled in relation to the work of the 
Intergovernmental Cooperation. It was not concerned with positive measures for third 
country nationals.12^  It was concerned with limiting immigration from third countries, as 
part of a more general concern with fighting crime and guaranteeing security in the 
Member States. There were no similar European institutions or Member States 
cooperation groups working positively in favour of third country nationals.
1 2 1  Bunyan, T. "Trevi, Europol and the European State", op.cit., at p.20.
1 2 2  General Reports on the Activities of the European Communities of 1991 and 1992 and Bull.EC, 
6/1993 point 1.4.19.
1 2 3  See Bunyan, T. in "Trevi, Europol and the New European State", op. cit., p.15 at p.34, footnote 5.
1 2 4  See the answer given by Lord Cockfield on behalf of the Commission in 22 February 1988 to the 
Written question of James Ford, No.2004/87 of 10 January 1988 (8 8 /C 195/26):"The Commission takes
part as an observer in the ministerial meetings organised by the Schengen group. It is informed in its 
capacity of the work carried out to implement the Schengen Agreement and studies closely any measures 
planned. However, no concrete proposals have so far been made on the measures announced by the 
Schengen Group in the areas referred to by the Honourable Member [immigrants, refugees or exiles].” See
O JC 195/14 of 25/7/1988.
1 2 5  However, note that the EC Commission is to be allowed to be present at the Committee meetings.See 
Cruz, Schengen, Ad hoc Immigration Group.... op.cit., p.27, footnote 31.
, 2 6  On this topic, as far as the Schengen system is concerned, see Frontier law: Why Schengen isn't 
working fo r  Europe's third country nationals, London, Immigration Law Practitioners' Association and 
the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, September 1995.
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CONCLUSION
The assessment of Intergovernmental Cooperation must be, on the whole, 
negative, with some reservations.
Some of the areas in which the Intergovernmental Cooperation operated (notably 
those concerning free movement of persons and third country nationals) could be dealt 
with under the Community framework, as has been argued in chapters 2 and 3. Among 
such areas are the areas related to the abolition of border controls on persons, for example 
areas related to immigration and immigrants from third countries. However, the Council 
can only act on Commission proposals and the latter had not presented proposals on those 
areas. Thus, judicial action against Intergovernmental Cooperation had to begin by 
questioning the Commission's failure to act and this was made by the European 
Parliament. It was suggested that Article 5 could be useful to justify why and to what 
extent Member States should not engage in Intergovernmental Cooperation to respect 
Community competence, in particular if the Commission decided to try to make the 
Community exercise its competence in those areas. It was also submitted that in the case 
of conflict between a rule produced by the Intergovernmental Cooperation and a positive 
and substantive rule enacted by a Community institution, the latter has primacy - at least 
from the point of view of Community Law.
Subsequently, this chapter made a detailed reference to the several ad hoc working 
groups preparing compensatory measures for the abolition of internal border controls. 
Such reference was intended to highlight how the concern with immigration matters was 
integrated into the general concern of the Member States on security problems. 
Furthermore, it showed the nature of the proliferation of intergovernmental groups. Their 
proliferation and the lack of effective coordination of their work have surely contributed 
to their relative failure.
Up to now, no legally binding instrument prepared by intergovernmental groups 
has entered into force, except for the Schengen Implementing Agreement, which does not 
apply to all Member States. Thus, it appears that the Intergovernmental Cooperation was 
not more effective than the Community framework to achieve agreement among all 
Member States on the sensitive matters at stake here.
Still, a negative assessment of the efficiency of the Intergovernmental Cooperation 
is mitigated by some important facts. First, by the considerable practical influence of the 
(non-binding) decisions of the ad hoc working groups. Secondly, by the long term 
importance of the activities developed under the Intergovernmental Cooperation 
framework. A substantial part of such work (namely the study of the relevant problems 
and the search for possible agreements between Member States) is valid in and of itself 
and had to be done in any case. Some of this work is also at the origin of the work 
currently being developed by the Third Pillar of the European Union.
However, the Intergovernmental Cooperation may be criticised in other aspects. 
The functioning of the intergovernmental groups lacked transparency, adequate 
parliamentary accountability and a uniform judicial control. Usually, secrecy surrounded 
the activities of the intergovernmental groups, and often even their very decisions. This 
clearly seems to be unacceptable in a democratic society. Moreover, the European and
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national parliaments often received insufficient information on such activities and decisions 
and thus could not control them in a proper manner. Furthermore, there was not a unique 
judicial authority with jurisdiction over the decisions or activities of the intergovernmental 
groups. Finally, the participation of the Commission of the EC's in the work of the 
intergovernmental groups, in matters so closely related to the establishment of an internal 
market, was of quite secondary importance, when it existed at all.
During the intergovernmental conferences that led to the conclusion of the Treaty 
on European Union, there was hope that this situation could be changed. The extent to 
which change was accomplished will be seen in the next chapter. Within the examination 
of the Treaty on European Union, the next chapter will also further develop the analysis of 
some negative aspects of the functioning of the Intergovernmental Cooperation, notably 
its lack of transparency and of uniform judicial control.
For now, it is important to emphasise that, to a significant extent, the activities of 
the Intergovernmental Cooperation constituted a Community job performed in another 
framework. This mainly refers to activities relating to the free movement of persons 
(including the abolition of internal border controls) and the legal status of third country 
nationals.
Moreover, the Intergovernmental Cooperation was not a good example of an 
efficient, transparent or democratic decision-making process. Finally, it was not meant to 
improve the position of third country nationals in the Member States. Its objective had 
generally a repressive character to control crime and immigration.
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PART II - THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
Chapter 7
THE NEW
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCED BY THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the new legal and institutional framework introduced by the 
Treaty on European Union and that is of relevance for third country nationals.
This Treaty created a "European Union" formed by the so-called "three pillars”. 
The "first pillar" corresponds to the old European Communities - including the "European 
Coal and Steel Community", the "European Atomic Energy Community", and the 
"European Community". The latter is the new name for the old European Economic 
Community. The "second pillar" corresponds to the "Common Foreign and Security 
Policy" and the "third pillar" to the "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs".1
The aspects of the Treaty on European Union that concern mostly third country 
nationals will be analysed in the following order.
In Section A an historical note will be made. It recalls the proposals related to third 
country nationals that were on the table of the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to 
the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union. The objective of this historical note is to 
contribute to the understanding of the intentions of the Treaty drafters, and to make clear 
how the final outcome was a compromise between diverging positions.
Section B examines Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. It created the 
"third pillar" of the Union, by providing a framework for "Cooperation in the Fields o f 
Justice and Home Affairs". It is predominantly under this Title that the European Union is 
supposed to address issues concerning third country nationals. First, this section will refer 
to the scope of the activities to be developed under Title VI. Secondly, it will deal with the 
types of activities to be undertaken and the decision making-process to be used. As far as 
the activities are concerned, the legal nature of the instruments to be adopted will be 
examined. In what regards the decision making-process two points will be analysed. One 
concerns the procedures to be used and the position of the different institutions therein. 
The other concerns the important issue of transparency in the institutional functioning of 
this framework. A third part of this section will deal with some legal limits established by 
the Treaty on European Union itself to the activities developed under its Title VI. The 
limits to be examined are the respect of fundamental human rights and the Member States' 
responsibilities "on law and order and the safeguarding of internal security". A fourth part 
of this section will deal with the judicial deficit in Title VI. Here I refer to the lack of a 
uniform judicial control on the activities developed and instruments adopted under Title 
VI, which is essentially derived from the lack of obligatory jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. A fifth part of this section explains the intermediate structure of decision making 
and law enforcement of Title VI. A sixth part examines the relations between Title VI and 
the European Community. A subsequent part deals with Article K.7 and with the relations 
between Cooperation developed under Title VI and other types of intergovernmental 
cooperation developed outside the Treaty on European Union. Finally, a general 
assessment of Title VI will be made.
1 The "Common Foreign and Security Policy" and the "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs" were established by Title V and Title VI, respectively, of the Treaty on European Union.
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Section C of this chapter deals with the amendments made by the Treaty on 
European Union to the Treaty of Rome which are of relevance for third country nationals. 
It will analyse the new Article 100C, with particular attention being given to the precise 
definition of its material scope. Furthermore, section C deals with the Protocol and 
Agreement on Social Policy, and with the provisions establishing Union Citizenship. 
Finally, a reference will be made to the changes introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union to some Community procedures for decision-making.
In this chapter I will not develop issues treated in other chapters, like the ad hoc 
intergovernmental cooperation between Member States (previous to the entry in force of 
the Treaty on European Union). This was dealt with in the previous chapter. Thus, 
references to this topic will be limited to what may be helpful in analysing the provisions of 
the Treaty on European Union itself. The same holds for the European Union activities 
already developed under the framework of Title VI. Some of these will be analysed in the 
next chapter, chapter 8. The next chapter analyses the activities of the European Union in 
the field of immigration policy: control of persons at the Union external borders, 
admission of immigrants to a Member State, and action against illegal immigration 
(including expulsion of illegal immigrants).
The present chapter analyses the provisions of the Treaty on European Union 
which are of relevance to third country nationals living in the Union. These provisions do 
not usually constitute substantive rules of law, but mainly establish a legal framework of 
competences and procedures to act on issues concerning those persons.
A) INTRODUCING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
- A HISTORICAL NOTE
On 7 February 1992, after hard negotiations, the representatives of the Member 
States of the European Communities signed in Maastricht the final draft of the Treaty on 
European Union. Then followed the ratification procedures, a protracted and sometimes 
dramatic process. This included the "No" vote in the first referendum in Denmark, the 
narrow "Yes" in the one in France, and the complex difficulties involved in the 
parliamentary ratification in the United Kingdom. Finally, after some other difficulties and 
another (positive) referendum in Denmark, the Treaty entered into force on 1 November
1993.
Presented as a "new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe",2 the Treaty on European Union represents the third big step in the 
process of European integration - after the Communities' founding treaties and the 
European Single Act. The limited progress it represented was the fruit of the general 
political and economic situation prevailing in Europe.
2  Article A, second subparagraph.
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As a logical development of the 1992 project, the Treaty is quite ambitious in the 
economic area. The "irrevocable" objective of having by 1999 a common currency is 
certainly the most important novelty of this Treaty. With that aim, common targets, 
detailed rules and new institutions are established. Furthermore, Community competences 
are enlarged in several fields and institutional changes are made. These give more power 
to the European Parliament and facilitate decision making in the Council.
However, provisions in other areas, also important for establishing a complete 
internal market, do not compare with the daring changes in the economic and institutional 
fields. As far as free movement of persons is concerned, progressive changes have been 
very limited. Immigration policies and the legal status of third country nationals are to be 
dealt with under the heading "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs". The 
Community may only act on some specific aspects of issues concerning visas.
The following sections will analyse the rules of the Treaty on European Union 
relevant for issues concerning third country nationals in the Union. But before that it may 
be useful to recall some of the proposals presented to the Intergovernmental Conferences 
that led to the conclusion of that Treaty?  This may facilitate the understanding of the 
intentions of the Treaty drafters, and make clear that the final outcome was a compromise 
between contrasting positions.
One of the early proposals concerning immigration matters was included in a joint 
letter of 6 December 1990, which was addressed by President Mitterrand and Chancellor 
Kohl to the Italian Presidency. It suggested that:
"Certain issues that are currently handled in an intergovernmental framework 
could enter the scope of the Union: [such as] immigration, visa policies, right of 
asylumf..). Consideration could be given to setting up a Council of Interior and 
Justice Ministers."3 4
To some extent this idea was later re-iterated by the "Non-Paper" of the Luxembourg 
Presidency, presented in 12 April 1991. It proposed the inclusion in the Treaty of Rome of 
a special Title with "Provisions on cooperation on home affairs and judicial cooperation". 
Article A therein stated that Member States:
"(...) shall regard the following areas as matters of their common interest:
(a) controlling the crossing of the external borders of the Member States;
3 For an historical overview of the negotiations in the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Treaty 
on European Union see Gialdino, C.C., II Trattato di Maastricht suW Unione Europea - genesi, struttura, 
contenuto, processodi ratifica, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato - Libreria dello Stato, 1993. 
For the most important working documents of the Intergovernmental Conference see Corbett, Richard, in 
The Treaty o f  Maastricht - From conception to ratification: a comprehensive reference guide, Essex, 
Longman, 1993, at pp.219-379; and Laursen, Finn & Vanhoonacker, Sophie The Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union - Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity o f  the 
European Community, Maastricht, EIPA, 1992.
4  They added that H[t]he new treaty could include a new provision allowing the transfer to the union of 
new powers to take action, on a decision by the European Council by means of a clear majority vote in 
Parliament". See the Joint letter of 6  December 1990 with a Memorandum to the Italian Presidency, 
completing their letter of 19 April 1990 to the Irish Presidency, in Laursen & Vanhoonacker, The 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union..., op.cit., at p. 313.
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(b) authorised entry, movement and residence on the territory of the Member 
States by nationals of third countries (in particular conditions of access, visa 
policies, asylum policies)".
This was supposed to be done for
"the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, as a result of the free 
movement of persons and the establishing of Union citizenship, and without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Communities".
Subsequent provisions provided for information, joint action and adoption of draft 
Conventions to be recommended for adoption to the Member States, similarly to the final 
version of the Maastricht Treaty.5 However, in the Luxembourg's "non-paper" the 
extension of Community competence to any of the matters referred to was not envisaged.6
Later on, the Dutch presidency presented a draft Treaty "Towards European 
Union", on 24 September 1991. It proposed to grant the Community competence on entry 
and movement of third country nationals in the territory of the Member States. It left for 
cooperation between Member States the harmonisation of rules on residence of third 
country nationals in a Member State. It proposed the addition of a new Article 100A bis in 
the EC Treaty, providing that:
"For the purposes of achieving the internal market, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
necessary measures concerning the entry into and movement on the territory of the 
Member States of nationals from third countries”.
However, a note of the presidency on this Article already stated that it proposed "drawing 
up new proposals on the subject, in the light of discussions to be carried out within the 
Intergovernmental Conference".
 ^ The sole exception was the lack of reference in the Luxembourg's "Non-Paper" to adoption of "joint 
positions", which are provided for in the Treaty on European Union. Note, meanwhile, that the 
expressions "joint positions" and "joint actions" are not an original idea of the Treaty on European Union. 
They are already mentioned by the Solemn Declaration on European Union, adopted by the Stuttgart 
European Council of 19 June 1983, when it reaffirmed the objective of strengthening and developing 
European Political Cooperation through their use. See Bull. EC, 6/1983, p.25.
6  However, note that Article C(3) of the same title established that if action by the Community was 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union, for instance those referred in the rule quoted in the main 
text, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, could decide unanimously to take "any appropriate 
measures." This provision was rather ambiguous. Did it provide for Community or Union competence? To 
make things clear, the possibility of adopting Community measures to support the objectives of the Union 
would be introduced in the EC Treaty, in a new Article 235A, by the "Draft Treaty on the Union" 
presented by the Luxembourg's presidency in 18 June 1991. According to that proposal the Council could 
even decide in what areas it would act by qualified majority. In any case, this new Article 235A does not 
substantially invalidate the assessment that the Community remained with no explicit competence on the 
matter. Under that provision, at most the Council could decide to adopt Community measures to support 
the Union objectives and only after request of the Council itself - acting within Article C(3) of the 
provisions of the title on "cooperation on home affairs and judicial cooperation". Note also that the latter 
document of the Luxembourg's presidency substantially repeated the rules of the previous document in 
almost all other respects of the matters here at stake. One exception was the previous reference in the 
mentioned Article A of the new Title to the European citizenship, which was deleted. See also Vignes, D., 
"Le Projet de la Présidence Luxembourgoise d'un Traité Sur L’Union* ", RM CUE, No.349, 1991, p.504.
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Simultaneously, according to the Dutch draft, a new "Chapter X", on "Home and 
Judicial Affairs", would be added to the EC Treaty. In that chapter, a new Article 220a 
would establish that:
"Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, and in accordance with 
the general objectives thereof, the Member States shall introduce cooperation in 
the following fields:
(a) harmonisation of the formal and substantive aspects of the residence of third 
country nationals on the territory of the Member States;
(b) harmonisation of the formal and substantive aspects of asylum policy;
(c) combating unauthorised immigration and residence on the territory of the 
Member States by third country nationa!s;(...)'’.
Subsequent provisions of the same chapter provided for the adoption of legal "measures" 
on the matter, envisaging only eventual jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on them.
The following Dutch presidency proposal, presented on 8 November 1991, was 
the "Draft Union Treaty".7 Its text developed the previous document and more closely 
resembles the final version of the Treaty on European Union.
A new Article 100C granted the Community explicit competence to deal with all 
aspects related to "the rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of 
the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon" and "the general conditions 
governing authorised entry to and movement" within the EC by third country nationals - 
"including the determination of the travel requirements required for crossing the external 
borders of the Member States". The EC powers on the entry and movement of third 
country nationals for short stay included specifically the determination of "the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States" and the adoption of "measures relating to the introduction 
of a uniform visa."8
Cooperation between Member States "injudicial and home affairs" would not have 
any application to those aspects concerning visas. It would deal with asylum policy, 
conditions for third country nationals’ entry and movement for long periods of residence, 
conditions of residence (including family reunion and access to employment), and the
7  See also Bull.EC, 9/1991, point 1.1.4., p.l 1.
8  According to Article 100C of that proposal: "1. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal of the 
Commission or on the initiative of any Member State, and after consulting the European Parliament, shall 
adopt the Directives relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States which concern the following areas, to the extent that such approximation is 
necessary to ensure the free movement of persons within the internal market: (a) the rules governing the 
crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; (b) 
the general conditions governing authorised entry to and movement within the territory of the Member 
States as a whole by nationals of third countries for short stays, including the determination of the travel 
requirements required for crossing the external borders of the Member States. The Council shall, in a 
manner laid down in the previous paragraph, [unanimously] decide which of the decisions are to be taken 
by a qualified majority. 2.The Council, acting by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission 
or on the initiative of any Member State, and after consulting the European Parliament, shall: - determine 
the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of 
the Member States; - adopt the measures relating to the introduction of a uniform visa."
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combating of unauthorised immigration and residence.9 The possibility of adopting joint 
positions, joint actions and proposals for Conventions on the fields subject to cooperation, 
was also envisaged.
Germany supported this Dutch proposal, but the United Kingdom successfully 
opposed it. The result was a compromise between the two diverging positions. In the final 
version of the Treaty, the Community was given competence only to define the uniform 
format for visas and to decide on the countries whose nationals would have to hold a visa 
to enter the Union. As Hendry states,
"(...) the two aspects of visa policy concerned were regarded as sufficiently self- 
contained and severable from the generality of immigration policy to make this 
compromise workable."
The fundamental issues related to third country nationals are not to be treated under the 
Community framework, but under the framework for Cooperation provided by Title VI of 
the Treaty on European Union. The setting up of this cooperation can be described as 
having been achieved through a grafting technique.11 It is the result of the will of some 
governments of the Member States to keep such areas outside the Communities'
framework.12
9  Article A of the "Provisions on cooperation in judicial and home affairs" provided that: "For the 
purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons and without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Community, Member States shall regard the following areas as 
matters of common interest: 1 .asylum policy; 2 .immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third 
countries: (a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member 
States for long periods of residence; (b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the 
territory of Member States, including family reunion and access to employment; (c) combating 
unauthorised immigration, residence by third country nationals on the territory of the Member 
States;(...)". Compare with the final version of Article K.1, quoted in the beginning of part I of section B 
of this chapter.
See Hendry, I.D., "The Third Pillar of Maastricht: Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs", German Yearbook o f  International Lawt Vol.36, 1993, p.295, at 302.
11 On the structure of the Union see, e.g., Curtin, Deirdre "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A 
Europe of Bits and Pieces", CMLRev, Vol.30,1993, No.l, p. 17; Dewost,J.-L., "Les Problèmes Posés par la 
Structure du Traité: Quatre Points Particuliers", in The Maastricht Treaty on European Union-Legal 
Complexity and Political Dynamic, Monar, J. , Ungerer, W. & Wessels, W. (eds.), Brussels, European 
Interuniversity Press, 1993, pp.63-65; Everling, Ulrich "Reflections on the Structure of the European 
Union", CMLRev, Vol.29, 1992, No.6 , pp. 1053-1077; and Heukels, Ton & de Zwaan, Jaap , "The 
Configuration of the European Union", Community Dimensions of Institutional Interaction", in 
Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration - Essays in Honour o f  Henry Schemers, Vol.II, Heukels, 
Ton & Curtin, Deirdre (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 195-228. See also Maclay, Michael 
"The Community Beyond Maastricht - Multi-speed Europe?", London, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1992; and Ungerer, Werner "Institutional Consequences of Broadening and Deepening the 
Community: The Consequences for the Decision-Making Process", CMLRev, Vol.30, 1993, No.l, p.70.
^  The cooperation involved in Titles V and VI of the 1992 Treaty on European Union resembles De 
Gaulle's proposals of 1961 on a Political Union. They had the aim of "approximating, co-ordinating and 
unifying policies of the Member States in the spheres of foreign policy, the economy, culture and defense, 
under the general leadership of the Council of Heads of State or Governments". Decisions would be taken 
by unanimity. See Kapteyn, P.J.G. and Verloren van Themaat, P., Introduction to the Law o f  the 
European Communities, 2nd. ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 1989, p.21. The Treaty on European Union is a final 
confirmation of the alternative way followed by the Community in relation to economic issues. 
Meanwhile, the "caution" displayed in the Maastricht Treaty on common foreign and security policy may 
be more understandable. As far as Justice and Home Affairs are concerned, particularly in what regards
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B) THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE VI, ON "COOPERATION IN THE 
FIELDS OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS"
This section examines Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, which 
established a framework for "Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs", the 
so-called "third pillar" of the European Union. The analysis undertaken in this section 
endeavours also to put the legal examination of Title VI provisions in the context of the 
practical problems raised by the work already developed under this Title.13
1 - The Scope of the Activities
Article K of the Treaty on European Union establishes that cooperation in the 
fields of "justice and home affairs" is governed by the provisions of Title VI. Justice and *I
immigration issues, see part 8  of section B, on the assessment of Title VI, in which an explanation is 
proposed for the fact that the EC governments prefer to treat immigration issues within an 
intergovernmental framework.
I3  There is by now an extensive bibliography on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. Apart from 
works mentioned elsewhere, see, Gautier, Yves, "Titre VI, Article K à K.9", Traité de Maastricht sur 
L'Union Européenne, Constantinesco, V., Kovar, R. & Simon, D. (eds.), Paris, Economica, 1995; pp.813- 
859; and Monar, J. & Morgan, R. (eds.), The Third Pillar o f  the European Union - cooperation in the 
fields o f  justice and home affairs, European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1994. Some of the legal 
literature on the work and the structure of Title VI includes already the assessment of its functioning, 
particularly in view of the preparation of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. See, e.g, Hix, Simon, 
The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Future o f  the Third Pillar, CCME Briefing Paper, 
No.20, Brussels, June 1995; Lepoivre, M., "Le domaine de la Justice et des Affaires intérieures dans la 
perspective de la conférence intergouvemementale", CDE, Vol.31, 1995, Nos.3-4, pp.323-349; Lodge, 
Juliet "Justice and Home Affairs - The internal security agenda", in Crisis or Opportunity? Justice and  
Home Affairs, Series on "The European Union and the 1996 IGC", Hull, Centre for European Union 
Studies, 1995; O'Keeffe, D. "Recasting the third pillar", CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.4, pp.893-920, and 
"A Critical View of the Third Pillar", in From Schengen to Maastricht, Alexis, P. (ed.), Maastricht, EIPA, 
1995; Standing Committee of Experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal law, Proposals 
for the amendment o f  the Treaty on European Union at the IGC in ¡996, Utrecht, 1995. On the 
assessement of the operation of the Treaty on European Union see also the following reports of European 
institutions: the Bourlanges and Martin report of 4 May 1995, on the functioning of the Treaty on 
European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and 
Development of the Union, made on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs Affairs of the 
European Parliament, docref. A4-0I02/95/Part I.A, on a motion for a resolution (particularly at p.7), and 
Part I.B, with the explanatory statements (particularly at p.5); the Commission Report on the Operation of 
the Treaty on European Union, Brussels, 10th May 1995, SEC(95) 731 final (particularly pp.56-62); the 
Council Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union, Brussels, 1995 (particularly pp.35- 
38 and Annex XI(a)); the Court of Justice Report on Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on 
European Union, Luxembourg, May 1995 (particularly pp.3, 11 and 12). See also the older Piquer report 
of 1 July 1993, on cooperation in the field of justice and internal affairs under the Treaty on European 
Union (Title VI and other provisions), made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref. A3-215/93. On the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, in 
general terms, see, e.g.: Federal Trust for Education and Research, Building the Union: reform o f the 
institutions. The Intergovernmental Conference o f  the European Union 1996, Federal Trust Paper No. 3, 
London, June 1995, and State o f  the Union, The Intergovernmental Conference o f  the European Union 
1996, Federal Trust Paper No.l, London, February 1995; O'Keeffe, D., "From Maastricht to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference: the Challenges Facing the Union", U EI, 1994, No.2, pp. 135-151.
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Home Affairs is an umbrella expression covering a wide range of issues mentioned in 
Article K. 1. This makes up an exclusive enumeration of the areas to be regarded by the 
Member States "as matters of common interest", for the purpose of "achieving the 
objectives of the Union,14 in particular the free movement of persons".
The areas listed by Article K.l are the following:
" ( 1) asylum policy;
(2) rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member 
States and the exercise o f controls thereon;
(3) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries;
(a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the 
territory of Member States;
(b) conditions of residence by nationals o f third countries on the territory of 
the Member States, including family reunion and access to employment;
(c) combating unauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of 
third countries on the territory of Member States;
(4) combating drug addiction in so far as this is not covered by (7) to (9)
(5) combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not covered by (7) 
to (9);
(6 ) judicial cooperation in civil matters;
(7) judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
(8 ) customs cooperation;
(9) police cooperation for the purpose of preventing and combating terrorism, 
unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including 
if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the 
organisation of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a 
European Police Office (Europol)." ^
These areas include some fields specifically related to third country nationals - like 
asylum policy,*6 crossing of persons and controls at the external borders of the Union, 
immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries. Moreover, it may be 
noted that virtually all areas mentioned by Article K.1 were already objects of the
*4  The objectives of the Union refer also to the objectives and activities of the European Community. 
Among the latter are included: "an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between the Member 
States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital", and "measures 
concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal market as provided for in Article 100 C". 
See Title I (Articles A and B) in the Treaty of European Union and the new articles 2 and 3 in the Treaty 
of Rome - on the EC objectives and activities, respectively. 1 will discuss infra the relations between the 
activities of the Community and those of Title VI of the Treaty of European Union.
*5 a  declaration of the Conference on police cooperation confirms the agreement of the Member States on 
the objectives of the German delegation proposals, as presented at the European Council of Luxembourg 
of June 1991, and enumerates the priority areas for adoption of practical measures in this field.
I6  Under pressure from Germany, a Declaration of the Conference states that asylum issues would be 
considered a priority area, with the aim of adopting harmonisation action by the beginning of 1993. The 
Treaty did enter in force later than expected, but the Member States intensified their work on asylum and 
when the Treaty entered in force priority was given to harmonisation in the field of asylum and a 
considerable amount of work was developed. See, e.g., the Presidency Conclusions of the European 
Council Summit of Corfu (of 24 and 25 June 1994), in Agence Europe, No.6260, of 26 June 1994.
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intergovernmental cooperation between governments of Member States, which was 
analysed in the preceding chapter.
One inevitable remark is that, in Title VI, activities on third country nationals are 
again put together with judicial and police matters, which are part of the repressive 
activities of the governments of the Member States. The protection and integration of 
third country nationals in the European society or in national societies are mentioned 
nowhere in the Treaty on European Union.17 This, after all, follows the usual trend of the 
concerns of intergovernmental cooperation. The objective seems to be, if not repression 
(as in relation to illegal immigration), at least control of those persons. They appear as 
undesirable, as requiring control, and as demanding the same manner of combat as drugs, 
fraud and international crime. They are primarily a matter concerning police work.18
This assessment is only slightly mitigated by the argument that third country 
nationals are a political issue as sensitive as the other subjects of cooperation stated in 
Article K.l. But why not, then, envisage some measure at the European level, whatever 
that may be, to protect the rights of these persons? The planned judicial and police 
cooperation has not been sufficient to protect them,19 nor could it be claimed that this 
kind of action could tackle all the social problems they face.20
There is also, of course, the sovereignty argument, according to which justice and 
home affairs are one of the distinctive features of independent states and cannot be given 
away. However this argument does not fit very easily with, for example, the creation of a 
European common currency, traditionally a distinctive feature of a sovereign country.
17  At least not explicitly, not even in one of the Declarations annexed to the Treaty.
18 As Groenendijk puts it, there is "more attention for exclusion of new immigrants than for the position 
of settled immigrants", see Groenendijk, C.A. "Europese migratiepolitiek na Maastricht: uitbreiding en 
beperking van vrijheden" in Migrantenrecht, 1991, p.76, at 78. See also the curious remarks of Mancini, 
who wonders whether the fact that the Treaty on European Union deals with the migratory phenomenon 
in the optic of free movement of persons and not in terms of social policy and labour law, represents 
"social frigidity”. He believes that is not the case, "at least south of London". Nevertheless, his former idea 
is a quite interesting one. See Mancini, G. F., "II govemo dei movimenti migratori in Europa", Diritto del 
Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, 1992, No.54, pp.233-242.
19  Note, however, that Community and Union initiatives against racism were developed in the follow-up 
of the European Council of Corfu of June 1994. As early as May 1993, the Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs of the governments of the Member States said they have decided to "initiate a collection and 
analysis of information on expressions of racism and xenophobia in Member States with a view to 
identifying the possibilities of enhancing counteraction". See Agence Europe, No 5977 (10-11/5/93). p.8  
and Bull.EC, 6/1993, point 1.4.19. Nevertheless the fact remains that no action in favour of third country 
nationals in the EC was envisaged in the Treaty on European Union. In any case, it may also be recalled 
that police departments may not always be the most trustworthy of people to protect third country 
nationals, if their behaviour in the last few years is taken into consideration. See, for France, Gresh, Alain 
"Ces Immigrés si coupables, si vulnérables - La démagogie contre Íe Droit", Le Monde Diplomatique, 
May 1993, p.3.
2 0  Note that the Agreement on Social Policy has not been used yet to adopt binding measures on third 
country nationals, and its scope of action (as far as third country nationals are concerned) is limited to 
conditions of employment of legally resident workers. See infra, section C.
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2 - Activities and Decision Making-Process 
a) Activities
As far as cooperation on Home and Justice Affairs is concerned, there are several 
types of action envisaged by Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union: (I) information 
and consultation for coordination on action, including collaboration between 
administration departments; (II) adoption of joint positions and promotion of cooperation; 
(HI) adoption of joint action and (IV) the drawing up of Conventions.
Article K.3( l) states that in the areas of common interest:
"Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council with a 
view to coordinating their actions. To that end, they shall establish collaboration 
between the relevant departments of their administrations."
This cooperation includes both cooperation between representatives of the governments of 
the Member States and direct collaboration between equivalent national departments.
Besides that simple information and consultation for coordinated action, Article
K.3(2)(a) also provides that the Council
"adopt joint positions and promote, using the appropriate form and procedures, 
any cooperation contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union".
Member States are then required to defend such common positions "within international 
organisations and at international conferences in which they take part".
A third level of activities is the adoption of joint action and of implementing 
measures for it. Relating to this there is the application of the subsidiarity principle, which 
was also introduced by the Treaty on European Union in the new Article 3B of the Treaty 
of Rome.21 In fact, Article K.3(2)(b) states that joint action would be adopted
"in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than 
by the Member States acting individually on account of the scale or effects of the 
action envisaged" . 2 2
A fourth type of activity envisaged is the drafting of conventions, which the 
Council will recommend the Member States adopt, "in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements". There is no doubt as to the legal nature of the Conventions 
envisaged in Article K.3(2)(c). They are formal treaty instruments binding their 
Contracting Parties under international law.
Examples of the conventions suitable to be adopted in this way are the Dublin 
Convention, on applications for asylum in the Member States, and the draft Convention on 
controls at the external borders of the Community.23 Other examples are the Europol 2
21 See supra section C of chapter 2, for an analysis of the relevance of the subsidiarity principle (as 
included in Article 3B of the EC Treaty) for the possibilities of Community action on third country 
nationals.
2 2  This seems to be a reinforcement of the rule provided by the last paragraph of Article A of the Treaty 
on European Union.
2 3  See the previous chapter for a more complete reference to both these two Conventions, drafted within 
the ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation framework, and the next chapter for an analysis on the draft 
convention on the Crossing of the External Frontiers of the Member States, presented by the Commission 
under Title VI.
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Convention, already concluded,24 and the Convention on the European Information 
System, still being negotiated.
Some authors,26 quite sensibly, regret the absence in the Treaty of rules 
formalising the features that characterise conventions adopted under Article 220 of the EC 
Treaty.26 In practice the drafting of conventions under this EC Treaty provision has a 
number of similar points to that of the Community acts.27 The Commission is in this 
respect fully associated with the work of the Member States. The initiative of elaborating a 
convention is usually taken by common agreement of the Commission and the Council. 
The negotiations between the national representatives are attended by the Commission, 
which may even publish its opinion on the final drafts. Last, but not least, the European 
Court of Justice is usually assigned with competence for interpretation and ruling on any 
disputes regarding the application of the conventions.28
The rules of Title VI do not prohibit the adoption of Conventions with this kind of 
procedure. But it is far from obligatory, to say the least. The Commission may end up 
having had no decisive intervention in the elaboration of the conventions. According to 
Article K.3(2), it may present proposals to the Council,29 but Member States may also 
present them. The Council is the sole institution entitled to take the initiative on certain 
subjects,30 and in all cases is the one which adopts the final draft. Furthermore, the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret the Conventions and to rule on disputes 
regarding its application will exist only if it is explicitly established in each Convention.31 
This lack of obligatory competence of the Court of Justice on the Conventions adopted in
2 4  At least partially concluded, since the issue of judicial control has not yet been definitively settled, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter.
2 6  Stangos, Petros N., "Les Ressortissants D’États Tiers au Sein de L'Ordre Juridique Communautaire”, 
CDE, Vol.28, 1992, No.3-4, p.307, at 342.
2 6  That provision states that "Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with 
each other with the view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: - the protection of persons and the 
enjoyment and protection of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by each State to its own 
nationals (...); - the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards."(Emphasis added). Two other areas are also 
referred to, but they are not very important for the purposes of this thesis. One is the abolition of double 
taxation. The other relates to companies and firms: their mutual recognition by Member States, the 
retention of legal personality in case of transfer of their seat from one country to another, as well as the
That was not the case in relation to the Rome Convention of 1967, on mutual assistance between 
customs administrations and on the "decisions of the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council". However, strictly speaking, these decisions are not within the powers 
granted by Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. See Isaac, op. cit., pp. 136-8.
2 9  Except in the fields referred to in Article K.l(7) to (9), as established by Article K.3(2). Note that the 
Commission does not have the formal power of presenting proposals in Article 220 of the EC Treaty.
3 0  The ones referred in Article K. 1 (7)to(9), as mentioned supra.
31  Third indent of Article K.3(2)(c). Hendry states that, "even if the European Court of Justice is not 
accorded [that] jurisdiction, the convention might still be enforceable by the International Court of Justice 
or another international tribunal, depending on the extent to which the jurisdiction of any such authority 
has been reciprocally accepted by Contracting Parties to the convention." See Hendry, op.cit., at p.313. 
The problem is that not all Member States have accepted the obligatory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. France, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Italy have not yet accepted such jurisdiction.
Stangos, idem, p,342 and Isaac, Guy, Droit Communautaire Générât, 2nd. ed., Place, Masson, 1989, at
& 36' 28 Th
136.
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pursuance of Article K.2(c), as on the activities developed under Title VI in general 
terms,33 simultaneously materialises and symbolises (here, again) the lack of progress in 
the Treaty on European Union.
Meanwhile, it is established that the recommendation and approval of Conventions 
will be done without prejudice to Article 220 of the EC Treaty.33 The precise relationship 
between Article 220 of the EC Treaty and Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European 
Union, as well as the definition of their scope, are in no way solved by this reference. To 
try to clarify this relationship may prove to be almost as complicated as to clarify the 
relations between Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in general, and Community 
Law - a problem that will be addressed below.34 In this context, we should note that 
Article 220 of the EC Treaty only applies for the benefit of EC nationals.35 On the 
contrary, issues concerning third country nationals only indirectly may benefit nationals of 
a Member State. That is particularly clear in the case of asylum.
Legal Nature of the Decisions
The precise legal character of the decisions of the Council is not always entirely 
clear. This may become a tricky question, in particular considering the fact that no 
obligatory judicial control is envisaged for the activities pursued under Title VI.36
The legal nature of the Conventions is clear. So too is the legal nature of the 
decisions envisaged by Article K.9, in which the Council decides to apply 100C of the EC 
Treaty to some of the activities dealt with under Title VI. This Council decision is a mere 
recommendation, with no binding effect in itself, since for such transferral to occur 
Member States have to agree with it according to their constitutional procedures.
However, the legal nature of the joint positions and joint actions does not seem so 
clear. Are joint positions acts mainly of a political character, and the joint action decisions 
of a legal nature? 37 Or is the legal character reserved to the implementing measures of 
joint action? The Treaty itself does not seem to help us much in coming to answers to 
these questions. A formal analysis of Article K.3 might suggest that the successive 
reference to "joint positions", and promotion of "cooperation" (to contribute to the Union 
objectives), "joint action" and even "conventions", would imply an "ascending order of 
formality" or of "anticipated substantive scope" between them.38 Understood this way, 
"joint positions" would be the weaker instruments and "Conventions" undoubtedly the 
stronger.
Meanwhile, "joint actions" have been published in series L of the Official Journal 
of the European Communities. From a general perspective, it is interesting that Union
3 3  Infra, it will be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice exists as far as the EC Treaty 
provisions that apply to Title VI are concerned. See Article K.8  and, infra, the part on transparency and 
the sub-section 4, on the lack of an obligatory uniform judicial control on Title VI activities.
3 3  Article K.3(2), second indent, (c).
3 4  See infra.
3 5  Or citizens of the Union.
3  ^Except, as mentioned supra, in the case of Conventions stipulating such control.
3 7  Jessurun D'Oliveira speaks of "joint positions" and "joint action" as "acrobatic stances". See Jessurun 
D'Oliveira, H.U., "Expanding External and Shrinking Internal Borders: Europe's Defense Mechanisms in 
the Areas of Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum" in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, 
O'Keeffe, David & Twomey, Patrick (eds.), London, Chancery, 1994, p.261, at 263.
3 8  Hendry, op.cit, at p.310.
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instruments are published in the Communities Official Journal. As far as the legal nature of 
the "joint actions" is concerned, their publication in series L, reserved for binding acts, 
seems to indicate that they are seen by the Council as also being binding. Moreover, it has 
been argued, correctly, that joint actions are binding inasmuch as they are part of the 
implementation of the Treaty on European Union.39
It seems that only clear positive rules on the matter will solve properly this 
problem. An alternative is the attribution to a single judicial authority of last recourse 
jurisdiction on instruments adopted under Title VI. Otherwise, the situation will remain 
uncertain. This is due also to the fact that courts in different Member States may have 
different interpretations of the matter, depending, for example, on whether their national 
legal system has a monist or dualistic vision of relations between international and national 
Law.
In any case, it must be noted that the overall majority of decisions adopted under 
Title VI have been decisions of a clearly non legally binding character, like 
recommendations, resolutions and conclusions.40
b) Decision Making Process
(i) Procedures and the position of the intervening institutions
Article D of the Treaty on European Union41 provides that it is for the European 
Council to
"provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the 
general political guidelines thereof."
Since this provision applies to the whole Treaty on European Union, the European 
Council has also a guiding and supervisory role in the activities of Title VI. However, it is 
for the Council of Ministers to take the current political decisions.
The Council is indeed the protagonist of the activities of Title VI, more than in any 
other field of Union activities.42 Information and consultation to coordinate action is to be 
done within the Council. Adoption of common positions and promotion of cooperation is 
decided by the Council, acting unanimously. The same procedure applies for the adoption 
of joint actions and for the drawing up of conventions to be recommended for adoption by 
the Member States.
Unanimity will, likewise, be required for decisions on where to charge the 
operational expenditure arising from the implementation of the provisions of the Title -
3 9  O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p. 914.
4 0  The Commission counted "some fifty” recommendations, resolutions and conclusions, adopted by the 
Council until May 1995, while only a few instruments envisaged in Title VI were approved, see the 
Commission Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, p.56, point 119.
4 1  Of Title I, on "Common Provisions", of the Treaty on European Union.
4 2  On the role of the Council after the Treaty on European Union, see, e.g, Dashwood, Alan, "The Role of 
the Council of the European Union", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration - Essays in 
Honour o f  Henry Schermers, Vol.il, Heukels, Ton & Curtin, Deirdre (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1994, pp.117-134.
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either on the budget of the European Communities or on that of Member States.43 On the 
other hand, a special qualified majority44 will be sufficient for decisions of a procedural 
nature, or on measures to implement joint action, provided the Council decides so ... 
unanimously.45 It is also provided that a majority of two thirds of the Member States46 
will be sufficient for the adoption of measures implementing the mentioned draft 
conventions - proposed by the Council pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
K.3(2)(c). But a qualified majority will only be sufficient if those Conventions do not 
provide otherwise.
In any case, up to now, no substantive decision was taken under Title VI by 
qualified majority voting. Moreover, the requirement of unanimous vote in the Council has 
prevented the adoption of several acts, or downgraded these to non-binding instruments, 
like recommendations.
As far as the phase before the adoption of a decision is concerned, proposals for 
instruments to be adopted by the Council may be presented by the Commission or by any 
Member State. Exception is made for areas related with judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, customs or police cooperation, on which only Member States may take initiatives. 
For the governments of the Member States the rule of the EC Treaty, according to which 
the Council may request the Commission to undertake studies and submit proposals, was 
not enough.47 In the Community system the power to present proposals is, in any case, an 
exclusive privilege of the Commission.
The non-exclusivity of the Commission right to present proposals under Title VI is 
quite understandable considering the political sensitivity of the issues dealt with by it. 
What is surprising is the complete exclusion of the Commission from presenting proposals 
in certain fields. This seems particularly strange considering two facts. First, it contrasts 
with the unrestricted powers the Commission has to make proposals on Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, traditionally an area in which the Member States are particular 
sensitive to any interference of the Commission. Secondly, the Member States may, in any 
case, reject the proposals presented by the Commission, amend them, or present their own 
alternatives. The fact that, for this purpose, the mere institutional dialogue is seen as an
4 3  On this topic see the Working Document on the financing of the co-operation in the field of justice and 
home affairs, drafted by Patrick Cooney on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 
of the European Parliament, of 13 April 1994, doc.ief. PE 209.039.
4 4  By virtue of Article K.4 (3), for this purpose the votes of the Members of the Council are to be 
weighted according to Article 148(2) of the Treaty of Rome, but a qualified majority is only attained when 
there are eight countries in favour, as it is provided in the latter Article for decisions of the Council based 
on proposals which were {M presented by the Commission. See also the reference of Article K .8  to several 
articles of the EC Treaty dealing with the internal organisation and work of the Parliament, Council and 
Commission.
4 5  See, e.g.. Article K.3(2)(b) in fine. Unanimity, however, is supposed not to be necessary for procedural 
matters referred to in Article K.4(3).
4 6  Not of two thirds of the votes of the Member States, weighted according to Article 148 of the EC 
Treaty. Consequently the majority in principle required for approval of Implementing measures of the 
Conventions is less demanding than the qualified majority usually required in Title VI : 8  Member States 
plus 54 weighted votes, according to the second paragraph of Article K.4 (3).
4 7  See its Article 152, applied in this Title by the remission of Article K.8 .
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undesirable factor appears to be quite significant.48 It seems more the expression of a 
nostalgic feeling of pure intergovernmental cooperation, of the good old days when 
everything was simple and where the Commission was, at most, a guest.
Although the role of the Commission is undercut in the way mentioned, it is, 
nevertheless, supposed to "be fully associated with the work" carried out under the Title. 
This is a positive point, that should be neither overlooked, nor overestimated. This is due, 
inter alia, to the fact that the Commission has no executive power. The Commission is not 
responsible for the application of the measures adopted by the institutions, as it is in the 
European Communities,49 nor is it the "guardian" of the Treaty on European Union, as it 
is of the EC Treaty.
Another relevant organ in the decision making process of Title VI is the 
Coordinating Committee.50 This committee consists of senior officials who, besides 
coordinating the work carried out under the Title, will "give opinions for the attention of 
the Council, either at the Council’s request or on its own initiative". It also has the 
functions of preparing the discussions on visa issues, as provided in the new Article 100C 
of the EC Treaty.51 Hence, the committee assumes functions which are equivalent, in the 
activities of Title VI, to the committee of the Permanent representatives of the Member 
States.52 But the Coordinating Committee reports to the COREPER, and does not 
substitute it within the work carried out under Title VI. Moreover, from a functional point 
of view, the advisory work of the Coordinating Committee corresponds also to the 
Economic and Social Committee. However, it represents no interest groups, a slight but 
important difference.
To a certain extent, the Coordinating Committee is equivalent to the Coordinators 
Group on the free movement of persons, which existed previously, in the framework of ad 
hoc intergovernmental cooperation. The Coordinating Committee concerns itself with the 
co-ordination of activities which were developed before the Treaty on European Union by 
a multitude of ad hoc groups and sub-groups.53
As far as the European Parliament is concerned, its intervention in the cooperation 
is quite limited. It is to be regularly informed by the Commission and the Presidency of the 
Council of "discussions in the areas covered by this Title”.54 However, there is no precise
4 8  See also O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.905, who refers to a lack of "real inter- 
institutional dialogue".
4 9  See, e.g.. Article 155 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
5 0  Established by Article K.4.
5 1  According to the new Article 100D.
5 2  Established by the new first subparagraph of Article 151 of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the 
Treaty on European Union. The original Article 151 had been repealed by Article 7 of the Merger Treaty. 
Article 4 of this Treaty had the same wording as the new first subparagraph of Article 151 of the Treaty of 
Rome.
5 3  A full reference to the present working groups and sub-groups is made infra, in the sub-section which 
deals with the intermediate structure for decision-making and law enforcement of Title VI.
5 4  Article K.6 , paragraph 1.
368
elaboration on how regularly that information has to be provided.55 It would reasonable to 
have a rule imposing the provision of information to the European Parliament, for 
example, each trimester.
The Parliament is also to be consulted by the Presidency "on the principal aspects 
of activities" in the areas covered by the Title. It is even stated that the Presidency "shall 
ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration".56 
The Parliament has complained that it should be consulted before the adoption of 
instruments and that seems to be a justified request. It is difficult to see how the 
Parliament's views can be "duly taken in consideration" in the Title VI activities, if it is not 
properly informed of such activities, if it is not capable of forming an opinion on them, and 
if it cannot express its views before the adoption of instruments 57
It is also provided that the "European Parliament may ask questions to the Council 
or make recommendations to it". Furthermore, annually, "it shall hold a debate on the 
progress made in the implementation of the areas referred to in this Title."58
It is clear that under Title VI the European Parliament cannot be much more than a 
forum for discussion of the issues.59 It will be informed and consulted (only on the 
principal aspects of the activities).60 It may ask questions or make recommendations to 
the Council. However, it will not have to be consulted on singular decisions of the 
Council. Joint action, its implementing measures and proposals for Conventions may be 
adopted by the Council without previous consultation of the Parliament. There is only a 
general duty on the Presidency of the Council to take the views of the Parliament into 
consideration, whatever that means in strict legal terms.
This seems to display no major difference to the state of affairs previous to the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. Already before, on its own initiative, 
the European Parliament was regularly discussing most of the issues referred to in Article
K. 1. It held debates, asked questions and made recommendations to the Commission and
5 5  The third subparagraph of Article D of the Treaty on European Union, mentions only that "The 
European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a report after each of its meetings and a yearly 
written report on the progress achieved by the Union."
5 6  Article K.6 , second paragraph.
5? Note that in some reports of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European 
Parliament on Council decisions adopted under Title VI, the rapporteurs refer to each of such decisions as 
a "draft", implicitly suggesting that the European Parliament does not recognise the procedure used in 
their final adoption. See the Lehne report, of 20 July 1995, on the "draft Council Resolution on the 
limitation on the admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member States for the purpose 
of pursuing activities as self -employed persons", C4-7/95; the Roth report, of 20 July 1995, on the "draft 
Council Recommendation concerning a framework text of a readmission agreement between a Member 
State and a Third Country", A4-194/95; and the Caccavale report, of 20 July 1995, on "the draft Council 
Resolution on the admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member Slates of the 
European Union for study purposes", doc. ref. A4-181/95.
5 8  Article K.6 , third paragraph.
5 9  See also the remarks of Niessen, Jan. according to whom "the Treaty on European Union gives no real 
boost to the European Parliament's influence, leaving it no more than ’Europe's most powerful NGO' 
Personal interview quoted in Ireland, P.R., "Asking for the Moon: the Political Participation of 
Immigrants in the European Community”, Revue Européenne des Migrations internationales, Vol.10, 
1994, No.l.p. 127.
6 0  Not also on the basic policy choices, contrary to what happens in the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. See Article J.7, first subparagraph.
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the Council. Due to its persistent efforts, it had also obtained official information from the 
Presidency of the Council on part of the work of the intergovernmental cooperation 
groups.61
The weak position of the Parliament under Title VI is one of its most negative 
points, being part of the democratic deficit of the European Union.62 The fact that not 
even the minimum threshold of obligatory consultation is provided is particularly open to 
criticism. This minimum level does not give the Parliament a true say on Council decisions, 
nevertheless it is seen as undesirable by the Council and Member States.
This suggests that the main concern of the governments of Member States is not 
that the Parliament may block the adoption of measures drafted by the Council. Neither 
does obligatory consultation challenge national sovereignty, when the Council acts by 
unanimity. The resistance to the provision of full information of activities to the Parliament 
seems to point to another explanation of the Parliament's weak position within Title VI. It 
seems to indicate that the governments of the Member States see the European Parliament 
as a kind of powerful pressure group. If it is informed of draft measures, it may try to 
influence public opinion and make human rights groups, and other sectors of the public, 
aware of proposed instruments. By not providing information to the Parliament, the 
Council can adopt controversial measures smoothly. Public discussion is only possible on a 
fait accompli. This has implications for the issue of transparency, to be discussed below.
Another aspect related to the parliamentary accountability of the Title VI activities 
is the participation of national Parliaments in the decision-making process. The possibility 
that the Title VI structure of decision-making be changed so as to allow the participation 
of national Parliaments is opposed by those who would prefer the Community to act in the 
third pillar areas. However, as an intermediate solution, one could imagine some sort of 
procedure with the intervention of national Parliaments. After all, at the present moment, 
the national Parliaments do already intervene in the adoption of Conventions drawn under 
Title VI. Some changes in their intervention in this respect is also conceivable.
Currently, for Conventions drawn up by the Council to enter into force they have 
to be ratified by national Parliaments, according to their national procedures. Experience
6 1  See, e.g., the resolution of the European Parliament of 15 July 1993. There it restated the position that 
"the common immigration policy should respect the rules of parliamentary democracy and the role of the 
European Parliament in justice and home affairs should be strengthened" - Agence Europe, No.6024, 
17/7/1993. Later, the institutional defects of Title VI were again pointed out by the European Parliament. 
On several occasions it has complained about its lack of participation in the decision-making process. For 
example, on 17 March 1994, prior to the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 23 March in 
Brussels, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament protested 
strongly against the decision of the Greek presidency to decline its invitation to inform the Parliament of 
the issues to be dealt with during the meeting, before the meeting was held. Furthermore, it expressed the 
wish to have a more significant role in the application and interpretation of a future External Borders 
Convention. The same type of complaint, of not having received information before the Council meetings, 
was repeated later, namely during the French presidency, in the second semester of 1995.
6 2  I am not even referring here to the political participation of immigrants in the European Union. On 
this topic see Geddes, A., "Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities and the EUs ’Democratic Deficit' ", in 
JCMS, Vol.33, 1995, No.2, pp. 197-217; and Ireland, "Asking for the Moon; the Political Participation of 
Immigrants in the European Community", op.cit., pp.127-142.
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has shown that this is a very lengthy process. Instead, one could imagine that a specific 
type of Council instrument would enter into force provided that, within a period after its 
publication in the Official Journal (six or nine months for example), a majority of 
Parliaments of Member States did not express themselves against that instrument.63 This 
would create a new type of procedure for adoption of Union binding acts, one whose 
structural dynamics would work more in favour of quick entry into force.
This new type of procedure should be an intermediate solution before a future 
passage to the Community of the activities presently developed under Title VI. The 
involvement of the national parliaments in the third pillar work may help to improve its 
transparency. However, from a structural and long term perspective, it does not seem to 
be an optimal solution. It does not seem to be very coherent to improve the position of 
national parliaments in the decision making process of the Union in this specific field, 
while not doing the same in other fields - like in those dealt with by the 
European Community, for example.
A final note must be made regarding the role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities in Title VI. According to Article L of the Treaty on European 
Union the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is excluded in general terms from Title VI. 
The Court has only jurisdiction concerning EC Treaty provisions that apply to Title V I64 
and in the case where Conventions adopted under the Title explicitly provide for such 
jurisdiction. This lack of obligatory uniform judicial control on the activities of Title VI is 
dealt with below, in sub-section 4.
(ii) Transparency
One aspect in which Cooperation under Title VI is particularly open to criticism is 
the lack of transparency of its functioning. The lack of transparency of Community65 and 
of Union functioning in general has already been criticised.66 But it seems to be under
6 3  The required majority of national Parliaments could also be equivalent to the majority of the population 
of Member States; or could be a qualified majority - using again the criterion of population or the current 
vote weighting system of the Council.
6 4  See Article K.8 .
6 5  See, e.g., Clapham, who sustains that "there is a certain secrecy and obscurity about the decision­
making process"of the Community. See Clapham, A., European Union - The Human Rights Challenge, 
Vol.I - Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical Overview, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991, at 
p. 61. The attempts to attain secrecy in the activities of the Union are noteworthy. See, e.g., the 
Commission proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the security measures applicable to classified 
information produced or transmitted in connection with European Economic Community or Euratom 
activities, COM(92) 56 final and OJ C 72/15 of 21 March 1992. This proposal raised too much 
controversy to be approved. On this topic see Official secrets law in the European Community?, 
Statewatch Briefing Paper No.l, London, Statewatch, May 1992/March 1993; and the Duverger report on 
openness in the Community, made on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European 
Parliament, of 21 March 1994, A3-153/94.
6 6  On transparency in the European Union, in general, see Curtin, D. & Meijers, H. "The principle of 
open government in Schengen and the European Union: Democratic retrogression?", CMLRev, Vol.32, 
1995, No.2., pp.391-442; Lodge, Joliet "Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy", JCMS, Vol.32, 
September 1994, No.3, pp.343-368; Piris, Jean-CIaude "After Maastricht, are the Community Institutions
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Title VI that it attains its lowest level. This is a quite important point because transparency 
is a fundamental right of the individual in a democratic society.67 The transparency of 
governing bodies being crucial for a democratic society, the lack of transparency within 
the European Union is part of the democratic deficit of the latter.
In Title VI, one of the most important aspects of the lack of transparency is the 
fact that public discussions of draft Council decisions are virtually non-existent.68 
Generally speaking, the decisions of the Council are adopted without public debate on 
them. Proposals have been made that draft Council decisions, specially of a normative 
character, should be published in the Official Journal some time before being adopted by 
the Council.69 It also seems appropriate that in the most important initiatives a process of 
consultation of human rights, immigrants and other interested organisations be launched.70 
Public discussion previous to the adoption of decisions in this field is surely a minimum 
requirement in a democratic system of government, and what was fought for and attained 
at the national level should not be lost at the level of the European Union.71
In this respect, an interesting aspect related to transparency is the public access to 
the Council working documents. This access has been the object of some cases in the 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities. One case has already been decided: 
Guardian v. Council.72 In this case the then European affairs editor of the British 
newspaper sought access to some documents related to meetings of the Council of 
Ministers on Social Affairs, Agriculture, and Justice and Home Affairs. These documents 
included Coreper preparatory documents, the minutes, the attendance and voting records 
and the decisions of those meetings.
As far as the Justice and Home Affairs Council was concerned, the Guardian 
requested documents related to the Justice Council meeting of 29 and 30 November 1993. 
However, the Council refused access to minutes, the attendance and voting records and 
the decisions of that Council meeting. It stated that these documents
More Efficacious, More Democratic and More Transparent ?", £ZJ?, Vol.I9, October 1994, No.5, pp.449- 
487.
^7 O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.917.
68 Exception may be made for some proposals of the Commission, like the External Frontiers Convention, 
which draft was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. This draft Convention is 
analysed in the next chapter.
69 See, e.g., the proposals presented by the Standing Committee of Experts, Proposals fo r  the amendment 
o f the Treaty on European Union .... op.cit., pp.3-4. This Committee proposes that a third paragraph be 
added to Article K.3, according to which drafts of joint positions, joint actions (or of measures in 
pursuance thereof), conventions (and measures implementing them) should be published in the Official 
Journal three months before the Council adopts a decision on them. Likewise adopted decisions would be 
published also after being adopted.
70  O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar”, op.cit., p.906-7.
71 See the general remarks of Jessurun D'Oliveira, quoted by O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", 
op.cit., p.917-8.
72 Case T -194/94, J.Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v. Council, judgment of the Court of First Instance 
of 19/10/1995, nyr. In another case pending now before the Court of First Instance, the applicant asked 
the annulment of a Council decision refusing access to certain documents concerning Europol, which had 
been requested under Council Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents, quoted infra. 
See case T-174/95, Tidningen Joumalisten v. Council, proceedings of the Court, No.26/95.
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"d ire ctly  refer to  the deliberations o f  the C ouncil and cannot, under its R u les o f
P ro ce d u re , be d isc lo se d ".7^
The Council stated that if allowed access to them, it would fail to protect the 
confidentiality of its proceedings, since the documents concerned contained "confidential 
information" on national governments positions during the Council deliberations.74 The 
Council also refused access to the preparatory reports to the Justice Council meeting 
concerning its future working programme. It justified this refusal by the fact that these 
were preliminary texts preceding the decision of the Council (adopted in that meeting) to 
recommend the adoption by the European Council of December 1993 of the plan of action 
to be taken in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs.
The Guardian's request was dealt with within the procedures of the Council 
decision 93/731, on public access to Council documents, adopted on 20/12/1993.75 This 
decision was based on the EC Treaty "and in particular Article 151(3) thereof',76 as well 
as on the Council Rules of Procedure, "and in particular Article 22 thereof' - which, in 
turn, are based on that EC Treaty provision. However, according to Article K.8 of the 
Treaty on European Union, Article 151 of the EC Treaty is one of procedural rules of the 
EC Treaty that applies to the Cooperation Under Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union.77
To decide the case, the Court of First Instance interpreted the provisions of the 
Council decision. Its most relevant provision for this case was Article 4(2), which provides 
that:
" A c c e s s  to a  C ou n cil docum ent m ay  be refused in order to  p ro tect the 
co n fiden tiality  o f  the C ou n cil's  p roceedings".
The Court considered that:
"I t  is c le a r  from  the term s o f  A rticle 4  o f  decision 9 3 /7 3 1  and fro m  the objective  
p u rsu ed  by th a t d ecision , nam ely to allow  the public wide a c c e s s  to C ou n cil 
d ocu m en ts , th at the C ou n cil m ust, w hen exercisin g  its discretion under A rticle  
4 ( 2 ) ,  genuinely b alan ce  the interest o f  citizen s in gaining access to  its docum ents  
a g a in s t any interest o f  its own in m aintaining the confidentiality o f  its 
d elib eratio n s."7 ^
Considering the circumstances of the case, the Court ruled that the Council failed to 
exercise its discretion in compliance with this criterion.79 The Council had not made a 
comparative analysis of on "one hand, the interests of the citizens seeking information and
7-* Idem, paragraph 16.
74  Ibidem, paragraph 22.
7  ^ Council decision 93/731 on public access to Council documents, adopted on 20/12/1993, OJ L 340/43 
of 31/12/1993. This decision was published in the Official Journal together with a Code of Conduct 
Concerning Access to Council and Commission Documents, agreed by the Council and the Commission 
on 6 December 1993, doc.ref. 93/730/EC, OJ L 340/41-2 of 31/12/1993. Both the Code of conduct and the 
Council decision took effect from 1 January 1994. See also the Commission Decision of 8/2/1994 on 
public access to Commission documents, OJ L 46/58 of 1994. On Council decision 93/731, see also case 
C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council, which hearing took place on 10/10/1995, although the decision of the 
Court is still pending.
7 6  Which provides simply that "the Council shall adopt its rules of procedure".
77  As mentioned supra, the Guardian requests did also concern a Agriculture Council meeting.
78 Case quoted supra, paragraph 65.
79  Idem, paragraph 78
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on the other hand of the Council interest in preserving the secrecy of its deliberations.®0 
Therefore, the Court annulled the implied decision of the Council refusing the applicants 
access to the preparatory reports, the minutes, attendance and voting records of the 
Justice Council of 29 and 30 November 1993.®1
It is quite interesting that the Court of First Instance (of the European 
Communities) ruled against the Council in this respect.82 The case related to Council 
activities on part of which, in principle, the Court does not have jurisdiction.83 It is clear 
that the Justice Council meeting of 29 and 30 November 1993 occurred under the rules of 
Title VI. There is no doubt that the Court's ruling is completely well-founded. As 
mentioned above, the Council decision 93/731, on public access to Council documents, is 
based on Article 151 of the EC Treaty. This applies to the activities of Title VI, by virtue 
of Article K.8.
Yet it does not seem to be very coherent that Community rules (including on 
judicial enforcement) apply to the activities of Title VI concerning public access to 
Council documents, but that similar rules do not apply to other closely related aspects - 
like on the European Parliament information of Title VI activities, and publication of draft 
Council decisions.
Transparency in this respect is a minimum requirement of a democratic system of 
government. Furthermore, in itself, it does not question in the least the national 
sovereignty of Member States.84
3 - Legal Limits of the activities developed under Title VI 
a) Human Rights85
The Treaty on European Union provides explicitly for the respect of human rights. 
Article F establishes that: 8012345
80  Ibidem, paragraph 74.
81 Note also that, before the ruling of the Court in case T-194/94, Guardian v. Council, which dates from 
19 October 1995, the Council adopted a "Code of Conduct on public access to the minutes and statements 
in the minutes of the Council acting as a legislator". This concerns "items in the Council minutes relating 
to the final adoption of legislative acts within the meaning assigned to that term in the Annex to the 
Council' Rules of Procedure and the statements thereon". It was adopted by the Council at its genera] 
affairs meeting of 2 October 1995 (see the Press Release of the meeting, point 13).
82 The Court annulled also the decision contained in the letter of the Council of 17 May 1994 refusing 
access to the minutes of the Agriculture Council of 24 and 25 January 1994.
83 See again Article L of the Treaty on European Union and see also infra, sub-section 4, on the lack of 
an obligatory uniform judicial control on the activities of Title VI.
84 In any case, note the draft Council decision on publication in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities of acts and other texts adopted by the Council in the field of asylum and immigration. 
Brussels, 16/11/1995, COREPER, 11699/95, ASIM 313. This document was not yet approved.
85 See Gaja, G., "The protection of Human Rights under the Maastricht Treaty", in Institutional 
Dynamics o f  European Integration - Essays in Honour o f  Henry Schemers, Vol.II, Heukels, Ton & 
Curtin, Deirdre (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp.549-560; and Twomey, P., "Title VI of the 
Union Treaty: 'Matters of Common Interest' as a Question of Human Rights", in The Third Pillar o f  the 
European Union..., op.cit., pp.49-66.
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■"The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law."
This corresponds, basically, to the case-law of the Court of Justice on Community 
Law. The mention of such a rule here constitutes a positive extension to the European 
Union of EC Law principles. However, it should be kept in mind that the Court of Justice 
has no jurisdiction on the Common Provisions of the Treaty on European Union. This 
justifies the view that that provision is mainly a political declaration.86
Meanwhile, Article K.2(l) provides that activities under Title VI will be carried 
out in compliance not only with the European Convention of Human Rights but also with 
the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, "and having regard to the protection 
afforded by Member States to persons persecuted .pn political grounds".87 One may 
question the legal relevance of this Article, giving the absence of any power of the Court 
of Justice to control the activities under this Title. I would even dare to say that, to a 
certain extent, this kind of mere formal assurance that human rights will be observed, 
sounds more like a notice that they may be disregarded, than a guarantee that they will be 
respected.88
Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that this provision be invoked in a 
national court. It may also be invoked in the European Court if competence is attributed to 
the Court by a Convention elaborated in pursuance of Article K.3(2)(c), as mentioned 
above.
b) Article K.2 (2), on Member States' responsibilities "on law and order and 
the safeguarding of Internal security"
Article K.2(2) provides that:
"This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security."
Here we have the reverse problem of the former rule. The point is not that it may be 
difficult for individuals to invoke the rule against governments. The danger lies in its
86  See "A legal Analysis of the Treaty on European Union" in The new Treaty on European Union, Vol.2: 
Legal and Political Analysis, Brussels, Belmont European Policy Centre, 1992; p.37 at 44.
87  One could wonder why it is that only political grounds are mentioned, for the Geneva Convention 
refers to other motives not less worthy of attention. The reason is probably related to the debate in 
Germany on the right of asylum. Article 16(2) of the Basic Law (Grundsgesetz) of 1949 of the Federal 
Republic of Germany provides that: "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of 
asylum". See also its Article 19. In any case, it does not seem very coherent to distinguish here between 
protection against persecution on political grounds and on other relevant grounds.
88  Such formal declarations, considering their political objectives and practical consequences, constitute 
for certain purposes a kind of "license to kill", in James Bond style. If his mission was to protect the lives 
(and interests) of the free world, he should not hesitate in killing if necessary for that aim. It is not absurd 
to fear also that here the protection of human rights may cede to considerations concerned with repression 
and safety. However, see Hendry, who believes that, although it is "difficult to see what legal purpose 
Article K.2 servesf...) it provides political reassurance, in legally binding terms". In any case, as he rightly 
points out, it may also help Member States refuse certain proposals. See Hendry, op.cit., at 307-8.
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eventual use by governments against individuals. Or its use in order to claim limits on the 
Member States' commitments under this Title.
In this respect, Hendry argues that this Article "provides a clear basis for resisting 
proposed action under Title VI", when a Member State considers that such action "might 
prejudice the exercise of its responsibilities to maintain law and order or to safeguard 
internal security." He adds that:
M em ber S ta te s  m ay fe e l obliged to  h a v e  re c o u rs e  to  A rticle  K .2  to  d ero gate  
fro m  m easures adopted  in p u rsu an ce  o f  T itle  V I ; a n d  in ca s e  o f  d ou b t they  c a n  be 
e x p e cte d  to m ake p ro vision  in su ch  m easu res to  en ab le  th em  to d o  so ."® 9
From a strict legal perspective it may be too forceful to consider this Article as a 
kind of derogatory or safeguard clause. This provision may be seen as another political 
declaration with the aim of relaxing the worries of the national governments on threats to 
their basic autonomy. However, "the maintenance of law and order" is such a vague 
expression that it may support almost any governmental excuse to keep or adopt national 
rules and practices.
In any case, the precise legal importance of this provision depends also on an 
available judicial system for its interpretation. This relates to the next point.
4 - The Judicial Deficit - The Lack of an Obligatory Uniform Judicial 
Control on Title VI Activities and Instruments
As mentioned before, the jurisdiction of the EC’s Court of Justice on activities of 
Title VI is limited to EC Treaty provisions that apply to Title VI 90 and to the possibility 
that Conventions adopted under the Title by the Council (acting by unanimity) do 
explicitly provide for such jurisdiction.91
The role of the Court of Justice within the system of the European Communities, 
the European Union and in European integration in general terms, has been analysed 
thoroughly.92 As far as Title VI is concerned, it is important to emphasise that the lack of
®9 Idem.
9  ^These relate to procedural rules of EC institutions functioning. See Article K.8.
91 Article K.3(2)(c). last paragraph.
92 On the Court of Justice, in general terms, see, e.g., Arnull, Anthony, "Judging the new Europe", 
ELRev., Vol.19, Feb.1994, No.l, p.3; Barav, A., "Omnipotent Courts", in Institutional Dynamics o f  
European Integration....op.cit., pp.265-302; Bebr, G., "Court of Justice: Judicial Protection and the Rule 
of Law", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration.... op.cit., pp.303-331 ; Burley, A.-M. & 
Mattli, W., "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration", International 
Organization, Vol.47, 1993, pp.41-76; Cappelletti, M., "Is the European Court of Justice 'Running 
Wild'?", ELR, Vol.12, 1987, No.l, pp.3-17; Dehousse, R-, La Cour de Justice des Communautés 
européennes, Paris, Montchrestien, 1994; Kapteyn,P.J.G. "The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities after the Year 2000", in Institutional Dynamics o f  European Integration..., op.cit., pp.135- 
152; Rasmussen, H., "On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in 
Judicial Policymaking", Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986; Rasmussen, H. "Between Self-Restraint and 
Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court", ELR, Vol.13, 1988, No.l, pp.28-38; Shapiro, M.,
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Va obligatory uniform judicial control, on the activities and legal instruments adopted under 
the framework of Title VI, means that one of the most negative aspects of the activities of 
the old ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation has not been overcome.
As O'Keeffe points out, the failure to have judicial review in the areas covered by 
Title VI,
"w ou ld  leave the Union open to the ch arg e  that in areas governed by the Third  
p illa r it does not provide for an adequate system  o f  legal rem edies, that it is not a 
sy ste m  governed by the rule o f  law, and that individual rights are  not adequately
p r o te c te d ." ^
It is very important that the European Union be able to provide a uniform 
interpretation and application of instruments adopted under Title VI. In particular as far as 
free movement is concerned, it is of the utmost importance that the law in practice be the 
same everywhere in the Union. The very right of equality before the law may be at stake. 
Uniform jurisdiction on Title VI could also help to overcome some legal uncertainties 
deriving from Title VI rules, like those concerning the precise legal value of instruments 
adopted under that Title, the standards for human rights protection, the definition of 
general clauses like those of Article K.2(2),94 not to mention general concepts and 
expressions used in instruments adopted under the Titled
It does not seem advisable to rely on the already existing power of judicial review 
of protection of human rights of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights. This power 
would be insufficient to achieve an effective uniform interpretation and application of 
Union rules. First, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. If recourse was to be made to the Strasbourg 
Court concerning a Union measure, this Court could only say whether or not it violated 
that Convention. It could not rule on the interpretation as such of Union rules. Secondly, 
despite recent changes in the structure of enforcement of the E.C.H.R., the functioning of 
the Court of Strasbourg is much slower than that of the EC Court of Justice. This is an 
important point in an area in which fundamental human rights are likely to be at stake. It 
may also be noted that, according to the E.C.H.R., a case can only be submitted to the 
Commission and Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg after exhaustion of national 
remedies. Thirdly, the fact that in the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights sit judges *6
"The European Court of Justice ", in Euro - politics : Institutions and Policymaking in the New 
European Community, Alberta Sbragiafed.), Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1992; Weiler, J. 
The Court of Justice on Trial*, CMLRev, Vol.24, 1987, pp.555-89; Weiler, "Journey to an
Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of 
Political Integration", in JCMS, Vol.31, December 1993, No.4, pp.417-446. See also the Rothley report on 
the role of the Court of Justice in the development of the European Community’s constitutional system, of
6  July 1993, on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref. A3- 
0228/93; the Editorial Comments of the Common Market Law Review : "Quis custodiet the European 
Court of Justice?", CMLRev, Vol. 30, No.5, 1993, pp.989-903, and "The IGC 1996 and the Court of 
Justice", CMLRev. Vol.32, N o.4,1995, p.883-892.
93 O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p. 910.
94 On Member States' responsibilities "on law and order and the safeguarding of internal security".
95 See those used in the draft External Frontiers Convention, examined in the next chapter.
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representing countries which are members of the Council of Europe, but not of the 
European Union, is also a problem.
It seems clear that the EC Court of Justice96 is the best judicial organ to have 
jurisdiction on activities and instruments adopted in the framework of Title VI. Several 
arguments can be adduced in favour of granting to it such jurisdiction.97
The first point to be made is that the EC Court of Justice is the natural organ to 
which jurisdiction on Union activities, to the extent that it is necessary, should be granted. 
To the extent that binding rules (procedural rules and normative acts) are at stake at the 
Union level, it should be for the Court of Justice to rule on their interpretation and on 
disputes arising from them. In principle, no other Court is better positioned to do so than 
the EC Court of Justice itself.
Moreover, its jurisdiction would assure a consistent interpretation of Community 
Law and instruments adopted under Title VI,98 the close relationship between which will 
be highlighted below. The coherence of the Union actions and policies would, 
undoubtedly, be better achieved if all matters related to Union activities (in all the three 
"pillars") be scrutinised in the last resort by one single Court.
Furthermore, the Court has also experience in fields close to those of Title VI, like 
free movement of persons, and institutional conflicts. This experience could be a valuable 
asset in the interpretation of instruments adopted under Title VI, and in ruling on disputes 
arising from the implementation of these instruments or from the very functioning of Title
VI.
It also appears likely that to grant the Court of Justice jurisdiction over Title VI 
would mean that a minimum threshold of human rights protection would be guaranteed. 
One of the reasons that makes some legal authors advocate the attribution of jurisdiction 
to the EC Court of Justice is the hope that the latter would apply to the matters at stake 
the positive aspects of its jurisprudence on Community Law. As O'Keeffe states,
" ( . . . )  it m ight be e x p e cte d  th a t  the C ou rt co u ld  em p h asise  the rule o f  law , the pre­
em in ence o f  the g en eral p rin cip les o f  law  su ch  as eq u ality  and n on -d iscrim in ation , 
legal certain ty , legitim ate e x p e cta tio n , ne b is in idem , the right to  a  fa ir  hearing , 
proportion ality  and the re s p e c t  o f  the p rin cip les contained in hum an rights  
instrum ents to  w hich  the C om m u n ity  o r  its  M e m b e r S ta te s  are  p a rtie s , including  
th e  E u rop ean  C on ven tion  o n  H um an R ig h ts ."9 9  9
9  ^I refer here also to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.
97 See the arguments of Groenendijk,C.A in favour of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice on 
the Schengen and Dublin agreements, in "The Competence of the EC Court of Justice with respect to 
inter-governmental Treaties on Immigration and Asylum", International Journal o f  Refugee Law, Vol.4, 
1992, No.4, p.531; and in "The Competence of the EC Court of Justice", published in A new immigration 
law fo r  Europe?, by Boeles, P. et al., Utrecht, Dutch Centre for Immigrants, 1993, pp.31-39. See also the 
part of section A of the next chapter, on the proposed jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on the 
Convention on External Frontiers.
98 Not surprisingly this aspect is highlighted in p.3 of the Court of Justice Report on the Application of 
the Treaty on European Union, quoted supra.
99  O’Keeffe, D., "The New Draft External Frontiers Convention and the Draft Visa Regulation", The 
Third Pillar o f  the European Union..., op.cit., pp. 135-149, at pp. 144-145.
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However, the governments of Member States have resisted granting to the EC 
Court of Justice jurisdiction on the activities developed under Title VI and on the 
instruments adopted under that Title. Even the use of the possibility provided by Article
K.3(2)(c), of granting jurisdiction in relation to Conventions adopted under the Title has 
proved to be unacceptable to some member States. A recent notorious case is that of the 
Europol Convention.100 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this Convention was 
signed in July 1995, although the issue of judicial control on the Europol activities has not 
yet been definitively settled. The United Kingdom persists in refusing the obligatory 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on disputes between Member States on the 
interpretation and application of the Convention. Article 40 of the Convention regulates 
this matter. It provides for an initial stage of discussions within the Council with a view to 
finding a settlement.101 After a period of six months it is provided that the member States 
in dispute "shall decide "the modalities according to which they shall be settled".102 All 
Member States, except the United Kingdom, have declared that, in that event, they will 
"systematically submit the dispute in question to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities".103 However, it seems that the national parliaments of some Member 
States, particularly those of the Benelux, are not willing to ratify the Convention without 
the guarantee that the EC’s Court of Justice will have jurisdiction on it, including as far as 
the United Kingdom is concerned.104
What can explain that Member States governments resist so much having activities 
under Title VI, including its instruments, under the control of the EC Court of Justice? 
The main problem in this respect seems to be that some Member States' governments want 
as much as possible to have a free hand in the fields of "Justice and Home Affairs". Some 
times, any judicial control of immigration measures is seen as undesirable, even at national 
level.105 Moreover, to a certain extent, the concern of some Member States' governments 
seems also to be related to the Court of Justice itself. Given the case-law of the Court on 
respect for human rights,106 recalled above by O'Keeffe, they would not feel safe against 
Court judgments if they entrusted it with a controlling task. Things could get out of hand. 
In this sense the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on activities and instruments 
adopted under Title VI appears also as a kind of punishment of the Court.107 A 
punishment for being too good at its job: for being independent and for protecting human 
rights.
100 Convention of 26 July 1995 based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), OJ C 316/2, of 27/11/1995.
101 Idem, Article 40( 1 ).
102 Article 40(2).
103 This type of solution was previously suggested by the Standing Committee of Experts, Proposals for  
the amendment o f  the Treaty on European Union op.cit., pp.3-4.
104 See MNS, July 1995 and Statewatch, Vol.5, November - December 1995, No.6, p.5.
105 See, e.g., the controversy between the then French Home Affairs minister Charles Pasqua and the 
national courts about judicial decisions controlling the legality of expulsion orders and of other migration 
related measures, see Legouy, André "Quand le violeur crie au viol". Plein Droit, No.24, 1994, p. 19.
106 In spite of all its limitations and some incoherence. See, e.g., my analysis of cases Demirel and 
Bozkurt, in chapter 5.
107 On this topic see AmuII, "Judging the new Europe", op.cit., at 13.
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Yet, that lack of jurisdiction will be to the detriment of the uniformity of the "law 
in practice". Furthermore, it is those who are deprived of such an important instrument of 
defence of fundamental human rights who will ultimately be the losers.108
5 - The Intermediate Structure of Decision Making and Law 
Enforcement109
The intermediate structure of decision-making and law enforcement of the "third 
pillar" of the Union is the following. Below the Council there is the Coreper, to which 
reports the K.4 Committee, on the fields of activities of Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union. The latter Committee is supposed to ensure overall coordination of the 
several working groups acting in this area. These working groups are put together under 
three Steering Groups, or Committee Directories. The first Steering group regards 
Asvlum and Immigration, and may be considered the successor of the Ad Hoc group on 
Immigration. It includes sub-working groups on migration (admission and expulsion), 
asylum, visas, external frontiers controls and false documents. In the area of immigration 
and asylum there are also CIREA (Centre for Information, Research and exchange on 
Asylum) and CIREFI (Centre for Information, Research and Exchange on the crossing of 
Borders and Immigration). Both are under the first steering group. The second steering 
group relates to Police Cooperation, in security and customs matters. It deals with 
matters previously treated by Trevi working groups and by the old CELAD and MAG. Its 
sub-groups deal with terrorism,110 police cooperation (operational and technical), drugs, 
serious organised crime, and police cooperation on customs. A sub-group on EURODAC
108 As Toulemon recalls: "(...) porquoi ne pas insérer dans le nouveau traité les mesures minimales 
nécessaires pour tout à la fois garantir les droits de l’homme et assurer une répression efficace du crime 
organisé [?] (...) Dans une union politique digne de ce nom, il appartiendrait au législateur commun (...) 
d'établir à la fois les garanties des libertés et la loi penale commune applicable évidemment aux seuls 
crimes et délits présentant un caractère international par les conditions de leur préparation ou de leur 
exécution." See Toulemon, Robert "Communauté Européenne, Union Politique, Confédération - 
diplomatie ou démocratie plurinationale?" in RMCUE, 1992, p.428 at 430. See also the Rothley report on 
the role of the Court of Justice in the development of the European Community’s constitutional system, 
made on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament, of 6 July 1993, 
doc.ref. A3-228/93.
109 See, inter alia, the Commission Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, op.cit., 
point 124; Den Boer, M. "Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger or Trojan Horse?", CMLRev, Vol.32, 
1995, No.2, pp.555-578, at 558; O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar’', op.cit., p.903; the Programme de 
Travail prioritaire pour 1994 et structures à instaurer dans le domaine "Justice et Affaires intérieures", 
Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Note de la Présidence, Bruxelles, 2/12/1993, doc. ref. 10684/93 Restreint 
JAI 12; and ” Third pillar' meetings", Statewatch, Vol.5, 1995, No. 4.
110 However, operational cooperation on terrorism seems to be dealt with outside the framework of Title 
VI of the Treaty on European Union. Apparently, the operational part of the old Trevi structures is still 
functioning. As noted in the previous chapter, according to Article 2(2), second paragraph, of the Europol 
Convention concluded in July 1995, cooperation against terrorism will be part of Europol activities no 
later than two years after the beginning of its functioning. See the Europol Convention concluded on 26 
July 1995, OJ C 316/2, of 27/11/1995. This beginning of Europol operations requires the ratification of 
the Europol Convention, which at the present moment does not seem to be capable of being completed in 
the near future. In any case note that Europol is not meant to have operational tasks, but mainly the task 
of collecting and analysing information. See Article 3 of the Europol Convention.
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("European automated fingerprint system"), which is a planned computerised fingerprint 
identification system for refugees and asylum-seekers, is also working under the second 
Steering Group. Finally, this Steering group includes also the Ad Hoc Group on Europol. 
The third Steering Group works on Judicial Cooperation both in Criminal and in Civil 
Law matters. It works in domains previously dealt with under European Political 
Cooperation. As far as Criminal Law is concerned, within the third Steering Group there 
are sub-groups on extradition, criminal law (including relations between criminal law and 
Community Law), and on the withdrawal of driving licenses. In relation to Civil Law, 
there is one sub-group for examining the possibilities of extending the scope o f application 
o f the Brussels Convention to Family and Succession Law, another for undertaking the 
elaboration o f a document to simplify and accelerate procedures o f transmission of acts 
between Member States, and another on commercial law (and protection o f financial 
interests and control of fraud).
Reporting directly to the K.4 Committee there are the National Drug Coordinators 
(the old CELAD), the Horizontal Information Group (working, for example on the 
European Information System), and the Consultative Commission on Racism and 
Xenophobia. However, it is a negative factor that this Commission does not have contacts 
with the work o f the various groups and sub-groups which are supposed to implement the 
strategy to fight against racism, taken on the basis of the Commission's work.
Finally, there is also the Europol Drugs Unit, presently working on the basis of a 
Council joint action,111 until the entry into force of the Europol Convention.112
There is widespread agreement that the functional structure of Title VI needs 
improvement. As the Council itself has recognised, the structure above described is "very 
cumbersome" and has slowed down the decision making process.11-* The multi-tier 
structure does not facilitate the search for compromise and "makes it too easy to refer 
matters to the next level above".114 *
This aspect seems to be paradigmatic of the Cooperation developed under Title VI 
on the whole. While it constitutes some progress in relation to the old ad hoc 
intergovernmental cooperation, it keeps some of the structural defects of the latter.
111 Joint action of 10 March 1995 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of 
European union concerning the Europol Drugs Unit, OJ L 62/1-3 of 20/3/95. See the previous chapter for 
historical details of the EDU.
112 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Europol Convention (OJ C 316/2, of 27/11/1995) was 
signed on 26 July 1995, although the issue of judicial control on the Europol activities has not yet been 
definitively settled. The United Kingdom persists in refusing the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice on the Europol Convention.
1 *3 Council Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union, p.38.
114 See the Commission Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European Union, op.cit., point 124. 
The Commission adds that at some levels of the structure some people are no! familiar with "Community
negotiating methods".
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6 - Relations between Title VI and the European Community115 
a) general aspects
It is quite challenging to ascertain what are the legal frontiers between Community 
Law and the law provided by and adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union.116 A crucial point in this respect is to determine whether there are areas o f  
Community competence which are also subject to cooperation under the third pillar. T he 
coincidence, or virtual overlap between objectives, competences and instruments o f the 
European Communities and those o f Title VI may be seen in several areas.
As far as drugs are concerned, for example, Article K .l(4) and (7) to (9) deals 
with "combating drug addiction", "judicial cooperation in criminal matters", "customs 
cooperation", and "police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating ( .. .)  
unlawful drug trafficking". Meanwhile, Article 129 of the EC Treaty states that
"Community action shall be directed towards the prevention of diseases, in 
particular the major health scourges, including drug dependence, by promoting 
research into their causes and their transmission, as well as health information and 
education".
This can raise problems, for example because the Commission does not have the right o f  
initiative in areas covered by Article K .l(7) to (9 ) .117
As far as the fight against fraud is concerned, it is also mentioned as an area o f  
common interest in Article K .l(5 ) and (7) to (9). Simultaneously, Article 209a of the E C  
Treaty obliges Member States to take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own 
financial interests.118
Moreover, customs cooperation is envisaged in Article K .l(8 ), while it is essential 
for the operation of the Community common commercial policy.119
The processing o f personal data is regulated by instruments adopted by the 
Community120 and by instruments concluded or being negotiated under Title V I - like the
116 See Bieber, R. "Links Between the Third Pillar' (Title VI) and the European Community (Title II) of 
the Treaty on European Union", in The Third Pillar o f  the European Union..., op.cit., pp.37-47; Demaret, 
Paul, "Le Traité de Maastricht ou les Voies Diverses de L'Union", idem, pp.37-48, at 41; Heukels & de 
Zwaan, "The Configuration of the European Union", op.cit., at pp.225-228; Müller-Graff, P.C.. "The legal 
Basis of the Third Pillar and its Position in the Framework of the Union Treaty”, CMLRev, Vol.31, 1994, 
No.3, pp.493-510 (published also in The Third Pillar o f  the European Union..., op.cit., pp.21-36, see 
pp.31-2); and O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., pp. 911-3.
116 The relation between Title VI and Community Law has some similarities to the relation between the 
EC Treaty as such and the Social Policy Agreement. The relation between these is analysed infra, in 
section C, part 2.
117 O’Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.9I3.
1 ^  As far as fraud is concerned see also Weiler, "Neither Unity nor Three Pillars - The Trinity
Structure of the European Union", in The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, op.cit., pp.49-62, at 56 
and 60.
119 See idem, at p.56.
120 See, e.g., the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281/31 of 23/11/1995.
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Europol Convention,121 the European Information System Convention, and the draft 
Convention on crossing the external frontiers of the Member States.122 As O'Keeffe 
states, the potential for their overlap is clear, without going so far as to claim 
incompatibility.123
In any case, the coincidence, or virtual overlap between EC objectives and 
competences and those of the third pillar may also be found in areas more concerned with 
this thesis.
The status of third country nationals, for example, is one of the most important 
topics to be treated under Title V I.124 It is already covered in some aspects by Community 
Law, as explained in Part I of this thesis.125 *Likewise, the control of the external frontiers 
of the Member States and the issue of visas, included in Article K .l(2), are indeed part of 
a global policy to establish an internal market, as defined by Article 7A .12  ^Visas are to be 
dealt with partly within the third pillar and partly within the Community framework under 
Article 100C. In the next section it will be seen that the line between the two frameworks 
is not always easy to draw. This difficulty seems to apply to the whole area of free 
movement of persons. According to Article K.1 of the Treaty on European Union, the 
cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs is to be undertaken:
"For the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free 
movement of persons, and without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Community 12^
It could be concluded that, as far as free movement of persons is concerned, the objectives 
of the Community and of the European Union are identical.128
Furthermore, arguably the Community had and still has the means to attain the 
Union objectives concerning free movement o f persons. I am referring here, for example, 
to Articles 100 and 235 o f the EC Treaty, which were analysed in chapter 2 .129 Article 
100 gives the Community powers to adopt Directives to approximate national rules that 
"directly affect the establishment or functioning o f the common market". Article 235 
allows the Council to take appropriate measures "to attain, in the course of the operation
121 Quoted supra. Articles 7 to 9 and 13 to 25.
122 The two latter Conventions are still being negotiated and the draft external border Convention is 
analysed in the next chapter.
123 O’Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.912. Indeed sometimes these instruments include 
provisions designed to avoid conflicts and overlaps, but only their practical application will show to what 
extent these provisions are capable of solving all problems. See, e.g.. Article 3(2), first indent, of the EC 
Directive on protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data .... quoted supra.
124 Article K.1 (3).
125 See also Article 2(3) of the Social Policy Agreement, analysed infra, in section C.
12  ^O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.912.
122 See also Article M and to a certain extent even Article B, as far as the respect for the acquis 
communautaire is concerned. See also Article 134 of the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, 
already referred to in chapter 6. It has a similar rule: "The provisions of this Convention shall apply only 
in so far as they are compatible with Community Law".
128 See also the Commission report on the operation of the Treaty on European Union, point 126.
129 See in this respect also Heukels & de Zwaan, who state that "Article 100, 100A and 235 of the EC 
Treaty with their potential for extended Community action remain in substance unaffected by the 
Maastricht Treaty”, Heukels & de Zwaan, op.cit., p.225.
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of the common market, one of the objectives o f the Community", in case that the EC  
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers to adopt those measures. Among the 
Community objectives there is the free movement of persons. This is particularly obvious 
after the Single European Act, as an area without internal frontiers had to be created. 130 
Therefore, as far as free movement of persons is concerned, it could be argued that the 
Community has competence equivalent to that provided in Title VI.
To the extent that the objectives and competence of the Community and of the 
third pillar are similar, all Title VI does, in legal terms, is to provide a formal alternative 
for the decision making process of the Community.
According to this idea, after the entry into force o f the Treaty on European Union, 
Member States are legally allowed to go "procedure shopping" in dealing with an area 
referred to in Article K .l, which is also important for the establishment of the internal 
single market, or with any other Community objective on which EC measures may be 
adopted under Articles 100 or 235 o f  the EC Treaty.'31
An exception to this assessment may derive from the fact that Article 7A o f the EC 
Treaty establishes a duty on the Community to establish an internal market.130 32 If  the 
concept of an internal market is strictly defined, the duty and thus the space for 
Community action is reduced. In that case, the areas capable of being treated only by the 
third pillar expand. However, if the concept of internal market is interpreted in a broad, or, 
more accurately, in a substantive manner, then the duty and space for Community action 
enlarges. With it enlarges also the possibility to choose one of two alternative frameworks 
for decision-making: either the Community or the third pillar framework.
A final note must be made on the possibility of concrete conflict between 
instruments adopted within the Community and instruments adopted under Title VI. It is 
submitted that, in this case, Community instruments should prevail.133 Arguably, this 
derives from the reference in Article K. 1 to the fact that the cooperation under Title VI is 
to be pursued "without prejudice to the powers of the European Community". This is not 
a straightforward provision like Article 134 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement,
130 See, in this respect, e.g,, the European Parliament's resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the 
intergovernmental conferences, Agence Europe documents No. 1769 of 10/4/1992.
131 The Commission, apparently, has a different view, see COM (95) 346, p.l 1 of the introduction.
132 See also Miiller-Graff who wonders: "whether there is any obligation of the Commission or of the 
Council to proceed on the basis of Community powers, or whether they can choose to abstain from using 
them and alternatively to use the procedure of the third pillar." He believes that: "[i]n principle, the 
existence of a Community power should not necessarily exclude the procedure of international 
cooperation, specially if results could be achieved this way rather than by efforts to issue a Community act. 
However, in Community law there are limits to the extent to which institutions may abstain from the use 
of Community powers, one limit being the scope of Article 175 EC (...)". See Miiller-Graff, CMLRev, 
op.cit., at p.505. The limits set by Article 175 may be related to the duty to establish an internal market 
defined in Article 7A, as suggested in chapter 3.
133 This should apply also to agreements and international engagements undertaken by the Community. 
As Heukels & de Zwaan recall, it "cannot be completely excluded that actions envisaged within the 
framework of [Title VI] may interfere with the Community's exclusive external competence pursuant to 
the AETR doctrine". See Heukels & de Zwaan, op.cit., p.226. Pointing in the same direction see also 
Weiler, "Neither Unity nor Three Pillars - The Trinity Structure of the European Union", op.cit., at 56.
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according to which the provisions of that Agreement "shall apply only insofar as they are 
compatible with Community law". However, it may be argued that, in strict legal terms, 
the creation o f a framework for cooperation under Title VI does not diminish Community 
competences. The reference in Article A that the Union is founded on the European 
Communities, and "supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by 
this Treaty", may be interpreted as further confirming the Community prevalence.134
b) the passerelle provision of Article K.9 135
Article K.9 is one of the so called "passerelles" to the Community procedures. It 
envisages the possibility of applying the new Article 100C of the Treaty of Rome to 
actions in the areas o f Title VI - with the exception o f judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and customs and police cooperation. Article 100C, analysed below in section C, 
gives the Community competence to rule on some aspects of visa policy.
To use the procedures o f Article 100C in the areas of Title VI, it is necessary to 
amend the Treaty on European Union. This amendment is made here according to Article
K .9, by way o f derogation from Article N o f the Treaty on European Union. Both the 
Commission and the Member States may present proposals with that aim. The Council will 
decide on them, acting unanimously. It will, "at the same time", also determine the voting 
conditions for decisions on the new Community areas. In the end, it will recommend that 
Member States adopt such decision according to their respective constitutional 
requirements. No specific intervention of the European Parliament is envisaged in the 
procedure o f this Article. This contrasts with Article N, which requires that the Parliament 
be consulted before the calling of an intergovernmental conference to revise the Treaty.
Article K.9, as other "passerelle" provisions,13^ seem to be a good example of 
material political declarations existing in legal instruments. They are mainly expressions of 
will for progress and a memory note for future decisions. In fact, Article K.9 establishes 
no duty to act on the Member States or Union institutions. Obviously, it does not give 
Member States any power they did not have before.
The only legal effects Article K.9 has are to derogate from the general rule of 
Article N(2) to amend the Union Treaties, creating thus a fast track amendment 
procedure. It will not be necessary to consult the Parliament and call an intergovernmental 
conference. The Council may directly make a proposal to the Member States. Apart from 
these aspects, Article K.9 constitutes a mere political declaration, being the result of a 
compromise between two opposite positions.137
Some Member States (Belgium, Netherlands and Germany) would prefer to make 
straight-away an express inclusion in the Community framework of issues related to the 
right of asylum, as well as control of the external borders. Belgium supported its view on
134 See also Article C of the Treaty on European Union, providing that: MThe Union shall be served by a 
single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities 
carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire
133 For a detailed analysis of this provision see Bieber, R., "Links Between the Third Pillar* (Title VI) 
and the European Community (Title II) of the Treaty on European Union", op.cit, at pp.40-44.
136 There is, for instance, the twin provision of Article 100C(6).
137 See Doutriaux, Yves, Le Traité sur L'Union Européenne, Paris. Armand Colin Éditeur, 1992, at
p.228.
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the eventual declaration by the Court of Justice that the establishment of a single internal 
market, with no internal frontiers, necessarily implicates a common policy on issues related 
to the free movement o f persons. Others, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark, 
would prefer to leave the intergovernmental cooperation as it was - operating in an 
informal manner, outside the framework of official European institutions. In the end, 
Denmark only accepted the "passerelle" provision on the condition that it would require 
the specific national approval necessary for the ratification o f any international treaty.*3**
In any case, up to now, the possibility provided by Article K .9 has not yet been 
used.139
7 - Article K.7 - Relations with other types of intergovernmental 
cooperation developed outside the Treaty on European Union
Article K.7 of Title V I provides that:
"The provisions of this Title shall not prevent the establishment or development of 
closer cooperation between two or more Member States in so far as such 
cooperation does not conflict, or impede, that provided for in this Title."14^
This provision seems to apply to the cooperation between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland resulting from their common travel area, as well as the Benelux arrangements in 
this field - already preserved by the EC Treaty.141
However, the main objective o f this provision seems to be to protect and legitimise 
the cooperation currently existing in the Schengen group. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, this could be a laboratory for future solutions for all Member States, an 
intermediate step towards measures applying in the Union as a whole.
Carlier raises the possibility that a blocking minority be formed inside the Council, 
formed, for example, by the Member States who signed the Schengen Agreements.142 13
1311 That means in Denmark either a majority of 5/6 members of the Folketing or both a majority of the 
members of the Folketing and a majority of voters in a referendum. See on this topic the note of Gj0 rtler, 
Peter, "Ratifying the Treaty on European Union: an interim report." ELR, Voi. 18, August 1993, No.4, 
p.356.
139 A Declaration of the Intergovemamental Conference that approved the Treaty on European Union, 
states that asylum issues would be considered a priority area, with the aim of adopting harmonisation 
action by the beginning of 1993. By the end of 1993 the Council would also consider, on the basis of a 
report, the possibility of applying Article K.9 to matters related with asylum policies. However, the 
Commission, in its Report to the Council on the possibilities of applying Article K.9 of the Treaty on 
European Union to asylum policy, SEC (93) 1687 final, of 4/11/1993, concluded that it was not yet 
appropriate to make recourse to the possibility envisaged by Article K.9 as far as the field of asylum was 
concerned.
14® A similar provision can be found in Article 100C(7), according to which: "The provisions of 
Conventions in force between the Member States governing areas covered by this Article shall remain in 
force until their content has been replaced by directives or measures adopted pursuant to this Article."
141 See Article 233 of the EC Treaty, allowing for more close regional integration between the Benelux 
countries.
386
These Member States could try to use their power to impose certain views or even to 
prevent the adoption o f  Union-wide measures, prepared under the framework o f Title VI. 
In this case, that author sustains that the Schengen Implementing Agreement would be 
contrary to Article 5 o f the EC Treaty of Rome. I fail to see how to apply that provision in 
the context o f Title V I ,* 1445 particularly without questioning the relationship o f the latter 
Title with the EC Treaty in general terms, and in particular as far as the Community 
objectives (including those of Article 7A) are concerned.
However, the rule embodied in Article K.7 seems to be interesting for another 
reason. It seems to entail the danger of violating the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds o f nationality, to the extent that closer cooperation between some Member States 
may end up giving more rights to nationals o f some Member States than to nationals of 
other Member States.
This may have a concrete relation to Community Law, as the Matteucci case144 
seems to suggest. This case concerned an Italian woman living and working in Belgium. 
Under Article 7(2) o f Regulation 1612/68 she is entitled, as a worker in the territory of 
another Member State, to the same social advantages as national workers.145 This 
includes the right to a grant awarded for maintenance and training with a view to the 
pursuit o f studies in the field o f further vocational training.
The applicant, Mrs. Matteucci, had applied for such a grant to the Belgian 
government. The problem was that the grant which she had applied for was awarded only 
within the framework o f a bilateral agreement between Belgium and Germany. Under this 
Agreement, each Contracting Party undertook to grant scholarships to nationals of the 
other party for the purposes of studying, researching, or to complete training in the other 
country.146
Nevertheless the Court o f Justice ruled that the Belgian government was under an 
obligation to require the German government to grant a scholarship to Mrs. Matteucci. As 
far as the German government is concerned, the Court ruled that:
"Since Article 7 of Regulation No 1612/68 requires the host Member State to 
grant the same social advantages to Community workers as to its own nationals, 
another Member State may not prevent the host Member State from fulfilling the 
obligations imposed on it by Community Law."147 
It explained that:
"Article 5 of the [ECJ Treaty provides that the Member States must take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the
14  ^ Cartier, J.Y., "L’Europe et les ressortissants des États tiers: de la coopération intergouvemementale 
vers le droit communautaire". Actualités du Droit (Revue de la Faculté de Droit de Liège), No.2, 1993,
p.207, at 209.
*4  ^ Compare Article 5 of the EC Treaty with the simple reference made in Article A of the Treaty on 
European Union to the fact that the Union tasks "shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating 
consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples."
144 Case 235/87, Matteucci v. Communauté française of Belgium and commissariat général aux relations 
internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium [1988J ECR 5589.
145 See supra, chapter 4, section B.
146 See paragraph 3 of the decision of the Court in the case.
147 Idem, paragraph 18.
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obligations arising out of the Treaty. If, therefore, the application of a provision of 
Community law is liable to be impeded by a measure adopted pursuant to the 
implementation o f a bilateral agreement, even where the agreement falls outside 
the field of application of the Treaty, eveiy Member State is under a duty to 
facilitate the application of the provision and, to that end, to assist every other 
Member State which is under an obligation under Community law."14&
This seems to suggest the existence of a general rule in Community Law, which, it 
is important to emphasise, applies only when a Member State is obliged to treat nationals 
o f other Member States as its own nationals.149 Apparently, that Member State cannot 
invoke an agreement with one or more Member States (applicable only to their nationals) 
to exclude nationals of the remaining Member States from the benefits o f that agreement. 
According to the words o f the Court in the Matteucci case, this rule would be valid "even 
where the agreement [as such] falls outside the field o f application o f the Treaty".
As far as Schengen is concerned, in principle this Community rule on non­
discrimination should not raise problems, since, for example, Article 1 o f the Schengen 
Implementing Agreement defines an alien as being "any person other than a national o f  a 
Member State of the European Communities". However, the existence o f such 
Community rule on non-discrimination remains o f relevance in a more general manner. It 
applies to any agreement between some Member States granting rights to nationals o f  
some Member States, while excluding nationals o f other Member States from the 
enjoyment o f such rights.
The application o f this Community rule on non-discrimination on grounds o f 
nationality may be excluded by Community Law itself, as in the case o f the Benelux. 
However, otherwise, the question may be raised whether "closer cooperation between two 
or more Member States", although cleared under Article K.7 of Title VI, may eventually 
violate that Community rule on non-discrimination, in the sense explained. I
I4® Ibidem, paragraph 19.
I4 9  This may include not only resident workers who are nationals fron another Member State, benefiting 
from equality in social advantages under Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, as previously mentioned; but 
also mere tourists, according to the rule of the Court of Justice in case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public 
[1989] ECR 195.
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V8 - General Assessment of Title VI
The cooperation provided by Title V I is a middle way solution between the 
Community institutional framework and that of the old ad hoc intergovernmental 
cooperation, although closer to the latter.150 Some o f the most negative points o f the 
previous ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation have not been overcome.
It is of the utmost importance to emphasise that under Title VI there is no balance 
o f powers between the different institutions. The Cöuncil is the indisputable protagonist of 
the activities developed under this Title. In practice, it can act without paying much 
attention to the Commission or the European Parliament.151 The Commission does not 
the exclusive right of initiative and in certain areas cannot even present proposals to the 
Council. The European Parliament does not even have the right to be consulted on the 
individual decisions to be adopted by the Council. The lack of accountability to the 
European Parliament most o f the time has not been, and some times cannot be, properly 
compensated for by the control exercised by national parliaments over their governments.
Moreover, the activities developed under this Title suffer from a serious and 
unjustified lack of transparency. One striking example is the fact that the draft Council 
decisions are rarely published, or subject to any public discussion before being adopted. 
The lack o f transparency, at this minimum level, is one o f the most negative aspects of the 
activities developed under Title VI. As Touraine recalls, secrecy is the antithesis of 
democracy.152
Another major weakness of Title VI is the lack of an obligatory and uniform 
judicial control on its activities and on instruments adopted under it. This control should 
be made by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. As argued above, this 
control is necessary to guarantee uniform interpretation of legal instruments across the 
Member States, coherence with Community Law and respect for human rights.
Other aspects o f Title VI which need to be revised are the uncleamess o f the legal 
status o f Council decisions, the five-tier structure of decision making in the Council, and 
the potential for overlap or conflict with Community activities and instruments.
The effectiveness of the cooperation developed under Title VI must also be 
mentioned. Progress has been achieved in some fields. The activities under this Title seem
150 On this topic see, e.g, Melchior, according to whom "(...) le Traité clarifie le schéma institutionnel en 
'prêtant1 à la nouvelle forme de coopération intergouvemementelle les institutions communautaires. Ces 
dernières utilisent cependant des procédures tout à fait distinctes des procédures communautaires 
classiques." See Melchior, F. "Le Traité de Maastricht sur L'Union Européenne (essai de présentation 
synthétique)". Actualités du Droit, 1992, No.4, p.1207, at 1252. Müller-Graff states that ”(...) this 
cooperation: in its core is intergovernmental cooperation, but is a developed form of intergovernmental 
cooperation" - Müller-Graff, CMLRev, op.cit., at p.497. See also Hartley, T. C. "Constitutional and 
Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement", ICLQ, Vol.42, April 1993, No.2, p.213, at 229; and 
Pocar, Fausto & Secchi, Carlo, ¡1 Trattato di Maastricht suil' Unione Europea, Milan, Giuffrè Ed ¡tore, 
1992, at p.15.
151 In fact, this will be the "pillar" of the Union in which the Council has the most power. Several 
analogies can be found between the procedures of Title VI and the procedures envisaged in Title V, on 
Cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, in the latter, the powers of the 
Commission to present proposals to the Council are not limited as in Title VI - see Article J.8 (3) and (4).
152 Touraine, A.," Democracy ", Thesis Eleven, No.38, 1994, pp. 1-15, at 3.
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to have accelerated with the approach of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
Apparently, Member State governments want to show that Cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairs is not a failure. However, the requirement o f unanimous vote in the Council 
has prevented the adoption of several important instruments, like the External Frontiers 
Convention. In other cases, the need to achieve unanimity in the Council downgraded 
draft documents to non-binding instruments, like recommendations or resolutions. Non­
binding instruments account, in fact, for the majority of Council decisions. Finally, 
important instruments already adopted by the Council, like the Europol Convention, have 
not yet entered in force and it is impossible to know when they will.153
Another important point relates to the relations between the framework for 
Cooperation under Title V I and the Community framework. As suggested above, to the 
extent that the Community objectives are similar to those o f  Title VI, all the latter does, in 
legal terms, is to provide a formal alternative for the Community decision making process. 
This seems particularly clear in what regards free movement of persons and the 
establishment of the internal market.
Therefore, one may wonder why an alternative framework was necessary. The 
official answer to this question is that the fields covered by Title VI are closely concerned 
with national sovereignty and thus cannot be treated within the Community framework.154 
Instead, an intergovernmental framework like that provided by Title V I could deal with
such issues.
This reasoning seems to be based on a clear contraposition between the 
Community framework and that o f intergovernmental cooperation. However, it has been 
stressed that cooperation under Title VI is not pure intergovernmental cooperation.155 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that "the institutional aspects of the Third Pillar cannot 
be described adequately in terms of the distinction between intergovernmental and 
supranational" frameworks.156
Following these ideas I suggest analysing Title V I keeping in mind that its different 
institutional aspects are not necessarily entailed by each other. The point I want to make is
153 jsJote that the Council itself recognised that "the initial results of the application of [Title VI] are 
inedequate although it is emphasized that the matters covered by this Title (...) are very sensitive and time 
has been very short to allow a true assessment." See the Council Report on the Functioning of the Treaty 
on European Union, Brussels, 1995, pp.35, point 75.
154 The same reason was already given as far as the ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation is concerned.
155 O'Keeffe, "Recasting the third pillar", op.cit., p.901.
156 Snyder, Francis, "Institutional Development in the European Union: Some Implications of the Third 
Pillar", in The Third Pillar o f  the European Union..., op.cit., pp.85-95, at 90. My subsequent reflections, 
in the main text, have their origin in my reading of this article. Note that Snyder advances "the hypothesis 
that the distinction between intergovernmentalism and supranational ism is losing its relevance in the 
context of the European Union". Idem, loc.cit. On institutional problems of the third pillar see also: de 
Zwaan, Jaap W., "Institutional Problems and Free Movement of Persons - the legal and political 
framework for cooperation", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, 
T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et al. (eds.), 
Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, pp.335-351; Groenendijk, C.A, "Three Questions About Free 
Movement of Persons and Democracy in Europe", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe..., op.cit., 
pp.391-402; and Monar, Joerg, "The Evolving Role of the Union Institutions in the Framework of the 
Third Pillar", in The Third Pillar o f  the European Union..., op.cit., pp.69-83.
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that not all institutional features of Title VI are exclusively explained by the official 
position that national sovereignty has to be preserved. In my opinion its institutional 
features are also explained by the emphasis on a restrictive immigration policy. It is well- 
known that, to a lesser or greater extent, in the last two decades, an emphasis on 
restrictive immigration policies has prevailed in Member States. The emphasis on such 
policies may explain various positions and solutions adopted by Member States that 
cannot be understood simply in terms of a mere concern to retain national sovereignty. 
This seems to be clearly the case with reference to the serious lack o f transparency, and 
even the lack of adequate parliamentary and judicial control in relation to Title VI. It is 
true that an eventual need to obtain the assent of the European Parliament to adopt 
measures, or the control by the EC Court o f Justice of common measures adopted 
unanimously, could set limits on Member States' powers. But more important than 
Member States' fears of being limited, as such, seems to be their desire to operate as freely 
as possible in immigration matters. This desire may manifest itself at a national157 or 
European level. Anything that may put in danger the effectiveness of a restrictive 
immigration policy is avoided.
If  the European Parliament had any concrete power it could be more difficult for 
the Council to adopt restrictive measures on immigration. The European Parliament has 
usually been more "progressive" than most o f the national parliaments. Likewise, review 
by the Court of Justice of restrictive immigration policies in terms o f respect for 
fundamental rights could undermine the effectiveness o f the former. Furthermore, the lack 
o f provision o f simple information to, or consultation of, the European Parliament, seems 
to be explained by the wish to maintain secrecy in the activities developed under Title VI. 
The lack o f  transparency in more general terms contributes to preventing public discussion 
of restrictive measures, and thus to avoiding pressure being brought against them by 
immigrant associations and human rights groups. The will to assure the full effectiveness 
o f a restrictive immigration policy prevails over the concern for respect o f fundamental 
human rights and for democracy within the European institutions.
By way of conclusion, it is submitted that the institutional features o f Title VI are 
partly explained by the wish of Member States to work in secrecy as far as immigration 
matters are concerned, and to be free to adopt and implement restrictive immigration 
policies. T o  the extent that this is so, the institutional framework of Title VI is not 
explained by the wish to retain national sovereignty as such. It is explained by the wish to 
retain the possibility o f making a specific use of that sovereignty. This use is open to 
challenge, even by those that may be concerned with the preservation of national 
sovereignty in the current process of European integration.
157 Note, for example, the controversy between the then French Home Affairs minister Charles Pasqua 
and the French courts about judicial decisions controlling the legality of expulsion orders and of other 
migration related measures. On this topic see Legouy, André "Quand le violeur crie au viol". Plein Droit, 
No.24,1994, p. 19.
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C) AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY OF ROME
1 - The new Article 100C of the EC Treaty, on visas 
a) general aspects
The only aspects concerning third country nationals, on which the Community was 
granted explicit competence by the Treaty on European Union, were aspects related to 
visas. The Community was recognised as having competence, first, to determine the third 
countries whose nationals must have a visa to cross the external borders of the 
Community and, secondly, to define a uniform format of visas.
According to Article 100C(1), the elaboration o f the list o f countries whose 
nationals will be required a visa to enter the Community [hereinafter the "list of visa 
countries"] is to be decided unanimously by the Council until 1 January 1996, and by a 
qualified majority after that date. However, when faced with the danger o f a "sudden 
inflow" of nationals of a third country into the Community, the Council may introduce a 
visa requirement for such persons, deciding by qualified majority. This visa requirement 
may only be introduced, in this manner, for a period of six months. The need for an easier 
decision making process, when confronted with an emergency, was decisive in putting 
aside the rule o f unanimity. However, if it proves necessary to extend the period in which 
a visa is required, the visa requirement will have to be adopted by unanimity, again.
Meanwhile, Article 100C(3) provided that measures related to the uniform format 
for visas were to be decided by the Council before 1 January 1996, also acting by qualified 
majority.
In the areas of application o f Article 100C, the Council will decide on a proposal 
from the Commission,158 the usual Community procedure. However, the Commission is 
supposed to "examine any request made by a Member State that it submit a proposal to 
the Council".159 This is more than what was already provided for in Article 152, 
according to which such requests may only be done by the Council, as an organ.160 The 
Council will also have to consult the European Parliament before adopting a decision 
under this Article. That is the same requirement made in Articles 100 and 235 o f the EC 
Treaty.161
Moreover, it may be noted that Article 100C(5) repeats the rule o f Article K.2(2), 
mentioned above, on the safeguarding of Member States exercise o f responsibilities in 
relation to "internal security". Furthermore, Article 100C(6) is a symmetrical rule to the
158 Note that the Council will also act on a proposal of the Commission in a situation of emergency, 
when there is "a threat of a sudden inflow of nationals" from a third country. In that event, the 
Commission will present a "recommendation". It is interesting that the Council, in such a delicate field, 
will be dependent on the Commission to act in a situation of "emergency". This contrasts with the fact that 
in the fields mentioned in Article K.l(7) to (9) the Commission cannot even make proposals to the 
Council.
159 Article 100C(4).
160 Article 152 is applicable to Title VI by virtue of Article K.8 of this Title.
161 Sec infra, on the amendment made by the Treaty on European Union to the procedure of Article 100 
of the EC Treaty.
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passerelle provision o f Article K.9, analysed above.162 Meanwhile, Article IOOC(7)163 is a 
partial replica of Article K.7, on the possibility for closer cooperation between Member 
States. Article 100C(7) has only one small difference compared to Article K.7. It refers 
expressly to "Conventions in force between the Member States".
It seems obvious that the explicit competence of the Community is not very much 
enlarged with the granting of powers on visas. Visas are only one aspect of immigration 
policies. The coordination of these policies will be pursued in the framework of the 
cooperation established in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. To decide what 
countries' nationals will be required to obtain a visa in order to enter the Community is an 
, important but quite limited aspect of the whole problem. It does not seem that Article 
100C constitutes much more than psychological progress. The Intergovernmental 
Conferences probably adopted it just to make the symbolic point that it was enlarging 
Community competence in this field. Clearly, it was not meant to make a major difference.
The next chapter will analyse the rules on visas proposed by the Commission draft 
External Frontiers Convention and of the Commission draft Regulation on the list of visa 
countries. The examination of the latter will concentrate specifically in the proposed list of 
visa countries and the criteria used to compile it. In this chapter, the following subpart of 
this section discusses the precise extent of the material scope of Community competence 
on visas under Article 100C o f the EC Treaty, with reference to the Commission draft 
Regulation on the list of visa countries.
b) the material scope of Community competence on visas under Article 100C
The precise material scope of the Community competence under Article 100C may 
be discussed by reference to the Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing a list 
o f visa countries.164 This draft Regulation, analysed in the next chapter, was presented 
under Article 100C of the EC Treaty. As far as the list of visa countries is concerned, the 
relevant parts of this Article are its first paragraph and part of the third, which state that:
"1. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, shall determine the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States."
I62 In any case, in 1996, the Intergovernmental Conference planned in Article N(2) of the Treaty of 
Maastricht may also enlarge the competencies of the Community on third country nationals.
*63 As mentioned supra it provides that: "The provisions of the Conventions in force between the 
Member States governing areas covered by this Article shall remain in force until their content has been 
replaced by Directives or measures adopted pursuant to this Article".
164 See the Commission’s "Proposal for a Regulation determining the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external frontiers of the Member States", presented 
together with the draft Convention on the crossing of the external borders, COM (93) 684 final, of 
10/12/1993, p.39. This draft Regulation was already adopted as Council Regulation (EC) No.2317/95 of 
25/9/1995, OJ L 234/1 of 3/10/1995. Both the draft Regulation and the draft Convention are analysed in 
the next chapter. It may also be noted that, following a Commission draft presented under Article 100C in 
July 1994 - COM(94) 287 final, of 13/7/1994 - the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1683/95 of 
29/5/1995, laying down a uniform format for visas, OJ L 164/1 of 14/7/1995.
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*’3. From 1 January 1996, the Council shall adopt the decisions referred in 
paragraph 1 by qualified majority."
The discussion about the draft Regulation on the list of visa countries showed two 
diverging perspectives as to the proper interpretation o f these paragraphs o f Article 100C. 
The divergence concentrates on two aspects of the draft Regulation. One is the 
elaboration and the precise binding force o f the list o f countries set out in the draft 
Regulation. The other is its provision for mutual recognition of visas between Member 
States.
According to a broad interpretation, adopted by the Commission, Article 100C 
would authorise, e.g., the adoption by the Community of a negative and a positive list o f 
countries whose nationals have, and do not have, respectively, the need to hold a visa 
when crossing the external frontiers of the Member States.165 Furthermore, Article 100C 
would also grant the Community competence to establish mutual recognition between 
Member States of visas issued by other Member States, which are valid throughout the 
Community. The Commission sustains a broad interpretation with the following reasoning. 
The place o f  Article 100C in the EC Treaty "shows that this article forms integral part o f 
the provisions relating to the internal market".166 Moreover, "Article 100C confers an 
exclusive power on the Community".167 The very language of Article 100C(1) "makes it 
plain that the Community is under an obligation to take the action referred to in paragraph 
1" and "that any action on the part o f the Member States is precluded as from the entry 
into force of the Treaty on European Union."168 In a more extreme position, the 
European Parliament believes that Article 100C "actually provides for harmonisation o f 
visa policy".169 Thus, it proposes that the draft Regulation provides on conditions for the
165 Instead of referring to a positive and a negative list, it could be said that the list of countries referred 
to in Article 100C is exclusive or not. If the list of countries is exclusive that means that the Member 
States cannot require a visa from a national of a country not included in it. Therefore the positive list (the 
list of countries whose nationals can enter a Member State without a visa) is defined by contrast, by 
contraposition. The Community has powers to enact positive and negative lists. On the other hand, if the 
list is not exclusive, then the Member States may require visas from nationals of other countries not 
included in the list adopted. In this case, the Community would not have power to make the so-called 
positive list, but would only have the power to establish a "negative" list of visa countries. To speak about 
an exclusive or non exclusive list has the advantage of placing the issue more directly in the context of the 
discussion on competence. However, the terms "negative" and "positive list" are widely used. Thus they 
will also be used in this chapter so as not to add further complications to a matter that is already quite 
complicated.
166 First considerandum of the Preamble of the draft Regulation. See also the Explanatory Memorandum 
of the Commission on the draft Regulation, p.l - COM (93) 684 final. Curiously, according to the 
European Parliament, an identical reference to the internal market (in the third recital of the Preamble of 
the draft Regulation) should be deleted.
167 Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission on the draft Regulation, p.3.
168 Idem, p.2.
16  ^ See p. 16 of the explanatory statement included in the Froment-Meurice's Report of 29 March 1994 
on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation determining the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, made on behalf 
of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref. A3-0193/94. 
That report was adopted in 21 April 1994 by the Legislative Resolution embodying the opinion of the 
European Parliament on that Commission's proposal, OJ C 128/350 of 9/5/94.
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issue o f  uniform visas, that it establishes the abolition of national visas after a transitional 
period and that it provides a detailed definition of visas.
On the other hand, a restrictive interpretation of the powers conferred on the 
Community by Article 100C is believed to correspond to that of the governments of some 
Member States.170 It denies EC competence to establish a positive list o f visa countries 
and to provide for mutual recognition of visas. These aspects are believed to be part of a 
more general visa and immigration policy that would not fit within the narrow limits of 
Article 100C. Such visa and immigration policy would rather be the subject of activities of 
cooperation under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.171
The draft Regulation o f the Commission on a list of visa countries was adopted by 
the Council on 25 September 1995.172 Contrary to what the Commission suggested in that 
draft Regulation, the Council did not accept that the Regulation dealt with the positive list 
o f visa countries,173 nor with the mutual recognition o f national visas. Subsequently, I will 
examine the legal validity of this position, from the point of view of the Community 
competence on visas established by Article 100C. I will first analyse such competence as 
far as the "positive" list of visa countries is concerned. Secondly, I will examine whether 
the Community competence includes the possibility of ruling on the mutual recognition of 
national visas. Finally, I will also refer to the issue of transit visas and whether or not the 
Community has competence to regulate that aspect of visa policy.
(i) A rticle 100C(1) and the "positive" list o f visa countries
-The Commission’s view and its proposal
The draft Regulation proposed by the Commission reflects its interpretation of 
Article 100C. Article 1(1) o f the draft Regulation, together with its Annex, would 
establish the so-called "negative list". Article 1(2) o f the proposal for Regulation provided 
that:
"Until 30 June 1996 Member States shall decide whether to require visas of 
nationals of third countries not listed in the Annex. Prior to that date the Council 
shall decide according to (...) Article 100C either to add each of those countries to 
that list or to exempt its nationals from visa requirements."
In other words, the Commission proposed the following general plan. During the 
initial period, from the adoption of the Regulation until 30 June 1996, there would be only 
a EC negative list. The nationals of countries (or territories) included in that list would be 
required to have a visa by all Member States. However, some Member States could decide 
to ask for visas from nationals o f some other countries. They could do so during the first 
period. The single restriction to this situation, mentioned only in the Preamble of the draft 
Regulation, is that such visa requirement will "not give rise to controls contrary to Article
170 Hailbronner, Kay, "Visa regulations and third country nationals in EC law", CMLRev, Vol.31. 1994, 
No.5, pp.969-995, op.cit., at 974.
171 See O'Keeffe, "The new Draft...", op.cit., pp. 146-147 and 149.
172 Council Regulation (EC) No.2317/95, quoted above.
173 See, e.g., Article 2(1) of the Regulation (EC) No.2317/95, quoted above.
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7A ".174 In any case, during the first period two parallel visa regimes would co-exist: the 
EC regime, the same in all Member States, and the national regimes, eventually different in 
each Member State.
During the following period, only the EC regime would exist. Before 30 June 
1996, the end of the first period, the Council would make a list specifying the countries 
and territories whose nationals would be required to have a visa to cross the external 
frontiers o f the Member States. Such a list would be identical for all Member States and 
would be the sole legal instrument on the subject. Member States could not require a visa 
from a person who was not a national of a country included therein. Therefore, such a list, 
although negative (in the sense that it defines the persons who cannot enter without a 
visa), would also define a positive list. The positive list would be defined implicitly, or a 
contrario sensu: the persons not mentioned in the negative list would automatically be 
allowed to enter without a visa.
In the Explanatory Memorandum the Commission explained that:
"Ideally [it] would have wished at this stage to place every third country either on 
the negative list or on a "positive list" of countries whose nationals are to be 
exempted from visa requirements. (...) However, this proved impossible in view of 
the very large number of countries for which the practices of the Member State 
diverge and the sensitive nature of the decision to be taken with respect to many of 
these countries."175
Accordingly, the Commission proposed the transitional regime, which, in its own words, 
was to be
"only applicable for a strictly limited period of time, whereupon each third country 
must be governed either by the positive or the negative list."*7^
The underlying interpretation o f Article 100C reflected in the Commission's plan is 
obvious: Article 100C entitles the Community to enact a negative and a positive list. It is 
not suggested that the positive list enter in force immediately only because of political 
reasons. The transitional phase is clearly entailed by the exclusive character of the 
reference made by the Commission to the negative list o f visa countries. According to the 
Commission's interpretation of Article 100C, the transitional phase is a kind o f derogation 
of the established Treaty rules. It is a concession to allow Member States to adapt 
progressively to the new and exclusive Community powers on the matter. Moreover, 
according to the Commission proposal, before 30 June 1996, the Council would approve 
the positive list which, in principle, would enter into force after that date. Naturally, it is 
not by mere chance that, according to Article 100C, after 1 January 1996 decisions on the 
list will be adopted by qualified majority. The Commission's proposal of a transitional 
phase was also made with an eye to the future change to the voting procedure in the 
Council.
l7  ^A definition of the Court of Justice of what Article 7A imposes in this respect is still expected in the 
pending case C-445/93, Parliament v. Commission. Therefore, the precise effect of the reference of the 
draft Regulation can only be definitively interpreted after the Court's ruling on the matter.
17 5  Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission on the draft Regulation, p.3.
176 idem, p.4.
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-Analysis of Article 100C
Now Article 100C will be examined in an attempt to further the analysis of the 
Commission's proposal in terms of its underlying interpretation of Article 100C, as well as 
to analyse properly the criticism made of the Commission.
First, in interpreting Article 100C, its wording will be examined. Next, the 
provision will be put in context, within the general legal framework of the Union and of 
the scheme of the EC Treaty alone. Then, some historical elements will be recalled. 
Finally, a general conclusion will be made together with some ideas for the future solution 
of the controversy.
The following analysis of Article 100C will concentrate on looking for the precise 
character of the list referred to in Article 100C(1). This will inevitably entail the search for 
an accurate interpretation of that provision in general terms. That search may be useful, 
for instance, with respect to the controversy over EC competence under Article 100C to 
rule on the mutual recognition of visas. However, this aspect will be examined at a later 
stage, only. Furthermore, the discussion concerning the eventual duty of the Community 
to act in this field, and its exclusive (or not) power will not be expressly dealt with here, 
although this issue may arise from the present analysis of Article 100C. The reader is 
therefore warned that the following analysis is not meant to answer all doubts over Article 
100C, if  indeed it answers any at all.
Wording of the provision
The wording of Article 100C(1) does not provide an unequivocal meaning of the 
provision. To a certain extent, this is precisely the origin of the problem.
The interpretation of the Commission, however, is that Article 100C includes the 
power to adopt a negative and a positive list. It has stated that:
’’Manifestly, this is what is contemplated by Article 100C.(...) By providing that 
the Council is to 'determine the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States' 
Article 100C necessarily implies that the Council must also determine which third 
countries are to be exempt from a visa requirement. The contrary view cannot be 
reconciled either with the letter or with the spirit of this provision."^
While the "spirit” will be considered later, it seems difficult to draw from the letter 
o f the provision any meaningful conclusions. In an attempt to draw some meaning from 
that wording, we could, for instance, stress the significance of the references to "ih£ third 
countries" or to "the external borders of the Member States", arguing that by definition 
they exclude any autonomous action by the Member States. However, it seems impossible 
to base any unequivocal conclusion as to its meaning on these phrases, or on any part of 
the wording of the Article.
Nor does it seem possible to draw unambiguous conclusions from a comparison of 
the wording of Article 100C(1) with that o f Article 16 of the previous draft Convention of 
the External Frontiers, made by the ad hoc immigration group. The latter Article 
envisaged the adoption of a negative and a positive list, as it referred explicitly to nationals 
who would require a visa to enter a Member State and also to those who would not. 
Nevertheless, such difference in the wording of the two provisions does not necessarily
m  Ibidem, p.3. Emphasis added by the Commission’s text.
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mean that they have different intentions and in particular that Article 100C(1) excludes the 
elaboration o f a positive list.
The search for the precise meaning o f Article 100C has to proceed beyond its 
wording. In search for the "spirit" of the Article, we may analyse its place within the 
general legal framework o f the Union (of the Treaty on European Union), and within that 
of the Community (in the EC Treaty).
System of the Union
Within the general legal framework of the Union, Article 100C has to be 
considered in relation to the provisions of Title VI o f the Treaty on European Union, 
envisaging cooperation regarding "conditions o f entry and movement of nationals of third 
countries on the territory of the Member States".!7® in the final version o f the Maastricht 
Treaty, the drawing of the list o f visa countries and the definition of the uniform visa 
format are the only cases o f (explicit) Community competence, in stark contrast to the 
Union general competence on third country nationals, under the third pillar. It is important 
to recall this fact in order to refute the general assertion made by the European Parliament 
that Article 100C "actually provides for harmonisation of visa policy".179
A further point, or perhaps another aspect of the same point, regards a search for 
the sense o f Article 100C in relation to the establishment of the internal market. It has 
been said that there is a close relationship between Article 100C and Article 7A of the EC  
Treaty and, in general terms, the establishment o f free movement o f persons in the internal 
market.180 This has been used as an argument to justify a broad interpretation of Article 
100C and thus the Community competence under the latter to draw a positive list of visa 
countries. According to this reasoning, only this broad interpretation would make sense, 
given the close relationship between Article 100C and the EC Treaty provisions on the 
establishment of the internal market.
However, the obvious intention of the drafters o f the Treaty on European Union in 
dividing the explicit competences on visa policy between the Community (Article 100C) 
and the Union (under its Title V I) cannot be forgotten in this respect either. As already 
noted, it is important to emphasise, for instance, that Article K .l of the Treaty on 
European Union states that the cooperation envisaged in Title V I has the aim o f 
"achieving the objectives o f the Union, in particular the objective of free movement o f 
persons". As this freedom of movement is an essential part of the internal market, the
U® Defined as an area to be regarded as a matter of common interest by Article K. l(3)(a).
179 explanatory statement of the Froment Meurice Report, of 29 March 1994, p.16, referred to
supra. See also Hailbronner, op.cit., p.973, who states that "[p]rocedurally Article 100C covers only some 
adjects of a common visa policy".
See Hailbronner, who states e.g. that: "lc]onsidering the Internal market and freedom of movement 
objectives of the Treaty, a solution seems hardly to be acceptable which either would require the 
establishment of new types of border control or which would seriously undermine the idea of a common 
external border regime. The abolition of internal border controls alone leads to the conclusion that a 
distinction between positive and negative listing cannot be maintained. It would be hard if not impossible 
to imagine how a system exclusively based on negative listing could function properly." See Hailbronner, 
op.cit,, at p.986.1 answer this view in the main text. Note, in any case, that Hailbronner makes in general 
a quite balanced analysis of Article 100C and often seems to avoid making definitive legal conclusions on 
the interpretation of that provision, referring often to the practical functioning of the rules. See also the 
Froment Meurice Report, of 29 March 1994, p.15, and specially point 2.1 of its explanatory statement.
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search for the sense of Article 100C within the establishment of the internal market cannot 
be limited to the EC Treaty.
As we have seen, in the search for the precise meaning of Article 100C we cannot 
forget that the competences granted by it to the EC are small exceptions to the Union 
competence on third country nationals in the third pillar. Furthermore, Title VI of the 
Maastricht Treaty is also supposed to contribute to the free movement of persons and the 
establishment of the internal market.
These points may reduce the arguments in favour of a broad interpretation of 
Article 100C. However, while they would appear to reinforce a restrictive interpretation 
o f Article 100C (one that denies EC competence to draw a "positive list” of visa 
countries), in fact they do not tell us the precise reason why Article 100C should be 
interpreted in a restrictive way. The precise extent to which Article 100C was supposed to 
contribute to the objective o f establishing a true internal market still remains to be 
determined.
Furthermore, there are repeated reservations in the Treaty on European Union and 
in its Title VI establishing that its rules are "without prejudice to the powers of the 
Community".181 Therefore, reference has to be made to the position of Article 100C 
within the EC Treaty.
Scheme of the EC Treaty
In the context of the legal framework of the Community, Article 100C may be put 
in relation to other provisions of the EC Treaty that are relevant for the building up of a 
situation of true free movement of persons. In particular, it has to be put in relation to 
Articles 100 and 235, which it can never substitute.182 Pursuant to these Articles, the 
Community could draw a positive list of visa countries, but only (until a future change to 
the EC Treaty) by a unanimous vote in the Council. While, in itself, this does not 
necessarily exclude a broad interpretation of Article 100C and EC competence to draw a 
"positive list", it nevertheless reminds us again that Article 100C is not the only EC Treaty 
provision on which the implementation of the visa aspect of the internal market may be 
based. This is not, however, sufficient evidence on which to make a convincing 
interpretation of Article 100C. Some historical elements will now be recalled as an aid to 
achieving such an interpretation.
Article K.1, referred to supra, says that "Member States shall regard [certain] areas as matters of 
common interest", "without prejudice to the powers of the European Community“. Article M of the Treaty 
on European Union provides that, except for the amending provisions, "nothing in this Treaty shall effect 
the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying 
them". Article B of the Treaty on European Union refers to the fact that one of the objectives of the Union 
is to "maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering [in the 
Intergovernmental Conference of 1996] to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by 
this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the 
institutions of the Community."
182 Furthermore, as O’Keeffe recalls, according to Article K.9 the Council can also propose to the 
Member States to apply Article 100C to action in the areas referred to in Article K .l(l) to (6), thus 
explicitly enlarging the Community competence. See O'Keeffe, "The new Draft...", op.cit., p.140.
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Historical aspects - the proposals preceding the final version of Article 100C
It seems clear that the authors of the Maastricht Treaty wanted to grant the E C  
competence for some aspects of the visa policy, while leaving others for cooperation 
between Member States under the "third pillar". The precise distinction between the 
aspects o f each pillar is, to a certain extent, what is at stake. Below, in section B ,  I 
recalled some of the proposals presented during the Intergovernmental Conferences that 
led to the signature of the Treaty on European Union.183
Here I will refer only to the proposal on the table which preceded the final version 
of that Treaty. That proposal was the Dutch presidency’s "draft Union Treaty", presented 
on 8 November 1991.184 In a proposed new Article 100C of the EC Treaty, it granted the 
Community explicit competence to deal with all aspects related to "the rules governing the 
crossing by persons of the external borders o f the Member States and the exercise o f  
controls thereon" and with "the general conditions governing authorised entry to and 
movement" within the EC by third country nationals - "including the determination o f  the 
travel requirements required for crossing the external borders of the Member States". The 
Community competence on the entry and movement o f third country nationals for short 
stay included specifically the determination o f "the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders o f the Member States" and the 
adoption o f "measures relating to the introduction o f a uniform visa."185 Meanwhile, the 
Cooperation between Member States "in judicial and home affairs" could not even operate 
in that field.
As noted above, Germany supported this Dutch proposal, but the United Kingdom 
opposed it with success. In the end, a compromise was reached, by which the Community 
was given competence only to draw the list o f  countries referred in Article 100C and to  
define the uniform format for visas.
Does this recollection help us in the search for the precise intentions o f the Treaty 
drafters? One very interesting point is that it seems clear that, in the last Dutch proposal, 
the competence given by Article 100C to draw the list of visa countries included also the 
competence to draw a positive list. Crossing o f external borders, entry and visa policy for
*8 3  See Corbett, op.cit., at pp.219-379.
I8 4  See also Bull.EC, 9/1991, point 1.1.4., p .ll.
*8  ^As recalled supra, in section A, Article 100C of that proposal had the following text: "1. The Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal of the Commission or on the initiative of any Member State, and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt the Directives relating to the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States which concern the following areas, to the 
extent that such approximation is necessary to ensure the free movement of persons within the internal 
market: (a) the rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and 
the exercise of controls thereon; (b) the general conditions governing authorised entry to and movement 
within the territory of the Member States as a whole by nationals of third countries for short stays, 
including the determination of the travel requirements required for crossing the external borders of the 
Member States. The Council shall, in a manner laid down in the previous paragraph, [unanimously] 
decide which of the decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. 2.The Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of any Member State, and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall: - determine the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States; - adopt the measures 
relating to the introduction of a uniform visa."
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4short stays were to be wholly and uniquely a Community matter.186 The reference to 
Community competence over a uniform visa only confirms the idea of general Community 
competence on visa policy.187 In the final version of the Treaty on European Union, the 
Community was granted no general competence on entry and movement for short stay, 
nor on the uniform visa. Instead, the Community was given competence only with respect 
to the uniform format for visas and the list of visa countries. As the reference to the latter 
used exactly the same wording as the last Dutch proposal, it seems legitimate to presume 
that it was meant to have the same substantive content as before, including, therefore, the 
competence to draw a positive list.
Article 100C is certainly not very clear as to whether it grants, or not, the EC 
competence to draw a list of countries whose nationals can enter the Community without 
a visa. The present author tends to favour a relatively broad interpretation of Article 100C 
in this respect, according to which this provision gives the Community competence to 
draw a positive list of visa countries. This interpretation seems to be the only one that 
takes into account two important facts. First, the wording of the reference to the EC 
competence to draw the list, made in the final version of Article 100C(1), which repeats 
ipsis verbis the reference made in the last Dutch proposal,188 granting the Community 
competence to draw a positive list. Secondly, the EC competence under Article 100C on 
the list o f visa countries is the sole substantive exception to the Union competence on 
third country nationals under Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty. Consequently, one may 
presume that it was meant to be given full effect and not to be interpreted in a restrictive 
manner.
In any case, this issue seems likely to raise practical problems only if, after 1st 
January 1996, it proves possible to form a qualified majority in the Council to adopt a 
positive list o f visa countries. However, it does not seem very likely to occur. The Council 
has expressed a quite narrow interpretation o f the Community competence granted by 
Article 100C, as in the case of transit visas to be mentioned below.
It is submitted that a definitive solution for the controversy on this point could be 
one of a mixed legal and political nature. First, the Regulation adopted by the Council in 
September 1995 could perhaps be maintained in force until new constitutional rules are 
adopted. Moreover, a clarification of the relevant Treaty rules should be made in the next 
Intergovernmental Conference. This would be a preferable course to making the matter 
becoming the object o f a dispute in the Court o f Justice.
(ii) A rticle 100C and the mutual recognition o f visas
As referred to before, Article 2 of the Commission's draft Regulation provided for 
the mutual recognition of visas "valid throughout the Community". However, the mutual
1 8 6  According to Article !00C(1) of that proposal, quoted supra.
1 8 7  Note also that the specification of competence on the list of visa countries, made by Article 100C(2) of 
the last Dutch proposal, was not meant to add new competences to those already provided in Article 
1 0 0 C(1) of the same proposal, but merely to provide for a different voting procedure in the Council: by
lified majority.
Conclusion
First indent of Article 100C(2).
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recognition of visas between Member States is not expressly envisaged by Article 100C or 
any other provision of the EC Treaty. Neither is the issue of visas with validity for all the 
Community. Thus the question arises as to the legal basis of such a rule in this draft 
Regulation.
According to the Commission, ’’the mutual recognition by Member States o f visas 
issued by each other" "is necessary to give full effect to Article 100C" and "is an essential 
accompanying measure for the achievement o f the objective set out in Article 7A as 
regards the free movement o f persons."189 The Commission uses here a sort o f implied 
power argument, which could be thought to have some legal background in the joined 
cases Germany et al v. Commission.I9  ^ There, the Court of Justice considered that, since 
Article 118
"confers a specific task on the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision is 
not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission 
necessarily and p e r  se  the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out 
that task."*9!
However, the matter under review here is quite different from the one at stake in 
that case. The latter case concerned the power of the Commission to promote close 
cooperation. The Commission was the only institution that could be responsible for 
promoting such cooperation within the Community. Besides, that cooperation was to be 
developed wholly under one single legal framework - that of Article 118 o f the EC Treaty. 
In the present case we are dealing with an eventual direct imposition o f a legal rule (the 
mutual recognition of visas) and within a field where the competence is divided between 
the Community and the third pillar. Therefore, the comparison has to be treated extremely 
cautiously.
Meanwhile, to corroborate the Commission's view, Hailbronner adds another 
argument:
"A uniform format of visas does serve a useful purpose only to the extent that 
visas issued by other Member States are recognised as mutually valid It can 
hardly be assumed that a common visa format is to be introduced simply for 
psychological or decorative purposes." W2
However, as argued before, to a certain extent that may have been exactly the intention o f 
the Treaty drafters: to grant the Community competence related to third country nationals 
on a quite secondary and formal matter in order precisely to disguise the lack of agreement 
on granting to it more substantial competence in that field.
Furthermore, we may also imagine that the introduction of a common visa format 
could have simply had the intention to prepare the way for the introduction o f a uniform 
visa. The latter point is not (or at the very least not expressly) mentioned by Article 100C. 
It is included under the Union competences in Title VI. Furthermore, Community 
competence over uniform visas (and therefore on their mutual recognition) was suggested
189 Second considerandum of the Preamble of the draft Regulation.
I9® As pointed out by Hailbronner, op.cit., at pp.986-7.
19 1 Cases 281,283-5 & 287/85 Germany et al. v. Commission (1987] ECR 3203, at 3253, paragraph 28. 
This is generally regarded as a use of the doctrine of implied powers. See Hartley, Trevor "The 
Commission as Legislator under the EEC Treaty", ELR, Vol.I3, April 1988, No.2, pp. 122-125, at p.124. 
See supra, chapter 2, for an analysis of the case. 
l9  ^Hailbronner, op.cit., p.988.
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by the Dutch proposal and clearly rejected during the intergovernmental conferences that 
led to the Treaty on European Union. It does not seem logical to exclude Community 
competence to draw rules on the issue of uniform visas and to include implicitly in Article 
100C the EC competence to impose the mutual recognition of visas.
Finally, in what relates to the argument that the mutual recognition of visas is 
coherent with the rules on the establishment o f the internal market,193 the reader is 
referred to the analysis of Article 100C above. There, it was argued that the rules of the 
third pillar have to be taken into account when searching for the meaning o f Article 100C 
within the (Union and Community) rules for the establishment of the internal market. 
Therefore, it is submitted that an interpretation that reads into Article 100C a Community 
competence to rule on mutual recognition o f visas does not conform with the intentions of 
the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty nor with the division o f competences on visas 
between its Title VI and the amended EC Treaty.
In any case, the mutual recognition of Article 2 "applies only to visas which are 
valid throughout the Community". The Commission recognises that the issue of the latter 
"is governed by the External Frontiers Convention."^4 As will be mentioned in the next 
chapter, the draft Convention provides for the issue of uniform visas for the whole 
Community and for their mutual recognition. In particular, Article 2 of the draft 
Regulation, on the mutual recognition of visas "valid throughout the Community", seems 
to be substantially identical to Article 18 of the draft External Frontiers Convention, which 
establishes that:
"A Member State shall not require a visa issued by its own authorities of a person
applying to stay for a short time within its territory who holds a uniform visa". 
Therefore, the mutual recognition of visas, even for those who accept its inclusion in the 
draft Regulation, would necessarily require the entry into force o f the External Borders 
Convention and would be dependent on its provisions. HaiJbronner even states that "[i]f 
this condition is taken into account, objections against Article 2 o f the draft Regulation are 
hardly convincing".
However, it could also be said that such a condition can, at most, only diminish the 
practical importance o f the controversy over the matter, but not the real pertinence of the 
objections to EC competence. It can still be maintained that the Community has no 
competence under Article 100C to establish the mutual recognition of visas. Would it not 
be strange that the Community would have competence on mutual recognition of visas, 
but no competence as to their issue? Additionally, what is the special reason that could 
justify a Community instrument giving legal force to a provision of a Convention between 
the Member States?
1^3 Hailbronner, op.cit., p.987, who sustains that "[i]n the case of a visa valid throughout the Community, 
the Internal market concept indeed does support the view that mutual recognition is implied in Article 
100C'\ It may be implied, but it does not mean that such provision gives the Community the power to rule 
on the mutual recognition of visas, especially when it is recognised that the EC has not competence to rule 
on the issue of visas valid throughout the Community.
194 ^ ^ ¿ 5  that "Member States could not be expected to recognise visas granted by each other without a 
minimum harmonisation. Otherwise the Member States would lay themselves open to the abusive practice 
of 'visa shopping'." See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission on the draft Regulation, p.4.
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(ii) Article 100C and transit visas
A final point must be made in regard to transit visas. The Justice and Home Affairs 
Council has adopted a list of third countries whose nationals have to hold a visa when they 
travel through a Member State in transit to a third country.195 This topic was dealt with 
under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, and not under Article 100C of the E C  
Treaty. The argument given for this matter to be treated within the third pillar was that the 
visas in question did not concern third country nationals authorised to cross the external 
frontiers o f the Member States.
This argument is a clear mystification o f the real situation in question. It is clearly 
the case that a third country national has to cross the external frontiers of Member States 
to be in transit through them from one third country into another. If the third country 
national concerned is authorized to transit through a Member State to go to another 
country, he or she has to be authorised to cross its borders. Even if  the authorised crossing 
of the Member State frontiers is concretely restricted in time and space to what is 
necessary for the purposes of transiting to another third country. Therefore, it is a matter 
included under Community competence under Article 100C to decide in the list o f  
countries whose nationals have to hold a visa for the sole purpose o f transit to another 
third country. It is a violation o f Community competence to rule on this topic under the 
framework of Title VI.
195 Decision of the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 23 November 1995, see MNS, 
December 1995.
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2 - The Protocol and the Agreement on Social Policy196
One of the major innovations brought by the Treaty on European Union, as far as 
third country nationals are concerned, was the Agreement on Social Policy, annexed to the 
Protocol on Social Policy. This Protocol was concluded by all the Member States. It 
authorises all Member States,197 except the United Kingdom, to have recourse to the 
institutions and mechanisms of the EC Treaty to implement the Agreement on Social 
Policy. This Agreement reflects the wish of other Member States for joint progress in the 
social area, in spite of persistent British opposition.198 The Agreement creates more 
possibilities for cooperation and adoption o f common measures than those provided by the 
Community. The relevance of the Agreement for the purposes of this thesis lies in the 
fact that it provides for the possibility of adopting Directives concerning "conditions of 
employment for third country nationals legally residing in Community territory1'.199 The 
Directives may be adopted by the Council, deciding unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission, upon the consultation of the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee.200
1 9 6  See Barnard, C. "A Social Policy for Europe: Politicians I, Lawyers 0" in International Journal o f  
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol.8 , 1992, No.l, p.15; Bercussson, B. "Maastricht: 
a Fundamental Change in European Labour Law", in Industrial Relations Review, Vol.23, Autumn 1992, 
No.3, p. 177 and "The Dynamic of European Labour Law after Maastricht", Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol.23, March 1994, No.l, p.l; Watson, Philippa "Social Policy After Maastricht", CMLRev, Vol.30, 
1993, No.3, pp.481-513; and Whiteford, Elaine A. "Social Policy After Maastricht " ELR, Vol.18, June 
1993, No.3, pp.202-222.
1 9 7  Austria, Finland and Sweden acceded also to the Agreement on Social Policy.
1 9 8  Note, however, that for some time it looked as if the UK almost risked ending up being a party to the 
Social Protocol. Until the attainment of final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, there was always a real, 
although small, possibility of that happening. The Labour Party kept proposing in Parliament the UK 
participation in the Social Protocol. Occasionally that possibility enjoyed the support of Tory Euro-sceptic 
MP's, trying to prevent the ratification of the Treaty as a whole. In May 1993, the UK government, trying 
to overcome the difficulties in the ratification, even said it could accept the amendment presented by the 
Labour Party, Agence Europe of 7 May 1993, No.5975 (n.s.). However, this was only a tactical move soon 
forgotten, one of many episodes in the battle for ratification of the Treaty. On 23 July 1993. a vote in the 
House of Commons calling for the acceptance of the Protocol was defeated by the margin of one single 
vote (318 to 317). The decisive vote was that of Betty Boothroyd, the Speaker of the House of Commons, 
obliged to cast her vote as the initial vote was even. It seems that she voted in favour of the government's 
position to obey the convention that the Speaker votes in line with the government. In fact she was elected 
as a Labour Party candidate. Nevertheless, in the end, the government succeeded in having the support of 
a bigger majority in Parliament. The formal instrument of the UK ratification was handed down on 2 
August 1993, quite a while before the German one. For a detailed review of the events leading to the UK 
ratification see Baker, D., Gamble, A. & Ludlam, S., "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: 
Conservative Divisions and British Ratification", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.47, 1994, No.l, pp.37-60. 
See also by Baroness Elies, "UK Constitutional and Parliamentary Aspects of the Maastricht Treaty", 
Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., pp.341-348.
1 9 9  See Article 2(3) of the Agreement annexed to the Protocol. The Directives will define "minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in 
each of the Member States" - Article 1(2) of the same Agreement.
2 0 0  To be more accurate, the decision-making procedure to be applied is that of Article 189C of the EC 
Treaty, which gives quite limited powers of intervention to the European Parliament.
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Whether or not the Agreement on Social Policy is part of Community Law is a 
matter of some controversy. I agree with those who believe that the Agreement is part o f 
the EC Treaty.201 An important argument in favour o f this position is that the Agreement 
is annexed to the Protocol, and the latter is part o f the EC Treaty.
It has also controversial whether the normal procedure provided by the EC Treaty, 
or that provided by the Agreement should be followed, for the adoption o f a specific 
measure in the social area.202 The most attractive position is that o f the Economic and 
Social Committee, according to which, if a measure is ultimately going to be adopted 
under the Agreement, the procedure provided by the latter must have been followed.20  ^
According to Article 3(2) of the Agreement, this means that social partners must have 
been consulted.
The problem of what procedure to use derives from the fact that, already before 
the Treaty on European Union, the Community had competence to act in the fields 
covered by the Agreement. That competence was, and still is provided by provisions of the 
main text o f the EC Treaty. As argued in chapter 2, as far as the employment conditions o f 
third country nationals are concerned, the Community had competence to adopt measures 
under Article 100 and 235 o f the EC  Treaty.204 However, that competence was not used. 
In this respect, the Agreement on Social Policy introduces an explicit Community 
competence to act on employment conditions o f  legally resident third country nationals. It 
is now more than clear that the Community, under the Agreement, may adopt measures in 
this area. The problem is that, until the present moment, no legally binding measure related 
to third country nationals has been adopted by the Council under the Agreement.205 It
2°1 In favour see Bercusson, Industrial law Journal, op.cit., at p.2 (with reference to the opposite 
opinion); Sciarra, Silvana, "Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Social Law", European 
Law Journal, Vol.l, 1995, No.l, pp.60-83, at 70 (with reference to various literal and contextual 
elements); and Whiteford, op.cit., p.204.
2 0 2  See the contrasting views of the Commission and the Economic and Social Committee expressed in 
the Commission Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented 
by the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, COM (93) 600 final of 14 December 
1993 (in particular its point 8 ); and in the Economic and Social Committee Opinion on the latter 
Commission communication, CES (94) 1310, of 24/11/1994 (point 1.4).
2°3 See the Economic and Social Committee Opinion referred in the preceding note, CES (94) 1310, at 
point 1.4.4.
2 0 4  See also Whiteford, who argues that Article 2(3) of the Agreement on Social Policy introduces 
"largely nothing new" in terms of Community objectives. See Whiteford, op.cit., at 206.
2 0 5  See, however, that in the framework of the social dialogue, representatives of the European social 
partners adopted in Florence, on 21 October 1995, a declaration on the fight against racism and 
xenophobia at work, see Agence Europe No.6590, of 23-24/10/1995. Under the new rules of the 
Agreement on Social Policy (Article 4) management and labour may conclude agreements, which, in 
matters covered by Article 2 of the Agreement, may be implemented by a Council decision. Thus, 
although this seems unlikely to occur in the near future, under the Agreement on Social Policy it is 
possible for social partners to enter into agreement at a European level on the fight against against racism 
and xenophobia at work, and it is possible for the Council to make such an agreement binding at the joint 
request of the signatory parties. On the new possibilities brought by the Treaty on European Union for 
conclusion of collective agreements at an European level, see Bercusson, Brian, "The Collective Labour 
Law of the European Union", European law Journal, Vol.l, 1995, No.2, p.175. On the fight against 
racism at work, see Wrench, John, Preventing Racism at the Workplace in the European Union, Dublin, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1995.
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seems that the governments o f the Member States give preference to the third pillar to 
deal with issues related to third country nationals.
3 - Union Citizenship206
The Treaty on European Union introduced in the EC Treaty the new Articles 8 to 
8D, which established a Union Citizenship.
Those provisions provide for the following rights for a Union citizen:
- the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,
- the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for municipal elections and elections for the 
European Parliament, in the Member State where he or she resides,
- the right to have protection from the diplomatic or consular authorities o f any Union 
Member State, in a third country in which the Member State o f which he or she is a 
national is not represented,
- the right o f petition to the European Parliament, and
- the right o f application to the European Ombudsman.
Almost none of these rights entered into force immediately with the entry into 
force o f  the Treaty on European Union. The right to free movement and residence is to be 
enjoyed subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the EC Treaty and in the 
Treaty on European Union, and by the measures adopted to give effect to it.207 That is to 
say: no new rights o f free movement were created by virtue of the simple entry into force
2 0 6  See Anderson, Malcolm, Den Boer, M. & Miller, G. "European Citizenship and Cooperation in 
Justice and Home Affairs" in Maastricht and Beyond- Building the European Union, Duff, A ., Pinder, J. 
& Pryce, R. (eds.), London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 104-122; Baccelli, Luca "Citizenship and Membership", 
paper presented in the 17th IVR World Congress on "Challenges to Law at the End of the 20th Century", 
Bologna, 16-20 June 1995; Closa, C. "The concept of citizenship in the Treaty on European Union", 
CMLRev, Vo!.29, 1992, No.6 , pp. 1137-1169, and "Citizenship of the Union and nationality of Member 
States”, CMLRev, Vol.32, 1995, No.2., pp.487-518; Gardner, J.P. (ed.) Hallmarks o f  Citizenship - A 
Green Paper, London, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1994; Groulx, Richard 
"M.Foucault or 'Governamentality' and Citizenship", paper for the IVR Congress; Habermas, Jürgen 
"Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe", Praxis International, 
VoM2, April 1992, No.l, p.l, and "The European Nation State - Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the 
Past and the Future of Souvereignty and Citizenship", paper for the IVR Congress; Jessurun d’Oliveira, 
H.U., "European Citizenship: Its Meaning, Its Potential", The Maastricht Treaty on European Union.... 
op.cit., pp. 8  M  06, and "Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?", in A Citizens' Europe - In Search o f  a New 
Order, Rosas, Allan & Antola, Esko (eds.), London, Sage, 1995, pp.58-84; Koslowski, Rey "Intra-EU 
Migration, Citizenship and Political Union", JCMS, Vol.32, September 1994, No.3, pp.369-402; Moura 
Ramos, R. M., Les Aspects Nouveaux de la Libre Circulation des Personnes: vers une Citoyenneté 
Européenne; Questionnaire, Rapport Général et Conclusions, XV Congrès de la Fédération 
Internationale pour le Droit Européen (held in Lisbon on 23-6 September 1992), Lisbon, 1994, pp.1-92; 
O'Keeffe, David "Union Citizenship", in Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, op.cit., p.87, and 
"Citizenship of the Union" in Actualités du Droit, 1994, No.2, p.227; O'Leary, Siofra The Evolving 
Concept o f  European Citizenship, From the Free Movement o f  Persons to Union Citizenship, Ph.D. 
thesis, EUI, 1993, and Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, forthcoming; O'Leary, S., "The relationship between 
Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community law", CMLRev, Vol.32, 
1995, No.2., pp.519-554; and Rosales, José Maria & Carracedo, José Rubio 'To Govern Pluralism: 
Towards a Concept of Complex Citizenship", paper for the IVR Congress.
2 ®7  Article 8A(1) of the EC Treaty.
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of the Treaty on European Union. As far as political rights at local and European level 
were concerned, it was provided that they would be exercised according to instruments to 
be adopted by the Council before the end of 1994 and 1993, respectively.208 The end o f 
1993 was also the deadline for agreement between Member States on diplomatic 
protection. As far as the Ombudsman was concerned, the Parliament had to establish the 
regulations and conditions governing the performance o f his duties,209 and had then to 
appoint him.210 Only on 27 September 1995 did he take the oath before the Court o f 
Justice and did he start to work, almost two years after the entry into force of the Treaty 
on European Union. Only the right o f petition to the European Parliament was meant to 
be enjoyed simply because of the entry into force o f the Treaty on European Union. 
However this right was not a novelty, since before that Treaty the European Parliament 
already received petitions.
The Union Citizenship is, in any case, an exclusive privilege o f nationals o f a 
Member State of the European Communities. The new Article 8 o f the EC Treaty
provides that:
"Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union".211
Therefore, third country nationals, even if legally resident in the Community for a long 
time will have no chance o f acquiring directly Union Citizenship. First they will have to get 
the nationality of a Member State. The only rights that third country nationals were 
granted by the Treaty on European Union were the right to address a petition to the 
European Parliament and the right to make complaints to the Community Ombudsman. 
Articles 138D and 138E define the beneficiaries o f those rights as:
"any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having his 
registered office in a Member State".
It is certainly a positive fact that third country nationals were granted these rights. 
[However, the problem is that these rights are not substantive, but mere procedural rights. 
They allow third country nationals to seek protection and promotion of their substantive 
rights, on which the Treaty on European Union did not introduce anything novel.
2 0 8  See the Directive 93/109/EC, on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at the European 
Parliament, approved at the "General Affairs" Council of 6  December 1993, OJ L 329/34 of 30/12/93. The 
deadline for its implementation was 1/2/1994. On 28 February 1994, the Commission presented its draft 
Directive on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local elections for European Union citizens, 
COM (94) 38 final, OJ C 105/8-13. It was adopted on 19 December 1994 as Council Directive 94/8Q/EC, 
OJ L 368/38 of 31/12/1994. It is to be implemented by 1/1/1996. On this topic see also the Commission 
Report on the Citizenship of the Union, COM (93) 702 final of 21/12/93.
209 With approval of the Council, acting by qualified majority. See Article 138 E (4) of the Treaty of 
Rome, as amended by the Treaty on European Union. The regulations and general conditions governing 
the performance of the Ombudsman's duties, were approved by Decision of the European Parliament of 9 
March 1994, after the Council had given its consent to them, OJ L 113/15-18 of 4 May 1994.
2 1 0  After a long and complex procedure, the European Ombudsman was appointed on 12 July 1995. He is 
Mr. Jacob Soderman, the previously Finnish Ombudsman. On the difficulties to appoint an Ombudsman 
see Magliveras, Konstantinos "Best intentions but empty words: The European Ombudsman", ELR, 
Vol.20, August 1995, No.4, pp.401-409.
21 1 Note also that a declaration, made by the representatives of the Member States that concluded the 
Treaty on European Union, states that "the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a 
Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned".
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This situation is open to criticism. The fact that Union Citizenship is reserved for 
nationals o f Member States only, seems to be particularly unfair, and negative in more 
general terms. It is unfair since third country nationals, who have a close relationship with 
one Member State, will not have the same rights there as other foreigners having a less i 
close relationship with that country. The latter foreigners will have more rights simply' 
because they have the nationality of a Member State. It is negative in the sense that it 
reinforces the exclusion of such non-nationals from the society where they live and from 
the political and cultural evolution in course in that society.
In this respect, the proposals of the European Parliament were more ambitious 
than the final draft o f  the Treaty on European Union. Politically cautious, the Parliament 
did not propose the attribution to third country nationals of Union Citizenship as such. 
Nevertheless, it proposed that a wide range of rights be granted to "Union citizens and 
their families and, under conditions laid down by a Union law, other persons resident in a 
Member State(...)".212 Those rights would include not only "the right to move and reside 
freely throughout the Union" and "to exercise any professional or economic activity 
without discrimination", but even "the right to exercise any lawful activity on the same 
terms as citizens o f the Member Sates concerned". Accordingly, the Union would have to 
remove legal obstacles to the effective exercise o f that freedom and would conduct a 
policy aimed at removing other existing obstacles."21 ^  The Parliament proposal envisaged 
a common definition o f the "notion of persons resident in the Union”, which would also 
include third country nationals.214 This definition would be adopted by the Council, acting 
unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission and with the assent o f the European 
Parliament. Then, instruments would be adopted defining "the criteria for admitting 
resident aliens to economic and professional activities in the Union as a whole". For 
persons satisfying that criteria, legislation would provide for equal treatment with Union 
citizens, "including the same conditions of employment". Finally it would also "determine 
the political rights of aliens”.21^
It may be recalled that usually fears are raised that if free movement was granted to 
third country nationals, coming from other Member States, there would be a suddeir 
invasion o f Member States by those persons. These fears are exaggerated. But, in any 
case, we could easily imagine a formulation of the conditions of acquisition of Union 
Citizenship that could put allay these fears. It would be enough to make citizenship 
conditional on longrterm legal residence in Member States: for example for a period of 10 
or 15 years. A non-perfect solution would be preferable to a plain denial to third country 
nationals o f even a slim chance of acquiring directly Union Citizenship.216 The extension
2 1 2  Resolution of the European Parliament of 21 November 1991 on Union Citizenship, proposal No.l(i); 
OJC 326/205 of 16/12/91.
2  Idem.
2 1 4  Or "aliens”, as mentioned in the Resolution. Those include nationals of third countries and stateless 
persons resident in the Member States. Ibid., proposal No.4.
21  ^Ibidem.
2 1 6  Note that the Standing Committee of Experts on international immigration, refugee and criminal law, 
has proposed that Union citizenship be granted to a person "who has been lawfully residing in the territory 
of a Member State for five years", see Standing Committee of Experts, Proposals fo r  the amendment o f  
the Treaty on European Union .... op.cit., pi 1.
409
*
of Union Citizenship to long term resident third country nationals could make a significant 
contribution to their social integration in Europe.
On the other hand, one should not overlook the limits of the substantial content o f 
Union Citizenship and the present political context in Member States. At present, access 
to the nationality of each Member State remains more important than access to the Union 
Citizenship, in itself. Thus access to the former should be the priority. This is the reason 
why the issue of Union Citizenship for resident third country nationals was not dealt with 
in more depth in this thesis.
4 - Changes in some Community decision-making procedures
It is interesting to note some amendments introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union in Community procedures for decision-making. The procedure of Article 100 was 
changed. Now the consultation o f the European Parliament and o f the Economic and 
Social Committee is always required to adopt Directives under that provision. This was a 
small change. Yet, a more important change was made in Article 100A, on the 
approximation of provisions "which have as their object the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market". The new procedure established for approval o f those measures is 
that o f the new Article 189B: co-decision between the Council and the European 
Parliament. However, it should be kept in mind that, according to its second paragraph, 
Article 100A does not apply to provisions related to the free movement o f persons, nor to 
the rights and interests of employed persons. Therefore, the change is of limited interest 
for the purposes of this thesis. It is, however, interesting to compare this change to the 
less significant change made to Article 100, the more important one for third country 
nationals. Under Article 100 the European Parliament has only the right to be consulted.
Article 59(2) should also be mentioned here. As previously recalled, it establishes 
the possibility o f extending the provisions on free provisions of services to "nationals of a 
third country who provide services and who are established within the Community". This 
provision was not changed: its procedure continues to be the same. The Council may act 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. No intervention of the 
European Parliament is envisaged. The absence of change in this procedure follows the 
general trend of the limited intervention of the Parliament in the decision making process 
concerning third country nationals. Nevertheless, this absence of change contrasts to the 
changes which have occurred in other provisions. In provisions dealing, for example, with 
freedom of movement of workers - Article 49 - and with freedom of establishment - 
Articles 54(2), 56(2) and 57(2) - the new procedure adopted was again the one established 
in Article 189B, a true co-decision between the Council and the Parliament.217 In 
contrast, in Article 59(2), not even the procedure established by the new Article 189C
2 ^ 7  Note that no other decision making procedure of the chapter on freedom of services was changed. 
However, one should recall that freedom to provide services was supposed to have been implemented (by 
the end of the transitional period) or is related to special fields governed by special rules of the EC Treaty 
- like transport and banking and insurance services.
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(cooperation),218 or that o f the new Article 100 (mere consultation o f the Parliament) 
were adopted. The lack of change in the procedure established in the second paragraph of 
Article 59 is consistent with the fact that it was never used. This latter fact confirms the 
political difficulty in adopting Community measures concerning nationals of third 
countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the legal and institutional framework introduced by the 
Treaty on European Union to deal with issues concerning third country nationals. The 
following chapter will analyse some Union activities already developed in this area under 
the new rules introduced by the Treaty on European Union. It will examine the activities 
concerned with control of external borders, admission of immigrants, and action against 
illegal immigration.
As far as third country nationals are concerned, the main novelty introduced by the 
Treaty on European Union was the creation, by its Title VI, of a framework for 
Cooperation on "Justice and Home Affairs". An assessment on this framework was 
already proposed at the end o f section B, wherein it was emphasised that this framework 
is a middle way solution between the Community framework and that of the previous ad 
hoc intergovernmental cooperation. Some o f the most criticisable aspects of the latter 
were not overcome. Cooperation under Title VI suffers from a serious lack of 
transparency, adequate parliamentary accountability and obligatory uniform judicial 
control. No balance of powers exists between the various intervening institutions. 
Undoubtedly the framework o f Title VI is not a model for a democratic form of 
government.
It was also suggested that part of the institutional features o f Title V I, notably its 
lack o f transparency, can be explained by the wish o f the governments of Member States 
to have their hands free to adopt and implement a restrictive immigration policy. This 
reason contrasts to the official explanation that intergovernmental cooperation is required 
to preserve national sovereignties. It could be said that instead of bringing the previous ad 
hoc intergovernmental cooperation into line with Community Law, it was more the 
previous rules that were changed to protect the basic decision-making process of that 
cooperation. Moreover, the changes introduced by the Treaty on European Union to the 
Treaty o f  Rome do not seem to compensate in a positive sense for the negative elements 
of Tide VI.
Under Article 100C o f the EC Treaty, the Community is granted explicit 
competences only in two aspects of visa policy. These are indeed only a small part of 
issues concerning border controls, not to mention immigration from third countries and 
third country nationals in general. The Agreement on Social Policy allows all Member 
States, except the United Kingdom, to adopt by unanimity Directives on conditions of 
employment of legally resident third country nationals. However, more than two years 
after its entry into force, this provision has never been used. Last, but not least, the
2 1 8  This procedure was adopted for the new Article 118A(2), on improvements on the health and safety 
of workers.
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creation of European Citizenship for nationals o f Member States only, reinforces the social 
exclusion o f third country nationals resident in the Community. This has a practical and 
symbolical importance.
As a kind of summary, I will recall here the assessment made by Weiler:
"Like the rejection of the much misunderstood term "federalism", the Three Pillar 
structure was in part of symbolic importance, a statement of méfiance against the 
Community and its institutions. Mistrust, fear and a certain measure of bad faith 
must have played at least some part in this choice. The mistrust was in the ability 
of the Community institutions and Community procedures to respond effectively 
to the new exigencies. The fear was, one surmises, of losing national control over 
delicate policy issues - a fear that, in fact. Community institutions could respond 
too effectively in vindicating the Community, rather than the Member States, 
interests. The bad faith was, perhaps, in assuming legal obligations but trying to 
exclude judicial control over their implementation and enforcement."2^
Nevertheless, some positive points may also be found in the Treaty o f European 
Union. In Title VI, the right o f intervention of the Commission and the European 
Parliament, although limited, is now legally asserted. Compared to the previous ad hoc 
cooperation, information on Title V I activities is more easy to obtain. The fact that the 
competent organs will be the same as those o f the Community, due to the single 
institutional framework o f the Union,219 20 also marks some progress. The jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice on cooperation activities is now discussed by Member States 
governments and accepted in some cases.221 Therefore, some aspects o f the Treaty on 
European Union may be welcomed. They are steps in the right direction.
As O’Keeffe puts it,
"One conclusion to be drawn from the Union Treaty provisions (...) is that one 
may be assisting at the start of a very slow evolutionary process, whereby there 
may be a very gradual transfer of competence to Community institutions".222 
"Slow evolution" are two good words for a summarised assessment o f the new rules 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union. We can take either an optimistic or
219 Weiler, "Neither Unity nor Three Pillars - The Trinity Structure of the European Union", op.cit., at
50.
220 see Article C, First subparagraph. As Müller-Graff puts it "In practice this is probably the most 
important new step taken in establishing the third pillar", Müller-Graff, CMLRev, op.cit., at 496. Note, 
however, that the validity of this idea has been criticised. Wellenstein states that the institutional set-up of 
the Union is "more singular than single". See Wellenstein, "Unity, Community, Union - what's in a 
name?", Guest editorial, CMLRev, Vol.29,1992, No.2, pp.205-212, at 209.
221 Note that although the United Kingdom government did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice on the Europol Convention it did accept it as far as some other Conventions are concerned. See 
Article 27 of Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the use 
of information technology for customs purposes, concluded on 26 July 1995, OJ C 316/34, of 27/11/1995; 
and Article 8 of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, concluded also on 26 July 1995, OJ C 316/49, of 27/11/1995. 
All the other Member States accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the three Conventions 
mentioned supra.
222 See O'Keeffe, D., "The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?", YEL, 
1991, pp.185-219, at p.216.
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pessimistic perspective on those rules, depending on which of them we attach more 
importance to.
My overall judgment must be one of regret at the loss of a major opportunity to 
make more substantial progress in this important area.
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PART n - THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
Chapter 8
IMMIGRATION POLICY
(CONTROL OF EXTERNAL BORDERS 
ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANTS 
ACTION AGAINST ILLEG A L IMMIGRATION)

INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the activities of the European Union in the 
field of immigration policy strictu sensu: control of persons at the Union external borders, 
action against illegal immigration (including expulsion of illegal immigrants) and admission 
of immigrants to a Member State.1
The present chapter will analyse some legal aspects of the current Union activities 
on the fields mentioned. Previous work, that developed by the early intergovernmental 
cooperation (before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty) is not the main concern 
of this chapter. Despite this, such work has relevance to this chapter, as the present Union 
activities are mainly a continuation of that work. Therefore, the work of the old 
intergovernmental cooperation will be mentioned when necessary to put in context the 
present activities and discussions within the European Union institutions.
As the focus of this chapter is the analysis of the legal instruments being discussed 
within the Union institutions, a substantial part of it will be dedicated to the control of 
external borders, where legal instruments were proposed by the Commission. Generally 
speaking, measures on expulsion and admission of immigrants from third countries remain 
in a less advanced stage, or are not meant to have a legally binding nature. Therefore, their 
analysis will be more general.
Section A of this chapter will deal with controls at the external frontiers. First, the 
Commission's draft Convention on the Crossing of the External Borders will be examined. 
The historical antecedents of this draft will be recalled. Then, a general overview of the 
Convention rules will be made and some interesting issues arising from its rules will be 
addressed. Secondly, this section will examine the rules on visas proposed by the 
Commission. This examination will comprise both the rules on visas of the draft External 
Frontiers Convention and some aspects of the Commission's draft Regulation concerning 
the list of countries whose nationals are required to have a visa to enter the Union.
Section B will analyse the resolutions adopted on the admission of third country 
nationals to Member States. It will examine the resolutions on admission of employed 
persons, self-employed persons, students and admission for family reunification.
Section C will make an overview of the Union's activities in the fight against illegal 
immigration, including the expulsion of immigrants from third countries. This section will 
deal both with measures to be taken within the Community and measures to be adopted in 
the framework of relations with third countries.
1 There is a considerable number of works on the treatment of immigration related matters at an 
European level, namely by the Member States of the European Union. However, only some of those works 
concentrate on the concrete activities developed in the framework of the intergovernmental cooperation 
between all Member States, notably within the institutions of the European Union. Among the latter 
works see Nanz, Klaus-Peter "The Harmonization of Asylum and Immigration Legislation Within the 
Third Pillar of the Union Treaty - Stocktaking", in The Third Pillar o f the European Union - cooperation 
in the fields o f  justice and home affairs, Monar, J. & Morgan, R, (eds.)t European Interuniversity Press, 
Brussels, 1994, pp. 123-133; Niessen, J. "European Migration Policies for the nineties after the Maastricht 
summit", CCME Briefing Paper No.7, Brussels, CCME, February 1992; O'Keeffe, David, "The 
Emergence of a European Immigration Policy", ELRev., Vol.20, 1995, No.l, pp.20-36; Webber, Frances 
"European Conventions on Immigration and Asylum" in Statewatching the New Europe - a  Handbook on 
the European State, Bunyan, T. (ed.)t London, Statewatch, 1993, pp. 142-153.
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A -CONTROL OF EXTERNAL BORDERS
1- THE COMMISSION'S DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE 
CROSSING OF THE EXTERNAL FRONTIERS OF THE MEMBER 
STATES 2
a) General presentation 
Origins of the present draft
A Convention establishing uniform and reinforced controls at the external borders 
has been considered an essential legal part of and a practical prerequisite for the abolition 
of internal border controls and thus for a true freedom of movement of persons in the 
Community.2 3
The ad hoc immigration group had already prepared a draft Convention on the 
crossing of external borders.4 This draft was ready by 24 June 1991, but progress on its 
approval has been obstructed since 1 July 1991. The Convention was not signed then due 
to the disagreement between Spain and the United Kingdom on its application to 
Gibraltar.5 Successive appeals made by the European Council to Spain and the United 
Kingdom to reach a compromise were fruitless.6
2 See the Beazley report of 19 April 1994, on the communication of the Commission containing a 
proposal for a decision, based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union establishing a Convention 
on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref. A3-190/94/corr.; and the Beazley 
report of 23 September 1993, on the crossing of the EC external borders, made on behalf of the same 
Committee, doc.ref. A3-0253/93 (the former Beazley report 194 was adopted in 21/4/1994 by the 
Legislative resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the draft Convention of the 
Commission, OJ C 128/358 of 9/5/94; whilst the latter Beazley report was approved on 28/10/1993 by the 
EP resolution on the crossing of the EC external borders, OJ C 315/244 of 22/11/93); O'Keeffe, David 
"The New Draft External Frontiers Convention and the Draft Visa Regulation", The Third Pillar o f  the 
European Union.... op.cit., at pp. 135-149, and "The Convention on Crossing the external frontiers of the 
Member States", in From Schengen to Maastricht, Alexis, P. (ed.), Maastricht, EIPA, 1995; and, by the 
Select Committee on the European Communities of the House of Lords, the report on "Visas and controls 
of the external borders of the Member States", 14th Report, Session 1993-94, HL 78, London, HMSO, 
1994.
3  This has been repeatedly considered to be so by the Community and Union organs, including the 
European Council. Such was the case of the latter's meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992, see Bull.EC, 
12/1992, p .ll, point 1.10. See also, for instance, the Palma Document and the Press Release, 
PRES/91/120 (1.7.91) of the General Secretariat of the Council on the Meeting of Ministers concerned 
with Immigration, in Luxembourg. On the part of the Commission see point 55 of the White Paper on 
"Completing the Internal Market", COM (85) 310 and the declarations of Commissioner Flynn that the 
draft Convention "contains essential compensatory measures for the elimination of checks on individuals 
at the internal borders", Commission's Press Release on the "Implementation of Maastricht's Third Pillar", 
IP/93/1065 (30.11.1993).
4  Its official name was Draft Convention of the Member States of the European Communities on the 
crossing of external frontiers.
5  See Press Release, PRES/91/120 (1.7.91) of the General Secretariat of the Council on the Meeting of 
Ministers concerned with Immigration, in Luxembourg. For a review of the main legal problems that have 
arisen by the particular status of Gibraltar, both from an historical point of view and more recently see
4 1 6
In December 1993, the Commission presented to the Council and the European 
Parliament a Draft Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member 
States.6 7 This proposal followed Article K.l of the Treaty on European Union* which 
provides that Member States should regard as matters of common interest, inter alia, the 
"rules on the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the 
exercise of controls thereon". The Commission's proposal may be approved under Article
K.3(2) of the Treaty on European Union.
The present draft does not seek to solve the disagreement between Spain and the 
United Kingdom, as the Commission admits that bilateral negotiations between the two 
countries will still be necessary.8 In all other aspects the substantial consensus attained in 
July 1991 is supposed to hold in future.9
The Commission's present draft Convention brought this area into the framework 
of the European Union. Still, the Commission's draft is very much based on the external 
borders Convention drafted by the ad hoc immigration group. The latter, in turn, is very 
similar to the corresponding provisions of the Schengen Implementing Agreement.10 
Therefore, in some aspects, the Commission's draft Convention may be the object of 
similar criticisms as the previous draft and the Schengen Implementing Agreement.
Nevertheless, the present draft of the Commission, although based on the old draft 
of the ad hoc immigration group, contains some adaptations to the new legal framework 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union and the EEA Agreement.11 The adaptations.
Lincoln, S.J., "The Legal Status of the Gibraltar: Whose Rock Is It Anyway ?" Fordham international Law 
Journal, Vol.18, November 1994, No.l, pp.285-331. See also "España sancionará a Gibraltar y el Reino 
Unido por no ayudar en la lucha contra el contrabando". El País, 15/3/1995, p.25; and Gibraltar and the 
EC: Aspects o f  the Relationship, RIIA Discussion Paper No.49, London, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1993. This paper includes an appraisal of the economic situation of Gibraltar and its relevance for 
the EC-Gibraltar relations.
6  The problem of Gibraltar is not a simple one. The sensitive sovereignty aspect of the problem is well 
known. But there are also other aspect of it. Spain accuses Gibraltar of facilitating the smuggling of 
tobacco and other goods to the rest of the Iberian Peninsula, an accusation that is likely to have some truth 
in it. Several Spanish proposals for some form of joint control of Gibraltar borders (namely in the 
Gibraltar airport) by Spanish and UK-Gibraltar authorities. They were all were turned down by the latter 
authorities. There is also a broad consensus that the United Kingdom government uses the Gibraltar 
problem to avoid progress in the building up of conditions to facilitate the total abolition of internal border 
controls in the Union. On the other hand, Gibraltar accuses Spain of using security related excuses to 
impose harsh frontier controls that undermine seriously the economy of the territory, which is heavily 
dependent on tourism and commercial activities.
7  COM (93) 684 of 10/12/1993. This communication also contains a Proposal for a regulation (based on 
Article 100C of the EC Treaty) determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a 
visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States.
8  COM (93) 684, p.la.
9  See, e.g., the Press Release, of the Meeting of Ministers responsible with Immigration, PRES/93/90 
(2.6,93), p.4.
l°As O'Keeffe refers, it was "largely modelled on the Schengen framework: like Schengen, it relies on an 
advanced information system and enhanced police and judicial cooperation in order to cany out the aim of 
increased and more effective external border controls", see O’Keeffe, David in "The Emergence of a 
European Immigration Policy", op.cit., at p.24.
COM (93) 684, p.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum. Here the Commission adds a further 
development "in the Community framework": the fact that "controls (on goods] have effectively been 
removed since 1 January 1993.
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according to the Commission, were necessary namely in relation to the new Article 100C 
of the EC Treaty. This provision gave the European Community competence in certain 
aspects of visa policy (uniform format and list of countries whose nationals are required to 
have visas) previously covered by some Articles of the draft Convention of the a d  hoc 
immigration group. ^
Overview of the Content of the Draft Convention
The Draft Convention begins by defining, in its first Article and Title, the concepts 
used in its main text. Then, Title II establishes general principles on the crossing of the 
external frontiers, surveillance and the nature of the controls to be made therein, with 
specific arrangements being laid down for controls in airports.
Title III first rules on the conditions of entry for short stay of third country 
nationals who are not protected by Community Law, in the sense that they do not have a 
right of entry and residence in a Member State. Secondly, the crossing of external frontiers 
is specifically regulated in relation to third country nationals who are residents in a 
Member State. Finally, a brief reference is made to the entry for stay other than for short 
periods of time.
Title IV deals with some aspects of the enforcement of the refusal of entry, 
particularly through compiling a list of persons to be refused entry. It rules on the general 
criteria for inclusion in that list and the consequences of being included in it for the 
purpose of the issue of residence permits and entry in exceptional circumstances. It also 
establishes the main principles on the exchange of information on data contained in the 
joint list.
Title V deals with accompanying measures, such as the reinforcement of 
responsibilities of carriers, the consequences of illegal crossing of external frontiers and 
the compensation for Financial imbalances between Member States due to expulsions. Title 
VI sets up a number of rules on visas.
Title VII deals with the implementation of the Convention, in relation to the voting 
procedure for the adoption of the implementing measures of the Convention, the primacy 
of international instruments of human rights, and Member States' relations with third 
States on frontier controls. Last, but not least, it provides for jurisdiction to the Court of 
Justice on matters related to the interpretation and settlement of disputes related to the 
Convention.
Title VIII of the draft Convention contains a single Article, meant to refer to the 
territorial scope of the Convention. Its text is presently blank, awaiting the results of the 
negotiations on the status of Gibraltar.
b) Issues on the Substantive Rules (Titles I to V)
The present part of this chapter will examine some issues related to the rules of 
Titles I to V. The analysis made in this section will not provide an exhaustive examination 
of those Titles. Instead, it will endeavour to make a general overview of the substantive 12
12 Note also that an opinion of 11 February 1993 of the legal service of the General Secretariat of the 
Council agreed with the need to amend, in that respect, the previous draft of the Convention. See Mise en 
oeuvre du traité de Maastricht.... op.cit., p.217.
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rules of the Convention (except on visas) and address some interesting points raised by 
these rules.
Title VII will be analysed subsequently and Title VI, on visas, will be examined 
later, together with the Commission's draft Regulation on visas.
(i) Personal scope: rule and exceptions
The personal scope of the provisions of the Convention is defined by Article 1(2) 
as being "all persons other than those entitled under Community Law", "except where 
there is an express statement to the contrary". According to Article 1(1) "persons entitled 
under Community Law” include both nationals of a Member State and nationals of third 
countries who, under Community Law, are entitled to enter and reside in a Member State. 
The reference to EC Law includes both the external agreements of the EC (particularly the 
EEA Agreement) *3 and the internal EC instruments conferring such a right on relatives of 
a migrant national of a Member State.
There seems to be a slight over assumption of the Convention, in its Article 1(1), 
in presuming that all nationals of an EC Member State are entitled to enter any other 
Member State.* 14 It is true that they have the right of entry, at least if they can justify it 
with the recipience of services in that Member State.15 However, in certain situations that 
may not happen. The Convention introduces no new rule in this respect. However, clearly, 
its concern is not the control of the entry of nationals of Member States16 but the control 
of third country nationals not "entitled under Community Law".
In any case, the general definition of the personal scope of the Convention has a 
number of exceptions. All persons are obliged to cross the external frontiers of the 
Member States at authorised crossing points17 and are liable to penalties for violating such 
an obligation.18 All persons shall be subject to an identity control at the crossing of an 
external frontier.19 Another exception is that third country nationals, entitled under 
Community Law to enter and reside in a Member State, may be required an entry visa if an 
EC instrument adopted under Article 100C so stipulates.20 Finally, Article 6, on specific
*3 See in this respect Chapter 5, on the external agreements of the European Community.
1 4  For practical reasons I referred only to entry, although Article 1(1) when defining the persons who are 
"entitled under Community Law" refers also to third country nationals who "have a right of entry and 
residence in a Member State" - emphasis added.
1 5  See Cases 286/82 & 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377. They can also be beneficiaries of the 
right of entry under other situations protected by Community Law, like those regulated under the 
Directives analysed in chapter 4.
1 6  In this respect note that routine and systematic questioning of those entering the territory, concerning 
the purpose and duration of their journeys and their financial means, were held contrary to Community 
Law in case C-68/89, Commission v. Netherlands, [1991] ECR 1-2637, particularly paragraph 10. 
However, the EC Court of Justice cleared spot checks in the case 321/87, Commission v. Belgium [1989] 
ECR 997.
1 7  Article 2(1).
1 8  This is so "unless otherwise stipulated in the law of the Member State concerned", according to Article 
2(4) in fine. The precise personal scope of the obligation refened to and liability may be also modified by 
eventual specific rules related to the "particular categories of maritime traffic" and "arrangements for local 
frontier traffic", established by implementing measures to the Convention, in accordance with its Article
2(5).
19  Article 5(1).
2 0  Article 5(2).
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arrangements for controls at airports appears to apply also to all persons, as will be 
submitted below.
(ii) Controls at the external frontiers (Title II)
Article 4 establishes the general principle that the "crossing of external borders 
shall be subject to control by the competent authorities of the Member State concerned 
(...) in accordance with national law". However, the controls envisaged by the Convention 
are to be performed "with due regard" for the provisions of the latter2! and taking into 
"account the interests of the other Member States".* 22 *24
Article 3 provides that external frontiers:
shall be kept under effective surveillance by mobile units or by other 
appropriate means. Member States undertake to provide surveillance yielding 
similarly effective results along all their external frontiers; their surveillance 
agencies shall consult and cooperate to that end".
This provision is perhaps an attempt to give a legal answer to the political claim of the 
governments of some Member States, notably the United Kingdom, that the southern EC 
States cannot be trusted to control their frontiers in an effective manner.2^
Article 2 establishes that all persons are obliged to cross the external frontiers "at 
authorised crossing points permanently controlled by the Member States",2  ^ otherwise 
they "shall be liable to penalties as determined by each Member State",25 the latter also 
being responsible for determining "the location and opening conditions of authorised 
crossing points on its external frontiers".26 Exceptions to these rules may be "stipulated in 
the law of the Member State concerned"27 or, in that which regards maritime and local 
frontier traffic, by measures giving effect to the Convention.28
- Nature of controls to be made
Controls are envisaged in relation to persons and objects - the travellers baggage 
and vehicles.
In relation to persons, the basic principle is established in Article 5:
"When crossing an external frontier upon entering or leaving the territories of the 
Member States, all persons shall be subject to visual control under conditions 
which permit their identity to be established by examination of their travel 
documents."
Upon the persons' entry, their control shall ensure that they fulfil the conditions of 
entry set out in Article 7.
2! Article 4.
2 2  Article 5(6).
2 5  On this point see O'Keeffe, D., "Non-Accession to the Schengen Convention: The cases of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland" in Schengen en Panne, Pauly, Alexis (ed.) Maastricht, EIPA, 1994, p.145 at 151.
2 4  Article 2(1).
2 5  Article 2(2).
2 6  Article 2(3).
2 7  Article 2(4).
2 8  Article 2(5).
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It is envisaged that controls may exceptionally be relaxed in accordance with the 
implementing measures of the Convention,29 which shall determine detailed rules for 
applying the controls in general.* 20
An important principle is established by Article 5(4) when providing that:
"controls upon entry shall take precedence over controls upon departure."
In relation to the travellers’ baggage and vehicles, Article 5(5) provides that they 
may be controlled, without prejudice to relevant Community rules, where such control is 
necessary for: "detecting and preventing threats to national security and public policy; or 
combating illegal immigration".
• Controls at airports
Article 6 provides, in a quite detailed manner, for specific arrangements for 
controls at airports. Its detailed rules have probably the aim of ensuring a very effective 
control of air passengers entering or departing from an EC Member State.
Article 6 appears to apply to all persons that cross the external borders. First, it 
makes no distinction among the persons to whom it applies to: it refers only to 
"passengers". Secondly, it seems that, from a substantial point of view, Article 6 is a 
specific application of the general rules of Article 5 (on the nature of controls at external 
frontiers) which applies to all persons. Finally, it does not seem possible to achieve its 
underlying objectives if it applies only to a certain group of persons, namely "persons not 
entitled under Community Law”.21 One of the objectives of the Article is to ensure an 
effective control of immigration to the Union and this justifies the need to control all 
persons. Another objective is to control the passengers' luggage. It would be difficult to 
ensure a complete control of luggage if only persons entitled under Community Law had 
their luggage checked by the police. Two passengers, one entitled and the other not 
"entitled under Community Law", could meet and intentionally exchange luggage to avoid 
security or customs controls.
(iii) Conditions of entry (Title III)
- for persons not entitled under EC Law, in general
Article 7 spells out the conditions of entry for a short stay22 of third country 
nationals who under Community Law do not have a right of entry and residence in a
2 9  Article 5(4). The EP Beazley report of 19 April 1994 suggested the elimination of the exceptional 
character of this relaxing of controls.
2 0  Article 5(3).
2 1 A number of other provisions seem to clearly apply only to persons "not entitled under Community 
Law". Among these provisions are Article 10, on the list of persons to be refused entry. Articles 11 and 
12, on issue of residence permit and refusal of entry to a Member State, respectively, and Article 15, on 
illegal crossing of external frontiers. Their objective seems to make sense only in relation to persons who 
do not have a Community right of entry to the EC. Besides, there is always the principle established in 
Article 1(2), according to which the "Convention applies, except where there is an express statement to 
the contrary, to all persons other than those entitled under Community Law". Also Article 14 (on national 
measures to be taken on responsibilities of carriers) when referring to "persons coming from third 
countries" or to "a person coming from a third country who is refused admission”, seems, by definition, to 
exclude its application to persons entitled under Community Law.
2 2  Article 1(g) defines short stay for the purposes of the Convention: it is to be considered as "(...)an 
uninterrupted stay or successive stays in the territory of the Member States the length of which does not 
exceed three months, calculated over six months from the date of first entry".
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Member State. According to Article 12, a person that does not fulfil one or more 
conditions of Article 7(1) shall be refused entry to the territory of the Member States.
The conditions for such an entry are the following: the possession of "a valid travel 
document which authorises the crossing of frontiers"; the "possession of a valid visa for 
the length of stay envisaged”(if applicable); the presentation of "documents justifying the 
purpose and conditions of the intended stay or transit" ("in particular the required work 
permits if there is reason to believe that [the person] intends to work") and, finally, the 
possession or possibility to acquire lawfully "sufficient means of subsistence" for the stay 
or transit, and for the return to the "country of origin or travel to a third State" into which 
the person is certain of being admitted.
It will be interesting to see how these last criteria will be applied, especially as 
there is no reference to their eventual detailed definition by measures implementing this 
Convention. This is a topic of the most practical importance, as its application will define 
who the immigration authorities will accept as a tourist or will consider to be, e.g., a 
prospective immigrant. Therefore, this is clearly a matter that needs more developed rules. 
Otherwise, there is the risk of leaving genuine tourists from third countries with no 
practical legal means of proving their situation.33
A further entry condition required by Article 7(1 )(c) is that the person "does not 
represent a threat to the public policy, national security or international relations of 
Member States" and "in particular" that the name of that person "does not appear in the 
joint list" of persons to be refused entry. This list will be examined later.
Article 7(2)(a) establishes that a person may be also be refused entry if his or her 
name is in "the national list of persons who are not to be admitted to the Member State to 
which he seeks entry". This provision refers to eventual differences in the Member States 
lists of persons to be refused entry. It has a very important practical and symbolic effect: it 
acknowledges the absolute supremacy of the national sovereignties in this field.34 
Irrespective of the rules set out in other provisions of the Convention, if a Member State 
wants to bar the entry of a "person not entitled under Community Law" it simply has to 
put the name of that person on its national list. It appears that the Court of Justice, even if 
given jurisdiction over the Convention as the latter envisages, could do nothing at all to 
alter this state of affairs.
Finally, according to Article 7(2)(b):
"Any person may a lso  b e refu sed  entry : ( . . . )  in all the circu m sta n ce s  in w hich a  
n atio n al o f  a M e m b e r S ta te  m a y  be refu sed  entry  to  an oth er M e m b e r S ta te ."
This seems to refer primarily to the Community instruments on restrictions to free 
movement of persons due to reasons of public policy, public security or public heaJth.35 34
33 A selective, restrictive interpretation of this rule - particularly demanding in relation to nationals of 
some countries, for instance - may also be equivalent in practice to a disrespect of an eventual positive list 
of visa countries eventually adopted under Article 100C. See chapter 7 for an analysis on the EC 
competence on visas under Article 100C.
34 The Convention does not contain one single reference to any eventual measure implementing this rule 
that would require this assessment to be mitigated,
33 The most important of which is Council Directive 64/221/EEC, of 25/2/1964, on the coordination of 
special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health, OJ 56/850 of 4/4/64. See also Council Directive 
72/194/EEC of 18/5/1972 (OJ L 121/32 of 26/5/72) and Directive 75/35/EEC of 17/12/1974 (OJ L 14/14
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However, in this way only the reference to public health would be added to the one 
already made by Article 7(1 )(c) to public policy and national security.
Nevertheless, under Community Law there are other reasons to justify the refusal 
of entry to nationals of Member States. Such reasons constitute the reverse side of the 
justifications for entry under Community Law. Nationals of a Member State (and some of 
their relatives) may enter another Member State if they go there to work (as employed, 
self-employed persons or providers of services), to receive services, to study, or to reside 
as retired persons or otherwise.3  ^if a national of a Member State may at least justify his 
or her entry to another Member State to receive services, she or he will be allowed to 
enter into that State.
One may wonder if the rule established by the second part of Article 7(2) could be 
interpreted as adding a similar requirement for the entry of third country nationals to a 
Member State. Such a requirement would only make a difference if it added some 
substantial content to the condition referred in Article 7(1 )(d): the possession of or 
possibility to acquire lawfully "sufficient means of subsistence" for the intended stay or 
transit. If the latter condition may already be questioned (notably in relation to its precise 
content), the situation could worsen by demanding proof of the intention to receive 
services. It would, for instance, be more difficult for third country nationals to come to a 
Member State to visit relatives residing there. One hopes that measures implementing the 
Convention will dispel these concerns.* 37
- for third country nationals residing in a Member State38
Under Article 8, third country nationals resident in one Member State can enter 
another Member State without being required to have an entry visa.39 This rule is
of 20/1/1975); extending the scope of Directive 64/221/EEC to persons exercising the right to remain in 
the territory of a Member State, after having been there workers or self-employed persons (respectively).
3  ^ In the three latter cases the right to reside depends on proof that the interested persons do have 
"sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
during their period of residence" and to "be covered by sickness insurance in respect of all risks in the host 
Member State". Articles 1 of Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29/10/1993 on the right of residence for 
students, OJ L 317/59 of 18/12/1993, Council Directive 90/365/EEC on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity and Council Directive 
90/364/EEC on the right of residence for persons who do not enjoy this right under other provisions of 
Community Law, OJ L 180 13/7/90, pp.28 and 26, respectively.
3 7  In the end it may even happen that each Member State defines the precise threshold for the 
immigration authorities to recognise the existence of "sufficient means of subsistence”. This may be 
questionable from the point of view of uniformity of rules, especially taking into account that third country 
nationals coming into the Union may enter, for instance, through a more expensive country to go to less 
expensive countries. However questionable, this was exactly what was proposed by a draft "Text on a 
project of common action of the European Union on immigration" made by the VI course of the Italian 
Scuola di scienza e tecnica della legislazione. See Rassegna Parlamentare, Year XXXVI, April- 
September 1994, No.2-3, pp. 135-8, and 303-8.
3 8  Cf. with the Draft Directive proposed in COM (95) 346 final, which grants, under certain conditions, 
to third country nationals "who are lawfully in a Member State", the right to travel in the territories of 
other Member States. This draft Directive is analysed in chapter 4 and has many points in common with 
the corresponding provisions of the draft External Frontiers Convention.
3 9  A literal interpretation of the wording of Article 8  ("a Member State shall not require a visa of a person 
who wishes to enter its territory... ") will be sufficient to conclude that its rule applies both to external
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conditioned by the following requirements. First, the third country national can only enter 
that Member State for a short stay or to travel (transit) through it. Secondly, he or she has 
to fulfil the general conditions for entry established in Article 7(1); except the visa 
requirement itself. Thirdly, he or she has to hold a residence permit entitling him or her to 
reside in another Member State, which is valid for more four months after the time of 
entry. In "exceptional cases", it will be enough to have "a provisional residence permit 
issued by a Member State and a travel document issued by that Member State."40
Article 8(5) envisages that measures implementing the Convention shall draw up: a 
list of the residence permits and provisional residence permits to be accepted as equivalent 
to visas and an "indicative list" of the exceptional circumstances in which Member States' 
authorities shall also accept provisional residence permits and travel documents issued to 
third country nationals by a Member State as being equivalent to visas. In relation to such 
an "indicative list", apparently, in the implementing measures of the Convention the word 
indicative should be applied in the sense that other documents of the type referred to may 
be accepted. In fact, while Article 8(2) only refers to "exceptional cases" in which the 
entry without visa "may also apply" to holders of those documents, Article 8(5) establishes 
that Member States "shall" accept them as equivalent to visas.
It should be noted that the Commission's draft Convention does not require that 
third country nationals residing in the Union to register in another Member States within 
three days of their arrival there. The ad hoc immigration group's version of the Convention 
made such a requirement.4*
Article 8(4) of the Commission's draft provides that "in exceptional cases", "for 
urgent reasons of national security", a Member State may require a visa for the entry of a 
third country national residing in the Union. This requirement must take into consideration 
the interest of the other Member States"42 and "shall be used only to the extent that and 
for as long as is strictly necessary to achieve the purposes referred".4  ^ There is an 
interesting aspect in this rule: it seems to be a lex specialis of Article 7(1 )(c), which 
stipulates that the entry of a person44 is conditioned to the fact that he or she "does not 
represent a threat to public policy, national security or international relations of the 
Member State".45
Article 8 in general is also a lex specialis of Article 7. While the latter establishes 
the conditions of entry for a short stay of persons "not entitled under Community Law", 
Article 8 regulates one of those conditions (the visa requirement) in relation to third
frontiers controls and to controls within the Union territory - whether they are made at internal borders or 
inside the territory of the Member States.
4 0  Article 8  (2).
4 * Webber, F., "European Conventions op.cit. at p.150.
4 2  Article 8(4)(1).
4  ^ Article 8(4)(3). Besides, according to Article 8(4)(2) "The Member State concerned shall inform the 
other Member States in an appropriate manner, determined by measures to give effect to this Convention."
4 4  Again, to be more precise : of a person "not entitled under Community Law".
4 5  See also the obvious relation between Article 7(1 )(d) in fine and the main text of Article 10(3). 
However, Article 7(1 )(c) refers to threat to the public policy, national security and international relations 
of a Member State, while Article 10(3) refers only to a threat to the public policy or national security of a 
Member State.
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country nationals residing in a Member State. The follow-up of this reasoning may be 
interesting in relation to the exceptional clauses of Article 7(1 )(c) and Article 8(4). It 
seems that a Member State - invoicing ’’urgent reasons of national security” as in Article 
8(4) - may require a visa for the entry to its own territory of a third country national 
residing in the Union, while it may decide noi to refuse his entry by resorting to the 
exceptional clauses of Article 7(1 )(c). This may seem odd at first sight, but it can also be a 
flexible instrument of control of what Member State’s see as their national interests, 
without, at the same time, entailing an absolute bar on the entry of a person. In specific 
circumstances, it is perfectly justifiable that the authorities of a Member State need to 
know if one person or a group of persons enters their territory, while it may not be 
necessary to bar them from entering.46
As we have seen, the draft Convention does not give to third country nationals 
resident in another Member State an automatic right of entry to the territory of another 
Member State. They have to fulfil all the entry conditions of Article 7, including those of 
Article 7 (1) (c) - on the threat to the public policy, national security or international 
relations of a Member State - and Article 7(1 )(e) - on the possession of sufficient means 
of subsistence for the stay and return. Therefore, it must be emphasised that the only 
requirement that they are in principle free is obtaining a visa.
It may be questioned whether the rules conditioning the entry of third country 
nationals, who are resident in a Member State, into another Member State, are in 
conformity with Article 7A of the EC Treaty. In a way, those conditions of entry may be 
less important to the extent that internal border controls are abolished. Yet, even if 
controls at the frontiers are abolished, the problem remains in relation to personal controls 
inside the territory of the Member States. In relation to the latter controls it could, 
perhaps, be argued that the need may arise for additional rules to guarantee that border 
controls are really abolished and not only moved from the borders to the interior of the 
territory of the Member States.
Meanwhile, the practical importance of Article 8 of the draft Convention has to be 
assessed not only in view of its inherent limitations (its conditions and exceptional 
derogatory clauses), but also in relation to the current legislation and practice of visa 
requirements in a Member State for third country nationals living in another Member 
State. In this respect it would be important to consider how many third country nationals 
residing in a Member State would be required a visa to enter other (and which other) 
Member States.
In any case, although the utility of Article 8 may be in the end more limited than it 
may seem at first sight, it is, in any case, a good example illustrating that the Convention 
rules are not only repressive. It has a clear positive effect for third country nationals.47 As 
O’Keeffe recalls, this rule
4 6  However, it should be noted that all the restrictions to the movements within the Union of residents in 
the latter have to be put into context by reference to the precise legal and practical situation regarding 
internal border controls and controls on persons within the territory of each Member State.
4 7  On this aspect see also Article 18 of the draft Convention and the Convention rules on visas. On the 
other hand, one can only hope that Member States will obey this rule better than they have done in
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"(...)is particularly important in the case of long term residents or a fortiori second 
or third generation migrants who otherwise may have to face long bureaucratic 
delays and possibly humiliating interrogations and obstacles before being entitled 
to move for a short period through the territory of the Union, even though they 
have lived a large part or indeed all their life in the Union.''4®
Finally, it should be noted that the facilitation of movement within the Union of 
third country nationals resident therein has been recently on the working agenda of the 
Union institutions. The German Presidency planned to propose "that Member States waive 
visa requirements for such persons for purposes of transit or short stays." This proposal 
was meant to be implemented before the entry into force of the External Frontiers 
Convention.* 49 A similar measure was meanwhile approved in relation to students residing 
in one Member State, who go into another Member State in the framework of a school 
visit.50 More recently, in July 1995, the Commission proposed three Directives to abolish 
completely internal border controls on persons,51 one of which deals specifically with the 
right of third country nationals to travel among Member States.52 These three Directives 
were analysed supra, in chapter 4, section A.
- entry for stay other than for a short time
Article 7 and 8 of the draft Convention concentrate on the regulation of the entry 
in a Member State for a short stay. Article 9 establishes that when the entry to a Member 
State has another purpose other than for a short time, it shall be done "under the 
conditions laid down in its national law." It adds that in such a case "access shall be 
restricted to the territory of that State."53 Naturally, if a person acquires a residence
relation to Community provisions (Article 3(2) of Directive 68/360, Articles 2(2) of Directives 90/364, 
90/365 and 93/96 and Article 2(2) of Directive 73/148, all quoted and analysed in chapter 4. These 
provisions oblige Member States to provide to third country nationals, who are relatives of a migrant 
national of a Member State, "every facility for obtaining any necessary visas". On a number of occasions, 
the European Commission has initiated the proceedings established by Article 169 of the EC Treaty 
against certain Member States that did not respect this rule. See above, chapter 4, and the 7th Annual 
Report on the Control of the Implementation of Community Law-1989, COM (90) 288 final, 1989, 
published in OJ C 232/1 at p.19, of 17/9/90.
4® See O'Keeffe, "The New Draft...", op.cit., at p.148.
4 9  See "Objectives and major Topics in the field of Home Affairs in the EU in the Second Half of 1994", 
by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, doc.ref. PE 209.051, p.5.
5 0  See the Decision 94/795/JHA on a joint action concerning travel facilities for school pupils from third 
countries resident in a Member State, adopted by the Council on 30 November 1994, OJ L 327/1-3. See, 
also the Background document for the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 30 November and 1 December 
1994, Press Service of the General Secretariat of the Council, doc.ref. CM94-128/6, p.2.
5 1  COM (95) 346,347 and 348 final, of 12/7/1995.
5 2  Draft Council Directive on the right of third-country nationals to travel in the Community, COM (95) 
346, final, of 12/7/1995. Note also that one of these three Directives proposes the deletion of the rules of 
EC secondary legislation allowing Member States to request visas (or other formalities) for the entry of 
third country nationals to their territories. See draft Directive presented in COM (95) 348 final, of 
12/7/1995.
5 3  The Beazley report of 19/4/1994 proposed that only until 31 December 1995 Article 9 applied to stays 
other than for a short time, in which case access would be limited to the authorising Member State. After 
that date, the possibility of Article 9 of entering a Member State under the conditions of its national law
426
permit later on, he or she can then benefit from the right to enter another Member State 
for a short stay - provided the entry conditions of Article 7 are fulfilled.
- readmission obligation
The benefit enjoyed by third country nationals residing in the Union, that of not 
being required to have a visa to enter another Member State, has a reverse side in the 
Member States where they reside. According to Article 8(3):
"Member States shall, under conditions determined by measures to give effect to 
this Convention, take back any person to whom they have issued a residence 
Permit or provisional residence permit (...) and who is illegally resident in the 
territory of another Member State."
Note that, in contrast, the Annex of the draft Directive presented in COM (95) 
346, referred to above, contains detailed provisions on the readmission by a Member State 
of third country nationals who are unlawfully resident in another Member State, but who 
hold a residence permit issued by the former Member State. See chapter 4, section A for 
some details on those rules.
(iv) Enforcement of entry conditions (Title IV)
• Joint list of persons to be refused entry in the Member States territory
One of the fundamental instruments of control envisaged by the Convention is the 
joint list of persons "to whom the Member States shall refuse entry to their territories".54 
This joint list is to be drawn up on the basis of notifications of names made by each 
Member State and "shall be continually updated".55
As can be easily imagined, and as suggested by references contained in some rules 
of the Convention,56 there will be a joint list and a national list. In principle the joint list 
should include all the names on the national lists.57
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 establishes the rules to govern the decision to put the 
name of a person on the Joint List. The basic principle is that "the decision to put a person 
on the joint list shall be based on the threat which that person may represent to the public 
policy or national security of a Member State. It is generally envisaged that the inclusion 
of a person on the Joint List "shall be based on a decision taken with due regard for the 
rules of procedure laid down by national law by the administrative or judicial authorities of 
the Member States." Such a decision shall be taken on account of one of the following 
alternative situations: a custodial sentence of one year or more in that Member State; 
"information to the effect that the person concerned has committed a serious crime"; 
"serious ground for believing that [the person] is planning to commit a serious crime or 
that he represents a threat to the public policy or national security of a Member State", or,
would apply to persons proposing to stay other than for a "limited period". This limited period is probably 
identical to the "stay of limited duration" defined in the new Article 1(g) - proposed in the same report - as 
being "an uninterrupted stay or successive stays the length of which does not generally exceed one year".
54 Article 10(1).
5 5  Article 10(2). The submission of such names is to be done in accordance with measures implementing 
the Convention, as established by Article 10(1).
5 6  Notably Article 7(2)(a).
5 7  It may be different for instance in the cases envisaged in the last subparagraphs of both paragraphs (1) 
and (2) of Article 11. See also Article 7 (2) (a).
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finally, on account of a serious offence or repeated offences against the law relating to the 
entry and residence of foreigners”.
The European Parliament proposed that the present reference in Article 10(3) to 
"with due regard" (to national rules of procedure) be substituted by "in accordance with", 
which is certainly a clearer and thus a safer expression. The Parliament also suggested that 
present reference to the threat that the person "may represent to the public policy or 
national security of a Member State" be changed to "threat which that person 
represents".58 Again this seems to be a preferable option, although it will all depend on the 
way that the rules are enforced. In this regard the importance of having a uniform judicial 
authority to control the application of the Convention is once more confirmed.
In the Commission's draft Convention, Article 10(4) establishes that "detailed rules 
for applying the criteria set out in paragraph 3” to put a person on the Joint List "shall be 
determined by measures to give effect to this Convention".59 *One important issue in this 
regard is whether such detailed rules will or will not include the definition of the very 
concepts of public policy and national security of a Member State referred to in the main 
text of Article 10(3).
- Residence permits of persons included in the Joint List
Problems may arise when a person whose name is included in the Joint List applies 
for a residence permit or is even already in possession of a residence permit in one 
Member State.
When such a person applies for a residence permit in a Member State, the latter 
shall first consult the Member State that entered the name on the Joint List and shall take 
its interest into account when deciding on the application, "The residence permit shall be 
issued for substantive reasons only, notably on humanitarian grounds or by reasons of 
international commitments." If the residence permit is issued, the Member State that 
entered the name on the Joint List shall delete the entry.^
When the person included in the Joint List is already in possession of a residence 
permit, the interested Member States "shall consult each other in order to determine 
whether there are sufficient grounds for withdrawing the residence permit." If the 
residence permit is not withdrawn, it is again provided that "the Member State which 
made the entry shall delete it."61
5 8  Beazley report of 19 April 1994. Note also that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights 
suggested that the references in Article 10 (3) of the draft Convention to "a custodial sentence", 
"information to the effect that the person concerned has committed a serious crime", "serious ground for 
believing that he is planning to commit a serious crime or that he represents a threat", "a serious 
offence(...) against the law relating with the entry and residence of foreigners" be all amended to include 
in those conditions the explicit mention to the existence of a proof of all those facts. However, this 
suggestion was not accepted by the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs in its final report. 
See idem, pp.18-19,
5 9  Article 10(4).
Article 11(1). It is curious that it is the Member State which entered the name that has to delete the 
entry, rather than a central authority responsible for the Joint List, e.g. at request of the Member State 
which issued the resident permit.
6 1  Article 11(2).
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Apparently, after deletion of the name of a person, he or she can only be refused 
entry in any other Member State (including the Member State which proposed his or her 
inclusion on the Joint List) according to the rules of Article 7, notably Article 7(1 )(c) and 
Article 7(2)(a) and (b). Note, in particular that Article 7(2)(a) provides that any person 
may be refused entry to a Member State "if his name appears in the national list of persons 
who are not to be admitted to the Member State to which he seeks entry." Therefore, a 
person may have his name erased from the Joint List but may continue having his name 
included in the national list of the Member State which requested its inclusion in the Joint 
List. While according to Article 7(2)(a), that person may be prohibited from entering that 
Member State, he may still enter other Member States... if no other restrictive clause 
applies.
Finally, Article 11(3) establishes that : "Detailed rules for the application of this 
Article shall be determined by measures to give effect to this Convention."
- Refusal of entry to a Member State
Article 12(1) is the reverse side of the entry conditions established in Articles 7(1) 
and 9.62 *It establishes that:
"Entry into the territories of the Member States shall be refused to persons who 
fail to fulfil one or more of the conditions set out in Articles 7( I) and Article 9."^ ^
Article 12(2) allows exceptions to this general rule "on humanitarian grounds or in 
the national interest or by reason of international commitments" of the Member States. 
Permission to enter on these grounds is then restricted to the territory of the Member 
State that gave the exceptional permission of entry. If the person concerned is on the Joint 
List, the Member State that let her or him enter shall inform the other Member States of 
the entry permission.64
It is a positive aspect of the Convention that exceptional clauses are not only used 
to limit entry to Member States, but also to allow it.
Nevertheless, while Article 12(1) spells out an obligation to refuse persons entry 
and makes exception to it in Article 12(2), Article 7(1) only establishes the requirements 
(seen together with Article 12(1) again) that are indispensable to enter, but which may not 
be sufficient. The very wording of Article 7(1) (a "person mav be authorised") and the rule 
of Article 7(2)(a) confirm that conclusion.
- Access to one Member State only
In some cases the access of a third country national can be restricted to the 
territory of a single Member State. That is the case envisaged in Article 9, allowing the 
entry to a Member State for stay other than for a short time under the conditions laid 
down by national law, and also of Article 12(2) on exceptional permission for entry of 
third country nationals "on humanitarian grounds or in the national interest or by reason of 
international commitments" of the Member States. Such is also the case of Articles 20, 23
6 2  While Article 7(1) makes a detailed list of the requirements for entries for a short stay. Article 9 deals 
with entries for stays other than for a short time and refers to the relevant national legislation.
6  ^Emphasis added.
6 4  The information will be provided in accordance with the manner determined by the implementing 
measures of the Convention, as established by Article 12(2).
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and 25, on the issue of visas or authorisations of entry valid for one Member State only. 
These will be analysed below, in the part dealing with rules on visas.
Doubts may be raised on the conformity with Article 7A of the EC Treaty of rules 
limiting the freedom of movement of a third country national to the territory of one 
Member State only.
- Exchange of information
According to Article 13 the "exchange of information on data contained in the 
joint list shall be computerised." Article 13(3) adds that:
"The joint list may be consulted by the competent authorities of the Member 
States which, in accordance with their national laws, are concerned with: 
processing visa applications; frontier controls; police checks; and the admission 
and regulation of the stay of persons who are not nationals of a Member State."6^
Article 13(2) provides that the creation, organisation and operation of the required 
computerised system will be the subject of the Convention on the European Information 
System. This Convention is supposed to "include guarantees for the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data." Work on the Convention on 
the European Information System is in progress, but agreement on a final draft is not 
envisaged soon, although it was supposed to have been agreed by 30 June of 1992.* 66 The 
pertinence of a special Convention on the European Information System, to deal with 
protection of individuals in processing of personal data, arose after the criticism of to the 
rules of the Schengen Implementing Agreement.67
In the framework of the Council of Europe, there are two instruments relevant in 
this regard. One is the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981.68 The other is a 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the use of
Article 13(4) provides that ”[e]ach Member State shall inform the Commission and the other Member 
States of the agencies authorised (...) to consult the joint list."
6 6  That was the latest date envisaged by the European Council of Luxembourg, on its instructions to the 
ad hoc working group on Immigration. See Agence Europe, N*5524, 30 June 1991, p.8 , as quoted by 
O'Keeffe, David in "The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European Integration?”, YEL, 1991, 
pp.185-219, at 209.
6 7  See Boeles, P., "Data Exchange, Privacy and Legal Protection; Especially regarding aliens”, in Free 
Movement o f  Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences, T.M.C. Asser Institute Colloquium on 
European Law, Session XXI, 1991, Schermers, H.G. et aí. (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoof, 1993, 
pp.52-57; O’Keeffe, in "The Schengen Convention...", op.cit. at 204-209; Schattenberg, B. "The Schengen 
Information System: Privacy and Legal Protection", in Free Movement o f  Persons in Europe.... op.cit., 
pp.43-51; and Verhey,L.F.M. "Privacy Aspects of the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement” in 
Schengen: Internationalisation o f  Central Chapters o f  the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Security and the 
Police, 2nd.ed., Meijers, H. et al. (eds.), Leiden, Stichting NJCM-Boekerij, 1992, pp. 110-134. For a 
comparison between the Schengen Information System and the European Information System see the 
paper of Magraner, Ana "Coexistence des différents systèmes informatiques SIS-SIE", presented at the 
EIPA colloquium "From Schengen to Maastricht”, held in Maastricht, on 15-16/12/1994.
6 8  ETS, No. 108. As mentioned before, it was ratified by 16 countries, including Iceland, Norway, 
Slovenia and all Member States, except Greece and Italy.
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information of a personal nature in the police sector.69 The Convention is generally 
regarded as being insufficient for an adequate protection of individuals.70 Furthermore, 
not all Member States have ratified it.71 Nevertheless, the European Parliament rightly 
proposed the primacy of the mentioned Council of Europe Convention over the 
Convention on External Frontiers.72 The Recommendation, although more detailed and 
envisaging greater protection for the individual, is even of a less binding nature and is not 
an adequate mechanism to achieve effective protection.
As far as the Community is concerned, on 24 October 1995 a Directive on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data was adopted. However, according to Article 3(2) of this Directive, 
its provisions do not apply to the processing of personal data "in the course of an activity 
which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V 
and VI of the Treaty on European Union"73
Finally, it may be noted that rules on data protection are also included in Articles 7 
to 9 and 13 to 25 of the Europol Convention, concluded on 26 July 1995, under Title Vi 
of the Treaty on European Union.74 *The scope of Europol activities will include matters 
related to illegal immigrant smuggling and trade in human beings.73 One of the points that 
created much controversy during the negotiations concerned precisely the status of the 
above mentioned Convention and Recommendation of the Council of Europe. In the end, 
it was decided that these are to be respected by Europol and by each Member State in the 
processing of personal data related to Europol.76
6 9  Recommendation No. R (87) (15) of 17 September 1987.
7 0  See Verhey, op.cit., at 112-113. One example of that insufficiency is the fact that it "has been expressly 
stated that the Convention does not have direct effect within the national legal systems and therefore no 
directly enforceable rights can be derived from it", as stated in its Explanatory Memorandum. See idem, 
p.l 12, main text and footnote 6 . Besides, its Article 9 has a very broad derogatory clause.
7 1 Up to the first of January 1995, the only Member States which have not ratified the Convention were 
Greece and Italy, although they did sign it. Furthermore, before 1990, only Austria, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom had ratified it. Iceland and Norway also ratified the 
Convention. Portugal only ratified the Convention with effect from 1/1/1994.
7 2  To be included in the eighth recital of the Preamble of the Convention on External Frontiers and in 
Article 26 of the latter together with the primacy of the E.C.H.R. and of the U.N. Treaties on Refugees. 
See the EP Beazley report of 19 April 1994.
7 3  Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281/31 of 23/11/1995. This Directive is meant to make Member 
States "protect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data (Article 1). In the Directive, detailed 
provisions regulate matters such as : the criteria for making data processing legitimate, the information to 
be given to the data subject, the data subject's right of access to data, the data subject's right to object to 
the processing of personal data, the confidentiality and security of processing of personal data, and the 
transfer of personal data to third countries. According to Article 8  of the Directive, "the processing of 
personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade- 
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life", is in principle prohibited.
7 4  OJC 316/2, of 27/11/1995.
7 3  Article 2(2) of the Convention.
7 6  Article 14. See also the subsequent Articles of the Europol Convention, which contain further rules on 
data protection and use.
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(v) "Accompanying measures"(TitIe V)
- Reinforcement of responsibilities of carriers77
Article 14 establishes the duty of the Member States to adopt national legislation 
obliging carriers of persons to take "all necessary measures to ensure that persons coming 
from third countries are in possession of valid travel documents and of necessary 
visas”("and to impose appropriate penalties on carriers failing to fulfil this obligation") and 
to assume responsibility for accommodation and expulsion of a "person coming from third 
country who is refused admission", when that will be "required by the control authorities".
There seems to be the risk that the possession of the required documents to enter 
the EC may eventually become more important in practice than the right of entry itself. 
This is due to the fact that the stress of the first indent of Article 14(2) is on the possession 
of documents rather than on the right itself, for instance the right to request asylum and 
entry for that purpose. Clearly, persons escaping from persecution may not always be able 
to present the documents normally required to enter a Member State, while according to 
international rules they should be able to escape persecution and present their claim to 
asylum. With these concerns in mind, the European Parliament proposed the deletion of 
Article 14.78
Equivalent rules of the Schengen Implementing Agreement79 have been also 
criticised due to the fact that they prevent genuine asylum-seekers from entering the EC to 
escape from persecution and presenting their claims to asylum. In this draft Convention 
the substantial difference is again that the jurisdiction of the EC Court of Justice may 
ensure an effective application of the reservation established in the beginning of Article 14. 
It provides that the responsibilities of carriers is without prejudice to Article 27 of the 
Convention, which establishes the primacy of human rights instruments such as the U.N. 
instruments on the protection of refugees.
- Consequences of illegal crossing of external frontiers or illegal stay
Article 15 establishes the consequences of the illegal crossing of the external 
frontiers and the illegal stay in a Member State.
It may happen that a person "illegally crosses an external frontier without having a 
residence permit".80 It may also happen that a person does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils 
the conditions of residence in a Member State. In all these cases the person "shall normally
7 7  See Cruz, Antonio, "Carrier Sanctions in Five Community States: Incompatibilities between 
International Civil Aviation and Human Rights Obligations", CCME Briefing Paper No.4, Brussels, 
CCME, April 1991, updated by the same author in "Carrier Liability in the Member States of the 
European Union", CCME Briefing Paper No. 17, Brussels, CCME, September 1994. See also by Cruz, 
Antonio Shifting Responsibility: Carrier's liability in the Member States o f  the European Union and 
North America. Staffordshire, Trentham Books, 1995.
7 8  The EP Beazley report of 19 April 1994.
7 9  Its Article 26. See also its Article 27.
8 0  These seem to be cumulative conditions. It does not seem possible (simple because of the Convention 
and just because of the illegal crossing) to expel a person who illegally crosses an external frontier but has 
a residence permit.
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be required to leave the territory of a Member State without delay, unless his stay is 
regularised".81
If that person resides legally in another Member State,82 "he shall go to the 
territory of that Member State without delay, unless he is authorised to go to another 
country where he is certain to be admitted."83 Article 15(2) establishes that:
"W h e re  such a  person h as not left voluntarily o r  w here it may be assum ed th at he 
w ill not so leave o r  if  his immediate departure is required for reason s o f  national 
secu rity  o r public p o licy , he shall be expelled a s  laid down in the legislation o f  the 
M em b er State in w hich he w as found."
According to the same provision, the person may be expelled either to his or her own 
country of origin, or "to any other country to which he may be admitted, notably under the 
relevant provisions of readmission agreements between Member States."84
-readmission agreements
The last reference relates to Article 15(4), which provides that Member States may 
conclude bilateral agreements among themselves on the readmission of persons who are 
not entitled under Community law.
- Compensation for financial imbalances between Member States due to expulsions
Article 16 provides for mutual financial compensation between Member States 
when the expulsion of persons in irregular situation "cannot be effected at the expense of 
the person concerned or of a third party". Implementing measures of the Convention will 
set out "the appropriate criteria and practical arrangements" to that effect.
c) Legal limits and legal relations of the Convention
- Relations with EC Law
In the draft Convention, there is no explicit rule similar to that of Article 134 of the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement, which establishes that:
"T h e  provisions o f  this Convention shall ap p ly  only in so  fa r  as th ey  are  
com p atib le  w ith C om m u n ity  L aw ".
However, this should not be seen as allowing in any way whatsoever for the violation of 
EC Law by the Convention, namely due to the repeated statements on the provisions of 
the present draft Convention that the latter is not to prevail over Community rules.85
Community Law is explicitly referred to by several substantive provisions of this 
draft Convention. The definition in Community Law of who is entitled to enter and reside 
in a EC Member State is fundamental for the personal scope of the Convention's 
provisions. Internal frontiers are taken as defined by "instruments enacted under the EC
8 1  Article 15(1). Clearly the word "normally1* here does not help to clarify the meaning of the provision: 
will the person be expelled unless his or her stay is regularised, or are there other possibilities to stay in 
the country?
8 2  In the words of the Convention, if "such a person holds a valid residence permit or provisional 
residence permit issued by another Member State".
8 3  Article 15(1).
8 4  In relation to residents in an EC Member State, an equivalent rule to that of Article 8(5) is established 
by Article 15(3): "a list of the resident permits or provisional residence permits issued by the Member 
States shall be drawn up by measures to give effect to this Convention."
8 5  See also the second and third recitals of the draft Convention.
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Treaty”.86 Control of persons at airports will be made "without prejudice to Community 
baggage inspection measures".87 Implicit reference also seems to be made to secondary 
instruments of Community Law when Article 7(2) states that: "Any person may be refused 
entry (...) in all circumstances in which a national of a Member State may be refused entry 
to another Member State." According to Article 14(1), incorporation into national 
legislation of measures on responsibilities of carriers will also be made without prejudice 
to "instruments enacted under the Treaty establishing the European Community”. A 
similar reservation is made by Article 17 in relation to visas, where it provides that 
Member States will progressively harmonise their visa policies "without prejudice to 
decisions adopted under Article 100C of the [EC] Treaty.”
Furthermore, certain provisions of the present draft, which limit the movement of 
third country nationals between the Member States, may raise problems under Article 7A 
of the EC Treaty from the perspective of total abolition of border controls.88
Following what was suggested in the previous chapter,89 it is submitted that in the 
case of concrete conflict between rules of the External Frontiers Convention and rules of 
Community instruments, Community instruments should prevail.
- Primacy of International instruments and constitutional rules on human rights
According Article 27(1) of the present draft 
"This Convention shall be subject to the European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and to the Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, relating 
to the Status of Refugees and without prejudice to the more favourable 
constitutional provisions of Member States on asylum."
This is one of the most important provisions of the Community's draft. Similar 
references to the international instruments on refugees was also made by Article 135 of the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement. However, only the attribution of jurisdiction to the 
EC Court of Justice made by the present draft Convention (and not in the Schengen 
Agreements) gives the insurance that such a reference will be fully translated into legal 
practice.90
The primacy of more favourable constitutional provisions of the Member States on 
asylum appears to seek to anticipate eventual criticisms and avoid legal problems in the 
process of ratification of the Convention.
8 6  Article l(h)(i). Community rules defining intra-Community flights and sea-crossings are Article 2, 
paragraphs (3) and (5) - respectively - of Council Regulation 3925/91/EEC of 19/12/1991 concerning the 
elimination of controls and formalities applicable to the cabin and hold baggage of persons taking an 
intra-Community flight and the baggage of persons making an intra-Community sea crossing, OJ L 374/4 
of 31/12/91. See p.9 of the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Convention, COM (93) 
684 final.
8 7  Article 6(2).
8 8  See the above mentioned remarks of O'Keeffe, in "The new Draft...”, op.cit., at pp. 143-144.
8 9  See part 6  of section A of chapter 7, on relations between Title VI of the Treaty on European Union 
and the European Community.
9 0  See infra the part on the jurisdiction of the EC Court of Justice on this Convention.
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As already mentioned, the European Parliament proposed that the Council of 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data also takes primacy over this Convention on External Frontiers.91
- Bilateral Conventions on local traffic
The present Convention is not supposed to affect bilateral Conventions on local 
traffic.92 While at first sight this may be considered a matter of secondary importance, in 
practice it may acquire considerable significance in some frontier regions, such as those 
close to the borders with Switzerland.
• Relations with Third States
In the Treaty on European Union, although Article K.7 allows for closer 
cooperation between Member States, there is no explicit reference to relations between 
Member States and third countries as far as Justice and Home Affairs are concerned. 
Nevertheless, in the draft External Frontiers Convention, Article 28 rules on the relations 
of Member States with third States on frontier controls. It provides that:
"A Member State which envisages conducting negotiations on frontier controls 
with a third State shall inform the other Member States and the Commission 
accordingly in good time",
and that, with the exception of agreements on local traffic, a Member State shall not:
"(...) conclude with one or more third States agreements simplifying or removing 
frontier controls without the prior agreement of the Council."
An interesting issue concerning the relations of Member States with third states is 
the situation of Denmark, Sweden and Finland within the Nordic Union.93 Although, 
apparently, recent developments have reduced the practical relevance of old arrangements, 
the Nordic Union had virtually abolished internal border controls between its Member 
States: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland.
Norway and Iceland are not Member States of the European Union. Thus a 
difficulty rises on the controls of the external borders of the European Union with those 
two countries. The case of Norway is particularly clear in this respect. Norway is the only 
Nordic country which is not a Member State of the Union and which has land borders with 
the Union - through Finland and Sweden, which are members of the Nordic Union.
The previous draft Convention on External Borders, of the ad hoc immigration 
group, addressed the problem of the control of the borders between Denmark and other 
Scandinavian countries in a Declaration annexed to the Convention. In that declaration 
Denmark undertook the general responsibility of engaging in talks with the other members 
of the Nordic Union. The aim of such talks would be to assure that those other countries 
made in their external borders controls on persons equivalent to those provided by the
9 1 See the Beazley report of 19 April 1994.
92  As defined by Article l(i), according to Article 27(1).
93  See also, infra, the reference to the parallel Convention (to this External Frontiers Convention) to be 
negotiated with third states.
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Convention on External Borders. The present draft Convention of the Commission does 
not seem to have addressed this problem at all.94
d) Adoption, Implementation and Judicial Control of the Convention 
• Declarations on the adoption of the Convention
The draft decision of the Council would have recommended to the Member States 
the adoption of the draft Convention by the end of 1994, a date to be revised.
In relation to the adoption of the Convention, an interesting point is referred to by 
the Commission in its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, when 
it states that :
"The Convention is now established by the Union and should not therefore include 
a Final Act. The Member States could, however, submit declarations to be 
recorded in the Council minutes."9^
This statement probably expresses a wish to reduce the legal force of eventual declarations 
made by the Member States on the Convention. In fact, those declarations could lead to 
ambiguity on the commitments of the Member States regarding the Convention 
provisions, similar to what occurred in the case of some common declarations annexed to 
the Single European Act.96 If the intention of the Commission was to reduce the legal 
force of eventual Member State's declarations, perhaps it had in mind the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in the Antonissen case. There, the Court ruled on a declaration 
made by all members of the Council and entered in the Council minutes at the time of 
adoption of Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360/EEC, declaring that
"such a declaration cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting a provision of 
secondary legislation where, as in this case, no reference is made to the content of 
the declaration in the wording of the provision in question. The declaration 
therefore has no legal significance."9^
In this perspective, future declarations of the Member States recorded in the Council 
minutes would be seen as mere political declarations.
Presumably, the Commission would not mind making a subtle redefinition of the 
classical character of the Conventions drawn up under the rules of Article K.3(2)(c).98
9 4  On the topic of border controls see also the reference made in chapter 6  to the negotiations for the 
accession of Scandinavian countries to the Schengen Agreements.
9  ^Point 19 of the Explanatory Memorandum, COM (93) 684 final, p.10.
9 6  Their legal status is not clear, but they are frequently mentioned to demonstrate that Member States 
wanted to limit the extent of the Single European Act provisions. See section C of chapter 3 for an 
analysis of the legal status of declarations of Member State's governments on the Single European Act. To 
a considerable extent such analysis is also useful for the issue here in question.
9  ^ Case C-292/89, Antonissen [1991] ECR 1-745, at 778, paragraph 18. Pointing in the same direction 
see Case 237/84, Commission v. Belgium, [1986] ECR 1247, paragraph 17.
98As remarked by O'Keeffe, in "The new Draft...", op.cit., p. 143. In the same direction points Article 2(1) 
of the draft "Council Decision (...) establishing a Convention on Controls on Persons Crossing External 
Frontiers". It states that : "The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the second month 
following the deposit of the instrument of adoption (...) by the last Member State to take that step" and 
that "provisions concerning the adoption of measures in implementation of the Convention shall apply 
from the first day of the third month following that date." It is certainly not customary that the entry into
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This aim could even have positive aspects to the extent that it would contribute to 
diminishing legal uncertainty. However, one may legitimately wonder whether this would 
be possible to achieve in the manner envisaged by the Commission and if that manner 
conforms to the rules of the Treaty on European Union."
It should be emphasised that the general legal status under Community Law of the 
declarations inserted into the Council minutes, on the occasion of the adoption of EC 
instruments, remains unclear. It is not to be excluded that, in the future, the EC Court of 
Justice may take a different decision from that of the Antonissen case, considering the 
specific characteristics of the situation at stake.
Furthermore, it is not yet certain which judicial authority will be called to rule on 
the present issue. The importance of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities on similar cases would be limited if it had no jurisdiction on the 
matter.
Finally, the Commission's suggestion to abolish a Final Act, and to record eventual 
Member State's declarations in the Council minutes, does not seem to be required by any 
provision of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. Actually, it appears difficult to 
sustain that the fact that the Council "draws up conventions which it shall recommend to 
the Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements", excludes the possibility of the governments of the Member States to make 
declarations on the Conventions approved.
In any case, this issue is a good example to corroborate the need for a common 
judicial interpretation of the Convention, not to mention the relevant provisions of Treaty 
on European Union itself. To leave their interpretation in the hands of several national 
jurisdictions, with the risk of different and contrasting interpretations, all with the same 
legal force, is perhaps not a very good idea,
- Implementing Measures
Implementing measures, or "measures to give effect to this Convention", according 
to the text of the Commission's draft, are planned to be adopted in relation to a very wide 
range of issues.
In relation to the voting procedure for the adoption of common implementing 
measures of the draft Convention, its Article 26 states that: *
force of an international Treaty such as the Convention at stake is determined by another instrument and 
not by the Convention itself. The governments and the parliaments of the Member States could object to 
this point of the draft decision of the Council. Note likewise, but admittedly on a less important aspect, the 
Commission’s statement that "as the Convention is being concluded under the European Union, the 
instruments of ratification now have to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council, as for 
conventions concluded under Article 220 of the EC Treaty". See the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Commission, at p.8 . To the knowledge of the present author there is no legal rule justifying the 
Commission's assertion of the existence of a legal obligation to do that.
"  O’Keeffe states that the "suggestion to omit a Final Act, a normal act of international treaty-making, 
does not appear necessary or to follow from the text of the Treaty". He also remarks that the Commission’s 
suggestion to "introduce a new form of Declaration, recorded in the Council Minutes (...) would add to the 
uncertainty as to the legal status to be attributed to declarations, and in some cases, as in the case of a 
unanimous Declaration which makes specific reference to a provision of the Convention, this may be 
serious, and create serious difficulty as regards the interpretation of the underlying convention." See 
O'Keeffe, in "The new Draft...", p.143.
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"Decisions needed to give effect to this Convention, other than those expressly 
provided therein, shall be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State."
This rule constitutes an exception to the exception established in Article K.3(2)(c) 
second paragraph to the general unanimity rale prevailing in Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union. While the general rule in Title VI of the Treaty is the adoption of 
decisions in the Council by unanimity. Article K.3(2)(c) provides that measures 
implementing Conventions "(...)shall be adopted within the Council by a majority of two- 
thirds of the High Contracting Parties" "[ujnless otherwise provided by such 
conventions...". The draft Convention, in its Article 26, precisely provides for decision by 
unanimity, although only if they are not expressly provided for in the final text of the 
Convention.100
The Commission's proposal for the adoption of such implementing measures by 
unanimity may be explained by the fact that the Convention already provides for the 
adoption of implementing measures in a very broad area.101
1 0 0  Attention should be given to the European Parliament's proposed draft of Article 26, which, 
apparently not changing the substantia! rule, makes, contrary to the Commission's draft, a clear 
distinction between implementing measures of the Convention "expressly provided therein" and "(o]ther 
decisions needed to give effect to this Convention". The Parliament proposal also adds that M[i]n either 
case decisions of the Council will be taken having consulted the European Parliament, as foreseen in 
Article K.6 ." See the Beazley report of 29 March 1994.
101 The matters to be dealt with by implementing measures of the Convention include: a) exceptions and 
specific rules applying to particular categories of maritime traffic for the crossing of external frontiers, 
and the arrangements for local frontier traffic (as established by Article 2.5); b) detailed rules for applying 
the controls at external frontiers, including relaxing them (Article 5.3 and 5.4); c) determination of the 
conditions for the Member States to take back any person to whom they have issued a residence permit or 
provisional residence permit within the meaning of Article 8(1) and (2) and who is illegally resident in 
the territory of another Member State (Article 8.3); d) the drawing up of a list of residence permits and 
provisional residence permits referred to in [Article 8 ] paragraphs 1 and 2 which shall be accepted as 
equivalent to visas (Article 8.5); e) the drawing up of an indicative list of the exceptional circumstances in 
which Member States' authorities shall accept the provisional residence permits and the travel documents 
referred to in [Article 8 ] paragraph 2 as equivalent to visas (Article 8.5); f) detailed rules for applying the 
criteria generally set out in Article 10.3 to put a person on the joint list of persons to be refused entry at 
the external borders (Article 10.4); g) detailed rules for application of Article 11, on the issue, holding or 
withdrawal of a residence permit in relation to a person whose name is on the joint list of persons to be 
refused entry (Article 11.3); h) the drawing up of a list of residence permits and provisional residence 
permits issued by the Member State (Article 15.3); and i) determination of the appropriate criteria and 
practical arrangements for compensation between Member States for eventual financial imbalances 
resulting from Member States' expenses for expulsions (Article 16).
In relation to visas, the following issues will also be dealt with by implementing measures of the 
Convention: a) definition of the period after which the absence of reply, from the central authorities of a 
Member State wishing to be consulted on the issue of a visa by another Member State, shall be regarded as 
indicating that there is no objection to the issue of the visa (Article 20.1(3)); b) general rules for 
implementing Article 20, on prior consultation of central authorities of another Member State for the issue 
of a visa (Article 20.2); c) determination of conditions and criteria for issuing multiple-entry uniform 
visas (Article 21.2); d) the principles established in Article 22 on the State and authorities responsible for 
the issue of uniform visas (Article 22.3); e) supply of information to the other Member States by the 
Member State that made an exceptional issue (according to Article 24.2) of a visa to a person that is in the 
joint list of persons to be refused entry (Article 24.3 in fine).
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UIt may also be seen as an anticipation of a likely insistence of the Member States to 
require unanimity for the adoption of those measures. Such Member States' position is 
particular likely to occur regarding the sensitive matters to be dealt with by the 
implementing measures.102 In this sense the Commission's proposal would show that it 
preferred to immediately propose a rule easily acceptable to the Member States’ 
governments, taking, instead, the risk of conflict on other issues - such as the jurisdiction 
of the EC Court of Justice.
- Jurisdiction of the EC Court of Justice
Article 29 of the draft Convention provides that:
"The Court o f Justice of the European Communities shall have jurisdiction:
- to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of this Convention; 
references shall be made as provided in the second and third paragraph of Article 
177 of the Treaty establishing the European Community;
- in disputes concerning the implementation of this Convention, on application by 
a Member State or the Commission."
This is, perhaps, the most important novelty of the Convention in relation to the previous 
draft of the ad hoc immigration group, not to mention the Schengen Agreements. One of 
the more important criticisms made of the two latter texts, and of the intergovernmental 
instruments in general, was precisely the fact that they were not subject to a uniform 
judicial control. A judicial control that could, for instance, be ensured by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities.
One of the reasons that makes some legal authors advocate the attribution of 
jurisdiction to the EC Court of Justice is the hope that the latter would apply to the 
matters at stake the positive aspects of its jurisprudence on Community Law.103
The present author agrees that the EC Court of Justice is the best judicial authority 
to have jurisdiction on the interpretation of the present Convention. However, in any case, 
the need for a uniform judicial control of the Convention is evident irrespective of what 
Court is charged with it. A uniform judicial control is indispensable for the rules of the 
Convention to have the same meaning in all the Member States, without being subject to 
divergent or even opposite interpretations of different national judicial systems.104
Furthermore, according to Article 14, each Member State is obliged to incorporate into its 
national legislation, measures on responsibilities of public service international carriers to ensure that 
persons coining from third countries are in possession of valid travel documents and necessary visas 
(including appropriate penalties on carriers failing to fulfil this obligation), as well as measures to oblige 
the carrier, where required, to assume responsibilities without delay (including eventually covering the 
cost of accommodation until departure) and to return a person coming from a third country who is refused 
admission at the first control on entry to the Community territory.
Finally, Article 15.4 provides that, at the request of one Member State, "Member States shall 
conclude bilateral agreements between themselves on the readmission of persons who are not entitled 
under Community Law."
1 0 2  Member States may even require unanimity for adoption of measures already planned by the
Convention.
1 0 3  See O’Keeffe, "The New D r a f to p .c i t . ,  pp. 144-145, quoted in part 4, section B of chapter 7.
1 0 4  See the analysis made in chapter 7 on the need for a common judicial authority with jurisdiction on 
the activities and decisions taken on the matters covered by Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
There it is argued that the Court of Justice of the European Communities is the best Court to have such a 
jurisdiction.
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This seems particularly obvious in relation to some concepts or expressions used in 
the Convention, like "national security",103 * “public policy".106 person representing a 
threat to "international relations",107 "sufficient means of subsistence",108 "serious 
crime",109 "serious offences",110 "humanitarian grounds"111 and "national interest".112 
These concepts are very imprecise and often have different meanings in different national 
legal orders. It seems difficult to justify that their interpretation should not have a uniform 
judicial control, being made by national courts only.113 The jurisdiction of the EC Court 
of Justice is even more important for the definition of crucial legal concepts when the 
Convention does not even envisage their definition by implementing measures,114 or when 
this possibility is not very clear.115
In this respect, it should also be highlighted that a uniform judicial definition of 
concepts can be important both from a perspective that tries to defend human rights and 
from a perspective that is concerned with preventing and repressing immigration to the 
European Union. The latter is due to the fact that the Convention contains exceptional 
clauses allowing for the entry of persons which are also based on the use of broad legal 
concepts (e.g. humanitarian grounds).
Furthermore, a uniform judicial control of the Convention would certainly 
contribute to ensuring a proper application of Article 26, which provides for the primacy 
of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the 
Geneva Convention on Refugees, as well as the New York Protocol to the latter.116
Naturally, the same reasons that justify the attribution to the EC Court of Justice 
of the jurisdiction on the Convention are also valid to extend such jurisdiction to the 
implementing measures of the Convention.
The European Parliament proposed that Article 26 of the Commission's draft be 
amended so that the Parliament, itself, could also have recourse to the Court of Justice in 
disputes concerning the implementation of the Convention. Furthermore, the 
European Parliament suggested the addition of a new paragraph to Article 26, so that:
1 0 3  Articles 5(5), 7.(1 )(c), 8(4) (“urgent reasons of national security“), 10(3).
10  ^Articles 5(5), 7.(1 )(c), 10(3). As O’Keeffe recalls, the concept of “public policy" (together with “public
security and "public health") have been interpreted by the EC Court of Justice in relation to Article 48 of
the EC Treaty. The need for a Court interpretation was not prevented by the adoption by the Community 
of detailed rules on those concepts, namely Council Directive 64/221/EEC, OJ 56/850 of 4/4/64. See 
O'Keeffe, "The New Draft...", op.cit., p.145.
1 0 7  Article 7.1(c).
108 Article 7.1(e).
1 0 9  Article 10.3.
1 1 0  Article 10.3.
11 1  Article 11.1 and Article 12.2.
1 1 2  Article 12.2 and 24.2.
1 1 3  The present author does not recall the existence in Europe of any other international Convention, erf 
similar importance and sensitivity, which is subject to national judicial interpretations only.
1 See, e.g. the case of "humanitarian grounds" referred in Articles 11(1) and 12(2).
11 3  See supra the comments on the relationship between Article 10(4) and the main text of Article 10(3).
1 ^  O'Keeffe, "The New Draft...", op.cit., p. 145.
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"The European Parliament and national parliaments of Member States shall have 
competence to question the Council concerning the application of this 
Convention."
In relation to the European Parliament, this proposal seems to constitute only a 
reinforcement of the vague rules provided on the matter by the third paragraph of Article
K.6 of the Treaty on European Union. In relation to national parliaments, while 
recognising that direct dialogue between them and the Council is not a bad idea in itself, 
the present author tends not to favour the proposal of the European Parliament. This lies 
in a structural perspective. What seems to be important is a transparent decision making 
procedure, namely through a significant involvement of the European Parliament in the 
work of the third pillar of the Union. The involvement of national parliaments in the latter 
work may eventually improve its transparency. However, from a structural point of view, 
it does not seem very coherent to improve the European position of national parliaments 
in this specific field, while not doing the same in other fields, like in some of those dealt 
with by the European Community.
Finally, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice faces strong 
opposition from the governments of some Member States, as recalled in chapters 6 and 7 
as far as the Europol Convention is concerned.
2- R U L E S  ON VISAS
The Commission's White Paper of 1985, on the completion of the Internal Market, 
envisaged that, with the aim of abolishing internal border controls on individuals, the 
Commission would present by the end of 1988, a draft Directive on the coordination of 
visa policies, which was supposed to be approved by the Council by the end of 1990.1*7 
Following its "pragmatic approach" to the abolition of internal border controls on persons, 
the Commission did not present this proposal but waited for progress within the 
framework of intergovernmental cooperation.
The Convention on the Crossing of the External Borders, drafted by the ad hoc 
immigration group, contained several rules on visa policy. Some of these were taken up by 
the Commission, which, under the new competences introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, 
included several provisions on visas in the draft Convention on External Frontiers. It also 
presented two draft Regulations on visa matters.
This section analyses the rules on visas in the Commission's draft Convention and 
the two draft Regulations proposed.
a) Rules on visas in the draft Convention on External Frontiers
The rules concerning visas in the Commission’s draft Convention envisage the 
progressive harmonisation of national visa policies and the establishment of rules for the 
implementation and functioning of a uniform visa. 17
1 1 7  Sec the White Paper on "Completing the Internal Market", COM (85) 310, point 55 and p.13 of the 
Annex.
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The harmonisation of national visa policies is envisaged in general terms and it is 
established that it will be made without prejudice to decisions adopted under Article 100C 
of the EC Treaty.118
A fundamental principle for the establishment of uniform visas is their mutual 
recognition. Article 18 of the draft Convention establishes that:
"A Member State shall not require a visa issued by its own authorities of a person 
applying to stay for a short time within its territory who holds a uniform visa. " 119
Article 19 contains the conditions for the issue of a uniform visa. It is required that 
the "travel documents presented upon application for a visa (...) be checked to ensure that 
they are in order and authentic" and that "the expiry date of the travel document (...) be at 
least three months later than the final date for stays stated on the visa, account being taken 
of the time within which the visa must be used". The travel document must also be 
recognised by and be valid in all Member States, and "must allow for the return of the 
traveller to his country of origin or his entry into a third country". With respect to the last 
point, it is still required that "the existence and validity of an authorisation or a re-entry 
visa for the traveller to return to the country of departure (...) be checked if such 
formalities are required by the authorities of that country", the same being applied "to any 
authorisation required for entry to a third country."120 Finally, the conditions for the issue 
of a visa also include the fulfilment of the entry conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of the 
draft Convention (except the very holding of a visa).121
The European Parliament proposed that common conditions and criteria affecting 
the issue of uniform visas should instead be established by the draft Regulation concerning 
the list of countries whose nationals are required to have a visa to cross the EC external 
borders.122 The rules proposed by the Parliament on the issue of uniform visas repeat ipsis 
verbis Article 19(2) of the External Frontiers Convention.
118 Article 17 of the draft Convention on External Frontiers proposed by the Commission.
11® The European Parliament proposed that the expression "stay for short time" be substituted by "stay for 
a limited period". See amendment to Article 18 as proposed in the Beazley report, of 19 April 1994, 
doc.ref. A3-190/94/corr. A "stay of limited duration" is defined (in a new alinea (g) of Article 1 of the 
draft Convention also proposed by the same report) as being "an uninterrupted stay or successive stays the 
length of which does not generally exceed one year".
12°  Article 19(2).
121  Article 19(1).
12 2  According to a new Article 2 a of the draft Regulation, as proposed in the Froment-Meurice's Report 
of 29 March 1994 on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation determining the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, 
made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, 
doc.ref. A3-0193/94. That report was adopted in 21 April 1994 by the Legislative Resolution embodying 
the opinion of the European Parliament on that Commission's proposal, OJ C 128/350 of 9/5/94. 
Consequently, in the Beazley report, of 19 March 1994, the European Parliament proposed several 
changes to the rules on the issue of uniform and national visas in the Commission’s draft Convention. The 
following provisions would be completely deleted: Articles 19(2) (on conditions for issue of the uniform 
visa), but not its paragraph 1 (on the requirement that the prospect visa holders fulfil the entry conditions 
of Article 7(1) of the draft Convention); the third subparagraph of Article 20(1) (allowing the exceptional 
issue of a visa with national validity only, in case of an objection or impossibility of consulting the central 
authorities of another Member State); Article 21 (on multiple entry uniform visa), Article 22, except the 
first part of paragraph 1, and also Article 24 (on national visas) and Article 25 (on visas for long stays).
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Nevertheless, the Parliament's proposed addition to the draft Regulation does not 
include the extra condition established by Article 19(1) of the draft Convention for the 
issue of visas: that the person fulfils the conditions for entry laid down in Article 7(1) of 
the same draft. The absence of this reference in the draft Regulation, as proposed by the 
amendments of the European Parliament, is perhaps understandable, because the definition 
of conditions for entry is a matter to be dealt with by the External Frontiers Convention. 
However, this absence could perhaps cause some practical problems. It would eventually 
be possible to issue visas to third country nationals who would not fulfil the conditions of 
Article 7( 1 ) of the draft Convention, and who thus later could be prohibited from crossing 
the external borders.
In the Commission’s draft Convention it is envisaged that a uniform visa may be 
valid for one or more entries. It is already established that neither "the length of any 
continuous stay nor the total length of successive stays may exceed three months in a six- 
month period starting on the date of entry". However, only measures giving effect to the 
Convention will determine conditions and criteria for issuing multiple-entry uniform 
visas.123
The issue of a uniform visa shall be made by the diplomatic and consular 
authorities of the Member States. Only exceptionally will other authorities determined by 
national legislation issue uniform visas.124 In principle, the Member State responsible for 
the issue of the visa is that of the main destination of the traveller. "If it is not possible to 
determine that destination the Member State of first entry shall be responsible" for issuing 
the visa.125
With respect to issuing of uniform visas, a very important new rule was also 
proposed by the European Parliament: a right of appeal to the competent authorities of the 
relevant Member State against a refusal to grant a uniform visa.126
Nevertheless, in the proposal of the Parliament a point seems odd from the perspective of the divisions of 
competence between the EC and the third pillar of the Union. The Parliament proposes that the conditions 
for the issue of uniform visas be regulated by the draft EC Regulation on visas. However, it proposes no 
changes to some rules of the draft Convention relevant for the issue of those visas. That is the case of 
Article 19(1) (on some conditions for issuing a uniform visa); Article 20 (on prior consultation of central 
authorities on the issue of visas), except the third subparagraph of paragraph 1 that would be deleted; and 
the first part of Article 22(1) - on authorities responsible for the issue of visas (its second part was 
changed). Furthermore, there are other Articles that, while proposed to be changed, still remain as 
substantial rules on aspects that are strictly connected with the issue of uniform visas. That is the case of 
Article 18(1) (on mutual recognition of uniform visas); and Article 23(1) (on the extension of uniform 
visas). It would be too easy to say that it is difficult for the Parliament to defend EC competence on these 
doubtful matters and still be coherent, e.g. with the Maastricht Treaty rules on division of competences. In 
any case, the fundamental problem seems to be a more general and structural one: the lack of precise 
division of competences between the Community and the third pillar of the Union.
123 Article 21.
*24 Article 22(1). The European Parliament proposed eliminating such exceptional issuing of visas by 
these authorities. See the amendment proposed to Article 22 by the Beazley report of 19 April 1994.
125 Article 22(2).
126 in a proposed new Article 2c of the draft Regulation. As Boeles recalls, commenting the equivalent 
rules of the Schengen Implementing Agreement; "(rjefusal of a uniform visa may be in breach of rights 
set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights, for instance (...) the right to family life or the
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The Commission's draft Convention leaves the Member States a considerable 
margin of manoeuvre.
Article 20, for instance, provides for prior consultation of central authorities of a 
Member State before the issue of a uniform visa by another Member State, where the 
former wishes to be consulted. It is even envisaged that": "If there is an objection, or if the 
consultation procedure (...) has not been implemented for reasons of urgency, only a 
national visa with restricted territorial validity shall be issued".
The obligation to consult the authorities of other Member States may raise 
important practical problems. In the case of the Schengen system, for example, the French 
requested that they be consulted on all visa applications by Russians at German and other 
Member States consulates.127 It was calculated that it would have required 49 years for all 
those applications to be processed at the present working rhythm. Therefore a new system 
to try to solve this problem is presently being studied within the Schengen system.128
Another aspect confirming that Member States retain much autonomy is the fact 
that they may extend the stay of holders of uniform visas and, in some circumstances, may 
still issue national visas. However, in these cases the extension or visa is valid only in the 
territory of the Member State concerned.129 A Member State may, for instance, authorise 
a holder of a uniform visa to stay in its territory for more than three months.130 It is also 
provided that, "if necessary", a Member State may "issue a visa the validity of which is 
restricted to its own territory to the holder of a uniform visa in the course of any one six- 
month period".131 Moreover, a Member State may also issue national visas for stays of 
more than three months, in accordance with its national law, subject only to the 
consultation of the joint list of persons to be refused entry.132
A final exception allows Member States to issue a national visa, "on humanitarian 
grounds or in the national interest or by reason of international commitments", to a person 
who does not meet one or more of the conditions for entry established in Article 7(1) of 
the draft Convention.133 In this case, if the person is on the joint list of persons to be 
refused entry, or if the central authorities of another Member State objected to her or his 
entry, the issuing Member State has to inform the other Member States. The validity of 
this visa is also restricted to the territory of the issuing Member State.134
In this respect, it must be mentioned that, insofar as it does not provide for such or 
other equivalent exceptions to the above, the proposal of the European Parliament may 
become more restrictive to third country nationals than the Commission's draft. This is the 
case with the proposed deletion of the third subparagraph of Article 20(1), which, in the
prohibition of inhuman treatment. See Boeles, P. in "Schengen and the rule of law" in Meijers, H. et al. 
(eds.) Schengen: Internationalisation .... op.cit., pp.135-146, at 141.
127 The total number of similar applications to be submitted to consultation with another Schengen 
Member State would have been 2.5 million in 1993.
128 Its name is "VISION", standing for Visa Inquiry Open Border Network, MNSt 7/1993, p. 1.
129 Article 24(1).
130 Article 23(2).
131 Article 23(1).
132 Article 25.
133 Except the very requirement of holding a visa.
134 Article 24(2),(3) and (4).
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Commission's draft, allows the exceptional issue of a visa with national validity only, in the 
case of an objection or impossibility of consulting the central authorities of another 
Member State.135
On the other hand, it may be noted that visas valid for only one Member State may 
give rise to problems of conformity with Article 7A of the EC Treaty. As O'Keeffe 
comments:
"It is striking in view of the Commission's intention to eradicate border controls, 
that provisions such as Article 12(2), 20 and 23 of the draft Convention^ .,) 
implicitly presuppose the maintenance in force of some internal frontier 
controls."136
A final reference must be made to the European Parliament’s proposal that a new 
Article 25 of the Convention provide for the publication by the Council of the 
implementing measures decided on visas under the relevant Articles of the Convention. 
Publishing these would certainly improve the transparency of the system. Moreover, at 
least in principle, it should be considered an indispensable requirement for the entry into 
force of the concerned implementing measures.
b) The draft Regulation on the List of Visa Countries
Together with the draft Convention on the crossing of the external borders, the 
Commission presented a "proposal for a Regulation determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external frontiers of the 
Member States".137
It may be recalled that a similar list had already been elaborated by the ad hoc 
working group on immigration, in June 1991. It contained 61 countries whose nationals 
were subject to a visa requirement by all the Member States.13® A consultation procedure 
was provided for in the case of a Member State planning to add or withdraw a country 
from that list.139
13  ^The proposed substantial change to Article 25 goes in the same direction. According to the European 
Parliament's proposal, the possibility included therein of a Member State authorising a territorially 
restricted extension of the stay of a holder of a uniform visa would be changed to " l.The uniform visa may 
be extended" and "2. The decisions for extending a visa shall fulfil the obligations incumbent upon the 
Member State under the Treaty on European Union and this Convention".
13  ^See O'Keeffe, in "The new Draft...", op.cit., at pp. 143-144.
137 COM (93) 684 final, of 10/12/1993, p.39. This draft was adopted on 25 September 1995 as Council 
Regulation (EC) No.2317/95 determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States, OJ L 234/1, of 3/10/1995. The Regulation 
adopted by the Council made some changes to the list proposed by the Commission, but it was not possible 
to introduce in this chapter the analysis of those changes. It may also be noted that in July 1994, the 
Commission presented under Article 100C(3) a draft Regulation laying down a uniform format for visas, 
COM(94) 287 final, of 13/7/1994. This proposal was already adopted as Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1683/95 of 29/5/1995, laying down a uniform format for visas, OJ L 164/1 of 14/7/1995. This thesis 
will not examine this Regulation.
138 See Bull.EC, 6/1991, p.107.
139 See Doutriaux, op.cit, at p.228.
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The draft Regulation was presented under the powers established in the new 
Article 100C.140 This provision, introduced by the Treaty on European Union, gave the 
Community competence in relation to certain aspects of visa policy - uniform format and 
list of countries to require visas - previously covered by some Articles of the draft 
Convention of the ad hoc immigration group. The precise extent of the Community 
competence on visas under Article 100C was already examined in chapter 7. Therefore, 
this part of the present chapter will concentrate in examining the proposed list of visa 
countries and the criteria used to compile it.
The list of visa countries and the criteria used to compile it
The list of countries whose nationals will be required to have a visa to cross the 
external frontiers of a Member State refers to 126 states or territories.
The following countries and territories are not included in this "negative list" of the 
draft Regulation, therefore their nationals are not required to have a visa for entry: in 
Western Europe, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; Cyprus and Malta; in the Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
countries from the ex-Yugoslavia; all countries of continental Latin America (except 
Belize, Guyana and Surinam); developed countries such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Japan, United States; and also Brunei, Hong Kong, Israel, Macao, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.141 Curiously, Kenya and Malawi are not included in 
the list either.
On the other hand, countries included in the list are: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey and all countries of the ex-USSR (except the Baltic States); all countries and 
territories in the islands of Central America (except Jamaica),142 almost all countries in 
Africa and most of Asia.
In this respect the work done up to now by the ad hoc immigration group and the 
Schengen group should be recalled. The ad hoc immigration group has been registering 
the number of third countries whose nationals are required to have a visa to enter the 
Member States. By the beginning of 1994, the nationals of 73 countries were required a 
visa to enter into all Member States.143 Within the Schengen system there is a negative and 
a positive list. In December 1992, while in the negative list there were 126 countries, the 
positive list contained 19 countries. A third Schengen list includes the countries whose 
nationals are required to have a visa by some Schengen Contracting Parties only. It 
counted 31 states.144
Under the amendments suggested by the European Parliament, the proposal would also include as its 
legal basis Article 3d of the EC Treaty.
141 it is unclear whether Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are or are not supposed to be included in the 
reference to China, whose nationals have to hold a visa to enter the territory of a Member State.
142 Bermuda (under U.K. control), Martinique (Fr.) and Puerto Rico (U.S.A.) are not included in the list 
either.
143 See the EP Froment-Meurice report of 29/3/1994, p.12.
144 A document of the Vienna group showed a substantia] difference between the visa policies of different 
European states. It also stated that Germany required visas from nationals of 105 countries and France 
required the nationals of the largest amount of countries to hold a visa - 137. See the EP report quoted in 
the preceding note, on p.14. According to the latter, France was also the only Schengen country who
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It is possible to question the way in which the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
countries or territories in the Commission's draft Regulation was decided. The 
Commission states in the third recital of the Preamble of the draft Regulation that:
"(•••) third countries should be classified according to their political and economic 
situation and according to their relations with the Community and the Member 
States, taking into account the degree of harmonisation achieved at Member State 
level."
The Commission does not add any further information. In this respect, we should perhaps 
consider the proposals of the European Parliament, according to which :
the "process of determination [of the list of visa countries] must be based on 
clearly understood, objective and publicly stated criteria as to why certain third 
countries' nationals are included on the negative list and others are excluded“;145
Admittedly, in practice, it could happen that the use of such criteria in compiling 
the list would in the end not make a substantial difference, notably on the countries 
included in the list. In any case, it would be an important demonstration to third country 
nationals that the process of Community decision-making, in such delicate matters, is 
transparent and not arbitrary.
Moreover, it is only normal that the public administration in a democratic society 
states the reasons why the liberty or the legal interests of a person are restricted.146 In this 
respect the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security may be recalled 
here. It sustained that, while visa policy has traditionally been an instrument of the foreign 
policy of States, it should now be transferred to a new sphere for regulating the movement 
of persons. The visa should also acquire a more positive character as a document 
conferring certain rights on the holder.147
Finally, the Parliament's proposal that the list be regularly updated, on a proposal 
from a Member State or the European Commission and after consultation with the 
European Parliament, seems reasonable.148 The Palma document already proposed a six- 
monthly revision of such list.149
required nationals of Argentina, Chile. Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and the former Yugoslavia to have a
visa.
145 According to the principles added in the first recital of the draft Regulation, as proposed by Froment- 
Meurice’s Report, of 29 March 1994. According to the Parliament, "the list, which is not in conformity 
with [these] principles (...) must be amended." See idem, note in p.10. There, the Parliament also 
proposed that "Member States must not impose visa requirements on countries which have for fair and 
objective reasons been excluded from the list". Furthermore, "(,..)no third country whose nationals do not 
at present require a visa for entry to a Member State should be on the negative list of those countries who 
are obliged to obtain visas under this Regulation". See idem, p.S.
146 Note, e.g., that in 1995 it was announced that the UK authorities were planning to give to all third 
country nationals, whose request for entry is refused, a written and specific explanation of the reasons for 
that refusal.
*4? Opinion adopted in 15 March 1994, see the Froment-Meurice's Report, of 29/3/1994, p.19.
148 According to a new paragraph 4 of Article 2 (Article 1 of the Commission's draft Regulation), as 
proposed in Froment-Meurice's Report of 29 March 1994.
149 Webber, F . " European Conventions...", op.cit., at p. 143.
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B - ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANTS
TO A EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATE
The Council has to date adopted four resolutions on the admission of third country 
nationals to the Member States of the European Union. They deal with admission for 
family reunification, for employment, for study and for pursuing activities as self-employed 
persons. The resolution on family reunification was the only one to be adopted before the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty - it was adopted in June 1993, in Copenhagen.150 
The resolution on "limitations on admission of third country nationals for employment" 
was adopted in June 1994, in Luxembourg.151 The two resolutions on admission for study 
purposes152 * and for pursuing activities as self-employed persons were adopted on 
November 1994.155
The resolution on admission for family reunification will be analysed at the end of 
this section. First, I will first analyse the three resolutions on admission for employment, 
for study purposes and for pursuing activities as self-employed persons. The analysis of 
these three resolutions will first deal with their common characteristics and then proceed 
to the examination of specific aspects of each of them.
1 - Common aspects of resolutions on admission for employment, for 
study purposes and for pursuing activities as self-employed persons.
All these three resolutions express agreement that the relevant national policies on 
admission should be governed by certain principles, which "may not be relaxed by Member 
States in their national legislation".154 Member States must consider such principles in any 
proposals for the revision of national legislation, and, in any case, "will endeavour to seek 
to ensure by 1 January 1996 that national legislation is in conformity with them".
150 To be accurate this resolution was adopted by what was then only the meeting of ministers of Member 
States that were responsible for immigration.
151 The precise official name of the resolution is: "Resolution on limitations on admission of third 
country nationals to the Member States for employment". For its content see the Press Release 7760/94 of 
the General Secretariat of the Council, Presse 128-G (20.6.1994) and Agence Europe, No.6255 (n.s.), 
20/21 June 1994, pp.7-8 and No.6259 (n.s.), 25 June 1994, p.l 1.
152 Resolution relating to the limitations on the admission of third-country nationals to the Member 
States for the purpose of pursuing activities as self-employed persons, Press Release 11321/94 on the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 30 November and 1 December 1994, Presse 252-G 
(1.12.94). See the Lehne report on the "draft Council Resolution on the limitation on the admission of 
third-country nationals to the territory of the Member States for the purpose of pursuing activities as self - 
employed persons", of 20 July 1995, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref. C4-7/95.
152 Resolution on the admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member States of the EU 
for study purposes. Press Release 11321/94 on the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 30 
November and I December 1994, Presse 252-G (1.12.94). See also the Caccavale report on "the draft 
Council Resolution on the admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the Member States of the 
European Union for study purposes", of 20 July 1995, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties 
and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, doc. ref. A4-181/95.
154 All quotations of the resolutions’ content are taken from their original text, as contained in the
corresponding Press Releases.
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However, it is explicitly stated that the principles referred to "are not legally binding on 
the Member States" and do not afford a ground for action by individuals. Therefore, the 
resolutions are not of a legal nature. They are political declarations of intent. At most, one 
could perhaps see them as soft-law.
As far as the personal scope of the resolutions is concerned, they do not apply to 
persons covered by Community Law provisions or agreements with third countries. 
Neither do they apply to third country nationals who have been allowed admission for the 
purpose of family reunification. Nevertheless, provision is also made for the family 
reunification of the persons admitted to enter under the resolutions. In this context a 
general reference is made by all three resolutions to national legislation, with some 
differences between the three in the elaboration of the guidelines to be followed. The 
resolution on admission for employment only refers to admission of the spouse and 
dependent children. The resolution on students refers to admission of family members in 
general, but the spouse is the only one for whom possible authorisation to work is 
envisaged. The resolution on self-employed persons is more detailed. It states that, subject 
to the resolution on family reunification, the following persons "will in principle be 
admitted": "the spouse and unmarried children under a maximum age, varying between 16 
and 18 years, depending on the Member State concerned".
The three resolutions still do not apply to third country nationals legally resident in 
a Member State "on a permanent basis" who do not have the right of entry and residence 
in another Member State. The Council agreed to examine at a later date matters related to 
the admission of such persons to another Member State.
In all the three resolutions under review there are detailed provisions envisaging, at 
least as a matter of principle, that persons admitted for a certain purpose cannot extend 
their stay by invoking another different purpose. The general rule regarding extension of 
permission to stay is that the conditions justifying initial entry have to subsist, otherwise 
third country nationals must leave.
The two resolutions on admission for study purposes and for pursuing activities as 
self-employed persons declare the necessity of avoiding the admission under their 
provisions of persons who are in fact looking for employment. The same precaution 
should be taken, as a matter of principle, to avoid the situation in which students and self- 
employed persons turn out to be in a dependent working relationship, once admitted in the 
territory of a Member State. These two resolutions also state that the application of the 
agreed principles does not prevent the application of national rules on public policy, public 
health and safety (according to the resolution on students) and on law and order, public 
health, national security, or public security and public order (according to the resolution 
on self-employed persons). Both resolutions mention as well that there shall be a regular 
review of their transposition and of the need for amendments to them.
2 - Limitations on Admission for Employment
The most important principle of the resolution on employment is established in 
clear and absolute terms:
"Member States will refuse entry to their territories of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of employment".
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The rest of the resolution states to whom and how the resolution applies» explains the 
grounds for adopting the principle and provides for narrow restrictions of it.
The resolution does not apply to persons seeking admission as students or self- 
employed persons. Neither does it apply to "casual work in the course of youth exchange 
or youth mobility schemes, including au pairs" or to business visitors - the last category 
under conditions defined in detail and provided the visit does not exceed six months. Other 
groups of persons to which the resolution does not apply are: refugees or asylum seekers, 
"displaced persons who are temporarily admitted" and "persons exceptionally allowed to 
stay on humanitarian grounds".
According to the resolution, Member States will consider request for admission 
into their territories for employment:
"only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be filled by national and 
Community manpower or by non-Community manpower lawfully resident on a 
permanent basis in that Member State and already forming part of the Member 
State's regular labour market".
To ensure that Community workers are indeed not available, Member States will make use 
of the EURES system. This is the network of European Employment Services responsible 
for exchanging information on clearing vacancies and applications for employment, as 
provided for in Part II of Regulation 1612/68.155
However, it may happen that no one from the two classes of, firstly, workers 
nationals of a Member State, or, secondly, nationals of a third country lawfully residing in 
the Member State concerned, are available. Only in this event, Member States may admit 
third country nationals for employment only "on a temporary basis and for a specific 
duration" and in four specific pre-determined cases. The first case is when an offer is made 
to a named worker, or named employee of a service provider and is of a special nature in 
view of the requirement of specialist qualifications. This repeats an expression used in the 
previous version of Article 16(3)(a)(i) of Regulation 1612/68, which allowed for a 
derogation of the principle of "Community preference" in the hiring of workers through 
the employment services of the Member States.156
The second case is one in which an employer offers vacancies to named workers, 
provided the national authorities accept the reasons invoked by the employer for such 
offers, in view of a "temporary" labour shortage at national or Community level which 
"significantly affects the operation of the undertaking or the employer himself'. Again, this 
provision is comparable to that of Article 16(3)(d) of Regulation 1612/68. This is also 
perhaps the most important exception to the general prohibition on importing labour from 
third countries. It does not demand any particular qualification of the prospective 
immigrant worker and leaves to the national authorities the appreciation of the justification 
for the offer of the vacancy.
A third case is when intra-corporate transferees are transferred temporarily by their 
company as key personnel. The last category of cases relates to vacancies offered to 
frontier workers, trainees and seasonal workers. In relation to seasonal workers, detailed
155 See Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 (OJ L 257/2 of 19/10/1968) as amended in its second part 
by Regulation 2434/92 of 27 July 1992 (OJ L 245/1 of 26/8/92) and implemented by the Commission 
decision of 22 October 1993 creating EURES ( OJ L 274/32 of 6/11/93).
156 For an analysis of this principle see supra, section A of chapter 4.
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provisions establish further restrictions for their admission. Their numbers have to be 
strictly controlled on admission to the territory of the Member States; they are to be 
admitted to undertake well-defined jobs, "normally fulfilling a traditional need in the 
Community country concerned" and only "if there is no reason to admit that the persons 
concerned will seek to stay within their territory on a permanent basis".
A third country national will not be admitted for employment "unless prior 
authorisation was given for him [or her] to take up employment" in a Union Member 
State. Furthermore, the "initial authorisation for employment will normally be restricted to 
employment in a specific job with a specific employer".
In relation to the periods of admission for employment the resolution contains 
detailed standards. A seasonal worker may be admitted for six months only in any period 
of one year and cannot return to any Union Member State before six months, at least, have 
gone by. In the first instance trainees cannot be admitted for more than a year, and their 
stay can only be extended for the time necessary to obtain a recognised professional 
qualification. Other types of workers coming from third countries may be admitted for a 
period lasting up to four years.
In the end, the resolution states that Member States may continue to admit third 
country nationals for employment under "arrangements" concluded by Member States 
before the approval of the resolution, provided that they were concluded with third 
countries with which Member States have special links. However, "Member States will 
undertake as soon as possible to renegotiate such arrangements in accordance with the 
terms of this resolution." It is stated that this obligation of renegotiation does not apply to 
arrangements "covering employment of persons for instruction and vocational training 
purposes". Thus, it can be presumed that the restrictive principles of the resolution apply 
to the hiring of professors for schools and universities in the Union - with the exception of 
previous agreements with third countries with which Member States have special links, 
which do not have to be renegotiated. However, the situation of professors seems to be 
covered by the general exceptions allowing for admission for employment when an offer is 
made to a named worker, the offer being of a special nature in view of the requirement of 
specialist qualifications.
Another important point is the appropriate nature of this resolution, notably of its 
main principle: the general prohibition on admitting third country nationals for purposes of 
employment. This is justified, it is claimed, by the "present high levels of unemployment" 
and the fact that at present "no Member State is pursuing an active immigration policy", 
having "curtailed the possibility of permanent legal immigration for economic, social, and 
thus social reasons".
It is indeed true that this resolution does not entail an important change to the 
immigration policies currently pursued in Union Member States. For a long time now that 
form of immigration for the purposes of employment has been virtually abolished as a 
category of entry in the majority of Member States. However, the resolution is perhaps 
open to criticism in so far as its drafting and substantial content asserts a link between 
present employment in the Union, on one hand, and immigrants coming from third
157 In particular circumstances this could eventually apply to the hiring of apprentices also.
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countries, on the other. Admittedly, the Council declared in the resolution that it 
"acknowledges the contribution of migrant workers to the economic development of their 
respective host countries". However, the risk is that the restrictive content of the 
resolution reinforces the idea that third country immigrants are the ones to blame for the 
present unemployment and its effects.
The restrictive content of the resolution is particularly clear in the very narrow 
scope of the exceptions to the general prohibition of admission for employment. Although 
the resolution is not legally binding, its principles, in themselves, do not leave a 
considerable margin of manoeuvre to Member States. This contrasts, to a certain extent, 
with the binding rules of the Convention on the Crossing of the External Frontiers of the 
Member States, examined above.
A more concrete reason for criticising the resolution is that, in the future, Member 
States may feel precluded from granting amnesties to illegal immigrants. Member States 
may, moreover, discover that the immigration of workers from third countries is in their 
interest again. Naturally, the resolution can be modified or substituted with any other 
proper normative act. However, in its present form it does not even provide for a regular 
review of its content and implementation.
A final interesting point regarding this resolution is the non attribution to third 
country nationals' resident in a Member State of the right to go to work and reside in 
another Member State. The granting of such a right, at least on a strict basis (e.g. as long 
as they are employed and provided no Community national is interested in a certain job), 
would be consistent with the resolution's objective of reducing unemployment in the 
Union.
3 - Admission for Pursuing Activities as Self-Employed Persons
The relevant resolution applies to individuals and not to enterprises. The 
authorisation granted is personal and non-transferable. It is not meant to apply to third 
country nationals covered by agreements concluded by the Community or by bilateral or 
multilateral agreements such as GATT, GATS or OECD agreements.
One of the main concerns of the resolution is to distinguish between admission for 
employment and for pursuing an independent economic activity. Admission for the latter is 
only allowed when the activity to be pursued brings an economic benefit to the Member 
State, be it through "investment, innovation, transfer of technology, job creation". The 
resolution adds that "artists exercising an independent activity of significance may also be 
admitted".
For the purposes of the resolution an activity as a self-employed person means 
"any activity carried out in a personal capacity or in the legal form of a company or firm 
within the meaning of the second part of Article 58 of the EC Treaty, without being 
answerable to an employer in either case". The reference to Article 58 means that such 
firms have to be "formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered, central administration or principal place of business within the Community", 
according to that very provision.
Furthermore, the resolution provides that only "those associates actively involved 
and whose presence is necessary in pursuing the company's or firm's aims and its
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management may be authorised to establish themselves in the host Member State's 
territory." It also adds that when those associates "do not have a majority or substantial 
share holding in the company or firm Member States may reserve the right not to admit 
them" except as salaried persons.
Detailed provisions exist on the demonstration and examination by national 
authorities of the fulfilment of the required conditions for admission.
A final point is made by the resolution to allow Member States to admit to their 
territories third country nationals who "make substantial investments in the commerce and 
industry of that Member State", provided that "there are important grounds for derogating 
from the principles of this resolution which restrict the business activities of [such] third 
country nationals".
4 - Admission for Study Purposes
The resolution on admission for study purposes declares that "the international 
exchange of students and academics is desirable" and has "positive implications for 
relations between the Member States and the States of origin". Yet, this must be read in 
the context of a subsequent provision stressing that "at the end of their studies, students 
must in principle return to their countries of origin", and also against the background aim 
that their admission to the Member States "does not turn into permanent immigration".
The resolution does not apply to school pupils and apprentices. It applies only to 
graduate and post graduate students and persons participating in "a course aimed at 
preparing for a specific course of university studies (e.g. providing language training)".
Prospective students have to prove that they have the financial means to pay for 
their studies and to live in the host country so that they do not need to claim social 
assistance there, and that "the earning of income is not the principal aim" of the admission. 
They may also be required by the national authorities to prove that they have "health cover 
for all risks in the host Member State".
The authorisation for residence has to be "limited to the length of the course". A 
dacronian measure is established, according to which M[a]ny change in subject will involve 
a change in the reason for residence". Such a change, "as a rule, argues against a fresh 
authorisation or an extension", unless it takes place within the initial period of studies. In 
case of studies lasting for more than one year, the permission to stay "can" be initially 
given for one year only. In that case the renewal of the permission "will depend" on proof 
that the student continues to fulfil the requirements for the initial permission and "has 
passed any tests or examinations set up by the institution in which he/she is studying"
Third country national students, covered by this resolution, "in principle (...) may 
not engage in gainful employment". It is envisaged that Member States "may allow short­
term or subsidiary jobs" if these do not affect the continuation of the studies, nor 
"represent a vital income for the subsistence of the student". The absolute formulation of 
this provision is questionable. In practice the only way available for most students from 
third countries to finish their studies is precisely to engage in some paid employment. 
Provided that their studies have been recognised to be of general interest, flexible rules 
should allow students to work to support their studies and to finish them. If Community 
nationals often need to do that, third country nationals in general need to even more.
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5 - Admission for Family Reunification158
This subsection will examine the resolution on admission for family 
reunification,159 adopted in the framework of the ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation by 
the EC immigration ministers in June 1993, in Copenhagen.160 No other instrument 
dealing specifically with family reunification of resident third country nationals has yet 
been adopted - within the framework of the Community, within that of the ad hoc 
intergovernmental cooperation, or under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.161 
Furthermore, this was the only resolution on admission of third country nationals 
approved before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. The three other 
resolutions on their admission examined above contain also some provisions on family 
reunification, but these were restricted in application to the persons admitted under their 
rules.
158 On family reunification in Member States see Choiewinski, Ryszard "The Protection of the Right of 
Economic Migrants to Family Reunion in Europe", ICLQ, Vol.43, July 1994, No.3, pp.568-598; Groupe 
d'information et de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigrés, Dossier on "Familles Interdites", Plein Droit, 
No.24, April/June 1994; Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, "Family Reunion Policies in Six 
European Countries", Euro-Briefing, No.l, Spring 1994; Panero, Enrico "Ancora pochi diritti per la 
famiglia immigrata", ASPE, Year 14,21/9/1995, No. 17, pp.26-7; Roth & Turner report of 30 March 1994 
on immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and on the harmonisation of family reunion policy, 
made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, 
doc.ref. A3-204/94. See also Rencontre internationale pour le Droit de vivre en Famille des Immigrés en 
Europe (Brussels, Novembre 1993) - Rapport introductif & conclusions, Paris, Fonds d'Action Social pour 
la Coordination pour les Droits des Immigrés à vivre en Famille, 1993; and the Working document of the 
EC Commission on "Family reunification in the light of international law, Community law and Member 
States' laws and/or practice", SEC (92) 513, of 13/3/1992. This document was intended to provide a 
factual background for immigration minister's discussions in the intergovernmental fora, such as the Ad 
hoc Group on Immigration. Its chapter 1 deals with the relevant International Law on the matter, while its 
chapter 2 refers to Community Law, and chapters 3 and 4 deal with national legislation of the Member 
States. For a general overview of the issue of family reunification in International and national Law see 
Plender, R. International Migration Law, 2nd. ed., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, chapter 11, at 
pp.365-392.
159 Resolution on "Harmonisation of national policies on family reunification". Ad Hoc Group 
Immigration, Brussels, 3 June 1993, doc.ref. SN 2828/1/93, WGI 1497, REV I. Published in A new 
immigration law fo r  Europe?, by Boeles, P. , Femhout, R. , Groenendijk, C.A., Guild, E. , Kuijer, A., 
Meijers, H ., de Roos, Th., Steenbergen, J. & Swart, A .H J., Utrecht, Dutch Centre for Immigrants, 1993, 
at pp.78-82. For an analysis of this resolution see by the Standing Committee of experts in international 
immigration, refugee and criminal law, Harmonisation o f Family Reunion Policies with regard to third 
country nationals in the Member States o f  the EEC - Advice o f the Standing Committee o f  Experts, 
Utrecht, 1993. See also Boeles, P. & Kuijer, A., "Harmonisation of Family Reunification", in A new 
immigration Law fo r  Europe?, op. cit., pp.25-34; and Spencer, M., States o f injustice - A Guide to Human 
Rights and Civil Liberties in the European Union, London, Pluto, 1995, at pp.l 12-3.
160 The resolution was adopted, although on that occasion the Dutch delegation expressed a 
parliamentary scrutiny reservation on its text.
161 It may be recalled that the EEA Agreement protects the rights of family reunification for nationals of 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein residing in the Member States, in a manner identical to that of the EC 
rules on free movement of persons. The latter were analysed in section B of chapter 4.
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This subsection will first refer to the content of the resolution. Then, it will 
compare the resolution principles’ with the rules of international treaties on the matter, and 
with the relevant EC rules on free movement of workers. Finally, a general assessment of 
the resolution will be made.
a) Content of the resolution
According to the immigration ministers, the resolution on family reunification was 
adopted with two ideas in mind. One was the fact that family reunification was already 
governed by national laws and international Conventions, the latter not being affected by 
the "process of seeking further harmonisation" of national policies on the matter. The 
other was the "need to control migration flows into the territories of the Member States", 
which, as the resolution declares, "is considered to be one of the factors for the integration 
of immigrants who are lawfully resident in the territories of the Member States." Thus, the 
resolution is meant to deal only with the admission of third country nationals for the 
purposes of family reunification. National legislation or practice, with "no direct bearing 
on the right of entry and stay”, are not to be affected by the principles of this resolution.162
Having the above ideas in mind, the immigration ministers expressed their resolve 
that national policies in respect of family reunification be governed by certain principles. 
The ministers agreed to consider such principles in any proposals for the revision of 
national legislation, and "seek to ensure by 1 January 1995 that their national legislation is 
in conformity with them". However, like in the three resolutions on admission of third 
country nationals examined in the previous chapter, it is explicitly stated that the principles 
agreed upon "are not legally binding on the Member States and do not afford a ground for 
action by individuals". Therefore, like the other three resolutions, this resolution is not 
legally binding. It is a political declaration of intent, which may have practical effect in 
national legislation, but is not legally binding on the Member States. This must not be 
forgotten when later I comment on the effect of expressions or concepts used in the 
resolution.
The resolution applies to third country nationals lawfully resident within the 
territory of a Member State "on a basis which affords them an expectation of permanent or 
long-term residence." Persons who do not have such an expectation, like students or 
persons admitted to employment for a fixed term, are not covered by the resolution. The 
determination of what constitutes an expectation of permanent or long-term residence is to 
be made by reference to national laws and policies. Moreover, this resolution does not 
apply to national policies regarding relatives of nationals of Member States, nor to persons 
protected in this respect by Community rales on free movement of persons or by the EEA 
Agreement. The family reunification of refugees is not affected by the resolution. On the 
other hand, the resolution seems to apply equally to the family reunification of a resident in 
a Member State with relatives that reside in another Member State, as to that of a resident 
with relatives residing in a third country. However, it could be argued that family 
reunification of the former type (with relatives that reside in another Member State)
162 Paragraph 12 of the main text of the resolution.
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should be governed by more liberal principles than that of the latter type (with relatives 
residing in a third country).163
The resolution provides that Member States "reserve the right" to require that 
third country nationals be legally resident in their territory "for certain periods of time" 
before family reunification is authorised. However, the resolution makes no mention of 
what could be the extent of such waiting periods.
The relatives to whom Member States "will normally grant admission" (after the 
waiting period) are the resident's spouse and the children of both "the resident and his or 
her spouse." They can only be admitted "for the purpose of living together with the 
resident".
The resident's spouse has to be "bound to him or her in a marriage recognised by 
the host Member State". In addition, Member States "reserve the right" to refuse entry and 
stay to a spouse if they determine that the marriage was "contracted solely or principally 
for the purpose of enabling the spouse to enter and take up residence in a Member State". 
This corresponds to the "primary purpose rule", introduced in the United Kingdom in 
1982.164 According to the resolution, a wife of a polygamous marriage, as well as her 
children, "will not be admitted" for family reunification, in a case where the resident has 
already another wife resident in a Member State. When only children of another wife are 
resident there, Member States "reserve the right" to refuse admission to the wife and her 
children of a polygamous marriage.165
As far as children are concerned, to be admitted for family reunification they have 
to be below a maximum age, agreed by the ministers to be "between 16 and 18 years”. In 
addition, they "must not have married, or have formed an independent family unit or be 
leading an independent life".
Further principles apply to the admission of adopted children and to children of 
only one member of the couple concerned. First, adopted children will "normally" be 
admitted, provided they were adopted by both spouses (of the couple concerned) while 
residing together in a third country. The adoption made in the third country should have 
been arranged according to a decision taken by the competent authority of that country, 
this decision being recognised by the Member State of residence. The adopted child must 
have the same rights and obligations as the other children of the couple and must have had 
"a definitive break with the family of origin". Secondly, it may occur that a child was 
adopted by both spouses, but while one or both of them were already resident in a 
Member State. In this case the fulfilment of the same conditions is required, but Member 
States "reserve the possibility" of admitting that child. Thirdly, the "primary purpose rule" 
is applied also to the adoption of children. It is stated that Member States "will consider" 
whether an adoption was arranged
163 See point 31 of the draft resolution included in the Roth & Turner report of 30 March 1994, quoted 
supra, in which the European Parliament asked for the application to this type of family reunification of 
the relevant EC rules on free movement of persons.
164 In that country, the zealous application of that rule led for some time to the performance of virginity 
tests to potential brides of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. This practice was latter abandoned as 
being degrading and unjustified. See Spencer, M ., States o f Injustice..., op. cit., p.112.
165 On the family reunification with the polygamous wife see Plender, R ., op.cit., at pp. 382-4.
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"solely or principally for the purpose of enabling the child to enter and take up 
residence in a Member State, and whether to refuse permission to enter and stay 
accordingly".
Finally, Member States do "reserve the option" of admitting a child who is an offspring of 
only one of the couple concerned. This applies also to a child who was adopted by one of 
the spouses only. To decide whether or not to admit any of those children, Member States 
"shall consider" whether each or both of the spouses "hold parental authority, have been 
granted custody of the child and have the child effectively in their charge".
As far as other relatives of the resident person are concerned, Member States 
"reserve the possibility" of allowing for their entry and stay when "compelling reasons" 
justify it. No further reference is made to this possibility, or to the "compelling" reasons 
that may justify it.
As far as conditions of stay are concerned, provision is made regarding the 
residence status of the admitted family members. It is provided that the authorisation to 
stay, which is granted for the resident relatives, may be "conditional upon the continued 
fulfilment of the criteria required for admission." It is for Member States to determine the 
duration of the period in which the authorisation to stay remains conditional.
However, it is agreed that, "within a reasonable period of time" and "in accordance 
with the national legislation", family members may obtain an authorisation to stay on their 
own, independent of the residence status of whom they came to live with. Nonetheless, it 
is provided that the authorisation for a family member to stay "may be terminated at any 
time if there are grounds for presuming that it was obtained by means of fraud or forgery". 
It may be noted that this "principle” is quite severe on the consequences of fraud, while it 
is vague on the verification of conditions for its application - merely referring to the 
existence of "grounds for presuming...".
Provisions are also made regarding the procedure to be followed to obtain 
admission to a Member State for the purpose of family reunification. Admission will "not 
normally" be granted without a visa or other prior written authorisation for that purpose. 
The application "must normally" be made while the family member concerned is not in the 
Member State into which he or she asks entry. Furthermore, family members "must, in 
principle" hold valid travel documents which are recognised by the Member State in which 
they seek residence.
An important principle is that Member States "reserve the right" to make the entry 
and stay of family members conditional upon
"the availability of adequate accommodation and of sufficient resources to avoid a 
burden being placed on the public funds of the Member State concerned, and on 
the existence of sickness insurance."166
166 It is usually required that the third country national resident be employed or have other income 
sources of his or her own. An interesting case in this respect is that in which, in its Sentence No.28, of 19 
January 1995, the Italian Constitutional Court interprets Article 4 of the Law No.943/86. This Law 
implemented the standards of the ILO Convention No. 143, Italy being one of the three Member States that 
ratified the Convention. Article 4 of the Italian Law regulates the family reunification of third country 
nationals living in Italy. It establishes that non-Community citizens have the right to ask for family 
reunification if they are legally resident and legally employed in Italy and if they are able to provide
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It is also stated that Member States "reserve the right" to refuse entry and stay to a family 
member "on grounds of public health". Finally, Member States will "normally" refuse entry 
and stay to a family member,
"if his [or her] presence would constitute a threat to national security or public 
policy ('ordre publique’) " 167
b) A comparative reference
(i) rules of international treaties - a general outlook168
The principles of the resolution can be examined in comparison with some rules of 
relevant international treaties on the matter.169
Article 44 of the UN Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers,170 
provides for the family reunification of a migrant worker with a person with whom he or 
she has a relationship equivalent to marriage according to the applicable law in the State of 
employment. Provision is also made regarding family reunification with their children, 
provided these are minor, unmarried and dependent on the parents.171 Article 44(3) of the 
same Convention calls for States in which migrant workers are employed to favourably 
consider on humanitarian grounds granting equal treatment to other family members with 
regard to reunification. A requirement for family reunification included in this Convention 
is that the foreign residents be legal residents in the country concerned. This is a condition 
repeated in all international treaties containing explicit rules on family reunification of 
foreigners. However, it is not always requested that foreigners be resident "on a basis 
which affords them an expectation of permanent or long-term residence", as the resolution 
requires.
normal living conditions to the relatives that join them. The relatives that can join them are the spouse, 
their dependent children who are not married and are minors according to Italian legislation, and the 
workers' dependent parents. The case was raised by a a Brazilian housewife residing in Italy, who was 
married with an Italian national. She was denied the possibility that her minor son living in Brazil be 
authorised to enter and stay in Italy for the purposes of family reunification, on the grounds that she was 
not an employed worker. The Italian Constitutional Court considered that to be compatible with the 
Italian Constitution, and with the protection that it affords to the family and the child, Article 4 of that 
Law had to be interpreted as allowing for the possibility of family reunification to a housewife. For the 
purposes of family reunification, her situation should be considered equivalent to that of employed 
workers. See on this case, Gennarelli, M.F. "Lavoratrice casalinga extracommunitaria e ricongiungimento 
familiare", I diritti dell'uomo - cronache e battaglie, Year V, 1994, No.3, pp.73-5.
167 Cf. with resolutions on self-employed persons and on students, examined above. They declare that 
their principles do not prevent the application of national rules on public policy, public health and safety 
(according to the resolution on students) and on law and order, public health, national security, or public 
security and public order (according to the resolution on self-employed persons).
168 See Rencontre Internationale pour le Droit de vivre en Famille..., op.cit., pp. 15-29.
169 Naturally, this comparison can only be fully helpful if consideration is made of the precise personal 
scope and enforcement mechanism of each treaty mentioned. Section B of chapter 1 gives a full account of 
these.
170 United Nations G.A. Res. 45/158, of 18 December 1990.
171 See Article 4 and 44 of that Convention.
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In the meantime, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, of 20 November 
1989,172 provides in its Article 10(1) that any request presented by a child, or by his or her 
parents, to enter into a State or to leave it for the purposes of family reunification, shall be 
considered "in a positive spirit, with humanity and diligence".
Article 13 of the ILO Convention No. 143173 provides that a "Member mav take all 
measures which fall within its competence (...) to facilitate the reunification of the families 
of all migrant workers legally residing in the territory".174 The family, for this purpose, is 
meant to include the worker's "spouse and dependent children, father and mother".175
Among the treaties adopted within the Council of Europe, the E.C.H.R.176 
provides in its Article 8 for the right of respect of family life. This Article was analysed in 
some detail in section B of chapter 1. Reference is made to that section for a full 
explanation of the possible relevance of that provision for family reunification of third 
country nationals in Member States. As recalled there, Article 8 has been more frequently 
used to avoid the expulsion of aliens than to ask for their entry into European countries. 
Furthermore, the Article does not provide for family reunification in itself. Nevertheless, in 
some cases the obligation of its Contracting Parties to authorise entry and stay will be 
relevant to family reunification. In a limited manner, this obligation was held to exist in 
Abdulaziz.177 There, the United Kingdom was condemned for violation of Articles 8 and 
14 of the E.C.H.R. for requiring more restrictive conditions for the admission of husbands 
to join wives living in that country, than for the admission of wives to join husbands. 
Another interesting case for family reunification is the GUI case.178 It concerns the refusal 
by the Swiss authorities to grant a residence permit to a minor son of Mr Gill, a Turkish 
national resident in Switzerland. Mr GUI, his wife and their baby daughter had been 
granted a residence permit in Switzerland on humanitarian grounds. They sought also that 
Mr GUI's son be able to join them. The Swiss authorities based their refusal to grant the 
residence permit to Mr GUI's son on the fact that Mr GUI had insufficient means to support 
his wife and his son. Furthermore, they also based their refusal on the fact that they 
considered that Mr GUI's wife could not look after the son because she was epileptic. This 
refusal was found to be in breach of Article 8 of the E.C.H.R., in a recent report of the 
Commission on the case, which is now before the Court.
The case Commission v. Germany179 also concerned the E.C.H.R., although it was 
decided by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. It concerned Article 10 (3)
172 United Nations, G.A. Res. 44/25, entered into force on 2 September 1990, it was ratified by 168 
countries, including all Member States, except the Netherlands.
173 UNTS, Vol. 120, p,71.
174 Article 13(1), emphasis added. The same list of relatives is included in Article 15 of the ILO 
recommendation No. 151.
175 Article 13(2).
17i> European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of November 
1950, ETS, No.5.
177 Abdulaziz et al., judgment of 28/5/1985, Series A, No. 94.
178 Gill v. Switzerland, Press Release of the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, No.290 of 
6/6/1995.
179 Case 249/86, Commission v. Germany [1989] ECR 1263.
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of Regulation 1612/68,180 which requires that for the family members of a migrant worker 
to install themselves with him or her in another Member State, the worker must have 
available for them ’’housing considered as normal for national workers in the region where 
he is employed". The Court ruled that, provided that the family lives in appropriate 
housing conditions when the worker begins his working life in the host State, he or she 
cannot be required that such condition be satisfied throughout the entire duration of their 
residence. In the view of the Court, such a requirement would violate the principle of 
respect for family life contained in Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. and protected as part of 
Community Law. Therefore, the Court of Justice ruled that the German law which made 
the granting of a residence permit conditional on the worker’s continuing compliance with 
Article 10(3) was in breach of Community Law.181
This may be of relevance to the resolution under examination, because it states that 
Member States "reserve the right’’ to make the entry and stay of family members 
conditional upon "the availability of adequate accommodation", together with the 
availability of sufficient resources and the existence of sickness insurance. The resolution 
provides also that the authorisation to stay on the basis of family reunification may be 
"conditional upon the continued fulfilment of the criteria required for admission." As 
explained above, in the opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, this 
requirement could violate Article 8 of the E.C.H.R.. Certainly, in the present state of 
Community Law, it would not be for the EC Court of Justice to rule on the family 
reunification of third country nationals residing in the Member States, unless they are 
already covered by EC Law rules. In any case, there seems to be room to argue that the 
expulsion of a family relative within the conditional period, may give rise to a violation of 
Article 8 of the E.C.H.R.
In the meantime, Article 19(6) of the European Social Charter182 provides that 
Contracting States shall "facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the family of a foreign 
worker permitted to establish himself in the territory." This formulation of the workers' 
situation, required for family reunification purposes, contrasts with the expression 
commonly used in the Social Charter: "worker lawfully within their territories". The 
difference may express the intention that an alien must be legally capable of remaining 
indefinitely in the country in order to have the right to ask for family reunification.183 In 
any case, according to the Annex of the Social Charter, for the purposes of Article 19(6), 
the "family of a foreign worker”, is understood to mean "at least" his wife and dependent 
children under the age of 21 years.184
180 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community, OJ L 257/2 of 19/10/68.
181 See Case 249/86, quoted supra, paragraphs 10 to 12.
182 ETS.No.35.
183 Harris, D., The European Social Charter, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1984, pp.175-
6.
184 See also the recommendation No. 1082/1988 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
which proposed that admission for family reunification be authorised to: the married or unmarried spouse 
who has been living with the foreign resident in question for more than a year; the underage children of 
the couple or of one of its members; the children of full age if they are dependent because of a disability or 
illness; and dependent ascendants (proposal 2).
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Article 12 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers,185 authorises family reunification with the spouse of the migrant worker and 
their unmarried children, when these are dependent on the worker and are considered to 
be minors by the relevant law of the receiving State.186 Family reunification is subject to 
two general conditions. One is that the worker "has available for the family housing 
considered as normal for national workers in the region where the migrant worker is 
employed". The other is that the authorisation may be "conditional upon a waiting period 
which shall not exceed twelve months". Furthermore, by a declaration addressed to the 
General Secretary of the Council of Europe, these possibilities for family reunification may 
be made "conditional upon the migrant worker having steady resources sufficient to meet 
the needs of his family".187
Finally, several international treaties of human rights, as well as various national 
Constitutions, provide for the protection of the family, of the right to family life, and of the 
right of every person to many and to found a family.188 As proclaimed by Article 16(3) of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
"the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State".
Therefore, following Plender, it could be sustained that whilst rules of international 
treaties "do not amount to evidence of a right to family reunification in general 
international law";
"they do however, establish the widespread acceptance of the moral or political 
proposition that States should facilitate the admission to their territories of 
members of the families of their own citizens or residents, at least when it would 
be unreasonable to expect the family to be reunited elsewhere."189
Has the ministers' resolution been sensitive to that "moral and political 
proposition"? It does not seem so. The resolution does not contribute to facilitate family 
reunification. Moreover, it appears quite clear that in some cases the general principles of 
the resolution may even be in contradiction with the existing rules of international treaties 
on the matter. Naturally, the resolution is not legally binding, but the contradiction is 
relevant inasmuch as the resolution will have practical influence on national legal rules and 
on their application. Meanwhile, it is also true that the resolution provides for various
185 ETS, No.93.
186 These worker's relatives are entitled to residence permits on conditions analogous to those which the 
Convention applies to the admission of migrant workers. Under Article 9 of the Convention, the validity 
of the worker's residence permit is, "as a general rule", at least so long as that of their work permit. When 
the work permit is of an indefinite validity, the residence permit shall, also "as a general rule", be issued 
or renewed for at least one year. The residence permits issued according to these rules may be withdrawn 
for reasons of national security, public policy or morals; or if the holder, conscious of the consequences, 
refuses to comply with measures for the protection of public health.
187 Article 12(2). Using the same procedure, a general temporary derogation is also possible, according to 
Article 12(3).
188 See, e.g.. Article 10 of International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 16 
of the European Social Charter, and Article 12 of the E.C.H.R..
189 Plender, R., op.cit., p.366.
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derogation and limitation clauses to its general principles. Nevertheless, at least in some 
cases the principles of the resolution may be incompatible with international rules binding 
the Member States.
This incompatibility regards several aspects related to the conditions for family 
reunification, such as those related to marriage and adoption of convenience, to the non 
definition of the period of residence before reunification is allowed, to the expectation of 
permanent or long-term residence, or to the type of relatives to be admitted. One concrete 
and clear example is that of the age that children must have for their admission to be 
allowed. The resolution envisages the entry of children below a maximum age, which is to 
be "between 16 and 18 years". This contrasts, for example, with the Social Charter, whose 
annex, as mentioned above, requires that the children be dependent and under the age of 
21 years. Furthermore, the resolution principles in this respect may also be in contradiction 
with various aspects of the rules of the E.C.H.R., as explained above.
The contrast between the resolution principles and international rules is relevant in 
two aspects.
First, by setting the resolution principles at a lower level than that of international 
treaties, the resolution demonstrates that its objective was not the amelioration of the 
conditions for family reunification, to say the least. As will be argued below, there is the 
risk that the resolution actually contributes to making family reunification more difficult.
Secondly, the contrast of the resolution principles with rules of international 
treaties can amount to a plain violation of Public International Law to the extent that the 
resolution principles are applied. This violation will occur when a specific contradiction 
(between the "normally applicable" principles of the resolution and international rules) 
cannot be eliminated by the use of some derogatory or limitation clause contained in the 
resolution itself. In addition, naturally, a violation of an international treaty can only exist 
when a Treaty binds the State in question, as far as its specific rule on family reunification 
is concerned.
In this respect it is useful to recall that, in its Preamble, the resolution mentions 
that international Conventions governing family reunification are not affected by the 
"process of seeking further harmonisation" of national policies on the matter. However, in 
view of the possible contradictions between the resolution and international rules, it would 
have been more appropriate to include in the main text of the resolution a general and 
"binding" principle providing for absolute priority of relevant rules of international treaties.
(ii) EC rules on free movement of workers
Section B of chapter 4 contained a detailed explanation of EC rules on free 
movement of persons, as far as family reunification is concerned. In that section an optimal 
interpretation of those rules was proposed, so as to facilitate the lull achievement of the 
underlying objectives of the EC rules on free movement of persons, and to respect the 
fundamental human rights of their beneficiaries. It was recalled that, as far as free 
movement of workers is concerned, Article 10(1) of Regulation 1612/68,190 grants "the 
right to install themselves with a worker who is a national of one Member State and who
*9° Quoted supra.
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is employed in the territory of another Member State" to the following of his or her 
relatives, "irrespective of their nationality": "(a) his spouse and their descendants who are 
under the age of 21 years or are dependants;" and "(b) dependent relatives in the 
ascending line of the worker and his spouse." Furthermore, paragraph (2) of the same 
provision specifies that:
"Member States shall facilitate the admission of any member of the family not 
coming within the provisions of paragraph 1 if dependent on the worker referred 
to above or living under his roof in the country whence he comes."191
These rules clearly contrast with the resolution principles', which are far more 
restrictive as to the conditions and the relatives allowed to enter for family reunification. 
The EC rules could be a source of inspiration to facilitate the conditions for family 
reunification of third country nationals residing in the Union. The Commission of the 
European Communities suggested this, proposing that Member States considered the 
possibility of approximating their legislation and practice on family reunification to the 
relevant EC rules.192 In this spirit, the Commission proposed that eligible persons for 
family reunification be the worker's spouse, the underage or dependent descendants, and 
the dependent ascendants of the worker and of the spouse. Furthermore, the Commission 
suggested that common criteria be defmed on the notions of "normal housing", and 
"availability of sufficient resources”, as well as on the conditions linked to the proof of 
family ties, public order, public security, public health and visas.
The validity of the first residence permit would be connected to that of the foreign 
person already resident in the country. In addition, still according to the Commission, 
Member States should consider the possibility of granting a "right to stay" for family 
members in cases of the death, disablement, or retirement of the applicant, or of the 
divorce between him or her and the joining spouse.
c) General Assessment of the ministers' resolution on admission for family 
reunification
This resolution was adopted with the intention of promoting a harmonisation of 
national policies and legislation on family reunification. However, the resolution is clearly 
only a small step within such a harmonisation. This is so not just because the resolution 
does not have binding legal force; but also due to the manner in which its principles are 
formulated. To assess the effective contribution of the resolution to the harmonisation of 
national policies, one may consider the changes that its full "respect" would entail. If the 
principles of the resolution were binding, what difference would they make for national
191 Article 10(3), mentioned above, adds that to be entitled to bring his or her relatives, "the worker must 
have available for his family housing considered normal for national workers in the region where he is 
employed". It is however provided that this provision, "must not give rise to discrimination between 
national workers and workers from other Member States." See the reference to case 249/86, Commission 
v. Germany [1989] ECR 1263, made above in the main text.
192 SEC (92) 513, of 13/3/1992, chapter 4. According to the Commission this proposal was also based on 
the fact that, due to the application of the principle of "reverse discrimination"(analysed in chapter 4), 
rules on family reunification which are less liberal than those of Community Law may apply to nationals 
of Member States in the so-called "purely internal situations".
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legislation? An answer to this question can be sought, even in the absence of an extensive 
reference to national laws and policies on the matter. In this respect, it is perhaps enough 
to notice the manner in which the principles of the resolution were formulated. The 
resolution is full of expressions of a rather vague character, such as "may", "reserve the 
rights", "must normally", "must in principle". It is rarely explained what grounds can 
justify the exceptions to the principles "normally" applicable.193 The resolution resembles 
more an abridged compilation of the present legal status quo than actually a step towards 
true harmonisation, even having aside the fact that the resolution itself has no binding legal 
force.
A few "peremptory" principles can be found in the resolution, but they go against 
the possibility of family reunification, never in its favour. The tone of the resolution is 
quite restrictive. It sets the standards at the level of the minimum common denominator. 
Therefore there is the risk that the resolution creates a dynamic which influences 
downward harmonisation. It may discourage ratification of more protective Conventions. 
It may legitimise political discourse sustaining the deterioration of the present protection 
granted by Member States to the right of family reunification.194 In this way, the symbolic 
and concrete value of the resolution is greater than its strict legal value. The message that 
the resolution transmits by legitimising lower legal standards is more important than the 
immediate necessary consequences that it entails in strict legal terms.
The harmonisation of national laws and policies on family reunification should be 
made in a different manner. The harmonisation to be pursued should not diminish the 
rights to which third country nationals are currently entitled. A standstill provision could 
be made in that regard. The international rules on the matter, as well as the EC rules of 
free movement of persons (the latter in particular if interpreted as suggested in section B 
of chapter 4) should provide inspiration for a substantive harmonisation. Account should 
be taken of the exceptional circumstances related to a broader concept of family prevailing 
in some cultures of third countries, as well as of the specific situation of each family 
concerned. Likewise, special consideration should be given to the situation of heterosexual 
couples not legally married and to that of homosexual couples. Relatives admitted for 
family reunification should have an independent residence status after a limited period of 
time. Even before such a period, exceptional consideration should be given to specific 
personal circumstances that might justify granting such stable residence status to 
divorcees, or separated partners. In all cases the persons concerned should have the right 
of appeal on a decision against their interests. As a stringent general rule, the persons
193 Flyn sustains that "[¡Instead of proposing the adoption of family reunion policies based on a common 
standard of human rights, the governments are actively considering the enhancement of their 
discretionary powers." See Flyn, D., in the Introduction to "Family Reunion Policies in Six European 
Countries", op. cit., p.l.
194 p]yn p0ints out that the "most restrictive provisions in force on different aspects of family reunion
policy in each member state may now be generalised across the Community as the prevailing norm", Flyn, 
D., op.cit., loc.cit., p.l. See also by the Standing Committee of experts in international immigration, 
refugee and criminal law, Harmonisation o f Family Reunion Policies op. cit. p.2; and Spencer, op. cit.,
p. 112.
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concerned should be allowed to stay in the country until such appeal is definitively 
decided.
Finally, the harmonisation of family reunification laws and practices should be 
decided in a more transparent manner - preferably within the Community framework. This 
resolution was adopted at an ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation meeting of ministers, 
with neither its draft or its final text having ever been until now officially publicised.195 In 
a democratic society it is unacceptable that governments use this type of procedure to set 
legal standards in matters related with a fundamental human right.
We live in an historical period in which restrictive immigration policies prevail in 
Europe. The facilitation of family reunification could be one of the most important 
exceptions to such restrictive policies.196 While respecting a fundamental human right, it 
could contribute to the integration of resident third country nationals in Member States.
This should be taken into account in the drafting by the Commission of a 
Convention "on admission of nationals of non-member countries, announced for 1996 in 
the Commission’s Work Programme for this year.197
195 As explained before, it was to this resolution that the present author was refused access by the 
secretariat of the Council.
196 This idea was even sustained by a document of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration, which 
prepared the ministers' resolution, see Report 3/12/1991, SN/4038/91, WGI 930, pp.14-5, quoted by the 
Standing Committee of experts,.., in Harmonisation o f Family Reunion Policies ..., op. cit. p.2. 
Apparently, later, this idea was forgotten.
197 COM (95) 512/3 of 15/11/1995; and supplement to the European Report, No.2085, 18/11/1995.
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C - ACTION AGAINST ILLEG AL IM M IGRATION
1 - Action against illegal immigration : general aspects
An essential part of a immigration policy is the action undertaken against illegal 
immigration.198
As early as 1976, the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Directive on 
the harmonisation of laws of the Member States to combat illegal immigration and illegal 
employment.199 The Directive, as proposed, imposed the charge of heavy fines on 
employers knowingly employing illegal immigrants. More stringent controls on the arrival 
of new migrants (e.g., by inland checks) were also envisaged. The proposal was presented 
under article 100 of the EEC Treaty, its adoption requiring unanimity in the Council. This 
undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the Council never approved it.2®®
In the context of intergovernmental cooperation, action against illegal immigration 
has been the object of considerable interest and work - both before and after the 
Maastricht Treaty. Naturally, an effective policy against illegal immigration involves a 
wide range of measures, relating to the control of frontiers and cooperation among police 
forces against international crime, not to mention development aid and external policy in 
general. What follows are a few notes on the action taken against illegal immigration. 
They will examine issues of particular pertinence to illegal immigration which will not be 
dealt with elsewhere in this dissertation. Issues regarding expulsion of illegal immigrants 
and their readmission by third countries will be dealt with subsequently.
In June 1993, in Copenhagen, the Immigration Ministers adopted a 
recommendation "concerning checks on and expulsion of third country nationals residing 
or working without authorisation".201 According to the Ministers, this recommendation is 
"based on the need for common endeavours to combat illegal immigration, [and] 
this objective presupposes the improvement of means for checking on and 
expelling third country nationals who are in an irregular situation".202 
In November 1993, the first Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a recommendation 
on the important subject of trade in human beings for the purposes of prostitution.203 It 
was addressed to the Member States and was meant to contribute to an increase in
198 On illegal immigration into the European Union see the interesting Article "The new trade in 
humans", The Economist, 5/8/1995, pp.25-6.
199 See the OJ C 277/2 of 1976 for the first draft and OJ C 97/9 of 1978 for the final proposal.
200 According to Jacobs, the proposal was not adopted due to the British opposition. The United Kingdom 
government (the Labour Party) feared that it risked harming race relations in Britain. See Jacobs, A. T. J. 
M. & Zeijen, H. in European Labour Law and Social Policy, Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1993, at 
P-46,
201 This recommendation was based in a previous document: the Draft Recommendation concerning 
checks on and expulsion of third country nationals residing or working without authorisation. Ad Hoc 
Immigration Group, Brussels, 25 May 1993, doc.ref. SN 3017/93 WGI 1516, confidential.
202 See the supra quoted PRES/93/90 (2.6.1993).
203 Council Recommendation on the fight against trade in human beings for the purposes of prostitution, 
annex 4 of the Press Release 10550/93 of the General Secretariat of the Council, Presse 209-G 
(30.11.1993).
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cooperation "towards intensifying the fight against the procuring of prostitutes and 
towards dismantling networks for the exploitation of prostitution". The Council approved 
a further document on "efforts to combat the trade in human beings" in June 1994.204
This topic was also dealt with by an important political document: the Berlin 
Declaration on Cooperation in Combating Organised Crime in Europe, which followed the 
Conference of September 1994 involving governments of the European Union, countries 
in the process of acceding to it and Central and Eastern European States.205 The 
declaration states that "cooperation in fighting all forms of organised crime should be 
further developed", with particular emphasis to be placed, inter alia, on the "traffic of 
human beings" and "illegal immigration networks." The declaration envisages further 
examination of possible means of improving cooperation on fighting organised crime. As 
far as the issue of combating traffic in human beings is concerned, mention is made of the 
following issues: the eventual "extension of responsibility of bilateral liaison officers to 
include this area of crime; [the] uniform collection of statistical data as a basis for the 
preparation of appropriate measures;" and the "drawing up of a manual on legislation and 
administrative practice in the fight against illegal traffic in human beings."206
As far as the issue of action against illegal immigration networks is concerned, 
several possible means of cooperation are also mentioned: visa policy and the issuing of 
visas; effective border controls and border surveillance in countries from or through which 
people are smuggled; "effective action against sea and air carriers transporting aliens 
without the requisite documents"; "the introduction of provisions that also penalise the 
illegal smuggling of aliens...in the territory of other participating States"; and "regulations 
governing the forfeiture of illegal profits from such crimes". A final concrete possible 
"means of improving cooperation" was described as follows:
the "rapid return to their home countries or countries of origin of aliens who have 
been smuggled in or have entered illegally in order to counteract promises by 
illegal immigration networks of long-term stay in the countries of destination, and 
to reduce their chances to recruit new victims for their illegal activities."
Meanwhile, it may be mentioned that the Essen European Council, of December
1994, acting on the basis of a German proposal, extended the material scope of the 
activities of the Europol Drugs Unit so that exchange of information will also concern 
action against illegal immigration networks. The Europol Convention, concluded in July
1995, gives Europol competence to act in order to prevent and combat, inter alia, "illegal 
immigrant smuggling" and "trade in human beings".207
204 See the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council on the Council's meeting in 
Luxembourg, PRES/94/I28 (20.6.1994) and Agence Europe No.6259 (n.s.), 25 June 1994, p.l 1.
205 The full name is: "Berlin Declaration on Increased Cooperation in Combating Drug Crime and 
Organised Crime in Europe"; for its contents see the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the 
Council, PRES/94/I82 (14.9.1994).
206 Note that there is a United Nations Convention for the suppression of the traffic in persons and of the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others, of 21 March 1950, UNTS, Vol.96, p.271, which entered into 
force on 25 July 1951. It was ratified by 69 countries, including the following Member States: Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. On
207 Article 2(2), first paragraph, of the Europol Convention concluded on 26 July 1995, OJ C 316/2, of 
27/11/1995.
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It may be also recalled that a further recomendation on "harmonising means of 
combating illegal immigration and illegal employment and improving the relevant means of 
control" was adopted on the meeting of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs of 21-22 
december 1995. It was initially meant to be a joint action.
Finally, it should be noted that the fight against illegal immigration became a 
common part of the external relations of the European Union. Provisions on this matter 
are included in Agreements with third countries, as explained in chapter 5.208
2 - Expulsion
The expulsion of foreigners who enter a country or stay in it illegally is an essential 
part of action against illegal immigration and of a restrictive immigration policy. As a 
result, expulsion has formed an important part of the harmonisation of immigration 
policies that has been attempted by Member States, both before and after the Treaty on 
European Union.
Issues relating to expulsion of third country nationals, who stay in or enter a 
Member State without permission, can be divided in two main groups. In the first place, 
there are the issues which could be described as making up the internal aspect of the 
problem. These relate to the organisation of the procedures and practicalities of expulsion 
from the point of view of the authorities of the Member States : e.g. the obtaining of 
documents for the order and enforcement of expulsion and the arrangements for transit 
through other Member States for the purposes of enforcement. In the second place, there 
is the external aspect of the expulsion, including matters related to third countries' 
acceptance of the entry into their territory of expelled persons. The internal and external 
aspects of expulsion will be examined in turn.
Even before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the ad hoc 
working group on immigration had adopted some recommendations on matters related to 
expulsion. As in relation to other resolutions of the same ad hoc working group, the exact 
legal value of these recommendations is not certain. It is clear that the recommendations 
are not part of Community Law. However, this tells us little about their precise legal 
standing, which is even less certain than that of the resolutions adopted under Title VI of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, the detailed content of the resolutions of the ad hoc 
working group was not published and is not very well known. Unfortunately, to a certain 
extent, the documents and resolutions adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council,
i.e. after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, are also not well 
disseminated. For this reason the following examination of such recommendations and 
resolutions is no more than a general overview of them.
a) Expulsion - internal aspects
As early as 1989, the Palma Document already planned action on "removal" of 
illegal immigrants, to be dealt with by the ad hoc group on im m ig ra tio n .^ ^  That *195
208 Note also that this topic was discussed in the Euro-Mediterrean Conference of Barcelona of November
1995, in Agence Europe, Documents No, 1964, 6/12/1995. See also MNS, 7/1995, and the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Madrid European Council of 15 and 16 December 1995.
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document envisaged that by 1989 criteria for determining the Member State responsible 
for the removal of illegal immigrants should be in place and that by the end of 1992 an 
eventual system of financial solidarity on expulsion expenses should be set up. As was the 
case in relation to other areas covered by the Palma document, its ambitious plans were 
not fully implemented.
In December 1992, in London, the Immigration Ministers approved two 
recommendations on deportation of illegal immigrants from third countries.* 210 The first 
recommendation dealt with "practices followed by Member States on expulsion of people 
unlawfully present in their territory'*. It contained guidelines for the procedure to be 
followed in cases of expulsion, dealing with practical measures for the execution of 
expulsion decisions and provided for general exchange of information.211 This 
recommendation was supposed to be based on the practices of the Member States and to 
be without prejudice to either Community Law or the provisions of international 
conventions on extradition.212 The second recommendation concerned issues relating to 
transit for the purposes of expulsion. According to it, Member States commit themselves 
to a general obligation of allowing transit for the purpose of expulsion, unless specific and 
well-defined reasons for refusal exist.213
In that meeting, the Ministers asked the ad hoc working group on immigration to 
work out, in the course of the following six months, the detailed arrangements for 
facilitating as far as possible the implementation of this second recommendation. Thus, on 
June 1993, in Copenhagen, the Immigration Ministers were able to approve "conclusions 
on the application of the provisions governing transit in cases of deportation".2^  They 
also adopted the above mentioned recommendation "concerning checks on and expulsion 
of third country nationals residing or working without authorisation".
After the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, expulsion continued to 
occupy an important position in Member State's cooperation in immigration matters. 
Among the priority concerns in the planning of action on immigration matters in 1994
2°9 See the Appendix V of House of Lords report, of the Select Committee for the European 
Communities, on 7992: Border Control o f People Session 1988-1989, 22nd report, London, HMSO, 
1989, pp.55-64, at 62.
210 See for the draft form of these resolutions the following documents of the Ad Hoc Immigration 
Group: Draft Recommendation regarding practices followed by Member States on expulsion, Brussels, 
doc.ref. SN 4678/92 WGI 1266, and Draft Recommendation regarding transit for the purposes of 
expulsion, doc.ref. 4687/92 WGI 1275. Both documents date from 16 November 1992 and are classified 
as confidential.
211 Nanz, op. cit., p.131.
212 See the Conclusions of the Meeting of Ministers responsible for Immigration, London, 30/11* 
1/12/1992, Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/92/230 (30.11.1992). See also 
the 26th General Report of the Activities of the European Communities, p.364, point 1070.
213 Nanz, op. cit. p.131.
21  ^ See Bull.EC, 6/1993, p.126. Curiously, this information is not provided by the Press Release on the 
meeting made by the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/93/90 (2.6.1993). However, these 
"conclusions" seem to be referred to by Nanz when stating that the recommendation on transit for 
expulsion (approved in London, in December 1992) was later supplemented by provisions for its flexible 
application. See Nanz, op.cit. p.131.
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were several measures related to expulsion and readmission.2 ^  Concerted action and 
cooperation on execution of expulsion measures were envisaged in general terms. 
Furthermore, measures were also planned on the follow up (to be eventually done with the 
help of the U.N.H.C.R.) of the return to sensitive countries of foreigners expelled or to be 
expelled. The study of the situation of persons that for some reason cannot be expelled 
was also envisaged.216
The importance of the concerns about expulsion was underlined by the objectives 
announced by the German presidency for the second half of 1994.217 Especial attention to 
consultation and cooperation in carrying out repatriation measures was envisaged. The 
aim of cooperation on the repatriation of individuals was "to reach an agreement on 
concerted action (...)to put staff and funds to better use", instead of the current situation in 
which "each Member State has repatriated individuals independently of other Member 
States, at great expense."218 In relation to transit for expulsion, the objective was to 
establish a common approach to unified procedures. Finally, cooperation among Member 
States was planned in obtaining documents to enable deported aliens to return home. 
According to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, foreign missions of certain 
countries of origin do not provide the required travel documents, or only do so with 
considerable delay. In the opinion of that Ministry, what is needed for this problem is an 
agreement between Member States on "concerted action vis-à-vis certain countries of 
origin".
In November 1994, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted one 
recommendation on the adoption of a standard travel document for the expulsion of third 
country nationals.2*9 This standard document was intended to be used by all Member 
States, from 1 January 1995, to aid in the expulsion of third country nationals who possess 
no travel document.
Furthermore, on 23 November 1995, the Council agreed in principle to a 
recommendation on co-ordination of expulsion orders.
21  ^ See the "Programme de Travail prioritaire pour 1994 et structures 'a instaurer dans le domaine 
'Justice et Affaires intérieures'", Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Note de la Présidence, Bruxelles, 
2/12/1993, doc. ref. 10684/93 Restreint JAI 12. p.3.
216 Idem.
217 Federal Minister of Interior of Germany, "Objectives and major topics in the field of Home Affairs in 
the EU in the second half of 1994", September 1994, Bonn, doc.ref.CM\249\249996 - PE 209.051 Or.de.,
Çy»
218 Idem.
21  ^Recommendation concerning the adoption of a standard travel document for the expulsion of third- 
country nationals, adopted at the Ministers meeting of 30/11-1/12/1994. See the document "Background 
Conseil Justice et Affaires Intérieures, Bruxelles, les 30 Novembre et 1er Décembre 1994", Secrétariat 
Général du Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Bruxelles, 28 November 1994, doc.ref. CM 94-128/6, and the 
supra quoted Press Release: Presse 252-G (1.12.94).
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b) Readmission220 
(i) General remarks
The other side of expulsion is the readmission of illegal immigrants. Readmission 
cannot take place without some form of collaboration between the authorities of countries 
into which expelled persons are to be sent. With this aim in mind a considerable number of 
readmission agreements have been concluded between Member States and third countries. 
The collaboration of third countries in the return of their own nationals provided in these 
agreements,221 is usually traded for some form of financial aid and, in general, with 
measures or provisions in the interest of those third countries. It also happens that such 
collaboration on readmission is traded with the continuation of aid or advantages 
previously granted, or that were previously negotiated independently of that collaboration.
Several readmission agreements have been concluded between Member States and 
third countries. Most of these have been bilateral agreements, such as the agreement 
between Spain and Morocco and the one between France and Algeria.222 An important 
multilateral agreement was also concluded between the Schengen countries and Poland on 
29 March 1991.223 It entered into force even before the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement. Its novelty lays not only in its multilateral character, but also in being one of 
the first readmission agreements to base the readmission obligation not only on the illegal 
crossing of frontiers but also on staying in a country illegally.224
It should be noted that readmission agreements, strictly speaking, constitute only 
one of the various aspects of the external face of policy on control of illegal immigration. 
Another aspect of the external face of such a policy is the reinforcement of controls placed 
on persons at the frontiers between third countries that neighbour the Union and other 
third countries. Several agreements, for instance, on concerted action between Member 
States and neighbouring third countries (notably countries of Central and Eastern Europe) 
have as their direct or indirect aim the prevention by the third countries in question of the 
transit through them of illegal immigrants coming from other third countries.
(ii) Cooperation between Member States
The Palma document envisaged that by the end of 1990, bilateral or multilateral 
agreements would have been concluded with third countries on the readmission of third 
country nationals. Again, this proved to be too ambitious. *1935
220 See Denoël, X., "Les Accords de réadmission - du Benelux à Schengen et au delà", RTDE, Vol.29,
1993, No.4, pp.635-653; Guardiola, Jean-Pierre "Les Accords de Réadmission” in Les Accords de 
Schengen - Quelle Politique Migratoire Pour la Communauté?t Luxembourg, Institut Universitaire 
International Luxembourg, 1992, pp. 147-166. See also the explanatory statement of the van den Brink 
report of 2 October 1992 on European Immigration Policy, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, doc.ref.A3-0280/92, pp.9-16 at 13.
221 Or, exceptionally, of nationals of other third countries, as in the case of the readmission agreement 
between the Schengen countries and Poland.
A readmission agreement between Germany and Algeria was being negotiated in the first half of
1995, see MNS, 5/1995. For an overview of the readmission agreements among all European countries see
MNS, 7/1995.
223 For a general overview of the content of this agreement see Denoel, op.cit., at p.646.
224 See Nanz, op.cit., p.132.
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Before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the European 
Council of Edinburgh, of 11 and 12 December 1992, produced an important declaration of 
the "principles governing external aspects of migration policy".225 The declaration 
included principles to inform and guide "the approach of the Community and its Member 
States, within their respective spheres of competence". It was stated that:
"they will reinforce their common endeavours to combat illegal immigration". 
Furthermore,
"where appropriate, they will work for bilateral or multilateral agreements with 
countries of origin or transit to ensure that illegal immigrants can be returned to 
their home countries, thus extending cooperation in this field to other States on the 
basis of good neighbourly relations"
In addition,
"in their relations with third countries, they will take into account those countries' 
practice in readmiting their own nationals when expelled from the territories of the 
Member States".
This latter principle had already been discussed by the ad hoc group on 
immigration, but it was left for the European Council to declare its importance. This was 
not only due to the fact that such a declaration needed the solemnity of a body such as the 
European Council. It was also due to the fact that a meeting of the ad hoc working group 
on immigration (even if made at the level of Ministers) could not speak in the name of the 
Community.
After the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, in November 1993, 
the Council confirmed that in principle a link should be made between association or 
cooperation agreements and the nature of third country practice on admission of illegal 
immigrants.226 However, this principle, which as we have seen is particularly important in 
relation to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, was asserted with the reservation that 
it be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.227
In the same Council meeting, previous work carried out in the framework of ad 
hoc cooperation culminated in the adoption of "guidelines to be followed by the Union 
Member States in preparing bilateral or multilateral readmission agreements with third 
countries". These guidelines dealt particularly with "demarcation of the scope of 
readmission agreements, the authorities competent to implement them, definition of 
nationality for the purposes of readmission, time scales and other aspects to be taken into 
consideration".228
One year later, in November 1994, a further concrete step was made. The Council 
approved a model of a bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State of the
225 Declaration in Annex 5 of the Conclusions of the Council, in BuIl.EC, 12/1992, pp.22-24, point 1.31.
226 See the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, on the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council of 29-30/11/1993, PRES/93/209 (30.11.1993).
227 The Permanent Representatives Committee was then instructed to continue the examination of the 
implementation of this principle and to report to the Council at its next meeting. However, no further 
decisions have so far been adopted on this point.
228 See the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, on the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council of 29-30/11/1993, op. cit. supra. It is not stated what the other aspects referred to might be.
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European Union and a third country.229 According to the Council recommendation that 
adopted it, this model agreement is meant to be used from 1 January 1995 as a basis for 
negotiations with third countries in this field. It is expressly provided that the model 
agreement "should be used flexibly by the Member States and may be adapted to the 
particular needs of the contracting parties".29 30
However, contrary to the plans of the German Presidency for the second half of 
1994, it was not possible to adopt soon a model for an additional agreement to 
supplement readmission agreements.231 This additional model agreement was meant to 
"make it easier for the authorities responsible for readmission to apply the agreements in 
practice". The main objective is the issue of how it is to be determined or proved, "or a 
prima facie case be made out", that a person has crossed a certain border and that he or 
she holds a specific nationality.232 This is a practical issue fundamental to the enforcement 
of expulsion orders and the implementation of readmission agreements.
Finally, note that on 23 November 1995, the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
came to a political agreement on the readmission clauses to be inserted into the 
agreements to be signed between the European Union and its Member States and third 
countries.
(iii) The "parallel Conventions"
Another aspect of intergovernmental cooperation regarding readmission 
agreements is the extension to third countries of the Dublin Convention and the 
Convention on the Crossing of External Frontiers. The Conventions that extend to third 
countries the provisions of those two Conventions are usually known as the parallel 
Conventions. The parallel Conventions have been in preparation since the drafting of the 
respective Conventions, negotiated between Member States themselves.
As early as June 1990, the Immigration Ministers declared after their meeting in 
Dublin, that :
229 PRES/94/252 (1.12.94). See also the following preparatory documents of the Council of the 
European Union: "Draft standard bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State and a third 
country", Brussels, 12 October 1994, doc.ref.8036/3/94 REV3 ASEM 131 Restreint, and the adopted 
"Council recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission agreement between a Member 
State of the European Union and a third country", Brussels, 30 November 1994. For a critical evaluation 
of this model agreement see the "UNHCR position on the standard bilateral readmission agreements 
between a member state and a third country", Brussels, UNHCR, United Nations, I December 1994, and 
the UNHCR document "Readmission agreements, ’Protection Elsewhere' and Asylum Policy", of August 
1994. Both documents were produced in Brussels by the UNCHR Regional Office for the Benelux 
countries and the European institutions. See also the Roth report on the "draft Council Recommendation 
concerning a framework text of a readmission agreement between a Member State and a Third Country", 
of 20 July 1995, made on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European 
Parliament, doc.ref. A4-194/95.
230 Presse 252-G (1.12.94).
231 See the supra quoted document of the German Presidency: "Objectives and major topics..." and the 
"Specimen de projet de protocole sur la mise en oeuvre d'accords de readmission entre un État membre de 
l’Union et un pays tiers", Brussels, 26 October 1994.
232 See the supra quoted document: "Objectives and major topics...", doc.ref.CM\249\249996 - PE 
209.051 Or.de., p.3.
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"During negotiations on this draft Convention [on the Crossing of External 
Frontiers] (...) [proposals for a multilateral agreement on re-admission will also 
be examined."233
Thus far, substantial progress has not been made in this respect because the Convention on 
External Frontiers has not been signed yet.
In relation to the Dublin Convention, a preliminary draft parallel Convention was 
approved in June 1992 as a basis for negotiations with third countries.234 Formally, 
negotiations on the parallel Convention cannot start without the completion of the 
ratification process of the Dublin Convention itself. However, meanwhile, talks have been 
held on the subject with Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada.235 
The EFTA countries then aspiring to accede to the Union were even warned that the 
Dublin Convention was part of the " 'acquis' built up by intergovernmental co-operation 
between the Twelve in the field of justice and home affairs, which the acceding States 
were to accept."236
Another point of interest concerns certain doubts that may be raised on 
competence of the Union to discuss and negotiate on areas covered by Title VI of the 
Maastricht Treaty agreements with third countries. In Community Law, the Court of 
Justice has declared that the Community has external competence if such competence is 
necessary to attain an objective for which the Community has powers in its internal 
system.237 However, the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction on Title VI of the 
Treaty on European Union. Under these circumstances, it makes little difference if the 
"parallel Conventions" are negotiated by the Union under the third pillar, on one hand, or 
merely by the representatives of the governments of the Member States perhaps "meeting 
within the Council", on the other. In any case they will be adopted by the Member States' 
Parliaments. This again demonstrates that the character of the third pillar of the Union is 
constituted by intergovernmental cooperation.
CO NCLUSIO N
This chapter took a predominant legal perspective to examine some instruments of 
the European Immigration Policy that is now in formation.
One of the most important instruments for such a Policy would be the draft 
Convention on the Crossing of the External Frontiers. In relation to this there are both 
positive and less than positive aspects to note.
On the positive side is the primacy of international human rights instruments and 
the attribution of jurisdiction to the EC Court of Justice. These points are not sufficient 
but certainly fundamental in the construction of a European Immigration Policy that
233 Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/9Q/96 (15.6.1990), p.4.
234 See the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/92/115 (11.6.1992) after the 
Meeting of Ministers with responsibility for Immigration, in Lisbon, 11/6/1992, and Bull.EC, 6/1992, 
point 1.5.13.
235 See the Press Release of the General Secretariat of the Council, PRES/93/90 (2.6.1993) after the 
Immigration Ministers meeting.
236 Idem, p.2.
237 See Opinion 1/76 ECR[1977J 741 at 755.
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respects a minimum threshold o f human rights. The inclusion of such rules in the 
Convention also overcomes some of the main criticisms made against the Schengen 
Implementing Agreement and the previous draft Convention of the ad hoc immigration 
group. Additionally, the working procedure has improved very much in terms of 
transparency and this is a very positive aspect. This transparency is certainly influenced by 
the new legal framework introduced by the Treaty on European Union and may be 
considered as only normal in democratic decision making. However, the simple fact that 
the draft rules are made public makes a fundamental difference in comparison to the old 
intergovernmental cooperation.238 In any case, there remains room for improvement in 
this area, namely in relation to the implementing measures of the Convention. Their 
discussion and approval should be as accessible to the public as the draft Convention was.
On the less positive side there is the fact that the overriding concern of the 
Convention seems to be the control of the entry of new immigrants from third countries. 
This may partially contrast with the repeated statements that the Convention is an 
indispensable instrument for the abolition of internal border controls, the need for the 
latter being justified by general considerations related not only to illegal immigration but 
also to public order and to public security. Police cooperation is provided by the draft 
Conventions on Europol and the European Information System, but these are negotiated 
separately and is not clear when they will be functioning.
The main concern of the draft Convention on control of the entry of new 
immigrants from third countries is obvious in three parts of it. First, the Convention is to 
be applied in principle only to third country nationals who do not have a right o f entry and 
residence in the Union.239 The exceptions to this general principle,240 referred to above, 
are clearly meant to ensure proper control o f the entry o f new immigrants from third 
countries and are not concerned with any general security control over the persons that 
enter and leave the territory o f the Union. Secondly, the overriding importance of the 
concern to avoid the entry of new immigrants is confirmed by the final part of Article 5(4), 
providing th at: "Controls upon entry shall take precedence over controls upon departure." 
Thirdly, it is particularly interesting to note that there is only a list of persons to be refused 
entry, not a list of persons to be refused departure. If there was a genuine concern on the 
global protection of the Union - be it from external immigrants or internal criminals - an 
eventual list o f persons to be refused departure should include both third country nationals 
and nationals of Member States. The inclusion of nationals of Member States could be 
justified, e.g., because they are wanted by the police and judicial authorities, or to avoid 
evasion from parental duties. While a common criticism of intergovernmental activities is 
that criminals and immigrants are dealt with together too frequently, in this Convention the
2 3 8  Sec O'Keeffe, "The New Draft op.cit., p.148. O'Keeffe praises the "openness with which this 
procedure is being conducted by the Member States and the Commission...". He mentions that "[t]he trend 
would seem to be positive, in that it would seem to incline to more parliamentary scrutiny, judicial control 
and external comment".
2 3 9  Article 1(2).
2 4 0  Particularly, the exceptions related to the obligation to cross the external frontiers of the Member 
States at authorised crossing points and the liability to penalties for violating such an obligation (Article 
2.1 &2.2), to the universal submission to identity controls at the crossing of an external frontier (Article 
5.1) and to specific arrangements for controls at airports.
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control of immigrants seems even to predominate over the control of criminals241 - except 
if the latter are third country nationals.
For all the reasons mentioned above, the Title of the Convention would perhaps be 
more accurate if, instead o f "Controls on Persons Crossing External Frontiers"242 as 
appears in the present draft, it made explicit reference to "Controls on the Entry of 
Persons at External Frontiers" or "Controls on the Entry of Immigrants at External 
Frontiers".
It can be said that the emphasis of the Convention on the control of the entry of 
immigrants lies in the fact that it is politically easier to reach consensus on measures to 
control prospective immigrants than, e.g., to control criminals at the external borders. In 
any case the difference is very significant, especially taking into account the emphasis on 
international criminality in Europe - at least in the political discourse that justifies the delay 
in the abolition o f controls on persons at the internal borders of the European Union.
Another aspect that must be emphasised is that under the Convention a third 
country national never has a right o f entry to a EC Member State, however limited and 
conditional it may be. Article 7(1) o f the draft Convention, containing conditions for entry 
for short stays, states that any person "may be authorised to enter", which is quite different 
from an hypothetical "may enter...", provided that certain conditions were fulfilled. In 
addition, under Article 7(2)(a), a Member State may always refuse entry to a person 
fulfilling the conditions of entry of Article 7(1), merely if the name of that person is on its 
national list o f persons to be refused entry. Meanwhile, Article 12 establishes the general 
rule that persons failing to fulfil the conditions o f Article 7 "shall be refused" entry for 
short stays "into the territories o f the Member States". Thus, while a third country national 
seems to have no real right o f entry, there is certainly a duty on the Member States not to 
let him enter.243 In this respect it would seem possible to say that the draft Convention 
introduces no positive European rules with overriding character. The predominant theme 
of repression o f immigration is again confirmed.
Nevertheless, it must also be admitted that, the escape clauses o f this draft 
Convention may also function to benefit third country nationals. Examples o f this can be 
found in Articles 12(2), 20(1) third subparagraph, 23 or 24(2). All these rules provide for 
exceptional authorisation of entry to a Member State.
This may lead to a different perspective on tins draft Convention. Actually, in some 
respects, rather than search in this draft for what is negative or positive for third country 
nationals, one should perhaps examine how it changes the present legal status quo. in 
practical terms, it is certainly very important that Member States have to abide by new 
rules. Y et, it is also important that exceptional clauses will allow Member States to retain 
a considerable margin of manoeuvre. Therefore it is possible to imagine that the
2 4  i Or at least to anticipate it, as the draft Conventions on the European Information System and Europol 
seem to much more difficult to agree upon than the present one.
2 4 2  Cf. Article K .l of the Treaty on European Union, which provides that Member States should regard 
as an matters of common interest, inter alia, the "rules on the crossing by persons of the external borders 
of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon."
2 4 3  Mitigated only by Article 12(2).
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Convention will be changed in the future, providing increased uniformity of rules.244 In 
this case, the final version of the Convention would already be an instrument of 
transitional nature. Although, naturally, a future trend to more uniform rules (decreasing 
the room for each Member State's margin of manoeuvre) may also be achieved through 
the implementing measures of the Convention.
Another important point regarding some derogatory clauses is their conformity 
with Article 7A of the EC Treaty. It may be argued that when a provision of the draft 
Convention restricts the movement, within the Community, of third country nationals who 
were allowed entry, that provision may be contrary to "an area without internal frontiers”. 
This matter should be addressed in such a way that Community Law and competence 
(notably under Article 7A) will not be violated.
In any case, it will probably take one or two years for the External Frontiers 
Convention to be concluded, not to mention to be ratified and implemented.245 A useful 
example in comparative terms is the Dublin Convention which determines the State 
responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in a Member State. While the 
subject matter of this Convention is usually regarded as being more consensual than 
immigration control, this Convention was signed in June 1990,246 and has not yet been 
ratified by all Member States.247 Thus it is questionable whether the External Frontiers 
Convention will be put in practice before the entry into force of new Union constitutional 
rules to be adopted by the intergovernmental conference o f 1996.
As far as visas are concerned, the European Parliament seems to be right when it 
suggests that visa policy be used in a positive sense and the entry visa should be seen as a 
document granting rights to the holder, including when it specifically proposes a right of 
appeal to a person who is refused the issue o f a visa. In the present political environment, 
it is not likely that this proposal will be accepted, or, even if accepted, that it will be 
adopted in a really enforceable manner. Nevertheless, it is not acceptable that such an 
important and sensitive matter be under the absolute discretion of national administrations, 
without any possibility whatsoever of control being exercised on them.
2 4 4  Even if at the present moment the main problem is that it has proved difficult to reach agreement on 
this draft.
2 4 5  According to Commissioner Flynn, after the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers meeting of 30/11- 
1/12/1994, the deadline (of October 1994) for adopting the Europol Convention not having been met, the 
Council was even further away from adopting the External Frontiers Convention. See Statewatch, Vol.4, 
November-December 1994, No.6 , p.I6 . In fact, the Commission's deadline of the end of 1994 to approve 
the draft Convention on the External Frontiers was. from the beginning, generally seen as being 
unrealistic. Future developments confirmed that such a critic was correct.
246 with the exception of Denmark, which signed it in the following year.
2 4 7  Note also the comments of Bruggeman, W ., according to whom "it will take a few years" before the 
Europol Convention be in force. See p.15 of Bniggeman's paper "Europol: a castle or a house of cards", 
based on his speech at the EIPA colloquium "From Schengen to Maastricht", held in Maastricht, on 15 
and 16 December 1994.
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Meanwhile, the examined Resolutions on admission of immigrants and the fight 
against illegal immigration confirm the overiding concern in implementing a restrictive 
immigration policy.
Moreover, the resolutions on admission o f third country nationals to Member 
States do not seem to have been well drafted. Several ambiguous, redundant or useless 
expressions may be found, such as ’’must, if so required", "may, in principle", or "may" 
followed by a binding "will". Sometimes this goes beyond the non-legally binding nature of 
the resolutions. The repeated use of "may", for instance, is clearly redundant in the context 
of restrictive measures. The resolutions are meant to be only a minimum set o f restrictive 
standards, rather than to provide for new possibilities for entry, or for any rights of third 
country nationals. Thus they do not seem to be incompatible with more stringent 
measures. In any case, the frequent use of "may" indicates, usually, that the fundamental 
concern of the resolutions is to limit the possibilities for entry of third country nationals 
into the Union. As is the case in the draft External Frontiers Convention, the resolutions 
envisage no new possibilities for entry into Member States, but establish new "duties” for 
Member States to prohibit such entry.
The substantive content of the resolutions is generally open to criticism on the 
basis that they reinforce a restrictive immigration policy. However, the content of the 
resolutions is even more questionable in so far as it enforces the restrictive immigration 
policy in a less than reasonable manner.
To a considerable extent, this is a characteristic also shared by the resolutions on 
action against illegal immigration, and by the model readmission agreements.
The Immigration Policy of the European Union is still in an embryonic stage. 
However, there are already grounds for concern about its future development.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS
A-MAIN FINDINGS
Questioning the status quo
- Underlying legal assumptions and their role
This thesis aims to call into question the manner in which immigration matters1 
have been dealt with at the level o f the European Union. The legal status quo in this 
respect (i.e. the existing rules and their use) is based on, and simultaneously reinforces, a 
number of assumptions about the Law of the European Community and of the European 
Union. Although these assumptions are presented as having an intrinsic value, they are 
often mere instruments of a specific view on how immigration matters should be dealt 
with.
The following are just some examples of such legal assumptions. The Community 
has virtually no competence to deal with matters related to immigration from third 
countries2 and to third country nationals living in the Member States. Article 7A o f the EC 
Treaty, providing for the establishment of an internal market "without internal frontiers", is 
not violated even if  checks on persons (for example third country nationals) are performed 
a t ... internal frontiers. The only reasonable interpretation o f Article 48 o f the EC  Treaty is 
that the free movement of workers for which it provides, can only apply to nationals of a 
Member State.
This is simply not true, as pointed out throughout this thesis. These and similar 
assumptions do not conform to a proper interpretation o f the existing legal rules. 
However, the worst is that these types o f assumptions, highly questionable as they are, are 
too often taken for granted. Too often they are not discussed. They are not seen as simply 
one of the possible hypotheses for interpreting the existing relevant rules. They are seen as 
their sole plausible or reasonable interpretation. In this way, what is a mere political 
opinion becomes the authentic interpretation of a legal rule, what is doubtful becomes 
certain, what is questionable becomes indisputable. A sort o f "conventional wisdom" is 
created.3
This legal "conventional wisdom", and its assumptions, support a specific view on 
immigration policy. A view that is shared by most politicians of the Member States, 
including politicians with governmental responsibilities. I am referring to the view that, 
presently, a European immigration policy should be concerned with avoiding new 
immigrants from third countries and should adopt restrictive measures on the rights of 
third country nationals living in the Union. In the meantime, the adoption o f measures in
1 These matters are to be understood here as including both immigration from third countries to the 
European Union and the situation of nationals from third countries living in a Member State.
2  Except as far as Article 100 C, on visas, is concerned.
3 Naturally, these assumptions are not always explicitly formulated, they are occasionally qualified, and a 
different degree of emphasis is put by different authors in each of them. Nevertheless, they are often 
linked, they permeate the discourse of a broad range of political actors and they all serve the same 
purpose.
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their favour should be avoided. I will refer to this policy as a restrictive immigration 
policy.
I do not agree with this policy. Since the mentioned legal assumptions support a 
restrictive immigration policy, and since such a policy permeates most o f EU Law on the 
matter, it was important to challenge the validity of such assumptions. A considerable part 
o f the thesis took this perspective to examine the Law of the European Union on 
immigration matters.
The analysis of European Union Law on immigration matters was made regarding 
both (1) institutional issues, in a general sense, and (2) substantive issues.
(1) As far as institutional aspects are concerned, two types of issues are particularly 
open to criticism. First, (a) issues regarding competence: the division o f powers between 
Member States and the Community or Union, and the use by the latter of their existing 
competence. Secondly, (b) issues regarding the institutional framework in which 
immigration matters are dealt with, including the functioning of such framework. After 
referring to these two types of issues, (c) some reflections will be made on the deep 
reasons for the present state of affairs regarding both competences and the institutional 
framework. A final point (d) will be made regarding the structure and functioning of the 
EC legal order.
(a) As far as competence is concerned, immigration matters should be treated to a 
greater extent at a joint level than they presently are. This joint treatment should be made 
through the addition of new explicit competences to the European Community (e.g. on the 
fight against racism) and through the use of the already existing EC competences.
In this respect, chapter 2 contradicted the assumption that the European 
Community does not have competence to act on immigration matters. The Community 
does at least have a potential competence to act in this field. Articles 100 and 235 o f the 
EC Treaty, for example, provide a legal basis to act on immigration matters. In most 
cases, it can be argued that issues related to third country nationals "directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market".4 Likewise, corresponding measures 
are necessary to "attain (...)one o f the objectives of the Community”, "in the course of 
operation o f the common market”.5 Articles 100 and 235 have been used to act on matters 
the close connection o f which to the common market could be seen as doubtful. They 
have been used to adopt measures in a wide range of fields, including, for example, money 
laundering,6 insider dealing,7 and acquisition and possession of weapons.8 These three 
fields are usually considered to pertain to the public order of each Member State, thus to
4  Article 100 of the EC Treaty.
5 Article 235 of the EC Treaty.
6  Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering, OJ L 166/77 of 28/6/1991.
7  Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ L 334/30 of 
18/11/1989.
8  Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on the control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons, OJ L 256/51-58 of 13/09/91. This Directive was adopted under Article 100 of the EC Treaty.
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prerogatives o f  Member States sovereignty. Nevertheless, there was consensus that it was 
appropriate to regulate them at a Community level. Another interesting example is that of 
the 1979 Directive on the protection o f wild birds,9 adopted under Article 235, before the 
introduction by the Single European Act of explicit EC competences on the environment. 
The preamble o f the Directive recalls that a considerable part of the birds concerned are 
migratory birds. Would it make sense to say that EC measures on wild migrant birds (e.g. 
coming from third countries) have a more sound legal basis than possible measures on 
migrant workers from third countries? I do not think so.
Furthermore, the ruling o f the Court o f Justice in Demirel,10 is a basis for 
sustaining that when the Community concludes agreements with third countries, it acts 
within its competence and exercises its own powers, as far as provisions on the legal status 
o f third country nationals in the Member States are concerned. Therefore, as far as such 
provisions are concerned, legally speaking these Agreements are not mixed agreements - 
contrary to what is usually considered, particularly by national governments.
The point is, therefore, that there is no overriding legal obstacle to the adoption by 
the Community o f measures on third country nationals. The key to explaining why 
immigration matters are not dealt with in the Community framework lies in obstacles of a 
political and not legal nature. In this respect this thesis tried to emphasise the political (and 
ethical) debate on these matters, rather than let them be avoided through the use o f an 
incorrect legal assumption. The lack o f political will to act within the EC in this field 
should not be allowed to hide easily behind such an assumption.
Moreover, as chapter 3 explained, it is not only legally possible, but is a legal 
obligation for the EC to act on third country nationals. This obligation derives from 
Article 7A of the EC Treaty and is binding in so far as necessary for the establishment of 
the internal market, as defined by that Article. The legal obligation to act is particularly 
clear regarding the abolition o f internal border controls. For a full compliance with Article 
7A, border controls on persons should be abolished in relation to all persons, including 
third country nationals. Arguments were adduced in favour o f the (partial) direct effect of 
Article 7A in respect of controls of persons at EC internal borders - so that such provision 
could be invoked against controls performed after 31/12/1992. Furthermore, the lack of 
Commission proposals for EC measures to abolish internal border controls by that date, 
entails that this institution has a responsibility for failure to act. However, judicial action of 
the European Parliament against the Commission on this matter does not seem very likely 
to have much success. This is due to the high sensitivity o f the issue in a problematic 
period o f European integration, as well as to the past case-law o f the Court on 
institutional failure to act, to the changes brought about by the Treaty on European Union 
and, last but not the least, to the proposals on the matter presented in July 1995 by the 
Commission.
In any case, the problem is that the possibility to act on third country nationals 
within the Community depends on the attainment o f unanimity in the Council, a
9  Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 103/1 of 
25/4/1979, later amended. This Directive was adopted under Article 235 of the EC Treaty.
10 Case 12/86, Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraphs 8  and 9. See also Weiler, J. "Thou Shalt Not 
Oppress a Stranger (EX.23:9): On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals - A 
Critique", in Free Movement o f Persons in Europe..., op.cit., pp.248-271, at 258-9.
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requirement included in Articles 100 and 235 of the EC Treaty.11 Several governments of 
the Member States have resisted the use of the Community framework to deal with 
immigration matters. Instead, they initially acted on those matters through ad hoc 
intergovernmental cooperation. The conformity o f this cooperation with the EC Treaty 
was disputed in chapter 6, notably as far as the establishment of the internal market is 
concerned. Later, through Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, Member States 
created an alternative formal framework for the treatment o f immigration matters. 
However, the Community competences were not reduced. From a legal standpoint and to 
a considerable extent, Member States can now choose either the Community framework, 
or that o f the third pillar, to act on immigration matters. A kind o f framework or 
procedure "shopping" is possible.
The issue o f competence was also examined in relation to Article 100C of the EC 
Treaty, giving the Community explicit competences to act on visas. It was suggested that 
the Community has competence under Article 100C to adopt a "positive list" concerning 
visas - i.e. a list of countries whose nationals can enter into the Union without a visa. This 
is based on two justifications. First, the relevant part of the present version o f that Article 
repeats ipsis verbis the equivalent part of the last Dutch draft proposal - which granted the 
EC competence to draw a positive list. So it can be presumed that, by not changing that 
provision, the Treaty drafters did not want to change its wide material scope. Secondly, 
the EC competence under Article 100C on the list of visa countries is the single 
substantive exception to the Union competence on third country nationals under Title VI 
o f the Treaty on European Union.12 Thus it may be assumed that it was not meant to be 
interpreted in a restrictive manner. On the other hand, the Community does not seem to 
have competence, under Article 100C, to rule on mutual recognition o f national visas. 
Such competence does not seem to conform with the intentions o f the drafters of the 
Treaty on European Union, nor with the strict division o f competences on visas between 
the EC Treaty and Title V I of the Treaty on European Union. This division of 
competences may not make much sense, but it seems intentional. Therefore, although 
questionable, the rules o f the game have to be respected.
(b) Issues regarding the institutional framework in which immigration matters are 
dealt with, including the functioning of such framework, are also open to criticism.
Only a small part of matters related specifically to immigration matters have been 
dealt with within the framework of the European Community.13 Immigration matters have 
been fundamentally dealt with through an intergovernmental cooperation procedure. In 
chapter 7, it was explained that Title V I of the Treaty on European Union, on
11 This is also required for the conclusion of association agreements with third countries. That conclusion 
was regulated by Article 238(2) before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, and is now 
regulated by Article 228(2). The unanimity requirement is one of the reasons why external agreements 
with third countries (with provisions on the legal status of third country nationals in the European Union) 
are considered by national governments to be mixed agreements and are ratified by national parliaments.
12 Under Article IOOC the Community may also adopt a uniform format for visas. However, even if 
important in itself, this is a rather formal and secondary matter.
13 That is the case for the status of third country nationals who are relatives of migrant nationals of a 
Member State, for the implementation of EC Agreements with third countries (as far as the rules on their 
nationals in the Union are concerned), and for the matters covered by 100C of the EC Treaty.
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"Cooperation in the Fields o f Justice and Home Affairs", basically formalised the previous 
ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation. In most respects the Treaty on European Union 
did not bring a fundamental change to such cooperation. Under Title V I, as a rule the 
Council takes decisions by unanimity. This has prevented the achievement o f satisfactory 
progress in this area. Furthermore, under Title V I there is no true balance of powers 
between the different institutions. The Council is the master, being able to adopt decisions 
almost alone. It is not dependent on the Commission's proposals because Member States 
can also present them, and in some fields only the Member States may present them. The 
Council can eventually approve measures without their preparatory documents being 
accessible to the general public. As far as the Parliament is concerned, the Council has 
nothing more than the superficially defined and not judicially enforceable duty o f informing 
it, consulting it, and taking its views "into consideration". In general terms, the Council is 
not subject to the control o f the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The 
competence o f  the Court is restricted to Conventions approved in the framework o f Title 
VI, and only in the event that Member States unanimously agree with granting to that 
Court such competence. This overall situation seems to be far from perfect within a 
democratic society. The lack o f transparency, and the lack o f adequate parliamentary and 
judicial control at the level o f the European Union, are particularly negative since they are 
not usually adequately compensated for at the national level. It is not acceptable that the 
institutions o f the European Union be allowed to be structured and to function in a manner 
that goes against the democratic traditions of the organisation and functioning of the 
modem État de Droit in Europe. The Union cannot constitute a retrogression from 
democracy.
(c) The explanation for the present state o f affairs regarding the institutional 
aspects of the treatment o f immigration matters in the European Union, seems to lie in 
two main factors. First, the fact that we are living in a transitional phase from a mere 
common market to a true political union. Secondly, the emphasis prevailing in Member 
States on a restrictive immigration policy.
The transitional phase may contribute to explaining why Member States have been 
resisting so much the treatment o f immigration matters within the Community. Some times 
such resistance seems to be clearly unnecessary to preserve existing national sovereignty. 
Instead, it should be understand as an expression o f the fear o f Member States that the EC 
may gradually overtake their competences in these matters. The treatment o f immigration 
matters (together with the abolition o f internal border controls) may be put against the 
background o f European integration in general. Initially, the European integration process 
seemed to be concerned only with strictly economic issues. But the evolution o f such 
process demanded an increased treatment of issues with increasingly clear social and 
political repercussions. Some o f these issues are seen as having a closer relationship with 
national sovereignty, than the strict economic issues previously treated. In this context, 
immigration matters and the abolition of border controls are simultaneously a consequence 
and a catalyst o f  progressive integration. In any case, I contend that the resistance of 
Member States to the treatment o f immigration matters within the Community and Union 
is not consistent with the current process of economic and political integration. What in
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Iprevious times could be seen as marginal or secondary for European integration appears 
now to be increasingly central for it.
In the meantime, one has to keep in mind the emphasis on a restrictive immigration 
policy. To a lesser or greater extent, such policy has prevailed in Member States since the 
middle o f the seventies, and has been fuelled, inter alia, by racism and high unemployment. 
Politically, immigration matters are a highly sensitivity topic. Secondary differences among 
Member States on this matter are seen as being more important than in other matters. The 
emphasis on a restrictive immigration policy may explain positions and solutions that 
cannot be justified by the mere concern to preserve national sovereignty. This is the cause 
for the general lack o f transparency, and the lack of adequate parliamentary and judicial 
control at the European level, characterising intergovernmental cooperation. Naturally, an 
eventual need to obtain assent of the European Parliament to adopt measures, or control 
by the Court of Justice, could diminish the margin of manoeuvre of national governments. 
But more important than this seems to be the desire of the national governments to 
operate as freely as possible in immigration matters. This concern may apply both at a 
national and at a European level. Anything that may put in danger the effectiveness of a 
restrictive immigration policy is avoided. Transparency could lead to public discussion of 
restrictive measures and pressure from immigrant associations and human rights groups. 
Any concrete power o f the European Parliament could lead to difficulties in adopting 
restrictive measures, especially because it has usually been more progressive than most of 
the national parliaments. The possibility o f review by the Court of Justice of the 
compatibility with human rights standards o f restrictive immigration measures could 
undermine the effectiveness o f the latter. The will to assure the full effectiveness of a 
restrictive immigration policy prevails over the concern for respect o f fundamental human 
rights and for democracy within the European institutions.
This challenges the official argument that the intergovernmental cooperation 
framework (notably that of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union) is necessary in 
order that national sovereignty be respected. It is my contention that the institutional 
framework within which immigration matters are handled in the European Union is not 
fully explained by the wish to retain national sovereignty. To a considerable extent, that 
institutional framework is the result of the wish to retain the possibility of making a 
specific use of that sovereignty - a use that favours a restrictive immigration policy 
adopted under less than optimal democratic conditions. It seems clear that this use of 
national sovereignty is open to challenge, even by those that may be concerned with the 
preservation of national sovereignty in the current process of European integration.
(d) Another point may also be made from a broad institutional, or structural 
perspective. This relates to the fact that the EC Law relevant for the treatment of 
immigration matters highlights the defects, or characteristics, o f the structure and 
functioning o f the Community legal order. One example is the difficulty in forcing the 
Council to act, in cases in which the EC Treaty obliges it to adopt measures, but where 
these have to be adopted unanimously. The failure of the EC institutions to adopt 
legislation to abolish internal border controls, or to adopt a uniform procedure for 
elections to the European Parliament, for example, is related with the weakness of the 
system o f enforcement of the obligations o f the EC institutions to act. However, this
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weakness does not seem to derive from any oversight in the creation o f the EC  system, 
being instead a predetermined feature o f that system. Another example relates to the 
precise definition of the scope o f EC Law and the protection o f human rights within the 
EC legal order. The non review of human rights by the Court o f Justice in cases such as 
Demirel and Bozkurt, highlight the lack of a precise delimitation o f frontiers between 
national and Community legal orders, as well as the lack o f a precise catalogue o f human 
rights to be respected in EC Law.
(2) On the substantive side of European Union Law on immigration matters, I dealt 
both with (a) aspects related to the regulation of the entry o f third country nationals into 
the European Union and to (b) their legal status in the European Union.
(a) In what relates to the regulation o f the entry of third country nationals into the 
European Union, chapter 8 analysed Commission proposals for the control o f external 
frontiers, as well as the various resolutions Council on admission o f third country 
nationals, and on action against illegal immigration.
It was shown how the overriding concern o f the European Immigration Policy in 
formation is the restriction o f new immigration from third countries. This is criticisable 
insofar as a restrictive immigration policy is also open to criticism. Furthermore, the 
instruments and rules used to implement such policy can be questioned from the point of 
view of respect o f fundamental human rights.
Particular attention was given to the Commission’s draft Convention on the 
Control o f External Frontiers. The respect of fundamental human rights is at stake in 
several aspects o f  this draft Convention. The Convention will make it more difficult for 
people from third countries to seek asylum in the Member States. Furthermore, the 
exchange o f information that it envisages requires adequate protection o f personal data, 
which is yet to be regulated. This is a very important point, because fundamental human 
rights can be seriously undermined by the accidental misuse o f personal data, or by its 
intentional abuse for illegitimate aims. Besides, it is important that, according to the 
Commission's proposal, the Court o f Justice be given jurisdiction on interpretation and 
disputes related to the implementation o f the Convention. From a more general point of 
view, it was also stressed how the overall concern o f the Convention is to prevent new 
immigration from third countries. Several rules o f the Convention require and justify 
restrictions o f the Member States on entry o f third country nationals. Moreover, under the 
draft Convention, a third country national does have the right to enter a Member State 
ever, for example, as a tourist. Such right never exists under the draft Convention, 
however limited and conditioned it may be. At the same time, special clauses leave 
Member States significant room to manoeuvre towards action against certain general 
principles of the Convention. Therefore, in practical terms, the draft Convention seems 
important mainly as a framework for a uniform control o f  the external borders o f the 
European Union. Such uniform control will only be achieved by a gradual process, of 
which the Convention will be one, albeit important, step.14
1 4  The Schengen Agreement is also an important step in that process, but does not apply to all Member 
States.
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As far as the Commission proposals on visas are concerned, the European 
Parliament seems to be right when it sustains that a visa should be used as a positive 
instrument o f an immigration policy, one that gives certain rights to the holder. Thus, the 
rule of law should apply to the issue of visas. When it is decided which are the countries 
whose nationals have to hold a visa to enter the European Union, the criteria for such 
decision should be transparent. Furthermore, persons who are denied a visa should have 
real possibilities of appealing against that decision. This is yet to be achieved.
Another important part of the regulation of the entry of third country nationals into 
the European Union are the resolutions on admission of immigrants to a Member State 
and action against illegal immigration. As far as the resolutions on admission to the Union 
are concerned, they establish common standards which constitute a low common 
denominator. Thus, although legally not binding, they may legitimise an even more 
restrictive immigration policy. While they grant no rights of entry into the Member States, 
they establish new "duties" to prohibit such entry. Moreover, they use rules and 
instruments o f too severe a nature, some times even disproportionate to their objectives. 
Finally, their drafting quality is poor. As far as action against illegal immigration is 
concerned, it was emphasised, for instance, that the export of the control of immigration 
to neighbouring third countries may result in a decrease in the guarantees available to 
asylum-seekers.
The instruments planned, or already in force (e.g. on visas), in the European Union 
entail the creation of a very powerful system of control of immigration. That system 
should not be allowed to work at the cost of entailing violation of human rights.
(b) As far as the legal status of third country nationals in the Union is concerned, 
the thesis examined the EC rules on free movement, social affairs and education, and those 
o f external agreements.
Chapter 4 challenged the assumption that the best or only reasonable interpretation 
o f Article 48  o f the EC Treaty, providing for free movement of workers, is that it only 
applies to nationals o f a Member State. More generally, it was argued that the extension of 
EC  Law on free movement to third country nationals would avoid some peculiar 
situations, which arise from the exclusion o f third country nationals in such area of EC 
Law. One o f the various examples o f such situations regards EC rules on coordination of 
social security schemes for persons who have worked in different Member States. The 
wife and orphan children of a deceased worker (third country national) can benefit from 
such rules if  they themselves are nationals o f a Member State. However, if they are 
nationals o f third countries, they cannot benefit from them. This seems to go against basic 
material justice. Furthermore, this cannot be justified as an issue solely concerned with 
national sovereignty, because the relevant Community Law did not give the deceased third 
country nationals a right to go and work in another member State. He or she could only 
work in different Member States with the permission of their national immigration 
authorities.
Also of interest is the legal status of third country nationals who are relatives of 
migrant nationals of a Member State, when the latter changes residence from one to 
another Member State under EC Law on free movement of persons. The rules of
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secondary instruments of EC Law on the right o f residence o f third country nationals 
spouses or partners (of that migrant) are particularly open to criticism. In the event of a 
divorce, the third country national spouse of a national of a Member State loses his or her 
Community right of residence in the host Member State. Furthermore, an unmarried 
partner who is third country national (including an homosexual partner) hardly ever has a 
right to reside in the Member State to which his or her partner (national o f a Member 
State) has moved. It makes no difference for Community Law whether or not they live in a 
stable and durable relationship. It was argued that these rules do not conform to a proper 
interpretation of EC Treaty provisions on free movement o f persons. Moreover, it was 
explained how in certain circumstances these strict Community rules may even violate the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
While EC rules on free movement of workers do basically exclude third country 
nationals from their personal scope, the EC legislation on social affairs and on education 
includes in its personal scope third country nationals living in Member States. This can be 
seen as a practical recognition that they are members o f European society. The denial to 
third country nationals of certain rights of free movement (notably o f workers) seems to 
be inconsistent with this de facto membership. Likewise, the Union Citizenship created by 
the Treaty on European Union is reprovable inasmuch as it reinforced the exclusion of 
resident third country nationals by being absolutely reserved to nationals o f a Member 
State, There are sound reasons to sustain that it should be extended to third country 
nationals residing in the European Union.
In any case, perhaps the most important part o f the existing EC  Law specifically 
concerned with third country nationals is that constituted by the Community agreements 
with third countries. Those agreements vary according to the third country concerned, but 
contain important rules on several domains relevant for the status of third country 
nationals in the Union - such as equality in working conditions, remuneration, and, in some 
cases even on equality in social security, as well as rules on the rights to work and reside, 
on the right o f establishment, on provision of services, and on the right to education. The 
rulings of the Court of Justice on the relevant provisions of the Agreements have been 
quite protective of the situation o f third country nationals. This protection has been 
achieved, for example, through the recognition of the direct effect of certain provisions of 
the agreements. But the Court has been less daring in what relates to the review of human 
rights, which was at stake in some cases related to the application of the Agreements. The 
case o f Bozkurt is an example that such non review of fundamental human rights may 
entail quite negative consequences. Another less positive point is that the agreements are 
far from providing for a general equality status and usually fail to guarantee properly the 
stability o f the residence status o f their beneficiaries. Furthermore, certain rights conferred 
by them, like equality in working conditions and in remuneration, should be applied to all 
third country nationals resident in the Union. At least at this basic level, the respect for and 
protection of persons who are nationals of third countries should be assured independently 
of whether or not their nations have a special relation with the Community.
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B - PROPOSALS FOR
AN IMPROVED EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY ‘5
The previous section concentrated on criticising the way in which immigration 
matters have been dealt with at the level of the European Union.
What, then, should be a proper Immigration Policy for the Union? The following 
are proposals for its main guidelines.
As a preliminary concern, European Immigration Policy should consider the 
international context in which migration develops, and should aspire to be coherent with 
the relations of the European Union to countries from where immigrants come. A 
European Immigration Policy should take a constructive approach, being both ethical and 
pragmatic - regarding what it should and can achieve. The rule of Law should prevail in its 
definition and administrative enforcement, namely by making that enforcement controllable 
by the judiciary. In its formulation and implementation, absolute priority should be given 
to the protection of fundamental human rights. A moderately open policy of immigration 
should be pursued, giving priority to asylum-seekers and family reunification. It should 
promote the social integration o f third country nationals living within the Union: it should 
take action in their favour, namely by acting against racism and by granting them a general 
equality status in the social area. Its ultimate goal should be the possibility of their 
integration as true citizens, participating also in the political life of the society in which 
they live. All these objectives should be achieved through the Member States acting to a 
greater extent in a joint manner, and within a more democratic framework, preferably 
within the European Community.* 16
First, a European Immigration Policy has naturally to bear in mind the 
international context in which migration develops - notably the economic, political and 
environmental problems of Third World countries. A part of the responsibility for the 
existence o f those problems lies with the countries of the European Union. They should 
recognise that responsibility. Furthermore, the European Union should work to avoid a 
deterioration of the world situation that inevitably will affect it in a very negative manner 
in the future. The policies pursued by the Union in its relations with Third World countries 
have to address the root causes of migration. This is certainly a long term task, but simply 
making immigration more difficult is no substitute. Long-term problems cannot be 
properly addressed with short-term solutions.
16 See, generally, O’Keeffe, D., "Reflections on a European Immigration Policy", in Towards a European 
Immigration Policy, Korella, G.D. & Twomey, P.M. (eds.), Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 
1995, pp. 19-32; and Withol de Wenden, C , "Migrations et Droits de L'Homme", in Le Défi Migratoire - 
questions de relations internationales, Badie,B. & Withol de Wenden, C. (ed.), Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Montreal, 1994, pp. 159-177.
1 6  The enumeration of these aspects does not neglect the fact that they are closely connected and may 
overlap with each other.
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A European Immigration Policy should take a constructive approach, 
simultaneously pragmatic and ethical. On the pragmatic side, it should, for example, be 
aware that the root causes of migration are not going to disappear in the near future. 
Therefore, it is not realistic to want to stop completely immigration from third countries. 
Simultaneously, the formulation o f an Immigration Policy has to be aware o f the present 
social and political context within the European Union. It has to be conscious o f the limits 
of tolerance and solidarity within the European Union, partly determined by the state of 
the political debate on immigration matters and by current high unemployment. Only the 
awareness o f the limits o f tolerance and solidarity, and o f the causes o f such limits, will 
permit the formulation of policies so as to overcome these limits. This is the ethical part of 
the approach that an Immigration Policy should have. In most cases to accept immigrants, 
and, in all cases, to treat them fairly, is an ethical imperative. A constructive immigration 
policy has to take this ethical imperative as a priority, while building a political consensus 
in its regard. It has to stress that problems created by immigration have to be managed and 
not just feared.
Furthermore, the rule o f Law  should prevail in the definition and enforcement of a 
European Immigration Policy. Its objectives and instruments should be clearly established 
by Law. In the implementation o f such objectives, administrative discretion should be 
reduced as much as possible. In any event, those responsible for administrative acts should 
be accountable to the judiciary.
In the formulation and implementation of a European Immigration Policy absolute 
priority should be given to the protection of fundamental human rights. I am referring 
here to a minimum threshold of human rights, like those recognised by the E.C.H.R. (and 
its Protocols), as well as other rights of a similar importance. The protection of 
fundamental human rights should also be a transversal concern, covering all the range of 
activities involved in a comprehensive immigration policy - concerning both the control of 
entry into the Union and the status o f third country nationals while living in it.
Fundamental human rights should be respected in that which regards the expulsion 
of illegal third country nationals, as well as their arrest and detention for expulsion. In this 
area, cases o f gross violation o f the right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading 
treatment are unfortunately too frequent and serious. Furthermore, no third country 
national should be refused entry and stay, or deported from a Member State, if  that would 
create a danger that he or she be killed, tortured or subject to inhuman or degrading 
treatment in a third country. The letter and spirit o f the UN Conventions on asylum should 
be fully respected. Vigorous action against racial attacks should also be taken, namely by 
giving high priority to this within European police cooperation.
In addition, the right to family reunification of resident third country nationals 
should be fully respected. Account should be taken of exceptional circumstances related to 
a broader concept o f family prevailing in some cultures, as well as to the situation of the 
specific family concerned. Meanwhile, a special effort should be made to guarantee the 
stability o f the residence status o f third country nationals living in the Union. After living 
for a certain time in the Union, third country nationals should have a legal right to 
permanent residence. Likewise, spouses and children should have an independent
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residence status after a certain period of time. Exceptional consideration should be given 
to divorcees and their children, even before such a period.
The control o f the external frontiers should also take into consideration the 
protection o f human rights. Personal data, for example, should be protected with the 
highest standards, as its accidental or intentional misuse can bring very negative 
consequences for the person concerned. Furthermore, the "exportation" of immigration 
controls to third countries (through the creation of "buffer zones'* and the readmission of 
immigrants) should also take into account how fundamental human rights are respected by 
those third countries.
Finally, the importance of this group o f human rights requires that the system for 
their protection be particularly effective. It should include, where pertinent, both 
preventive and repressive measures, as well as appeal procedures - in which, as a rule, 
persons should be able to wait in the territory of Member States for the final outcome of 
the procedures.
As far as immigration of persons from third countries is specifically concerned, a 
moderately open policy should be pursued. Priority should be given to the immigration of 
asylum seekers and immigration for purposes of family reunification (even beyond the 
close family). Temporary immigration for vocational training and for seasonal work should 
also be allowed.
Apart from the protection of fundamental human rights, a comprehensive 
European Immigration Policy should promote and encourage the social integration of 
third country nationals residing in the Union. This objective is both justified by the aim of 
attaining a global social harmony and by the respect that any person living in our society 
deserves. The vast majority of third country nationals living in the Union is here to stay 
and cannot be expelled. They are already members of the society in which they live. This is 
a fact and we had better face it, instead of avoiding of disguising it. Provided third country 
nationals have lived in the Union for a considerable period, they should be entitled to live 
within it, enjoying equal conditions of dignity and well-being as nationals of the Member 
States.
For this purpose the Union should promote and encourage actions in favour of 
third country nationals residing within the Union. These actions would regard the access 
to rights and goods indispensable for a decent life, such as proper housing, employment, 
education, vocational training, social security and social assistance. Where appropriate, 
EC social programmes in favour of needy persons should include actions specifically 
oriented to the problems of third country nationals. In general terms, it is important to 
emphasise that particular care should be taken in the formulation and implementation by 
the public authorities o f actions in favour o f third country nationals - namely as far as the 
granting o f rights and provisions of goods to them is concerned. Competition between less 
favoured people, who are nationals of a Member State, and third country nationals equally 
in need o f help, should be avoided.17 The reception and integration of third country
17 Similarly, as a matter of principle and to avoid their xenophobic exploitation, criminality problems 
caused by third country nationals should be faced in like manner to those caused by nationals of Member 
States, with both preventive and punitive measures.
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nationals should not be made at the cost of the poor people who are nationals of the 
Member States. This is specially important in a historical phase characterised by a 
tendency for the reduction of the State's social expenditures.
Another important type of action in favour o f third country nationals would be 
action against racism and racial discrimination. Racism affects also nationals o f Member 
States, but concerns predominantly third country nationals living in the Union. A global 
programme for the Union on action against racism would involve the adoption o f a wide 
range of measures, such as those proposed recently by the several Council working groups 
and by the Consultative Commission on Racism and Xenophobia. A part of such measures 
could be adopted under Title V I o f the Treaty on European Union. However, to assure its 
effectiveness, action against racial discrimination would be better pursued within the 
Community framework. Finally, EC measures against racial discrimination can arguably be 
already adopted with the existing EC competences. However, both from a legal and a 
political perspective, it would be preferable to introduce new provisions in the EC Treaty, 
granting explicit competence for the Community to act in this field.18
Furthermore, any integration policy should respect the cultural and religious 
identity of the persons concerned. Conceptions which base an integration policy in cultural 
assimilation are unacceptable. They do not respect human rights, they are not effective, 
and they hinder the cultural exchange allowed for by immigration.
A further step in the social integration o f third country nationals residing in the 
Union would be to confer on them a general equality status in the social area. The 
Community dimension of this point would entail the extension to such third country 
nationals of the personal scope of the relevant EC social programmes and o f the EC rules 
on free movement of persons. It was submitted that Article 48 could be interpreted as 
being also applicable to all third country nationals with permanent residence in the 
Community.19
The ultimate aim o f an integration policy should be the possibility o f the full 
integration o f third country nationals as citizens in the society where they live.20 In this 
respect, the extension of Union Citizenship to long term resident third country nationals 
could undoubtedly improve their political (and social) integration. However, presently, it 
seems clear that the access to Member States' nationality still remains more important than 
the access to Union Citizenship, namely due to the content of the latter. For this reason, 
and also because of the present political context, it is submitted that priority should be 
given to the facilitation of conditions o f access to the nationality of each Member State.
18 This has been suggested by numerous authors and entities - such as the Consultative Commission on 
Racism and Xenophobia, appointed by the European Council.
19  For these purposes, a permanent resident would be a person who has an unlimited right of residence in 
one Member State; or who has resided in one or more Member States for more than a total of 10 
continuous years, or for fifteen non continuous years. Moreover, it seems also justified that, after three 
years of legal residence, EC rules on free movement be extended to refugees in the Community.
For an analysis of the issues raised by the relationship between nationality and citizenship, notably as 
far as political rights of third country nationals and European citizenship are concerned, see Guiguet, 
Benoît "Citoyenneté et Condition de Nationalité", PhD thesis, Florence, E.U.I., forthcoming.
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Moreover, a European Immigration Policy should be achieved by acting to a 
greater extent in a joint manner, and within a more democratic framework. It should be 
more transparent, more accountable to the European Parliament, and submitted to a 
uniform judicial control such as that of the EC's Court of Justice. The use of qualified 
majority vote in the Council should be the rule instead of the exception, as presently is the 
case. Preferably, a European Immigration Policy should be elaborated and implemented 
through the framework of the European Community.
By way of conclusion, I will recall that the way in which we treat third country 
nationals in the European Union, and the way in which issues related with them are dealt 
with in the European Union, is not simply a matter of having a more or less admirable or 
coherent institutional and legal system. From a more fundamental perspective, it is about 
what we want to be. It is about the way in which we see others and otherness, and thus, 
the way in which we see ourselves. That way shows how we are prepared to live with 
plurality - both to take full advantage of it (when that suits us) and to respect it (when that 
is not the case).
In this regard the Law of the European Union still has some progress to make.
Immigration problems are frequently quite complex. At the same time, the stakes 
they raise are high. We have to deal with immigration while we keep and develop further 
our democratic society, while we keep our commitment to respect and promote human 
rights. We have to deal with immigration while we keep open to the world and keep our 
solidarity with other peoples.
It is often a difficult task. However, if we are to take an ethical stance, we have no 
other choice. For to the extent that Law loses an ethical foundation, it is not Law any 
more. It is just an instrument of the strong.
I
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